Q&A: Non-Jewish Milk
Non-Jewish Milk
Question
Hello Rabbi!
Is it permitted to eat products containing powdered non-Jewish milk?
In principle, the Sages prohibited milk and cheese milked by a non-Jew. Today the concern is gone with supervised milk, but has the decree itself been nullified, or does that require a Sanhedrin? By what authority have contemporary halakhic decisors been lenient on this issue?
And one more question—what is the difference between non-Jewish milk and powdered non-Jewish milk? After all, the powder was also milk beforehand, and it was prohibited while it was still milk…
Answer
There are many halakhic decisors who were lenient about this (among them the Hazon Ish and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein). Indeed, there is a question here of how one can nullify a decree that was enacted by formal count, for even if its reason has lapsed, we require another formal count to permit it.
But there are many examples of such nullifications, and where the times require it and there is no concern at all of the original concerns, there is certainly room to be lenient.
Discussion on Answer
I’m not sure this is a decree; there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) who hold that it is only a concern. Also, there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that if the reason is gone, the enactment/decree is gone. The decisors you mentioned did not permit it for that reason, but because in our reality this falls under the category of “they are afraid to do so,” which was already permitted in the Talmud.
In short, there are 3 grounds for permitting it, for a rabbinic prohibition…
If it’s just a concern, then it’s even easier. See Column 2.
“They are afraid to do so” is like “they won’t undermine their own credibility” (which is said regarding non-Jewish courts). Yes indeed.
As for the reason lapsing, I do not know of medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold that if the reason lapses the enactment lapses. That goes against explicit Talmudic passages. Even the Raavad (and other medieval authorities) who disagree with Maimonides regarding lapse of the reason—this is only regarding the requirement that the later court be greater in wisdom and number, but everyone agrees that we require another formal count to permit something that was prohibited by formal count.
Regarding concern—of course, that’s what I meant.
Regarding “if the reason lapses, the enactment lapses,” look at the Rosh, Klal 2, sec. 8, concerning wearing linen fringes. As for the explicit Talmudic passages, I assume you mean “Return to your tents” at the beginning of tractate Beitzah; the Rosh, of course, deals with that there—see there. The Rosh repeats this view (less explicitly) in his rulings on Avodah Zarah, ch. 4, halakhah 7. An even more novel position appears in Hagahot Asheri on Ketubot, ch. 1, halakhah 2.
One more anecdote: the Magen Avraham in sec. 9, par. 6 wants to say that the Shulchan Arukh follows the Rosh.
Rabbi Yosef Messas, in his responsum in Mayim Hayyim I, writes an interesting distinction—
that if the reason has lapsed only locally, then the enactment is not nullified.
But if the reason no longer has any existence at all, and also cannot realistically come back in the foreseeable future, then it is nullified. (He writes this regarding the repetition of the Amidah, since today there are no longer people who do not know how to pray but do know how to intend to fulfill their obligation through the blessings of the prayer leader and understand what he is saying.)
He relies on the Shulchan Arukh, which abolished kiddush in the synagogue because it was no longer common for guests to eat and sleep there.
As for the Rosh, these are his well-known words regarding a case where the reason for the decree is known. I brought them in the third book when I discussed the nullification of enactments. But he too agrees with the rule that something enacted by formal count requires another formal count to permit it. And regarding “Return to your tents,” he himself writes that there too the reason for the decree/enactment is clear, and nevertheless it is not nullified without an explicit repeal.
I wrote there about several mechanisms for nullifying enactments, and among other things I also brought the Rosh regarding a case where the reason is known (and compared it to the Rosh in Bava Metzia 90 regarding deriving the reason of a verse when the reason is clear), and a case where the reason is totally irrelevant (it seems to me that Rabbi Messas was preceded in this. See the last chapter of The Changing of Nature by Rabbi Guttel).
Bottom line, no one disagrees with this rule.
Do you agree that the Rosh holds that even something decreed by formal count (that is, not just a mere “concern”) may be permitted when the reason is clear and no longer relevant today, because we assume that in a case like ours they would not have decreed? As with libation wine: since the clear reason is that they might pour it as an idolatrous libation, nowadays, when non-Jews do not pour libations, we say that they decreed only regarding those who do. The same applies to non-Jewish milk. Even if we say it was decreed as something enacted by formal count (which, as noted, is itself disputed), since the reason is clear, we say they decreed only regarding those who adulterate the milk. In other words, you are right that one cannot nullify “something enacted by formal count” even when the reason is known, but if the reason is known we say that in such a case they never decreed, and therefore it is permitted even if the decree has not been nullified in principle; de facto, it is gone.
If you agree with what I wrote regarding the Rosh, it turns out there are 3 grounds to permit non-Jewish milk:
1. It is only a concern and not a decree, and today there is no concern.
2. According to the Rosh—even if it is a decree (that is, “something enacted by formal count”), when the reason is clear and irrelevant, we assume they did not decree in our case, and therefore the matter is permitted.
3. Even if we say the decree still exists and was enacted even where there is no concern, there is reason to say that the reality before us is considered a case of “they are afraid to do so.”
3 grounds for leniency in a rabbinic prohibition
Completely agree.
I would note that in my opinion this is a decree, as appears from the Mishnah itself (Avodah Zarah 35b). Several laws that were prohibited are listed there, and at the end it says that Rabbi and his court permitted oil—from this we see that these are decrees that require formal repeal, not just recommendations because of some concern. It does not seem reasonable to me that in the same breath they would bring both recommendations (concerns) and decrees that would require a formal count to permit them.
Hello Rabbi,
For someone who is careful about non-Jewish milk,
what is the law regarding dark chocolate that does not contain milk
but may contain milk… in terms of allergy labeling?
Of course it has OU-D certification.
Thanks in advance
I didn’t understand the connection to allergy labeling or the issue of the certification. This concern should not be troubling, because presumably any such amount is nullified. There is only a small doubt involving a nullified minority.
By the way, those decisors were lenient even regarding actual milk, not only powdered milk. Someone who distinguishes between milk and powder, in my estimation, is trying to solve the problem you raised: that even if the original concern no longer exists, a formal count is still needed to permit it. If one finds a distinction from the original decree, there is room to permit it even without a formal count.