Q&A: Idolatry in Partnership in the Leibowitzian Conception of Morality, According to the Rabbi
Idolatry in Partnership in the Leibowitzian Conception of Morality, According to the Rabbi
Question
With God's help,
Hello Rabbi,
I am currently watching the YouTube series on Jewish law and morality (which is excellent, by the way, so thank you very much!). I was very troubled by the problem the Rabbi presented in Leibowitz's conception of morality as an atheistic category, according to which it is a kind of idolatry in partnership the moment one accepts it as binding (and perhaps even actual idolatry in partnership on the halakhic level!).
Since this is, in my humble opinion, quite a radical statement, I would like to try to understand what definition the Rabbi accepts for this category. Is every object in the reality of my life that is not a divine directive automatically idolatry? To go with Leibowitzian examples: if I want to marry a certain woman and not another, or if, as the Rabbi said, I choose the value of health over the value of pleasure when I go on a diet, am I doing what I do because the Holy One, blessed be He, cares about it (even if one says that He does care—is that the reason I do it?).
Let me sharpen this with another quotation from Leibowitz himself on another subject, namely Zionism. Leibowitz is quoted as saying (unfortunately I found this only on Wikiquote and not in his writings) that he is a Zionist for two reasons: a. God wants us to live in the Land of Israel (an interesting claim in light of the fact that elsewhere he qualifies the commandment of settling the Land of Israel in the plain sense of Maimonides), b. Leibowitz's desire to live in a Jewish state, or in a quotation that I do know from the writings: "we are fed up being ruled by goyim." Is such a Zionism, according to the Rabbi, also a form of idolatry in partnership just because it explicitly gives reasons beyond the reason that this is God's will? If ever I heard such a claim in such radical form, it was only in the article "The Footsteps of the Messiah" by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, may his memory be a blessing, where he calls nationalism and socialism "idolatries," and the continuation of his words is well known.
In addition to this difficulty, the Rabbi explained that for the Hazon Ish morality is subordinate to Jewish law. Perhaps I did not understand the Rabbi correctly, but from the plain sense of the Hazon Ish it seems to me that the Hazon Ish is making a claim more similar to Rabbi Kook, though a bit different: that we are simply confused and do not know what the "correct" morality is, like a mistaken perception of reality in other areas. Am I right that the Rabbi's view is different?
Again, apologies for the length; unfortunately, this is my way…
Answer
Any source that is not God and nevertheless gives validity to binding values is included in "idolatry" in this sense. Other explanations that are not on the value plane (like "we are fed up") are not relevant to the discussion. If I do X because I am obligated, and the source of the obligation is not God, that is partnership. If I do it because I want to (I feel like it), then not.
As for the Hazon Ish, I think I explained it there. I noted that people attribute this to the Hazon Ish unfairly, but I use his name as a heading for that approach.
Discussion on Answer
And regarding the Hazon Ish, I understood that the Rabbi was arguing there against the view that the Hazon Ish denies morality as a value altogether, and not only that we are mistaken about what morality is. But beyond what he himself actually meant, there really seems to be no practical difference.
I am explaining my position, not Leibowitz's. And indeed, for a Jew who serves God, every value in his life is there because the Holy One, blessed be He, expects it of him. Specifically regarding "the law of the kingdom is law," this is obvious, since it is an explicit halakha.
Your argument leads to an infinite regress. Clearly, at the beginning of the chain there must be a source of validity that does not need another source to ground it. God is by definition such a source. Therefore in the Torah judges are called "elohim," because "God" is one who must be obeyed by virtue of being who he is (and not necessarily because he is right). That is what I called formal authority, as distinct from substantive authority. The concept of God means an entity with unconditional authority that needs nothing outside itself in order to receive validity.
Things in reality have no value.
Any assignment of value is falsehood and deceit. Therefore it is idolatry.
Assigning value comes from a person's need to be enslaved to something.
Thank you very much, Rabbi!
Still, I am not sure the distinction is entirely sharp, certainly not in Leibowitz himself, who used the concepts of "value" and "I feel like it" somewhat interchangeably (though the Rabbi also addressed that, and in any case that is not the point here). In any event, I do feel that there are also planes of "obligation" that I at least perceive as extra-divine, and the conception is that they obligate. For example, "the law of the kingdom is law" is indeed a Torah statement, but it is seemingly derived from reasoning. Would the Rabbi claim that this reasoning, too, is divine in origin? You can attribute everything to God, but does the Rabbi really think that?
Besides that, there is another point I forgot to clarify—the Rabbi emphasized several times, and in my humble opinion rightly, that one cannot accept the authority of any authority-source without something external to that authority-source, otherwise it is begging the question or just nonsense. According to that, if we accept the premise that there is no source of authority besides God—what is the source of God's authority? Seemingly, if we accept something that obligates us to listen to God, a real contradiction is created here.