Question

 
In honor of the Rabbi, may he live long and well,
I had a doubt regarding the Hazon Ish, and I would be happy if the Rabbi would spare some time to resolve it.
[Sorry if I went on too long.]
The first Mishnah in Kiddushin teaches us the concept of the marriage covenant as the betrothal of a woman effected through acquisition by money, but the Mishnah does not explain what the term “money” written there means, since it has many possible meanings. Money changes over the generations; it changes according to the world economy. There are times when “money” means barter of one item for another, and there are times when it means wheat or dates and the like [depending on the country], and there are times when it means silver metal or a coin made of silver, or a coin made of other metals, or situations in which the money itself has no intrinsic value and all its value comes from state law. All this has practical implications: if “money” means specifically metal, and in the amount of a perutah, then accordingly we assess “money’s worth”; but if it means legal tender, then perhaps even less than the value of a perutah would suffice, because there are times when a circulating coin is worth less than a perutah from an earlier period. Let us look carefully at the words of the Mishnah and sharpen the meaning of acquisition by money in the betrothal of a woman.
 
 
 
             “The woman is acquired in three ways, etc…. She is acquired by money, etc…. With money, Beit Shammai say:
             with a dinar or the value of a dinar; and Beit Hillel say: with a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah?
             One-eighth of an Italian issar.”
 
As is clear from the words of the Mishnah, it does not indicate what “money” is. According to both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, their dispute is not about the essential meaning of the “money” stated in the Torah, because both agree that perutah-money counts as money, and they only disagree about how much must actually be given to betroth a woman, as explained in the Talmud on page 11a.
 
                “What is the reason of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Zeira said: because a woman is particular about herself
                and is not betrothed for less than a dinar, etc…. He said to him: I am not speaking of a case where
                she stretched out her hand and accepted it; rather, I am speaking of a case where he betrothed her at night,
                or alternatively where she appointed an agent.”
 
And Tosafot, s.v. “because a woman is particular about herself,” explains:
 
                 “And he answers: I am not speaking of a case where she stretched out her hand, for then even with a perutah
                 she would be betrothed, since it is called money. Rather, I am speaking of a case where he betrothed her
                 at night, etc. And in this lies the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.”
 
It is clear that in a case where she received her betrothal at night or sent an agent [to receive her betrothal], where she does not know what she received, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree as to the usual amount for which women consent and become betrothed. According to this, it is still not clear what “money” is—metal, or circulating currency. To get to the depth of the concept of money, let us examine the words of the medieval and later authorities—the Rif, Maimonides, Ritva, Tur, Avnei Miluim, and Hazon Ish—as follows:
 
Rif, page 6a:
 
          “It follows that one perutah is one-eighth of an Italian issar, and its measure is one part in 192
           of a zuz of shashrang, which is the Arabs’ gold dinar. Thus according to this measure, a perutah is half a
           habbah, because a gold dinar is ninety-six habbahs.”
 
The Shiltei HaGibborim wrote [there] that this is also clear from the words of the Tur, namely that its weight is half a barley-grain.
 
Maimonides, Laws of Marriage 3:1:
 
“How is a woman betrothed? If he betroths with money, it must be no less than a perutah in money or the value of a perutah.”
 
It is clear that “money” means silver, but Maimonides does not explain there the measure of the money. However, elsewhere, in Laws of Claims and Counterclaims 3:1, the measure of a perutah is indeed explained:
 
          “And how much is a perutah? The weight of half a barley-grain of pure silver.”
 
At first glance this is difficult: why did Maimonides not explain this in Laws of Marriage? Also, elsewhere he explained the barley measure differently, for “half a barley-grain” implies that one weighs a whole barley-grain and gives the woman half that weight in silver, but in his Commentary on the Mishnah to Kiddushin [chapter 1, mishnah 1] he explained differently: “A perutah is half a grain of silver.” It is explicit that the weighing follows only the grain itself and not the whole barley-grain. So why did he not specify this in Laws of Claims and Counterclaims? Also, the Talmud does not mention at all the measure of half a barley-grain of silver, and apparently this is a measure estimated by the Geonim and medieval authorities according to their time [which would imply that money is not necessarily specifically silver metal, but varies according to each era]. This requires investigation.
 
 
Ritva:
 
 
          “And strictly speaking, Beit Hillel should not have taught ‘with a perutah,’ for the verse says ‘money,’
          and Beit Hillel hold that this does not mean actual money,
          but rather property—that is, something worth a perutah. And since that is so, an actual perutah coin,
          which is made of copper, is simply itself worth a perutah, and is not money. But since it taught that
          Beit Shammai say ‘with a dinar,’ because one cannot do without that wording there, as it teaches ‘with money,’
          it also taught for Beit Hillel ‘with a perutah and with the value of a perutah.’ But there, in the chapter HaZahav,
          where it teaches ‘there are five perutot,’ it teaches only: ‘A woman is betrothed with something worth a perutah.’”
 
The later authorities disagreed about the meaning of Ritva’s words, namely Avnei Miluim and Hazon Ish, as follows:
 
Avnei Miluim, siman 27, se’if katan 1, explained Ritva’s words—“Beit Hillel hold that this does not mean actual money but rather property”—as meaning that there are two possible meanings of “money.” In order to illuminate his point, he used the theory of language as a collection of language-games, according to which “the existence or essence of things, according to the postmodern conception, is not a foundational assumption that grants their representations meaning, but rather an accompanying implication and a later effect of the language-games that are woven out of them. Only by virtue of descriptions’ claim to meaning does the ‘thing’ receive a specific form, etc. The postmodern idea may be illustrated by the metaphor of clothing, which is one of the most prominent kinds of signifiers [signifier = word, signified = object]. Clothing is initially a functional thing—for example, a soldier’s uniform, a worker’s garment, and the like serves the needs of the role. Its form and the material from which it is made are determined by the functional needs of the one who wears it. In the second stage the garment becomes a sign of social status; the particular garment worn by a particular person points to his place in society. The gap between signifier and signified is not entirely erased, because the signifier is shaped by the signified independent of it—the social status of the wearer. In the next stage, the game becomes a mere ‘game of signifiers’: not because you belong to a certain society or class do you dress this way; rather, because you dress this way, you belong to that class. The sign shapes the content. The rules of dress become rules of fashion, not determined by the signified but from within themselves, and they define social status and convey a social message.” According to this, there are two kinds of speech: (a) formal speech, that is, a later effect of language-games, since from the standpoint of the “thing” language does not really represent it; (b) foundational assumptions that give representations meaning, since language represents it as it really is. From this it follows that there are likewise two meanings of the word “money”: (a) money as silver metal, or a silver coin, as a foundational assumption [for it is silvery metal] that gives representations meaning; (b) money as a formal thing, as a national-cultural narrative of acquisition, since betrothal is an act defined by acquisition, and acquisition is done according to the regulations of the state or community [depending on the period], which define what counts as a mode of acquisition, and it is not always by money. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the acquisition is done by silver metal, silver coins, or anything else; and it likewise makes no difference whether the amount is large or small. The principle before our eyes is the conventions of that place, that this is how acquisition is done—by exchanging a given thing for another given thing. And Avnei Miluim held that Ritva follows option (b), namely that money is a formal matter.
 
 
 
Hazon Ish, Even HaEzer siman 148:
 
 
              “In Avnei Miluim, siman 27, se’if katan 1, he wrote in the view of Ritva that if something worth much more than other items,
              even though it is less than half a barley-grain of silver, should be fit to effect betrothal,
              and these words are puzzling. For if so, we have no fixed measure at all for a perutah,
              and what is called ‘worth much’? And if you say it means the smallest local coin, this is precisely
              the reasoning of Rav Yosef in Bava Metzia 12a, and the conclusion there is that this is not so. Rather, it is
              one-eighth of an issar, meaning one part in 192 of the dinar that existed in the days of Moses,
              whose weight was known to the Sages, and we have received the weight of the perutah from the Geonim,
              namely that it is half a barley-grain. And Ritva’s intention is…”
 
Two points emerge from the words of the Hazon Ish: (a) an objection to Avnei Miluim’s reading from the words of the Talmud on page 12a. In order to understand it well, let us explain the words of the Talmud and of Ritva [there]:
 
              “Rav Yosef thought to say: a perutah means any amount whatever. Abaye said to him: but doesn’t it teach regarding it,
              ‘How much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar’? And if you would say that this refers to the days of Moses,
              but here it depends on what people consider significant—did not Rav Dimi, when he came, say that Rav Simai estimated in his generation
              how much a perutah is: one-eighth of an Italian issar?”
 
To understand the give-and-take in the Talmud, let us turn to Ritva there:
 
               “Rav Yosef thought to say: a perutah means any amount whatever—meaning, any coin that circulates in the place where
               the betrothal took place, even though it is not one-eighth of an issar, for since it circulates in that place,
               it is considered property.”
 
Rav Yosef’s reasoning is that a perutah is not specifically that fixed amount, but rather circulating money, as explained by Avnei Miluim. But Abaye rejected this through the testimony of Rav Dimi:
 
               “When Rav Dimi came, etc.—meaning: and in the places of these Sages, perutot were available.
               For otherwise, what would the difficulty be? Since there was no perutah coin in that city, they would have had to estimate
               Beit Hillel’s perutah. Rather, certainly there were perutot there, and this is the testimony of Rav Dimi and Ravin:
               even though there were perutot in their city, those Sages would not rely on them to betroth
               a woman until they had measured Beit Hillel’s perutah, contrary to Rav Yosef.”
 
From the end of Ritva’s words it appears that the measure of a perutah is fixed and unchanging, and not as Avnei Miluim explained Ritva, that “money” is formal and changes according to the time.
 
(b) Money is a fixed thing, meaning a foundational assumption that gives representations [words] meaning, and the fixed measure is
   “one part in 192 of the dinar that existed in the days of Moses, whose weight was known to the Sages, and we have received the weight of the perutah
    from the Geonim, namely that it is half a barley-grain.” And Hazon Ish explained Ritva’s words—“Beit Hillel hold that this does not mean actual money
    but rather property”—by interpreting the term “property” specifically as a silver coin of half a barley-grain, and “money” not as silver metal in general,
    but as a silver coin of a certain measure. And in the Talmud we learned that even equivalent value works, but still according to the value of half a barley-grain.
 
 
But at first glance the words of the Hazon Ish are puzzling, because Ritva seems to imply from his phrase “not actual money but rather property” that we do not follow “money” in the full literal sense, and there is no mention of coinage; rather, there is a sharp distinction: “money” means silver metal, while “property” means something worth silver metal. Also, from where does the measure of half a barley-grain of silver come? The other medieval authorities who held this wrote so explicitly, as is clear in the Tur, siman 31, who says: “How so with money? He gives her in the presence of two witnesses a perutah or something worth a perutah, whether silver—and that is the weight of half a barley-grain.” If so, why did Ritva not spell this matter out?