1. There is no need here for an actual infinite. There was no point in time at which the singular point did not exist. That sentence is really meaningless, because as you yourself note, the time axis was created in the Big Bang (not that this is understandable, but that is already another question). But either way, I don’t see where there is any more need here for an actual infinite than in the statement that God always existed, or alternatively, that there was never a moment when God did not exist.

2. Meaning, that it is contingent? It is unreasonable that it exists without someone having created it because it could have failed to exist? Why is that not also a question about God? Why do you assume that God is contingent? How do we know there are such entities at all? After all, it is not logically necessary. (The choice of contingency as the criterion for stopping the infinite regress does not follow logically from the argument. It is a criterion that can single out God. But by the same token, we could have chosen another criterion that applies only to him.)

3. Your claim is that if the point is eternal and suddenly it explodes, that cries out for explanation, and it cannot be that this just happened on its own at some point in time. Seemingly God is free of this problem, because although he is infinite (potentially), no change applies to him. But clearly that is not true. He suddenly did want there to be a world. So why not ask your same question about God? What happened at the moment of the Big Bang that changed his will, and what brought that about? In other words, you too agree that even infinite things suddenly change, so why is this more of a problem when we are talking about a material point? Your question about matter is no less difficult when applied to the will of God.

1. Matter is not its own cause, so something created it, unless it has existed for an actually infinite amount of time.
2. Because if we assume that it too is contingent, then we run into an infinite regress. Here I am proving the existence of a non-contingent being. After its existence is proven, I call it God.
3. God is a being with will, and at any moment he may decide to do something if he wishes. Nothing needs to bring about the change in his will. More than that, it is possible that this had been his will from eternity: that at such-and-such a moment a world would come into being. According to that, there is no change in his will.

1. I agree that every material particular I know is contingent. The computer I see right now could have failed to exist; it is not necessary. But can we say that about matter itself in the world? I understand that something is contingent when I can imagine the world without it, and thus I understand that it is not necessary. But it is not really possible to imagine the world without matter. It is not possible to imagine the world without the singular point. What does that mean? So what would there be instead? Doesn’t that make it non-contingent, and therefore the kind of entity you proved?
(I myself am unsure about what I said, since I can imagine the world without God, or without any contingent being whatsoever. But if so, do we really have an intuition of what is contingent and what is not, such that we can claim that matter itself is indeed contingent?)

3. This is a bit outside the original question, but even if we accept that there is free will, it still seems reasonable to say that the dilemma within which I choose stems from changed circumstances. I choose whether to respond to my friend or not because my friend said something to me, or because some desire arose in me, which presumably stems from deterministic processes. Is that not true of every choice—that the dilemma is deterministic, and when it arises, I have free choice among the different options? Doesn’t it make sense to think that this is also true regarding God, in which case the question arises: what change caused his dilemma?

1. If every part is like that, then the whole is too. And if you see the whole as an object created from another object, then again this is an actual infinite (and of course contrary to the Big Bang). I don’t see any difficulty imagining a world without matter. Maybe you wouldn’t call it a world, but what is the problem?
3. Absolutely. I expanded on this in The Science of Freedom. But God does not act within constraints, since he created the constraints. He decided freely (without a dilemma).

I understand. Thank you very much for the answers!
In general, it feels like you’re the only one you can ask questions like these and hear answers from that actually make sense.

As for the World to Come—I do not know. But even from the perspective of this world, it is not clear that entering a state framework is beneficial.

By entering a state network, the head of the institution runs into a far from simple problem: both because of the loss of the institution’s educational autonomy and the acceptance of burdensome outside directives at every step, and because of the tight supervision that brings with it countless bureaucratic demands, such that meeting them requires wasting a great deal of resources, to the point that the increased government support may turn out to cost more than it is worth.

It may be that the institution has no choice but to accept state support, but one must be aware of the fact that this involves entering a problematic system—not simple and not smooth at all. And more than once, “Better a dry crust with peace than a house full of feasting with strife.”

Best regards, Yiftach Lahad Argamon-Bakshi

Rabbi Yiftach Lahad Argamon-Bakshi, you should probably move your reply to the right place, and perhaps while you’re at it address this point too; I’d be glad to hear your opinion:
If, God forbid, they are tempted by government support, it will be harder for them to prevent God-fearing Sephardim who desire Torah from entering the Talmud Torah schools. Heavens above, such mixing would be entirely “a house full of feasting with strife,” a loss of this world and the next..