Q&A: Q\
Q\
Question
How can one derive by an a fortiori argument that something derived by an a fortiori argument can itself go on to teach by an a fortiori argument? Isn’t that begging the question?
(Tosafot touch on the point, but in their view it is a problem only if the a fortiori is derived from a verbal analogy, because the rule that a verbal analogy can teach by an a fortiori argument is itself learned by an a fortiori argument, but not if it comes from an analogy.)
I thought that this whole discussion in the Talmud is actually not based on the original sources of knowledge, meaning verses or a law given to Moses at Sinai, but rather the proofs for these questions are brought from baraitot. In other words, the Talmud is not trying to find a primary source that answers the question, like verses, but to clarify the views of the recognized authorities on the matter. So maybe this a fortiori argument is also not an a fortiori argument in the sense of one of the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted, but rather a logical principle used in order to clarify the view of the tannaim. But that does not seem reasonable to me, because if in these very questions that logic does not always work, then there is no reason to apply it to the tannaim’s view on them.
Answer
What is the problem? An a fortiori argument can certainly be made. And from this a fortiori argument we learn that one can derive an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument. Especially since the rule that one does not derive an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument applies only to sacrificial matters, whereas the discussion about the rules is not connected to sacrificial matters, so there one certainly can derive it by an a fortiori argument.
Also, that is not quite precise. An a fortiori argument is certainly logical, and if it is not applied in sacrificial matters, that is a scriptural decree. Therefore, when it comes to the tannaim’s view, there is no reason not to apply it.
Discussion on Answer
I’m not currently fluent in this topic.
As I recall, in my article on the a fortiori argument in Higayon, vol. 2, I noted that the derivation that one may derive an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument is itself learned by an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument (and not by a single a fortiori argument as you wrote). That is already more problematic. But it seems to me that one can still say that the methodology of sacrificial matters is not itself sacrificial matter. If Tosafot thinks otherwise, then there really is a problem according to their approach.
As for your question, I didn’t really understand. I think you meant to say that when one derives an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument, that itself is based on the rule, and then it becomes an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument (the grandson of an a fortiori argument. And in light of my previous remark, one more should be added). But then I do not see the problem, because either way: if in sacrificial matters one may derive an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument, then what is the problem with deriving that very rule itself by an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument? It is consistent. Of course, the assumption here is that if there is no impediment, then one may derive it (that is, the burden of proof is on the one who says it cannot be derived). However, the straightforward reading of the Talmudic passage is that the assumption is the opposite, since they search for a source for why one may derive it, and this requires further investigation.
As for deriving by an a fortiori argument regarding the tannaim’s view, I did not understand the question. Why should we not be able to derive it? The discussion in the Talmudic passage is about the Torah’s mode of interpretation in sacrificial matters, not about the logic itself in sacrificial matters.
I have not seen the article in Higayon, but at least in the article on the hermeneutical principles as a basis for non-deductive thinking, you wrote the opposite; see there (only the derivation from a verbal analogy is an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument, and therefore begs the question).
What Yishai wrote, that when one derives an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument it is also based on the a fortiori argument of the general rule, and that this itself is an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument (+ from another a fortiori argument, according to the Rabbi’s correction), is not correct.
It is indeed based on the rule, but one is not deriving an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument in the sense discussed by the Talmudic passage. One is indeed using an a fortiori argument to prove that one may derive an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument, but that is unrelated.
But then, when one derives an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument, it is also based on the a fortiori argument of the general rule. And that itself is an a fortiori argument from another a fortiori argument.
Also, these rules are only about sacrificial matters, so seemingly the discussion about them is also a discussion about sacrificial matters (that is also what the above Tosafot seems to have thought).
Clearly an a fortiori argument is logical, but here the question whether it can be applied in sacrificial matters is not a logical one. Logic says that all the rules can be applied everywhere, including an analogy from a paradigm case. But we know that for some reason in sacrificial matters there is a limitation on “what is derived may not itself derive,” and the question is when that limitation applies. If the Talmud had said that everywhere there is no contrary proof one may derive, that would be logical, but to derive it by an a fortiori argument as to the tannaim’s view is not.