So your whole novelty in that article (Parashat Vayeshev) is according to those who hold that a minor is not completely excluded from commandments, right?

And second, from pure reasoning it seems much more plausible to say that he is excluded rather than merely exempt, because obviously it makes no sense to command a three- or four-year-old child to do something—he understands nothing at all. So presumably one should say that he is totally excluded. Why push it and say he is only exempt?

On the contrary: reason suggests that he is obligated like every Jew, but because his understanding is incomplete he is exempted from obligation and punishment. If I recall correctly, I brought there Maimonides about a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, and Rabbi Chaim on that.

An adult woman who enters levirate marriage with a minor—the halakhah says that it is effective, except that he must have intercourse with her again once he is an adult, since intercourse by a minor is not a complete legal acquisition, and so he did not fulfill the commandment and did not discharge his obligation.

My question is: in a case where the minor had intercourse with her, and as a result she became pregnant—does he still have to have intercourse with her again once he becomes an adult in order to discharge his obligation, or not?
I wanted to bring proof that he does not, from Rabbi Chaim in the laws of the Passover offering, who argues that if they offered the sacrifice on behalf of a minor and he came of age in the meantime, he is not obligated in the second Passover, because even though he did not fulfill the commandment in the full sense of the word in the first one, still the legal effect of offering a sacrifice took effect for him, and there is a sacrifice that was offered on his behalf. So too here, with a minor and his yevamah: if when he had intercourse with her as a minor she became pregnant, then the purpose of the commandment was fulfilled, and he should not need to do it again. What do you think?

There is no proof from there. With a sacrifice there is a distinction between one on whose behalf a sacrifice was offered and one who fulfilled the commandment. But that is not a distinction between the purpose of the commandment and the act of the commandment. So there is no necessity that in levirate marriage that is the situation.
As for your question: the very fact that when she did not become pregnant he has to have intercourse again says that he did not perform levirate marriage, because intercourse by a minor is not an acquisition. So if she became pregnant, it is still intercourse by a minor, which does not acquire. Even though the purpose of the commandment is fulfilled, the definition of the commandment is the acquisition, and a minor has no acquisition.
According to your approach, the obligation to have intercourse again should have stemmed from the fact that intercourse by a minor does not lead to pregnancy and is not complete intercourse, irrespective of a minor’s incapacity for acquisition.

Wait—what is the essence of the commandment of levirate marriage? That she should become acquired to the levir, or that by virtue of the levir she should have enduring offspring?
At first glance I would say it is the second.
So my claim is this: granted, the definition of the commandment and the act of the commandment is that the levir should have intercourse with his yevamah, but since the essence / core / purpose of the commandment is that she become pregnant (as though the Holy One commanded us: perform levirate marriage so that you establish offspring), then in a situation where they reached that result without the formal act of the commandment, still there is no further obligation on them to repeat it in order to fulfill the commandment.

I didn’t understand the difference between our case and the Passover offering case; it really seems like the exact same thing.

The definition of the commandment, plainly, is the acquisition of his yevamah. The purpose of the commandment is to establish offspring for his deceased brother. Therefore, intercourse by a minor levir requires another act of intercourse once he comes of age, since he does not acquire. Otherwise the Talmud should have said that another act of intercourse is needed because he did not establish offspring for his brother. Even an adult who performed levirate marriage and had intercourse with his yevamah and acquired her has no obligation to have intercourse with her again in order to establish offspring for his brother. That is the reason for the commandment, not its formal definition. We do not derive Jewish law from the reason of the verse, and halakhic decisions are made according to the formal definition and not according to the reason.
Regarding the Passover offering, that may be a special law in sacrifices, since there there is a state in which a sacrifice was offered on someone’s behalf even if he did not fulfill a commandment. It is not the reason for the commandment that a sacrifice be offered on his behalf; it is part of the formal definition. An adult who is registered for a Passover offering both fulfills the commandment of the Passover offering and is also considered someone on whose behalf a sacrifice was offered. In the case of a minor, only the second element exists. But that does not mean that in all commandments a similar split can be made.

1. What is the difference between women with positive time-bound commandments and a priest separating terumah (let’s say that only an Israelite separates terumah for a priest, and a priest separating terumah is simply absurd), or a person wearing tzitzit at night (which, if I’m not mistaken, involves no commandment at all)?

2. Is the commandment of levirate marriage similar to eating matzah (there is only the action, and that’s it) or to the Passover offering (besides the act of offering, there is also a legal effect of “a sacrifice having been offered”)? And the practical difference would be for a minor.

3. I always understood “you are exempt from a commandment” to mean: “I would very, very much like and be happy to obligate you in this, but I’m nice and didn’t want to burden you with such a heavy yoke, so don’t worry—but of course if you want to do the commandment, wonderful and delightful.” That’s not a correct understanding?

4. At the end of the day, I’m left confused about the concept of a commandment. What is it, ultimately? Is it only when there is a command? But if so, what does someone who is not commanded and yet performs fulfill? I mean positively, not just “he doesn’t fulfill a commandment in the full sense.”

1. When there is a command, it generates an object in the spiritual world (an idea), and that object is a commandment. Whoever acts in accordance with it performs a commandment. Without a command there is no such object, and therefore you may do a good deed or not, but you are not fulfilling a commandment.
A non-obligatory commandment is also based on a command. Rather, the content of the command is such that if you fulfill it, you have a commandment, and if not—nothing happened. It is a different type of command, but it too is a command, and it generates an idea. Therefore one who fulfills such a commandment has fulfilled a commandment and has not merely done a good deed.
The question is what happens with an obligatory commandment when a person who is not commanded in it (a woman) fulfills it. One must remember that there is a command regarding the matter, except that it is directed to men. Therefore an idea has been created here. From this some halakhic decisors inferred that this is a non-obligatory commandment, since there is an idea. I tend to think that there is no commandment here at all, but at most a good deed.
At night there is no commandment of tzitzit at all. It is like putting a mezuzah on a garment. It is not like a commandment performed by someone else. True, there are cases where a commandment performed by someone else is like mezuzah on a garment. For example, if an Israelite were to abstain from grape products like a nazirite. But abstaining from impurity is considered significant according to quite a few commentators, even regarding an Israelite who is not commanded in the matter.
2. The commandment of levirate marriage is similar to a sacrifice, since the woman becomes a yevamah-wife even if the minor did not fulfill a commandment (because he was not commanded). That is exactly the claim. You can ask why those commentators thought so, but that is what they thought. Apparently it is because the Torah itself says that levirate marriage is “to establish a name for the deceased brother,” meaning the Torah itself informs us that there is some result here that is the desired one.
3. It depends on the context. See 1.
4. See 1.

1. “I tend to think that there is no commandment here at all, but at most a good deed”—but this seems hard; there is apparently a contradiction in your words. In La’asot Mitzvotecha you emphasize that one who is not commanded and performs does not merely do a good deed (something optional), and more than that, it even permits the prohibition of a brother’s wife for a minor, so clearly this is not merely a good deed. So what is it, in positive terms?

2. If so, since it is similar to someone on whose behalf a sacrifice was offered (in which case he does not have to go back and bring another sacrifice, as Rabbi Chaim explained), why does the minor have to have intercourse again when he comes of age?

3 and 4. Understood, thanks for the answers.

1. Who said there is a prohibition of a brother’s wife for a minor? Minors are not subject to prohibitions. And besides, the claim there is that levirate marriage is a factual result, and that happens and may perhaps also override a prohibition. Personally I think it is indeed not correct to perform levirate marriage so long as there is no commandment. But that is the view of the commentators cited there.
2. You wrote above, didn’t you? It is because intercourse as a minor is not effective.

1 continued. And likewise in the column “What Is a Commandment,” part 2, note 8, you write: “The distinction between saying that someone discharged his obligation and saying that he has fulfillment of the commandment is discussed in my article on Parashat Vayeshev in Media Tova 5767 [it appeared in the book La’asot Mitzvotecha] on levirate marriage by a minor. See the examples I brought there. All of them deal with situations in which there is fulfillment despite there being no command.”
So you see—you explicitly wrote that one who is not commanded and performs has fulfillment of a commandment even though he does not discharge his obligation.

Only in commandments that have a result, like levirate marriage or a sacrifice. Note that there it is not a non-obligatory commandment, but fulfillment of an obligatory commandment by someone who is not obligated in it (a minor). There there is a difference between fulfillment and discharge of obligation.

1. The prohibition should have applied to the yavam, but the Talmud in Yevamot says that with levirate marriage by a minor there is no prohibition—according to Tosafot because there is a bond, and according to Rashi because in a certain sense he fulfills a commandment. That is why in your book you went on at length to explain what exactly he is fulfilling, given that he is a minor, and you explained that he is like one who is not commanded and performs.
You see that one who is not commanded and performs does have fulfillment of a commandment and not just a good deed, so why did you write the opposite above in this thread?

😩 I’m missing something and not seeing what it is.

I no longer remember everything I wrote in the articles. But I explained above here that there is a difference between commandments that have a result—where you have fulfillment even without the command and without discharging the obligation—and commandments without a result, where without a command there is no fulfillment. Think of the commandment of mezuzah or a parapet. If someone puts a mezuzah or a parapet on my house, I certainly have no commandment (and no reward either), but the house is exempted. There is fulfillment (even if there is no reward). Of course, here the result is physical and so it is easier to see. But I claim that with a sacrifice and with levirate marriage it is the same thing, even though the result is spiritual-abstract and not physical.

Ah, wonderful, now I understand—thank you very much.
One last thing, if you don’t mind: I’m repeating my second question—why is the minor obligated to have intercourse again when he comes of age, but not to offer again if he came of age between the two Passovers? Isn’t levirate marriage and the Passover offering the same law here (there is a result here, which means the commandment was fulfilled, etc.)?

You yourself wrote above that the halakhah obligates him to have intercourse again because his acquisition is not complete. In other words: because his intercourse is incomplete (not effective in the way an adult’s is). With a sacrifice, all that is needed is that he be considered one on whose behalf it was offered (that is, someone for whom they offered a sacrifice), and that exists even for a minor.

Understood, thanks.
In your view that a woman with positive time-bound commandments is only doing a good deed, would you instruct your wife or daughter not to recite a blessing over a commandment they perform? Would you instruct them that it is forbidden to perform a positive time-bound commandment in a way that involves a prohibition (for example, tzitzit with kilayim)?

In a case involving a prohibition, it seems to me definitely not to perform it (although the Raavad at the beginning of Sifra writes that women may perform laying on of hands voluntarily even on a Jewish holiday).
But regarding the blessing, many halakhic decisors have written that one may recite it, because we do have such a commandment and the Jewish people were commanded in it. That is not at all far-fetched, and so in my view that opinion has room. It is possible that for women this is a blessing of praise and not a blessing over commandments, but I’m not sure.