Q&A: Would a New Interpretation of the Plain Meaning of the Text Receive Torah-Level Status?
Would a New Interpretation of the Plain Meaning of the Text Receive Torah-Level Status?
Question
Hello. There is a theory that early Jewish law interpreted “and you shall take for yourselves” as preparation for making the sukkah (as mentioned by Ibn Ezra in his commentary there, and similar to the Passover offering, “and they shall take for themselves, each man a lamb according to their fathers’ houses,” where the purpose of the acquisition is the sacrifice). And only after Ezra did the Sages change the interpretation of the verse, so that the taking would be for the sake of taking it in hand, as an act in itself, and not as preparation for the sukkah.
Without addressing the correctness of the theory, according to what is written in Yishlach Sharashav on the second root, then even according to Maimonides the taking would be Torah-level, because it is “explicit in the text” by way of explanation, [and not like the thirteen hermeneutical principles or an inclusion, which are like “legislation” that expands the text, and not “like branches from the roots”].
Thank you
Answer
Clearly. Any interpretation of the Torah, no matter when it was created, is Torah-level law.
However, not everything of that sort is a command or a commandment. For example, in the ninth root he discusses the command to take the ingredients of the incense (“Take for yourself spices”) and says that this is merely a preparatory act, not a commandment.
Discussion on Answer
As far as I remember, Maimonides does not say that Torah-level law must be free of dispute. In itself that is also clearly incorrect, because it contradicts the facts. What Maimonides does write is that no dispute arose regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai. That too contradicts the facts, and the responsa Havot Yair discusses this at length. He also writes that a derashah is creative unless it is clear from the Sages that it is merely being supported, in which case it is Torah-level. I don’t think he mentions dispute in that context, but even if he does, that is only because here we really are dealing with the question of a tradition from Sinai, and Torah-level status follows from that.
Maimonides does not write that there is no dispute in a law given to Moses at Sinai by force of some “special property”; he writes the opposite — that matters over which no dispute arose are such because there was a tradition regarding them.
Of course. Who said otherwise?
And this is the main point — you must grasp its secret. Namely: the accepted interpretations transmitted from Moses, as we have said, contain no dispute whatsoever, for from then until now we have never found a dispute arising at any time from the days of Moses until Rav Ashi among the Sages such that one would say, “One who puts out his fellow’s eye — they put out his eye,” as it says, “an eye for an eye,” while another would say, “It means only monetary compensation that he is liable to pay.” Nor have we found any dispute about what Scripture says, “the fruit of a beautiful tree,” such that one would say it is an etrog, while another would say it is quinces, or pomegranates, or something else. Nor have we found any dispute that “the branch of a dense-leaved tree” means myrtle. Nor have we found any dispute regarding the words of Scripture, “then you shall cut off her hand,” that this means monetary compensation. Nor regarding what it says, “And the daughter of a priest, if she profanes herself by harlotry, she shall be burned with fire” — that we do not apply this decree unless she is certainly a married woman. Likewise with the Scriptural decree regarding the young woman for whom signs of virginity were not found, that they stone her — from Moses until now we have found no one who disagreed with the one who said that this only applies if she was a married woman and witnesses testified regarding her that after betrothal she committed adultery with witnesses and prior warning. And similarly throughout the commandments there is no dispute regarding them, for they are all interpretations accepted from Moses, and regarding them and the like they said: the whole Torah, its general principles, its particulars, and its details, was given at Sinai. But even though they are accepted and there is no dispute about them, from the wisdom of the Torah that was written for us we can derive these interpretations by means of the methods of reasoning, textual supports, proofs, and hints found in Scripture.
“What Maimonides writes is that no dispute arose regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Meaning: necessarily, in a law given to Moses at Sinai there can be no error.
But Maimonides writes the opposite: where there is agreement because of tradition, no dispute will arise.
I think I wasn’t understood. Your words imply that Maimonides “guaranteed” that whatever has a tradition attached to it will not become subject to dispute. (That is very difficult, since in the Talmud in many places — especially Pesachim 15b — we see Rav Pappa inventing a law given to Moses at Sinai in order to reconcile some law dealing with ritual impurity.)
I’m saying that this was not what was said; rather, the opposite was said: if you found some law over which no dispute arose, that is because there was a tradition regarding it.
There is no logic to that at all. There cannot be a case where there is no dispute despite there being no tradition. That of course is also not what Maimonides says.
This discussion here is strange and disconnected, and it seems to me it has run its course.
Thank you. Torah-level law, even though the new interpretation displaces the previous interpretation. So it follows that it does not have an unequivocal character, and that there can be dispute about it. And it does not meet Maimonides’ requirement that a derivation from the thirteen hermeneutical principles is considered Torah-level only if there is a tradition about it, in which case there would be no dispute about the interpretation of the Torah. Is that correct?