Q&A: Maimonides in Hullin Regarding the Sciatic Nerve
Maimonides in Hullin Regarding the Sciatic Nerve
Question
You often cite Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah to Hullin, that after the giving of the Torah the children of Israel are not commanded not to eat the sciatic nerve because of the prohibition given to our forefather Jacob, but because of the command at Mount Sinai.
An insight: Maimonides writes in Laws of Kings 9:1, “Abraham came and was commanded, in addition to these, concerning circumcision… and Isaac set aside a tithe… and Jacob added the sciatic nerve… until Moses our teacher came and the Torah was completed through him.”
And it sounds from his words that Moses only “completed” what was lacking, but whatever we had already been commanded before the revelation at Mount Sinai remained in force, and it is by virtue of those commands that we are still commanded today. No?
Answer
There is no contradiction. We were also commanded to place manna in a jar and to put a fiery serpent on a pole, and that is not counted because it was a temporary command (Principle 3). The same applies here. The commands were for their time, until Mount Sinai established them for all generations.
Discussion on Answer
I do not understand what the difference is. Without it, we would not have been supposed to observe it.
As for charity, according to his view the reason they do not compel him is not because he vowed about something he was already commanded concerning, but because for charity itself they do not compel, since its reward is stated alongside it. There is a dispute about this. So too, even if he vowed to give charity, they do not compel him. In any case, that is not relevant to us, because with charity there are two prohibitions: that he did not give, and that he violated his vow. Regarding the commandments from before the giving of the Torah, this is not relevant.
I understand.
What is the analytical definition of the command at Sinai? Is it a completely new command, or is it a new command to observe what our forefathers had already been commanded?
For example, Ketzot HaChoshen (section 26) notes that one who vows to give charity is not compelled to do so, even though with vows one is compelled to fulfill them, because here he vowed regarding something he was already commanded about (charity).