Rabbi, I still don’t understand you. Why do you prefer to go in that direction? After all, it is intuitively clear to all of us (and you are a big believer in intuition) that morality is the highest value we have. Also, it seems that the non-moral commandments exist because the Torah was given to a people in a certain situation at a certain time, and therefore many commandments that conflict with morality were changed! “An eye for an eye,” the stranger, the attitude toward a non-Jew, and many others. Historically, it seems that this is how things developed… So you told me that the commandments that are simply non-moral are difficult for you? Is that the reason? So I have two directions that seem reasonable to me and would leave our basic intuition in place:
A. It can be explained that they were created in order to form a people with its own customs—kashrut: to prevent assimilation and closeness, impurity and purity: to sanctify the value of life, etc.
B. It can be said that they really are religious values as you claim, but they are still of lesser value than morality, and they too must take morality into account. Why? Because intuitively that is what seems right to us.
Basically—if the non-moral difficulties don’t bother you, then you shouldn’t be troubled by their being subordinate to morality. So why not subordinate them?

I don’t know what “the highest” means. The world was probably not created for morality; there is a strong argument for that (because morality is for creating a proper human society. Don’t create people, and there will be no need for it). The commandments also show this, because most of them are unrelated to morality. So there is no reason to assume otherwise. Moreover, morality definitely does not override Jewish law, and in the conventional view even less so than in what I am proposing. So Jewish law itself cries out that morality does not have much of a status.
You are suggesting an option in which everything is arbitrary, just in order to develop a framework and commitment to it. Not convincing.

A. I didn’t understand the argument that the world was not created for morality because it would have been possible to create a perfected world and there would have been no need for it. Even if there are commandments, it still isn’t clear why God needs them. I remember that you cite Rabbi Kook, who says that service is a divine need—and that there is an idea that God wants us to perfect ourselves so that He will be perfected—so that also answers why God did not create a perfect world and does want us to elevate the world through morality.
B. Clearly there are many commandments that are not related to morality, but in my humble opinion there is no reason to assume they are above it, unless you have no other way to interpret them, in which case truly—what can I do if the Holy One, blessed be He, decreed it upon me. And as for the reason to assume that morality is a supreme value—there is no shortage of sources in the Hebrew Bible that speak about God’s morality, and also—it is the most basic intuition of all of us!
C. The fact that I depart from the conventional view does not mean that it is not correct (that I learned from you).
D. I am not saying that everything is arbitrary—I am saying that regarding commandments I do not understand—like kashrut—I give a general rationale: to create a separate society, but not that I am literally creating angels when I eat a cow and demons when I eat a dog. I also do not understand why this is different from what Maimonides says regarding the details of the commandments—he too argues that the details have no rationale; I am merely expanding his words, but not claiming that it is irrational.

A. My assumption is that morality is intended to repair society. That is its definition. Therefore one cannot say that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world for morality, for He could have not created a world and not created morality, and nothing would have been missing. Indeed, the claim that service is a divine need says that the Holy One, blessed be He, was lacking before He created the world, and our purpose is to complete that lack. Even if for some reason He is interested in moral acts regardless of their results (that is, not for the sake of repairing society), that means He has goals beyond morality. And that is also what almost all of Jewish law says—really, cries out. We are repeating ourselves.
B. I did not say that they are above it. I asked what “above it” means. There are moral obligations and there are other obligations (religious ones). Not above, not below, not in front, and not behind. I have no intuition whatsoever that morality is a supreme value, nor does Jewish law. I also do not think that this is everyone’s intuition. On the contrary, most religious people will tell you that Jewish law overrides morality.
C. Of course. Who said otherwise?! That also obviously does not mean that you are right.
D. I already answered that.
In my opinion we’ve exhausted this. If you do not agree—that is perfectly fine, of course.

Rabbi, sorry, but I haven’t exhausted it, because I feel I’m missing something in your position:\

A. Rabbi, that is exactly the completion itself—He cannot be completed unless there is a lack. If He creates a perfect world, then there is nothing to complete. Therefore morality is the compass that directs us to complete Him. I do not understand why you do not accept this.

A question from another responsum that I asked, but we already converged here: I would be glad to understand what the sources are, aside from Rabbi Shimon, that say that according to your view—even though morality and Jewish law are two different categories, it is still possible to include morality within halakhic considerations—I simply do not understand this (I mean sources that show that despite their being two different matters). If these are two different values—and you have no common denominator by which to decide what is preferable to what—then I do not understand at all how morality can be included in Jewish law.

Another question: I do not understand how you do not accept what I said, that we see the Sages changed Jewish law knowingly, because they were deviating from what the Torah said since it was no longer morally acceptable—“an eye for an eye,” the status of the stranger, the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, halitzah, the stubborn and rebellious son, and many others—what is it here that I am not understanding? If this is true, then we see that morality, which is divine, even uproots verses….

One final question: Rabbi, if you really think there are religious values—how do you relate to mysticism and Kabbalah? Could you refer me to a column on the matter or to a source where you expand on it?

Thank you for the time you devote to clarifying the truth of Torah.

I’m done. This is a discussion that is taking place at intervals that make it hard for me to keep in mind what happened here earlier, and it is also repetitive. I’ll answer briefly one last time.
1. I do not accept it, both substantively and factually. Factually, Jewish law is full of directives that are not morality. Substantively, there are other values. Moral perfection itself is a value different from morality. Its purpose is not to create a proper society but to complete the Holy One, blessed be He (through moral self-perfection). It seems to me I mentioned this possibility in my book as well.
2. I did not understand what you are asking and what all this has to do with Rabbi Shimon. Everything is detailed in the trilogy and in my lecture series on Jewish law and morality. I explained that even if there are different standards, one can still decide dilemmas between values. This is also true with regard to clashes between two moral values. There too there is incommensurability, and nevertheless we decide.
3. You assume that the midrashim are driven by moral reasons. That is not necessarily true. Not injuring a person is also a religious value and not only a moral one, and therefore “an eye for an eye” is interpreted as monetary compensation. Moreover, once there is a midrash, it gives me another possible interpretation beyond the plain meaning. Now even if I choose between it and the plain meaning based on a moral consideration, that is legitimate.
4. I think so, based on the consideration I explained above. There I wrote that moral self-perfection can also be a religious value. Kabbalah is a proposal that concretely describes those values, and I see in it a general intuition that probably contains something real. As for the details, I treat them with great skepticism. You can search here on the site for my answers (there have already been questions about this).
All the best,