I’ll try again. Maybe in stages.

There are many ways to preserve creation. Morality is only (maybe) one of them. Therefore, if God specifically put moral values into us, that is a sign that He is not only interested in our preserving creation (if at all), but also that we behave morally for other reasons as well. Let’s call those reasons “the religious reasons.”

If so, one can say that God has already revealed Himself to all human beings by creating them with an understanding of what is good and bad from His perspective.

Is that clear so far?

Those are different moral conceptions, not values beyond morality. Whatever is intended for the life and welfare of human beings is morality.

Why can’t one say the following:
1. Morality is a means to a “properly ordered society” (and therefore morality is not the goal of creation, because if you don’t create a society, you won’t need to create morality).
2. A “properly ordered society” is a means whose goal is creation itself (and then there is no need for a parallel religious system of laws alongside morality, and no revelation as explained above); it actually simplifies things.

I didn’t understand point 2 or what it is trying to say (to raise a difficulty, to suggest an alternative to something).

Thanks for the response,

It is meant to suggest an alternative to the view that says the Creator has “religious reasons” in addition to morality,
a view according to which I agree that some kind of revelation is needed in order to know what the religious laws are,
because we define them as irrelevant to morality (and as beyond our understanding).

So what I’m suggesting, as a continuation of the original question, is to say that there are no incomprehensible religious reasons, only moral reasons, and that is simpler because no revelation is needed (and the moral reasons come through the moral sense, or however we define this “knowledge” that exists within us).

Now regarding the problem that:
“If the goal is to create a moral society, then there is no need to create society at all,”
because then I am building something for something external to it,
so I suggest what I wrote in point 2, that a moral society is not the final goal but also a means to an external goal, similar to the incomprehensible religious laws that constitute a reason for the Creator.

And just as I don’t know how religious laws “help” the Creator, so too I don’t know how a “moral society” helps the Creator, but the suggestion here is that moral society is not the goal but a means. And then the religious part is unnecessary.
I am saying (or asking) that the fact that a moral society is a (known) goal of morality does not mean it cannot also be a means to a “transcendent” (and unknown) goal of the Creator.
(And incidentally, according to this, it turns out that the Creator is not only the validator of morality, but also benefits from it indirectly.)

In principle that is possible, but there is still a goal here beyond morality. If the Holy One, blessed be He, had revealed Himself and said that morality itself is the goal (that is, a means to the goal), it would not have been different. But He revealed Himself and said that the religious goal is achieved by other laws.

Thank you very much,

Okay, I understand—yes, there is still a goal beyond morality.
So are you saying that in order for us to know that a moral society is itself the goal (the means to the goal of the Holy One, blessed be He, the “higher need”), revelation would also have been necessary?
If so, then I want to argue that for this we have the “moral sense,” unlike religious laws, where I agree revelation is needed, because we do not have a “religious sense” (maybe to some extent? I don’t know…).

(On further thought, I agree that this argument, which makes revelation unnecessary in favor of the moral sense, is not so simple. But right now it does sound to me like a non-negligible option that needs to be considered. Because on the other hand revelation is not simple either, but I’m not ruling it out.)