Q&A: A Priest Seizing It by Force
A Priest Seizing It by Force
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
You taught us, Rabbi, that in Choshen Mishpat all of one person’s obligations stem from the rights of the other, whereas an obligation in Yoreh De'ah does not stem from the right of the other. An example of this is the commandment of charity and interest.
Pidyon ha-Ben is a commandment in Yoreh De'ah. The father is obligated to redeem the son. Seemingly, the father’s obligation creates a right for the priest to receive the five sela'im from the father in order to redeem his son. This right of the priest is not a right that stems from any property ownership the priest has in the child. And the father can choose any priest he wants. It is quite similar to the case of charity: the poor person has no right in the charity money; rather, the giver has an obligation to give.
So too in the Talmudic topic of “a priest seizing it by force.”
Why is there any dispute at all in the passage over whether to take away from the priest the firstborn animal regarding which there is doubt?
After all, the priest has no proprietary right in the firstborn that he seized. The obligation is on the owner, and he can choose another priest.
Let them take it away from the priest, give it back to the owner, and let him decide which priest to give it to. Why is the fact that there is doubt in the money relevant to whether to take it away from the priest?
Thank you in advance for the answer
Answer
Simply speaking, even if benefit of choice has monetary value, the object itself does not belong to the owner; only the benefit of choice in it belongs to him. Therefore, when a priest seizes the firstborn, he has taken what is his (that is, what belongs to the tribe of priests), except that he has deprived the owner of the benefit of choice. So at most one could obligate him to pay for the benefit of choice, but not to return the object itself. (See Nachmanides and Rashba on Kiddushin 58b, regarding one who steals his fellow’s untithed produce. The Ritva there disagrees, and simply speaking the dispute is whether benefit of choice is actually the owner’s money or not.) But even about this there is room for discussion, since the medieval authorities (Rishonim) in Chullin 130 disagree about one who damages another’s benefit of choice, which according to one explanation in the Talmud there is “property that has no claimants” — why he does not have to pay. From Rashi it appears that he really is obligated to pay the priests, except that no specific priest can sue, because he can tell him, “I would have given it to a different priest.” And Tosafot and the Rosh there added that he is obligated to pay according to the law of Heaven. From here we see that this is property of the tribe of priests. But the Ran on the Rif there wrote that there is no property law here. From his words it emerges that it does not belong to the priests, and according to his approach your question has room.
But even according to that approach, it seems that there is an obligation to give to the priests, and as long as he has not given it, the benefit of choice is his. But once it has reached the priests, it is certainly their property, and the law of benefit of choice is not something enforceable in court (either because this is merely indirect causation, or perhaps because this is not full-fledged property, as in the dispute among the medieval authorities mentioned above in Kiddushin). Especially since here we are dealing with a firstborn, which is holy from the outset and does not require designation like terumah and tithes, so there it is even more reasonable that all this would not be said.
Discussion on Answer
You mean the priest should grab the baby?
Yes
They’d arrest him for kidnapping and child trafficking.
What on earth?! The child is obviously not his property. “What exactly are you asking?” This is only a ceremonial question.
And of course he is also not his parents’ property.
Rabbi,
The priest has a right that does not stem from the father’s obligation.
And the father has an obligation that does not stem from the priest’s right.
And still, the right and the obligation are connected to each other.
Otherwise, what is the dilemma?
I didn’t understand.
Does “a priest seizing it by force” also apply in the case of a human firstborn?