No. Even if a person decides to suffer, it’s because he calculated that the suffering is worth the pleasure. Or he enjoys suffering, and then again he is enjoying it and not suffering (a masochist).

Fine, so you’re assuming determinism. But in my opinion a person certainly can decide otherwise; it’s just that there’s no logic in doing otherwise, so he won’t do it. A person can decide to jump off the Shalom Tower. Does the fact that nobody does that mean a person has no possibility of deciding that way? I don’t understand this strange claim.
Of course, if you’ve decided that a person has no choice, then nobody will manage to convince you otherwise. I don’t see any point in this discussion.

Following up on that, and with a slightly different question, I’d like to ask: I am a religious person who observes the commandments, believes the Torah is from Heaven, and am committed to Jewish law. The Torah says that there is free choice. But I assume that a person cannot do anything except choose pleasure and flee from suffering. The Rabbi said that this is determinism. If so, there is a contradiction between what is written in the Torah, that there is choice, and what I think, that there is no choice. How should I deal with such a case?

And continuing with the example the Rabbi gave, I’ll share some study I saw: 100 years ago, in a certain place, they saw that there was a large number of suicides. They committed suicide by getting into a gas oven, and within a quarter of an hour they died. What did the researchers do? They caused the gas flow to slow down, and now committing suicide takes 3 hours. What happened? Fewer suicides. Why? (Here I’m doing with my hand what people do when studying Talmud—15 minutes of suffering in order to stop suffering for a whole lifetime is worth it, so I’ll choose the small suffering [gas oven] over the great suffering [life]. But if suicide means 3 hours of suffering, then forget it, let’s just go on living. Because 3 hours of suffering is too much. So the fact that someone doesn’t jump from the tower is proof that, for him, the suffering of life is smaller than the great suffering of suicide. And one who does jump—it is only because he believes that the suffering he endures in this world is so great that it is preferable to commit suicide.

That’s the question you’re supposed to answer, not me.

If you read my answer, you’ll see that the case you brought is not relevant to the issue.

I’d be glad for some guidance, Rabbi—what happens when there is a clash between what the Torah says, that it is from Heaven, and on the other hand I become completely convinced that there is no free choice?
I don’t know how to answer it, so I’m asking the Rabbi..

We have an argument. I say x and you say not-x. It turns out to you that not-x leads to a contradiction. What should you do?

Amit,
regarding your conflict, think to yourself how much certainty you actually have when you deny free choice, and whether it’s enough to overturn all the observations and logic in your theory of faith. If the doubt is not stronger than the certainty, then you have a difficulty. That’s what it is. All of us have lots of those, atheistic scientists too.
It’s basically a kind of pros-and-cons list; not every difficulty is certain and strong enough to refute a theory, and maybe epistemologically we are necessarily missing something anyway (not a fun claim).
At the end of the day, all of us are either innocent ignoramuses, or agnostics who are betting (I, for example, bet with confidence and would be very surprised if it turned out that I was wrong in the bet), or, as Rabbi Michi likes to say, "I’m not sure of anything except that sentence."

With claims of this kind, it seems to me that the answer is either yes or no.
Either there is God or there isn’t God.
Either there is sun outside right now or there isn’t.
So either there is no free choice or there is free choice.
So apparently if the Torah says there is free choice, then there is free choice… it seems to me..

By the way…
Do you know that urge to jump when you’re standing at the edge of a building?
I assume no one (sane) has acted on the urge—because it makes no sense. In your opinion, can you also not decide yes, to jump? Does your intuition really tell you, at the edge of the building, that you have no choice in the matter and that you are incapable of jumping?
That is to say, true, almost no people make meaningless choices that harm them, but intuition says with full force that we can. Where does that feeling of ability come from, in the deterministic machine that we are?

Every question has one single unequivocal answer. That’s not what I meant.
A scientific theory—or a scientific teaching—is a "useful explanation," and we are not sure it is true.
Even when there are difficulties, one usually does not refute a theory because of them if it has yielded many positive predictions (google "zeta function," which mathematicians swear by even though it has no proof and there are several difficulties).
That’s the approach. It’s hard to believe that you are really so certain that there is no free choice, and maybe you are also not so certain that there is a religious Creator. And that is already reason for a separate question.