Q&A: Will, Purpose, and Perfection
Will, Purpose, and Perfection
Question
1: What compels the conclusion that God is a willing subject, or that there is a purpose? (This is a necessary condition for religion; to illustrate: a machine without an external purpose has no meaning whatsoever, and there is no problem if the gears inside it do not function properly.)
2: Doesn’t that contradict His perfection? (As the philosopher says in the Kuzari, and it even seems that the Companion agrees with him: desire reflects a lack of the desired object.)
3: Why is the basic assumption of everyone who deals with this that God is perfect at all? And if He is not, does that interfere with His being a first cause? Does that say anything about religious validity?
Answer
1. The assumption that He is an object or subject with will is required by the physico-theological argument. Without that, the regress would not stop, because we would need a cause for God Himself as well. The assumption that there is a purpose is reasonable, because logic says that whatever someone does, he does for a purpose. I don’t know what the issue with the gears is.
2. In my opinion, no. A. Will is not necessarily a lack. I want the world to be good, so does that mean I am lacking? B. Indeed, there are deficiencies in Him that only we can fill. See the column on perfection, self-perfection, and “work as a higher need.”
3. That is what has been transmitted to us. There is also some logic in assuming it, because if there is a first cause, there is no other level of power at which I would stop. If He had power level 8, I would ask: why specifically that? But in my understanding, it is not really necessary. And as stated in section 2, He truly is not completely perfect.