Q&A: Question about the first debate with Aviv
Question about the first debate with Aviv
Question
You were probably asked this and answered it many times already, but I couldn’t find exactly what I’m asking. In the first debate with Aviv Franco about the argument for the existence of God from the existence of the world, based on the principle of causality: on the one hand, you said that since the principle of causality is a product of reason and not a conclusion from experience, it is not reasonable to limit it only to things within our experience, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the existence of the universe as a whole also has a cause, even though the universe as a whole is beyond our experience. On the other hand, you said that in order to stop the causal chain, there must be an entity at which the regress stops, and it is an entity whose existence does not require a cause, and the principle of causality does not apply to it because it is far, far beyond our experience. So I didn’t understand: if in your view the universe as a whole is like things in our experience (a watch, a tree, a mountain), then why did you use the argument that causality is a product of reason? And if the universe as a whole is not like things in our experience, then let it be the thing that stops the regress.
Answer
The universe is the collection of things that are all within our experience. Therefore it is reasonable that it has a cause. The coming-into-being of a universe is not within our experience, so someone could argue that in that case there is no need for a cause. That is what Aviv argued, but I do not agree, since this is the coming-into-being of the things in the universe. But in any case, even according to his view, the first link in the chain must be without a cause, and apparently it is not one of the kinds of things in our experience.
Discussion on Answer
Exactly.
So the claim here is that events cannot be exempted from the principle of causality, whereas entities can be exempted. Could you make that distinction more understandable to me? If something is so unique that it falls outside the principle of causality, what is the difference between an event and an entity? A universe came into being without a cause. Is this a matter of choosing between alternatives—that exempting an entity is more reasonable than exempting an event—or do you see exempting an event as something more than that? Thanks, and sorry for the repeated questions.
This is not a distinction regarding the principle of causality. Events cannot be the cause of something. Events do not create things. Entities create things, and the creation is an event. Therefore, coming-into-being is not an explanation for anything. It is an event. If the world was created, there has to be an entity that created it and brought about the event of its coming-into-being.
I understand your claim, thank you!
But I am still left with one small ambiguity regarding the way you use the claim that the principle of causality is not a product of observation of reality. In the debate, it seemed that this was an important point for you.
– Regarding the universe itself (the collection of all things in our experience), I understand you to be saying that even if the principle of causality were a product of observation, it would still be reasonable to assume that the universe itself requires a cause.
– And regarding the formation of the universe, you are saying that an event is not the cause of anything, and only entities are causes, so if the universe requires a cause, then “the formation of the universe” cannot be such a cause.
– And regarding God, you do not apply the principle of causality (He is the entity to which the principle of causality does not apply).
So what use are you making of the claim that the principle of causality is not a product of observation? What exactly were you arguing with Aviv about on that point? What escape route would Aviv have, in his view, from your arguments if the principle of causality did apply only to things within our experience?
I explained above. He made a distinction between the formation of the world and the formation of objects within it, and claimed that the principle of causality does not apply to the formation of the world.
But your answer to that is not that the principle of causality should also apply to things beyond our experience (= the formation of the world), but rather that the event of the world’s formation is not the cause of anything.
The question is whether it needs a cause. We’re repeating ourselves.
The distinction between the existence of the universe (which requires a cause) and the formation of the universe (which, according to Aviv, does not require a cause) is new to me as part of your discussion. But I didn’t understand what this move accomplishes.
If according to his view the formation of the universe is not the kind of thing within our experience, then let that be where the causal chain stops. And your repeated claim against him that the principle of causality also applies beyond our experience does not seem to affect his position here, since both the formation of the universe and God are beyond our experience, so just as you excluded God, he excludes the formation of the universe.
Are you claiming that a coming-into-being is not an entity but an event, meaning it is not a link in the chain, and the causal chain has to stop at a link (which is God)?