Regarding the psychophysical problem,
I spoke with people about the problem and it wasn’t defined at all, so that’s why I asked for a column on the subject, because the Rabbi usually defines things in a systematic, deep, and unusual way.
In any case, this is a problem that Leibowitz wrote he had no solution for.

As for animals, maybe they really don’t feel pain.
My question was only whether, in order to posit a sensation of pain, you need a spiritual component.

I really do not agree with Leibowitz. I do not see a problem with interaction between the mental and the physical, even though that contradicts the laws of physics. I discussed this at length in The Science of Freedom and in articles.
Indeed, in my opinion, the sensation of pain requires the existence of a spiritual component.

It is somewhat puzzling to claim that an animal does not feel pain. First, from the way it reacts—and it is not clear what it means to say that it behaves like something that feels pain—and second, what is the issue of causing suffering to animals if it does not feel pain or suffering?

Andrei and Hazi,
I feel the same as you do, but:
It is obvious to you that an animal experiences that it exists, and feels its pain, because you know your own consciousness. And the animal resembles you. But from an objective angle, there is no reason to assume they have consciousness. You are basically assuming what you want to prove: how do you know an animal has consciousness? Because it experiences itself in its own consciousness. Just like Moses our Teacher’s gartel.

If we take something a bit less similar to us, like a plant, you surely would not assume it is conscious because it twists and withers when set on fire or becomes green when watered.
ChatGPT reacts exactly like human beings, and still you would not assume it is conscious.
The very existence of consciousness in human beings is an obscure and baffling mystery, so before you ask whether animals have consciousness, ask whether anyone besides you has consciousness…

Andrei,
The “statement” that it behaves like something that feels pain is very simple:
Just as a tree that is burned gets scorched, shrivels, and crumbles—without feeling anything. An animal—a very complex biological body—that gets hit reacts with certain phenomena. There is no need at all to assume that there is something that experiences those phenomena. The one who experiences them is you, and then you project them onto the animal. Like children who attribute feelings to a toy—that it is sad because it got lost in the garden.

According to what you are saying, David S., why did the Torah command regarding causing suffering to animals, but not regarding causing suffering to plants?

Andrei, you are mixing levels. The discussion here concerned the question of whether there is empirical evidence for this, not proofs from the Torah. Beyond that, the Torah could also prohibit this in order to educate us, and not in order to care for animals.

And one more note. Even if animals do have a sensation of pain, the suffering caused by it is not a function only of the sensation. Different levels of awareness can affect the level of suffering at the same level of pain sensation as such.

It seems to me that there is a misunderstanding here on the Rabbi’s part. Leibowitz argued that he was a materialist, so he certainly did not believe in a soul as something “spiritual.”
Though I would be happy to read about the body-soul problem according to the Rabbi. I did not find it in a search.

I read him many years ago already, but I do not recall that he writes anywhere that he was a materialist. On the contrary, I got the impression that he was a dualist, and only because of that is there a psychophysical problem. In a materialist world, it does not exist.