Q&A: A Question About the Local Halakhic Authority
A Question About the Local Halakhic Authority
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I saw that it says in tractate Sabbath, 130a:
In Rabbi Eliezer’s place, they would cut wood to make charcoal in order to forge iron on the Sabbath. In Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s place, they would eat poultry with milk.
It seems that in practice they followed the view of the local halakhic authority even though it was a minority opinion. But the well-known rule is: when it is one against the many, the Jewish law follows the many. If so, why did they follow the local halakhic authority even though he held a minority opinion?
With blessings,
Answer
We follow the majority in a religious court when they were counted together and held a vote. Before the matter was decided in the Sanhedrin, each person followed his own view or the custom of his place.
Later on, the matter was decided, and everyone treats poultry with milk as forbidden.
Discussion on Answer
This can be explained in several ways. First, if he was his rabbi or the local halakhic authority, then he must obey him if that is indeed what he said. Someone else is not obligated to him.
Second, in that period there was a rule that the Jewish law follows the earlier authorities, and from Rava onward the Jewish law follows the later authorities.
Third, it is possible that the basis of the question lies in an assessment of the reality (what exactly the woman and the husband intended), and that kind of assessment has two characteristics: 1. There is no sharp line, and therefore the greatest sage’s assessment is the one that is accepted. 2. Such an assessment changes from place to place and from time to time. If Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua gave his own assessment of the reality, perhaps that assessment is binding for that place but not for another place.
Following up on this question: in tractate Kiddushin 13a it says: “Rav Acha bar Rav sent to Ravina: What is the law in such a case? He sent back: We have not heard this teaching of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua; you, who have heard it, should take it into account.” And the Chavruta commentary explains: “Rav Acha bar Rav sent this question to Ravina: What is the law in such a case? In a case like this [where he betrothed her with a mat that contained coins], what should the Jewish law be in practice: according to Rava, who said she is not betrothed, or according to Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua, who was stringent in the matter? Ravina sent him this reply: We have not heard what Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said! He did not say it to us, nor did anyone else tell it to us in his name. Therefore we rule like Rava, that the woman is not betrothed. But you, who did hear it — take it into account! You, who heard the words of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, should be concerned for his view, and require the woman to receive a bill of divorce out of doubt before she marries another.” My question is: why wasn’t the issue decided by reasoning or by following the majority? In addition, if we say that Rav Huna really did say this objection, then everyone should take it into account; and if he did not say it, then no one should take it into account, and one should rule that it is an invention or a textual corruption. So why does Ravina issue a halakhic ruling different from the one he follows for himself? It comes out that surely one of them is making a mistake.
With blessings,