Q&A: Only the Servant of God Is Truly Free
Only the Servant of God Is Truly Free
Question
I read the articles “Only the Servant of God Is Truly Free” and greatly enjoyed their content. But I don’t think that’s what Rabbi Yehuda Halevi meant, or that it is the explanation of the saying, “You have no free person except one who engages in Torah.” According to your explanation, any system with constraints makes room for freedom; that would also be relevant to the New Testament and a cookbook. Of course, the points themselves are correct, but I would like to suggest a different explanation of the words of the Talmud and Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, one that doesn’t run into the problems you raised with Rabbi Kook’s explanation.
A person faces two possibilities: either to choose what is comfortable and easy, the animal soul, to choose not to choose (as you wrote in several places), or to choose to choose—to let the divine soul overcome his nature. A person who engages in Torah has conquered his nature and chosen above it; he has chosen the divine soul—being a choosing human being.
True, according to this explanation, every time a person chooses the good over the comfortable he expresses his freedom. But if we assume that the Torah enables a person to attain the complete good when he fulfills the religious command, then it is understandable why only the servant of God is truly free, and why “you have no free person except one who engages in Torah.”
Answer
Sounds like the same thing to me. Indeed, there is freedom in every system, but truth still matters too.
The system has to be true, even if that is not a condition for freedom.
Discussion on Answer
That’s wordplay. But fine.
Could you please explain why it’s wordplay? This is actually a topic I’ve dealt with and tried to understand. In my position I tried to point to a concrete difference: freedom in the capacity versus freedom expressed in the act. Where am I going wrong?
Choosing to do good means that there are two possibilities between which you choose, and that each choice has moral weight (which is not up to you). Exactly as I said. Beyond that it’s all semantics. You can call freedom the capacity or the choice itself—those are just words.
I believe he is distinguishing between the capacity to choose and the content of what you choose. Unlike the Rabbi, he argues that the content of what you choose also contributes to freedom, and not only the mere fact that you choose.
1. According to what you’re saying, there is room for freedom in the Torah—”one who engages in Torah is free”—but not that “there is no free person except one who engages in Torah.” Though I’m not sure that’s a significant difference.
2. My proposal is different from your explanation. According to your explanation, freedom exists among constraints: there is freedom between doing this or that, and freedom is expressed in the ability to choose this or that. According to what I’m saying, freedom is not expressed in the ability, but in the choice itself. I think that when someone chooses the good, his freedom is expressed in the act of choosing itself—that he is a choosing human being and not a person subject to his nature. I think the difference between the two proposals is significant.
(And I think my proposal fits the Talmud better, because according to me one can choose complete good only with the Torah, whereas according to you there is freedom within constraints and the Torah is also true, but those two things are not connected.)