Q&A: A Fortiori Regarding Goring in Private Property
A Fortiori Regarding Goring in Private Property
Question
In the Mishnah in Bava Kamma 24b, Rabbi Tarfon brings an a fortiori argument that goring is liable for full damages in private property, based on tooth and foot. In the Mishnah there are two ways to formulate the a fortiori argument: (a) to begin by proving that private property is more stringent, from the fact that tooth and foot are exempt in the public domain and liable in private property; and therefore, since goring is liable for half damages in the public domain, in private property it should be liable for full damages. (b) to prove that goring is more stringent than tooth and foot, from the fact that goring is liable in the public domain unlike tooth and foot; and therefore, since tooth and foot are liable for full damages in private property, all the more so goring should be liable. But Tosafot there on 25a presents a third possibility for constructing the a fortiori argument through the domains. I did not understand how there can be a third possibility.
And also, what is the logic of the first possibility, where the more stringent case would be more than the less stringent one? (Even according to the Rabbis, we still have to arrive at the principle of “it is enough.”)
Answer
I don’t think there is a third possibility. Are you referring to Tosafot on the subsuming of the refutation?
I didn’t understand your question at the end. That is precisely why they reformulated the a fortiori argument so that there would not be an “it is enough.” In the first formulation there indeed is an “it is enough.” It is possible, however, that they did this only according to Rabbi Tarfon’s view, though I do not think it is necessary to understand it that way.
The passage there is logically complicated, and this is not the place to go into more detail.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t think they are speaking about a third type of a fortiori argument. Rather, it is the a fortiori argument of the domains, and nevertheless they do not say “it is enough,” because they derive the relative stringency in the public domain and apply it likewise to half damages.
If possible, could you link to some text that explains this passage? I also got stuck on it. Why is this an instance of “it is enough”? After all, the a fortiori argument can be learned in two ways, and in the second way there is no refutation.
I don’t recall having written about it. There is a chapter in the book on the logical principles that deals with “it is enough” and with this passage. But that gets into the formalism we developed there.
Indeed, I was referring to that Tosafot. It seems from his words that there is a way to formulate the a fortiori argument such that the more stringent domain requires that full damages be paid there. As for the second question, it seems there that “it is enough” is an additional rule applied to an a fortiori argument (and in the Talmud there is an initial assumption that there is no “it is enough” even where it does not refute the a fortiori argument). Therefore I asked why the a fortiori argument requires that it be more stringent than the less stringent case. (And similarly with Miriam’s confinement: if not for “it is enough,” she would have been quarantined for two weeks.)