On Meretz's Zionism: Slogans Versus Substance (Column 98)
With God's help
About a week ago, the question of the Zionism of the Meretz party came up for discussion. Makor Rishon reported that it is consistently deleting Zionist elements, and even the very concept of Zionism, from its platform (see here, here and here). MK Mossi Raz, the party's secretary-general, who has now entered the Knesset, said that there is no place for Zionism within the party platform, since it includes Arab MKs who are not Zionists. The party spokeswoman said similar things. And indeed, the party platform seems to be emptying itself of its connection to Zionist values.
Among other things, Mossi Raz says that the term Zionism is in fact empty of content. And it indeed seems that he is right, for even those among his colleagues who insist that this is a Zionist party point to values such as an exemplary state and fraternity among peoples, which could characterize Belgium or Kazakhstan just as well.
A few days ago another minor uproar arose around the remarks of MK Zuhair Bahloul (see here), who announced that he would not take part in the celebration marking one hundred years since the Balfour Declaration, since he could not identify with a Zionist celebration so long as his people (the Palestinians) had not attained independence and sovereignty. The chairman of his party, Avi Gabbay (see here), distanced himself from those remarks and said (according to his associates) that Bahloul, as someone who holds such views, has no place in the party in the next term.
By Mossi Raz's criteria, it is clear that the Labor Party, too, cannot define itself as Zionist so long as it has room for Arab MKs. Ilan Gilon, his fellow party member, argues, by contrast, that the fact that there are Arab MKs does not prevent Meretz from being a Zionist party, just as secular MKs do not prevent the Jewish Home from being a religious party (Mossi Raz maintains that the Jewish Home is indeed not a religious party). Others there argue that the Jewish MKs in Meretz are Zionists, but the party itself is not, and need not be, such.
On its face, this whole business is rather confusing, and it is truly hard to say what exactly the problem here is and who is right. I assume nobody is really surprised that the discussion around the matter focuses on slogans and branding, rather than seriously entering the conceptual thicket. Despite all the commotion, I have not seen a systematic discussion that tries to clarify this issue one way or the other. Not from Meretz's side and not from Makor Rishon's side.
The Basic Questions: A Brief Clarification
The basic question in the background of all this is what Zionism actually is, at least in our time. Does the term have an agreed meaning? Beyond that, what is the meaning and definition of a Zionist party? Can there really be a Zionist party when some of its members are not? There are, of course, deeper background questions as well—what Judaism is and what Israeli identity is, and how those two relate to Zionism. This is not the place to enter those questions, but in my view the discussion can be carried through even without them. For that purpose, only a few simple conceptual clarifications are needed.
There is a rather thin basis that can define the consensus around the state's Zionist character: the desire that there be a nation-state here for the Jewish people. Who is a Jew, and what the character of that state should be (religiously, in its attitude toward various minorities, in its attitude toward our Palestinian neighbors, and so forth)—those are disputed questions. In that sense, I assume that all the Jewish participants in these polemics are Zionists.
The next question is whether their party has made the Zionist value part of its banner. Until recently everyone claimed that it had, but today there are fissures around this question. Why do we all understand that this is not really important except at the declarative level? Because today there is no real threat to the Jewish character of the state (at least as that Jewish character is defined by Meretz members. Except, of course, for the threat of Haredization and increased religiousization), and therefore this party can omit Zionist values from its platform and focus on other, more important and more current questions regarding which partnership with non-Zionist Arab MKs is possible. Questions of economy and society, the attitude toward the other, diplomatic processes, and the like—all these are not directly related to questions of Zionism, and there can be consensus on them between Zionists and those who are not.
In passing, I would say that the partnership of secular MKs in the Jewish Home, in the religious context, is not similar to the case of Arab MKs in Meretz in the Zionist context. The secular MKs in the Jewish Home are willing to shoulder the struggle for those values for whose sake the party was founded (the Jewish character of the state in some sense). Differences in personal outlook (such as observance of the commandments) are not necessarily relevant on the plane of party-political activity. If they are prepared to act in the political sphere for those same values, there is nothing to prevent all of them, with all their differences, from belonging to the same party. Moreover, later in these remarks I will argue (and I have already written this several times before) that in my opinion the Jewish Home is in fact an outright Haredi party, and Shaked and Bennett (who on the personal level are of course far from being Haredi) are active partners in this path. By contrast, if Meretz had been founded primarily for Zionist aims, I find it hard to see how it could include Arab members.
However, as noted, Meretz does not see itself as a party that works for Zionist values, and that is hard to dispute. Even if its Jewish members support them, these are not the questions relevant to its activity today. If so, there really is no obstacle to including Arab MKs in it as well. Moreover, even the Labor Party, which does see itself as a Zionist party (though I find it hard to see the difference between these two twins, apart from some sentiment or some vague tonal shade), can include Arab MKs so long as it focuses mainly on questions unrelated to Zionism. The differences in worldview regarding Zionism are marginal under the circumstances that now prevail in the state, and therefore such a partnership is entirely reasonable and possible.
One may well wonder what will happen if questions that touch the core of Zionism do indeed come onto the agenda. For example, turning the State of Israel into a state of all its citizens and erasing its Jewish character. I assume that Meretz MKs would split among themselves on that question (in my view, even its Jewish members would not be a monolith), and then perhaps they would have to consider whether their partnership was still possible and relevant. But for now, as noted, that is not on the agenda.
Interim Summary
The conclusion that follows is that there is indeed room for parties in which MKs who embrace different worldviews cooperate, so long as the differences between them do not touch the core of the party's activity. If by chance a question related to Zionism does arise, Meretz MKs can be given freedom to vote as they see fit, because this is not really a question that matters to the party (even if it may matter to some of its members). This party was not founded for that.
Therefore, all the uproar that has arisen around the Zionism of Meretz or of Labor is a tempest in a teapot. Everything was known beforehand, and there is nothing startlingly new here, except that the matter is now being explicitly formulated and placed on the table. These declarations do not carry much significance, for the Meretz members at issue are indeed Zionists; it is simply that, in their view, no important questions related to Zionism are currently on the agenda, and therefore they see no obstacle to including Arab members.
Thus, for example, MK Ilan Gilon, who wants an urgent discussion in the party on the question of Zionism and the platform, clearly also understands that there is room in the party for MKs, Arab or Jewish, for whom Zionism is not their cup of tea (whether on the personal level or on the party-political level). Even if Zionism is important to him, he certainly agrees that it is not the core. Therefore, from his standpoint, such a discussion is an ideological discussion about the party's path, but I find it hard to believe that he would demand the expulsion of everyone who is not a Zionist or who does not want Zionism to be part of the party platform. These are declarations meant mainly to satisfy the personal sentiments of those involved in the matter, but they have no real significance.
Another Example: The Fault Line in Religious Society
I want to offer another example of this phenomenon. A few days ago I gave a lecture at the Kohelet Forum in Jerusalem, and there I spoke about the traditional division of the religious world into two camps: Religious Zionism and Haredism. I argued there that this division is anachronistic, since the questions with which we are occupied today are not related to Zionism. We keep wrangling over whether it was proper to establish a state, when the State of Israel has already existed for some seventy years, and no one is bothered by that. The more important questions are those of religion and state and various social questions. But on these questions the division between Zionists and those who are not is irrelevant. On the contrary, on almost all these questions the Hardal (nationalist-Haredi) segment within the Jewish Home holds positions very similar to those of the Haredi parties. So what do they share with the more liberal segment? Zionism. But why is that important? What question connected to Zionism is currently on the agenda? What has been created here is a coalition between two parties around a question that is not on the agenda. This is the same anachronism as the discussion about Meretz's Zionism.
In my view these questions are not important either, but even if someone thinks otherwise, he must admit that they are not currently on the agenda. Contemporary political activity is concerned with entirely different questions, and with respect to them this division is irrelevant. That is why I have already written in the past that today the political division within the religious public ought to be between the conservative segment (nationalist and non-nationalist alike. Whatever nationalism may mean in this context) and the modern-liberal segment. The Zionist-Haredi fault line is a foolish anachronism that only confuses us all (see, for example, here, here, here and here). I have pointed out that there are interested parties who keep it alive for reasons of their own; the strange thing is that they succeed. We are all taken captive by them. In this respect, credit to the Meretz party for being willing to examine the declarations of the past and update the battle lines in light of changed circumstances.
Declarations Versus Practice
These two examples reflect a human tendency to cling to declarations even when their content is no longer relevant. We hold fast to the horns of the familiar altar, even if it is no longer important and no longer on the agenda. The fervor with which we fight over these empty slogans is enough to arouse envy when compared with the fervor of the struggle over the things that truly matter. After all, what bothers the Right about Meretz is not their lack of Zionism but their worldview. Whether that is Zionist or non-Zionist, it is not really important. So why pick on the question of Zionism? Because the slogan arouses ideological fervor and helps us malign and condemn them. That way we can claim that the Left is by definition non-Zionist, and what could be more convenient than that? By the same token, it is convenient for us to argue with those who hold modern and liberal positions by claiming that they are Mizrachnikim (religious-Zionist types) and "lite" types, since that exempts us from discussing the arguments themselves. I will not return here again to the question of who is a heretic, which likewise really deals with vague and fairly empty definitions, instead of the questions themselves.
I suggest that none of us be swept along by this shallowness. When something like this comes up, it is worth pausing for a moment and thinking about its real implications. Instead of asking whether so-and-so or some party is Zionist, a question almost empty of content, it is better to ask what their position is on some concrete question that is actually on the agenda and discuss that. Declarations, especially those that deal with concepts whose content is vague and not univocal, add nothing at all to the discussion.
Discussion
In my humble opinion, you are too quick to dismiss the slogans and write them off as anachronistic. They may perhaps have stopped speaking to you, but they are still meaningful for quite a broad public.
At the very least, the gap between Religious Zionism and Haredism around the question of the state is still relevant.
It is true that the questions change over time, but generally speaking the Haredi attitude toward the state is completely different from that of a Zionist, even a Hardali one. (And of course there are edge cases that do not teach us about the rule.) This gap affects positions across a very wide range of issues—not only on matters of religion and state, but also on purely diplomatic matters such as foreign relations.
Also regarding Meretz, in my opinion the question of Zionism is still relevant. You rightly argue that party members have more urgent matters to deal with, and that questions touching the core of Zionism do not arise every other day. But the point is that the question of Zionism lies on a higher plane than other questions, and therefore it greatly affects areas that may seem, on the face of it, unrelated.
A person who defines himself as a Zionist will act differently in many contexts. (For example, in the event of a peace agreement, he may place the interests of the Jews above those of the Arab inhabitants of the land, even though this question does not touch the core of Zionism.)
The person who votes for Meretz knows exactly how it will act on all the questions you raised here (which, in their view, probably are not connected to Zionism). It is quite consistent and transparent. The question of what heading stands above those actions—Zionism or not—is utterly devoid of meaning. As I wrote, Ilan Gilon did not say that in his opinion anything should be changed in the character of Meretz’s activity, only the heading of Zionism or non-Zionism. And that is exactly my point: this is empty attachment to slogans.
As for Meretz, see my reply to Avi (above you). This heading does not have the slightest implication or significance.
As for the Haredim and Religious Zionism, that is indeed a well-known example, and in my opinion a completely mistaken one. I think that in general there is no difference in practical attitudes toward the state (except for empty theological slogans with no content). Every sane citizen wants it to succeed and not be destroyed, whether Haredi or not. So what difference does it make whether he is Zionist or not? In the post I linked to several articles where I elaborated more, but this is not the place.
Thank you very much!
A simply יפה, light, and persuasive article (I hope not only to the already convinced, like me).
For me, Zionism is a matter of Jewish solidarity, or “one heart,” as the Maharal put it in Netzach Yisrael, chapter 25 (Rabbi Shagar, “Shirah Hadashah,” in On That Day: Sermons and Essays for the Month of Iyar, expands on the matter); one heart, as was felt in Israel at the time of the kidnapping of the boys. The novelty of Zionism is that Jewish solidarity does not remain in lofty rhetoric but becomes a plan of action whose end is the establishment of the State of Israel. This solidarity has two aspects: inward-facing and outward-facing.
Inwardly, it requires equal mobilization that rises above local, parochial considerations in favor of global ones. Yuval Noah Harari illustrated this nicely in his history book about the future when he compared the Jews’ ability to move forces from one area to another and thereby achieve a strategic concentration of forces against the Arab enemy, to the Arab inability to achieve such mobilization, which led to their defeat in battle. This is, of course, only one example, but it is characteristic. Outwardly, it requires the establishment of a sovereign body that stands before the nations of the world out of constant concern for the welfare and well-being of Jews everywhere, whose purest expression is the Law of Return, which allows any Jew to immigrate to the land and immediately receive citizenship here (the Law of Return allows exceptions, as in the case of the mobster Meyer Lansky, who was politely returned to the United States for imprisonment). Both of these aspects are necessary for the success of the project: on the one hand, a developed civic consciousness that is not dragged into a local perspective, and on the other hand, firm resolve against the outside world. And when these aspects are missing, something defective is felt.
As for the Haredim, let us begin by saying that clearly the state sees the Torah world as an important foundation of its self-identity. In the end, the factor that exempts the Haredim from military service in favor of Torah study in yeshiva is not the Haredim themselves but the state. Implicitly, the assumption arises here that there is equivalence between Torah study and military service (an assumption that is not officially endorsed, as emerges from the state’s response to the High Court of Justice). The fact that the Torah world is important to the state, and thus indirectly to Jewish solidarity, does not mean that the Haredim themselves are good citizens. In fact, my impression is that for the most part they are poor citizens. There are some who are, such as my former neighbor, who told me how during Operation Protective Edge there was a ban on leave in the yeshiva and increased study (I think around the clock), but in general, overall solidarity in its practical sense is rather low among Haredim, and this is not the place to elaborate. This is a flaw on the inward side.
With Meretz, unfortunately, the flaw is on the outward side. As the owner of this site writes, the fact that I am paranoid does not mean they are not after me. It is clear to me that there are very powerful forces in the world to whom the existence of a Jewish state is hateful, and they are doing everything they can to dismantle it. The current slogan is “a state of all its citizens,” one of whose unstated clauses is the abolition of the Law of Return on the one hand and acceptance of the antisemitic demand for return on the other (this demand exists only against the Jewish state and does not exist with respect to any other refugee body in the world). Those who surrender to this approach will always justify it in the name of the “peace” they will achieve. The fact that Meretz has fallen into their clutches is regrettable, because this was a major party with major achievements. What the owner of this site writes—that the self-evidence of the existence of a Jewish state with the Law of Return is self-evident—is not self-evident to me. And when you make an alliance with people who are, at best, non-Zionist, do not be surprised if “political” constraints suddenly require you to adopt a position you do not believe in.
Hello Rabbi, thank you for your words.
I do not understand what the meaningful distinction is between an empty slogan and a symbol, and therefore why a slogan is something devoid of meaning. Perhaps the question of defining Meretz as a Zionist party has no practical implication, but it does have declarative meaning—in my understanding—namely, whether its people see themselves as continuing the Zionists of previous generations (for whom this heading did have practical implications). The closest example that comes to mind is a person who chooses to take off his kippah at the end of a process of becoming secular. Even if his inner world has not changed at all, if he was already completely detached from the world of the commandments, does not that act have meaning?
Indeed, my attitude toward symbols is similar. I do not understand why this particular expression is important if the content is clear one way or another. It is a vague expression, and it only confuses and obscures the discussion. In any case, no one is proposing changing Meretz’s platform or modes of action, so why does it matter whether there is one heading or another above them? I understand that this may have one emotional implication or another, but it is really not worth a discussion and a public uproar. Whoever it bothers—should take a pill.
I remind you that when the independent Hasmonean kingdom reached seventy years, it was in the prosperity and peak of the period of Queen Salome Alexandra, who also knew how to conduct herself wisely. You know what happened a short time afterward. So from where do you derive the confidence that if the State of Israel has already existed for seventy years, nothing will threaten it anymore? That is, its being an independent state with a solid Jewish majority (which for me is the criterion for the question of its existence, without at all belittling issues such as the level of public health and other important substantive questions). You yourself oppose the common sense of confidence in Religious Zionism that we are in a certain process of redemption….. So why is the question of Zionism no longer relevant in your opinion? Has hostility toward independent Jewish existence disappeared entirely among our neighbors, or even in Europe? And if, for example, a certain party, such as the Joint Arab List, advocates implementing the Palestinians’ “right of return” into the Green Line—would such a matter also be marginal in your eyes regarding the question of the state’s future? (Assuming that some government might implement the idea, or that the idea begins to gain traction among the broader public.) I would appreciate your reply.
I really do not understand where this message came from. Who said I am confident that nothing will happen to the state? You yourself say I’m not. Chinese.
I actually don’t quite agree that this is superficial. A person who votes for Meretz wants to know that the party (as a body) will not act in an anti-Zionist way, or at least will do so only if, in their view, some more important value is at stake. There are certainly still questions today that concern Zionism in its broader sense, for example: whether and to what extent a Jewish majority in the state is important (absorbing refugees), the value of encouraging immigration to Israel, and so on. Even the division of Jerusalem is, in my view, a Zionist question, although, as stated, it is certainly possible—and it does happen—that in a Zionist left-wing party there will be a need to compromise between Zionist values and other values (but not to ignore them in the set of considerations).