On Changes in Jewish Law and the Question of Authority (Column 101)
With God's help
It is said that in various Christian families descended from the conversos in Spain and Portugal, strange customs remained that have no explanation. For example, on the eve of Passover, before the meal, those families (as noted, devoutly Christian ones) would go down to the cellar, begin the meal there, and then go upstairs and finish it. In this way one can find remnants of customs that remained in different Jewish (or pseudo-Jewish) communities around the world, vestiges of customs and laws once observed there and long since abandoned. The phenomenon looks very strange, for there is no logic at all in doing this today. On the other hand, it is uncomfortable to mock these customs, since they are traditions for which people gave their lives and suffered greatly, so it is no wonder they survived, even in so strange and puzzling a form. In this column I want to point out that in fact all of us behave in similar ways, and to discuss what can and should be done about it.
On concerns and Jewish law
In my controversial column on kitniyot (legumes and similar foods) (Column 2) I pointed out that in fact we are all in the same situation. I mentioned there the urban legend about the Ger Rebbe who, when he came to light the Hanukkah candles, asked his attendant to remove the broom that was standing there next to the Hanukkah menorah. He explained that he was concerned that next year all the Hasidim would light candles with a broom placed next to the Hanukkah menorah. The attendant removed the broom, and the next year the Hasidim of course placed a broom there, removed it, and only then lit the candles. I explained there that although we all laugh at the stupidity in this story, in fact we behave in exactly the same way. The "kitniyot decree," whose basis was apparently concern about the presence of leavened food in packages of kitniyot, is based on a concern that no longer exists today, and yet we all continue scrupulously to avoid every trace of kitniyot in Passover food products.
I further added there that one must distinguish between a custom and an enactment or decree. In the case of an enactment or decree, the rule is A matter established by formal count requires another formal count to permit it (a matter instituted by formal vote requires another such body to rescind it); that is, an enactment or decree accepted by the Sanhedrin requires another Sanhedrin in order to repeal it, even if its reason has lapsed. But kitniyot is neither an enactment nor a decree, but merely a concern. The public feared the presence of leavened food in kitniyot, and with good reason, and therefore did not use kitniyot on Passover. But once the concern disappears, the "decree" disappears with it. One may worry about a pothole in the road and steer around it so as not to endanger one's life, but sheer foolishness is required to keep steering around the spot after the pothole is no longer there. The reason is that no authorized institution ever established a prohibition on passing along that stretch of road. It was a concern, not a decree or an enactment.
A few examples from Jewish law
With concerns, this seems obvious, but as noted, the same is true in the realm of Jewish law. This applies both to Torah-level laws and, all the more so, to rabbinic laws that no longer make any sense today and that we nevertheless preserve for various reasons. I will bring here only a few examples from among quite a number.
A. The first example is the repetition of the Amidah by the prayer leader. The source of the enactment lies in concern for people who do not know how to pray or read. The prayer leader recites the prayer aloud so that they can pray along with him or fulfill their obligation through him.
Today there is almost no one who cannot read and write and cannot pray from a prayer book. This of course does not prevent us from repeating the prayer twice a day, day in and day out, and doubling the number of times we mumble this text, which was already too long to begin with.
B. Another example is the law of the three-month waiting period between a first and second husband. According to Jewish law, a woman whose husband has died or divorced her must wait at least three months before remarrying. The reason is that if she gives birth seven months after marrying the second husband, we will not be able to determine whether the child is the first husband's nine-month child or the second husband's seven-month child. The Talmudic assumption is that there are two types of pregnancy, one lasting seven months and one lasting nine, and this is what creates the doubt.
Today this is not relevant, both because there do not really seem to be two such distinct types of pregnancy. It looks more like a continuum. Beyond that, today there is an easy medical way to determine whether a child is Reuven's or Shimon's. And yet no one even contemplates abolishing the three-month waiting period.
C. The second festival day in the Diaspora. This is one of the most annoying and unnecessary enactments, and its source is doubt regarding the fixing of the month (the establishment of the new month: whether the religious court decided to intercalate the month or not). In the past the religious court would decide in real time whether to declare the new month on the twenty-ninth day of the month or to extend the month by one day (that is, to intercalate it). When the religious court in Jerusalem made its decision, a notice would go out to the entire world, either by messengers or by lighting beacons on mountaintops. This mechanism of notification had a limited speed, and therefore there was a certain radius of places to which the message took more than two weeks to arrive, and then they did not know when to celebrate Passover or Sukkot. The sages ordained that in all places outside the borders of the Land of Israel, people should celebrate for two days out of doubt, so as not to desecrate the festival. The problem is much sharper with Rosh Hashanah, since it falls on the first of the month and not on the fifteenth, and therefore they established that even the inhabitants of the Land of Israel should celebrate for two days. Although today the calendar is already fixed and everyone knows the correct dates in advance, the sages established that we should continue to celebrate for two days lest the Temple be rebuilt and we return to sanctifying months on the basis of sighting, and the problem return.
But this enactment too is a clear anachronism, for modern means of communication can reach the moon in a matter of seconds. Even if we return to sanctifying months by sighting, there is no place in the world that cannot be updated in real time about the decision of the religious court. One must remember that beyond the inconvenience, the sense of pointlessness, and the meaningless limitations it imposes on our lives, because of this enactment we do not put on tefillin (phylacteries) on that day even though it is in fact an ordinary weekday. Not a few laws and practices are suspended solely because of the absurd concern that the Temple may speedily be rebuilt and we may return to a situation of doubt about the correct day. This is of course apart from the problem of Do not add ("do not add" to the commandments) regarding festivals that we have invented for ourselves without any reason.
D. Absorption in utensils.[1] The laws of mixtures and of permitted and prohibited foods devote a good deal of attention to the absorption of prohibited taste in various utensils. Experiments conducted in recent years have shown that modern utensils absorb almost nothing. The sages' estimates of how much is absorbed in utensils bear no relation to reality (at least today, and probably in their own time as well). Other physical and chemical processes that Jewish law assumes also seem not really to be connected to reality (Whichever is lower or upper prevails – whether the lower or upper element prevails – and the like). There are decisors who agreed that there is room, and even a need, to change these laws, but out of fear of illegitimate change and breaching the fence they sought the agreement of additional decisors, which of course never really came, and so the matter remained stuck. We declare utensils forbidden and throw them away, and from time to time even arrive at far-reaching leniencies because of rulings about utensil absorption, all without any connection to actual reality.
E. Various presumptions. For example, the Talmud assumes a presumption that women want a relationship at any price, in its language: It is better to live as two than to live as a widow ("better to sit as two than to sit alone as a widow"). This presumption too has far-reaching implications for women denied a get and agunot (women chained to dead marriages) who do not receive a Jewish bill of divorce from their husbands, and the religious courts do not annul the marriage on the claim She did not sanctify herself with this in mind ("she did not betroth herself on that assumption") (see my ruling here). The assumption is that no matter what happens – whether the husband is mentally or physically ill, beats and abuses her, or refuses to give a get – the woman wants this relationship and would have wanted it even had she been asked in advance.
And again, here too it is clear that the situation today is manifestly different. Many women are selective and are unwilling to marry except a partner acceptable to them. It seems to me that this is an overwhelming majority of women, including Haredi women, who are unwilling to marry just any husband at any price. This does not lead the religious courts to change anything in their approach. Courts do not annul marriages on the ground of She did not sanctify herself with this in mind, even though it is clear that the marriage is utterly null and void (indeed, it is probably void even if the court took no action and did not annul it).
F. There are various Torah-level laws, such as the disqualification of women from testimony and the attitude toward gentiles, where there is certainly room to consider changing them today because the relevant reality has changed. In my articles (here and here) I showed the mechanism that makes this possible, but decisors are unwilling even to consider it. Thanks to these arguments, I had the honor of earning the distinguished title of heretic (just this week I heard from an important rabbi that he has already been asked several times whether I should indeed be regarded as a heretic, and I assume there are other rabbis who have been asked this as well).
The realm of Jewish law raises the question of authority: Jewish law and civil law
There is of course a difference between various concerns and the realm of Jewish law. The main difference is that concerns depend on reality, and if reality has changed, then obviously there is no point in being concerned. By contrast, in the realm of Jewish law we are dealing with binding and valid laws that were established by an authorized and binding religious court (the Sanhedrin, or the Talmud, which the decisors wrote has the status of a Sanhedrin). In state law as well, no one thinks that if there is a law that is no longer relevant it lapses automatically. The Knesset is supposed to repeal it, and so long as that has not been done, the citizen is not supposed to violate it.
And indeed Maimonides, at the beginning of chapter 2 of Hilkhot Mamrim, cites the Talmudic law that A matter established by formal count requires another formal count to permit it. That is, a legal determination made by the Sanhedrin cannot be changed except by another Sanhedrin. And with rabbinic enactments and decrees there is an additional requirement that the later religious court be greater in wisdom and number than the first one that established the original law. On the face of it, these legal rules, which were themselves codified as binding law, categorically prevent any legal change (as distinct from the cancellation of concerns, which depends only on reality). Therefore, arguments in favor of change today very often appeal to the excuse of authority. Even if change is appropriate, we have no authority to make it.
And yet there is a problem
And yet, it is hard to deny that this situation arouses deep discomfort. We are stuck with many laws that are no longer relevant. If we look in the mirror, we will find that all of us behave like the conversos or the Ger Hasidim (I do not know which of these two sects is closer to Judaism). Beyond that, the analogy to changing laws brought above sharpens the discomfort even more. The law can afford to say that so long as some statute has not been changed, it remains binding even if its rationale has disappeared, because there is an active institution that can make the change (the Knesset, the Attorney General who determines that a given law is unenforceable or that enforcing it is not in the public interest, or sometimes the courts as well through statutory interpretation, or judicial legislation). But in Jewish law we have been stuck for about two thousand years without any institution that has authority to change any law at all, or even to innovate new needed laws, while reality changes at an ever-accelerating breakneck pace.
This arouses harsh feelings of the irrelevance of Jewish law, feelings that threaten Jewish law itself and the public's commitment to it, not to mention the terrible desecration of God's name that all this provokes inwardly (the feelings within the religious public as well) and outwardly (the Torah, and all of us, look like Ger Hasidim, heaven forfend). In recent years we have seen a weakening of the absoluteness of halakhic commitment. There are lightly observant religious people, people who do or do not observe the restrictions on physical contact, people who talk on the phone or send texts on the Sabbath, people who live with partners without marriage, and so forth. In my opinion, part of what drives these phenomena, beyond the postmodern age and the values of freedom and autonomy (in their distorted interpretation), is the justified lack of trust in Jewish law. A person asks himself why he should observe laws that are no longer relevant, whose continued existence stems only from a historical accident that happened to us two thousand years ago. How many people are prepared to live their lives on the basis of an irrelevant system merely because we lack authority to change it? Suppose a plane carrying all the members of the Knesset crashed and all of them perished – would anyone imagine that all the citizens of the state would go on devoutly obeying that anachronistic legal system just because there was no authority to change it? So why should a Jew continue to observe and maintain a normative system, a substantial part of which is based on ancient and irrelevant norms, and on factual circumstances that changed long ago? Am I supposed to live in light of a system of laws that has no meaning or value just because two thousand years ago someone decided that this was the proper way to act, or because circumstances then prevailed that required such behavior (and there is the well-known absurd argument of the Hazon Ish that the binding reality is the one that prevailed during the two thousand years of Torah, that is, in the Talmudic period and not in our own day), and the plane of those who could update and change it crashed? A substantial part of Jewish law looks like a burdensome and irritating anachronism, and it is no wonder that many people abandon it to varying degrees and in varying measures. The rabbinic establishment and the educators are fighting a rear-guard action in order to defend a system that cannot be defended.
It is important to understand that if the system as a whole inspired trust, and there were only marginal cracks that demanded commitment because of the lack of authority – fair enough. But the feeling is that this is not the situation today. Incidentally, in my opinion this is not true of most of Jewish law, but there is a not inconsiderable part of it that is like this (see the examples above). I think that if people saw that what could and should be changed was in fact being changed, they would be prepared to accept the burden of those laws that the decisors would say should not be changed. But the feeling is that the decisors are unwilling to touch anything, and it is no wonder that this leads to a loss of confidence in the system as a whole (sometimes unfairly).
Ways of coping
Attempts to cope with this worrying phenomenon amount to apologetic defenses. First and foremost among them is the argument from authority (we have no authority to change). Another method is to pour new contents into a law that has lost its relevance. Thus the repetition of the Amidah, which originally was meant to help those who do not know how to pray, is presented as a law whose purpose is to give prayer a public character. Incidentally, precisely here such a conception has some logic to it, but it does not seem that this was indeed the purpose of the original enactment. It is clear that this is an explanation given de facto only in order to prevent changing a law whose rationale has lapsed. Thus people lament the destruction of Jerusalem but in fact mean the Temple. The second day of Rosh Hashanah is given various mystical meanings (what happens in heaven and what we are judged for)[2], whereas originally it was simply an enactment because of doubt about the day.
A third way of coping is the theory of hidden reasons. Apologetic considerations lead various rabbis and decisors to create a theory according to which behind enactments and decrees there are additional hidden reasons, and therefore a change in circumstances cannot justify changing them. This is a theory devoid of any logic, and it is completely clear to me that it is an ad hoc attempt to explain why nothing may be changed. If it seems to you that the rationale of an enactment or decree has lapsed, you are mistaken. There are hidden reasons that nobody knows, and they of course have not lapsed. If nobody knows what they are, how do we know they have not lapsed? Very simple: we do not know that they have lapsed. This is a magic solution against change. Its only drawback is that it is really not persuasive and not logical. But admit that it is very useful. Just look at how many people quote it with a grave expression and an air of immense depth in every discussion of change in Jewish law.
Exceptions
This was not always so. Decisors throughout the generations changed laws, enactments, and decrees, in hundreds of cases. Although since the redaction of the Talmud there has been no authority to change Torah-level or rabbinic laws, decisors do this all the time and on a large scale. One can see many examples of departures from the rules governing change in the last chapter of Rabbi Neria Gutel's book Hishtanut Ha-Teva'im Ba-Halakhah. After the decisors do so, various interpretations are proposed, and thus rules are created that qualify the rules of authority that prevent change. Although there is no religious court, and certainly not one greater in wisdom and number, many laws are nevertheless changed. For a summary of these mechanisms, see my article here.
I have no doubt that the decisors who changed those laws did not analyze the Talmudic passages and discover qualifying rules that eliminate the need for authority. As a matter of Talmudic law, nothing may be changed, and yet they change things. Why? Because it seemed intolerable to them to leave the system frozen for thousands of years despite all the changes. They saw it as both their duty and therefore their right to adapt Jewish law to reality. It is important to understand that this was already being done in the Middle Ages, when the pace of change was nowhere near the mad pace of today, and when communication and information were far less widespread and accessible, so that the desecration of God's name and the anachronistic image were far less sharp and harmful than they are today. After the changes were made, others came and defined rules that qualify the need for authority in various cases (those qualifying rules are described in the article cited above and in Gutel's book).
A possible solution
How can decisors act head-on against Talmudic law? After all, the rules that require a religious court, and that it be greater in wisdom and number than its predecessors, are themselves Talmudic law that binds us all. Everyone agrees that one may not dispute the Talmud. The excuses and rules created after the fact to explain that there are legitimate mechanisms are of course ad hoc constructions.
In my book on Jewish law (the third in the trilogy that, with God's help, will appear speedily in our days), I offer various explanations of the matter and try to show that there are mechanisms that qualify the rules of authority. But, as noted, all of these are ad hoc mechanisms. Here I want to argue that behind all of them there stands one fundamental explanation, although nobody says it openly and of course nobody puts it in writing.
The requirements that limit the ability to change – A matter established by formal count requires another formal count to permit it, and the requirement of a religious court greater than its predecessors – are themselves stated in the Talmud. At that time the situation was that there was a Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, or one was expected to exist, and its absence was temporary. When we are in Babylonia and have no Sanhedrin, or when we expect (even if mistakenly, before people understood the depth of the coming exile and the cessation of ordination) that one will soon be established, it is easy and logical to freeze Jewish law and not allow it to be changed until an authorized institution arises. It is no wonder that they established the rule that one who is not authorized cannot change it. But now we have already been without a Sanhedrin for nearly two thousand years, and it does not seem that a Sanhedrin will arise soon, and this long historical accident has ossified Jewish law and brought us to the brink of disaster. This is truly a Torah catastrophe and a terrible desecration of God's name. Not only do we not look good; we are not really fulfilling God's will and the Torah's will. After all, if the enactment of the second festival day is not relevant today, then the Torah wants us to put on tefillin on that day (unless we accept the absurd explanations that pour ad hoc contents into the second festival day). Every law that requires change is in effect saying that in the current situation we are not fulfilling God's will. The price of conservatism and ossification is not merely one of convenience and of desecration of God's name in the eyes of others. First and foremost, the price is non-fulfillment of God's will and the Torah's commands.
Therefore it seems clear to me that the rule requiring a greater religious court in order to change laws is itself no longer relevant today. It was originally said for times and situations in which there was an alternative – a Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, or an expectation that a Sanhedrin would arise. In such a situation they determined that no other factor should change Jewish law. As I noted, in such a situation state law too forbids violating the law until it is changed by the Knesset. But when for thousands of years there has been no authorized institution that can make a change, it is completely clear that the Torah does not at all intend that we should remain bound to an anachronistic system merely because of such strange considerations of authority. The principle may determine that authority is entrusted only to the authorized institution, but that is when such an institution exists. When there is no authorized institution and none is expected soon, there is no reason to deny authority to others.
We have seen that sages throughout the generations have made, and continue to make, such no-choice calculations as part of their legal practice and rulings. Just as one example, the conversion process requires acceptance of the commandments, circumcision and immersion, the bringing of a sacrifice, and that all this be done before a religious court of ordained judges. What happens when there are no ordained judges? There is a doctrine according to which present-day courts act as their agents, which delegates authority to lay courts. Originally this was said only in a situation where there were ordained judges in the Land of Israel and we were in Babylonia. The sages extended this to a later time (down to our own) when for thousands of years there have been no ordained judges anywhere in the world. Tosafot on Gittin 88b extended this even further, ruling that although the Talmud says this rule of agency was said only about common matters involving monetary loss, it also applies to conversion. Why? How do we know that? One must understand that without a religious court of ordained judges, conversion has no validity at all and the convert is in effect a gentile pure and simple. And yet Tosafot rules, with no basis or source, that this enactment of agency applies to conversion too, because it cannot be otherwise. Tosafot is essentially arguing that it is simply implausible that Jewish law would bring us to a situation in which conversion is impossible, and therefore it is obvious that the limitation has fallen away.
It seems to me that the same is true here. I am already tired of hearing – and even more tired of saying again and again to questioners -: "You are right. Change is needed, and the halakhic situation is incorrect and does not fit reality. It is in fact ridiculous and absurd, exactly like the Ger Rebbe's broom and the descent to the cellar by the descendants of the conversos. But what can one do? We have no authority to change it." There is a limit to how far this game can go. When we are not dealing with esoteric margins but with a substantial part of the system that is anachronistic, and when the damage to halakhic commitment is clear and unequivocal (and justified), one cannot ignore it. The time has come to determine that the rules requiring a religious court in order to change laws are null and void. It is clear that from the outset they were not stated for a situation like ours today. No one intended to leave us stuck for dozens and hundreds of generations, under changing conditions of life, with a petrified and frozen system. And if someone did intend that – that is his problem, not ours.
Rabbi Kook, in his book LeNevokhei HaDor, wrote that when the great religious court arises, it will be able to repeal the law that requires a court greater in wisdom and number as a condition for repealing enactments and decrees. It will also be able to repeal the law that we do not derive law from the reason for the verse (the rationale of the verse; purposive interpretation, which is in fact the main basis for changing laws). Here I want to argue something even more far-reaching. Even before the great religious court has arisen, these laws (which require a greater religious court) should be repealed through our own interpretive process. Moreover, my claim is that sages throughout the generations did this quite often, even if they did not place these things squarely on the table.
A note on the slippery slope
I know and understand very well the dangers here and the problem of the slippery slope, which will certainly be raised in the comments. I understand very well that we need to find alternative mechanisms that will prevent chaos and anarchy. What I wanted to argue here is that there is a completely reasonable mechanism open to us today. One must understand that leaving the situation as it is and declaring a sweeping lack of authority is no less dangerous than the breaching of fences of which I am speaking. Its victims are legion, and only a small part of them has been described here. All this is apart from the very fact of living a lie, and apart from the simple fact that we are simply not fulfilling God's will and Jewish law.
[1] See a comprehensive halakhic discussion here, and also here (including discussion by contemporary decisors).
Discussion
More power to you for these words that cry out from the heart! Although I do not have an unequivocal position regarding each and every one of the arguments in the article, there is no doubt that one cannot help but agree with the spirit of what you wrote!
I am sure this article gives voice to many perplexed Jews who are happy that at last a serious Torah personality like Rabbi Michael Abraham is also "putting these things on the table."
Thank you for the article.
I think that the lack of a mechanism that allows updating halakhah is only a symptom of an underlying mindset, and in my understanding that is where the main discussion should take place.
As you yourself wrote, throughout the generations decisors endlessly changed and updated halakhot, and this continues to this day. The gates of casuistry were never locked, and rabbis were always good at that. There is no need even to 'create' a new mechanism of change; there are enough old and proven ones.
I think the tendency to leave a large part of halakhah 'fossilized' stems from a principled opposition and backlash to modernity. The desire to preserve the past in its original form, and to protest against the view that the world is constantly progressing to a better place, sometimes leads to several undesirable outcomes (as you demonstrate in the article), but there is no doubt that the opposite extreme will also lead to undesirable outcomes (for example, a complete abandonment of commitment to halakhah like the Reform movement).
I accept that a balanced way must be found. But again, in my opinion the underlying question is the question of modernity. The search for mechanisms that will allow halakhic flexibility is entirely unnecessary if there is no willingness to use them.
I have the sense that today in the mainstream there is no such willingness, and in my view rightly so.
Likewise, I am sure that specifically moving in this direction and in the spirit of these ideas is what will increase among the public the value of "faith in the sages," because in this way it is indeed evident that what stands at the forefront of the sage-halakhic authority's concerns is the basic commitment to intellectual honesty and the search for truth (and of course accepting it "from whoever says it") as basic representatives of God's will, as Rabbi Michael Michael Abraham signed off at the end of the post.
What did that important rabbi answer?
To Yishai – are you by any chance Y. A. or Y. M.?
How many more pennies can still drop? Only now I realized that all mainstream religious-Haredi thought is one big ad hoc construction!!
As is well known, I am a great and famous supervisor in the doctrine of goblins. I have a complex thought and philosophy on the subject that nobody can refute.
An example from Wikipedia:
Someone who holds a belief in leprechauns (goblins) can prevent its refutation if he uses an ad hoc hypothesis (for example, claiming that the goblins are invisible)
As for the actual point of the article – I very much agree with the problem (how could one not agree?), but the solution, as the rabbi himself noted, is problematic. I claim it is really, really, really problematic. The moment we say that authority is in our hands and we need to do what makes sense in our day, there are not many commandments I think I would continue to observe..
Presumably he answered that even if you were to say that so-and-so is a heretic, still, as the great sages of our generations ruled regarding the heretics of our times, one should draw them near with pleasant ways and bonds of love.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
And from the way I saw Ramda at that meeting, he himself fulfilled "they lower [the amount] on the scale and do not raise [it]" 🙂
First of all, there is no doubt that the problem is real and the article analyzes it correctly.
But the solution does not really belong, precisely because of the note at the end. Ultimately, the mechanism that would prevent chaos and anarchy is the Sanhedrin. There is really no way to have your cake and eat it too. Power leads to anarchy, and the way to prevent anarchy is through some kind of unity in the religious leadership of the Jewish people. If it is possible to find a consensus that will prevent anarchy – let that consensus itself establish the Sanhedrin.
In the end, the very wretchedness of the rabbinic leadership described here is exactly what turns the establishment of the Sanhedrin into a distant dream. You cannot solve one without solving the other.
Rabbi Michael, regarding the repetition of the Amidah by the prayer leader – Maimonides writes (Laws of Prayer, chapter 8, halakhah 4): "And what is communal prayer? One person prays aloud and all listen, and this is not done with fewer than ten adult free men."
From here it follows that in his view communal prayer is the prayer said aloud. If anything, then one should have abolished the separation between the silent prayer and the prayer said aloud and made them one together. [As appears in Maimonides' well-known responsum.]
And regarding the decree of distinction, I do not know where you saw that it is based on there being only two kinds of pregnancy. The decree is an expression of the possibility of birth after 7 months and after 9 months, and therefore confusion could arise.
The question whether there are also pregnancies of intermediate durations (7.5 or 8 months, etc.) makes no difference at all.
So the main issue is that today there is no need for distinction, because there is a fairly simple test that makes it possible to know who the father is.
Thank you for the important article.
It is clear both to you and to any sensible person that a foundational halakhic mechanism that removes the need for a Sanhedrin, justified and proper as it may be, will not sweep after it the masses of the House of Israel who wish to observe the commandments; rather, it will serve a relatively narrow segment of the Jewish population. The immediate implication is a split in Orthodox Judaism into two camps fundamentally different from one another. As a rule, I am not among the devotees of "unity of the people" and the like, but one must carefully examine what the above halakhic split would cause.
With God's help, 5 Kislev 5778
To Shimon – greetings,
The method Ramda proposes, to change what seems to us irrelevant, has been tried and is being tried for about two hundred years now by well-known communities in Europe and the USA, and all the arguments raised have already been discussed and 'chewed over' endlessly. In those communities a considerable part of the public reached the conclusion that the prohibition on marrying non-Jews is also irrelevant in our generations, being contrary to any liberal conception. They started with a cup and ended with an ocean 🙂
With blessings, S.Z. Levingeiger
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The questions of the halakhic attitude toward changes – apparent or not so apparent – in reality accompany almost every halakhic discussion.
In many discussions of this kind you will encounter the laws of Hanukkah. For example: in our times, when people are out in the street far beyond half an hour after sunset, does the ideal time for lighting change? And what does one do in a high-rise building? Does one light at the entrance to the apartment facing the stairwell, or at the entrance to the building facing the courtyard, or perhaps in a window facing the public domain? And what does one do in an apartment higher than twenty cubits above street level – can one rely on people seeing the candles in the buildings opposite? Discussions that Ramda for some reason found occasion to mock in column 44.
A famous ruling that took account of a change in reality is the ruling of the Chafetz Chaim (in Likutei Halakhot on tractate Sotah), that nowadays, when the religious tradition from the home has weakened, it is not only permitted but a mitzvah to establish schools in which girls will study Torah, which will protect them from all the 'frivolity' flooding the world.
In short: in every halakhic discussion, one clarifies the halakhic definitions as they emerge from the Talmud and the decisors, and alongside that examines reality to see whether a change has occurred or not, and if so – whether the law changes in accordance with the definitions established in the Talmud and the decisors!
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
The examples mentioned here are, in part, very puzzling. For example, the second festival day of the Diaspora. After all, already in Talmudic times sanctification of the month by sighting had ceased and the fixed calendar had spread throughout Israel, and nevertheless the sages of the Land of Israel sent to Babylonia: "Although we have sent you the order of intercalations, be careful to preserve your ancestral custom in your hands." And regarding the repetition of the Amidah by the prayer leader – for some 1,500 years there have been written prayer books, and yet they did not abolish the repetition of the Amidah. And are there not today situations in which a visually impaired person arrives at synagogue without his special glasses or without a Braille prayer book and needs to fulfill his obligation through the prayer leader?
Regarding 'It is better to dwell as two than to dwell alone,' I already showed in my response to Ramda's article 'The Gentile That Halakhah Did Not Recognize' that even in Talmudic times there was no rule that a woman was ready to accept any defect. The statements were said regarding a defect that had been repaired or there was the possibility of repairing it, in which case women tend more than men to give a 'chance' for repair and not reject outright so quickly. Regarding absorption into vessels, I noted in one of the responses (there and in Yossi Sofer's article 'The Challenge of Renewing Halakhah') a discussion on the subject that was held in HaMaayan; see there and there, and this is not the place to elaborate)
Rabbi Rappaport argued last year in one of his lectures on tractate Gittin that Tosafot hold that a decree that creates a reality harmful to its original intention is automatically suspended without any external intervention.
Rabbi, yasher koach for the honest words.
If in any case halakhot that have outlived their time must be changed without the Great Court, why not establish it in the first place!? If we are already making a drastic change, then let it be to abolish the halakhot that supposedly prevent the establishment of the Sanhedrin.
Shatz"l,
What does shemittah have to do with an omelet? If in Talmudic times they thought the Temple would soon be rebuilt and we would return to the doubt about the day, today it is clear that this is not true.
As for the repetition of the Amidah, what exactly did you prove by showing that they did not change it? That is exactly what I am crying over. If there is a blind person who needs a prayer leader, do we all have to suffer twice a day? This is precisely the absurdity of the matter. It is like saying that some people need to clean the floor near the Hanukkah lamp, and therefore one should place a broom there.
As for 'it is better to dwell as two,' go and see that rabbinical courts make no use whatsoever of the consideration of "with this understanding." And when the rabbinical court in Safed did this, it got smacked down for it (though there, to a certain extent, justifiably).
And the examples you brought, such as the Hanukkah candle, are indeed examples of such discussions, and I can bring more from laws with far more far-reaching implications (I mentioned my article and Guttel's chapter on the matter). And precisely because of that, it is very puzzling why they recoil from doing the exact same thing in many other places, even though the justification there is no less good, and even better.
I agree with every word, except one: "rightly."
Shatz"l, how were you at the meeting and I didn't see you? 🙂
Absolutely not true. Why is only a Sanhedrin a solution? If a body of rabbis without ordination is established, is that not a solution? They do not have the legal status of a Sanhedrin, but it would certainly provide a solution. The practical question of establishing such a body is another matter. I agree there is no chance, and perhaps that means that some bold things need to be done from below without agreement, in order to shake up the public and its leadership (or replace it).
That is what I hinted at in my remarks, and this is not the place to elaborate.
The conception in the Talmud is that there are two kinds of pregnancy. You are right that here this is not necessary. Still, this law is unnecessary, as we agreed.
Indeed. But I tend to think I have no interest whatsoever in unity with the system as it currently looks.
There is definitely room for this line of reasoning. It is one of the mechanisms I spoke about and that are brought in the article I mentioned in the post.
This is exactly Maimonides' method regarding renewing ordination. But my claim is that even without agreeing to establish the Great Court and renew ordination, the problem is solvable.
And after not receiving an answer as to what the answer was, may I ask a personal question about the absurd argument of the Chazon Ish.
I understand how a smart person like the Chazon Ish could believe such an argument, because it is connected to beliefs he grew up with and to a habit of not examining them too much. What puzzles me is how someone who grew up in a modern society, was accustomed to a scientific and empirical mode of thought and even studied it at university, and is by nature a critical person, one day encountered this whole apologetic system and adopted it for many years until he saw the light.
And I am not saying this to provoke (this time, okay?), but I am really trying to understand, because it seems very strange to me.
With God's help, 6 Kislev 5778
To Ramda – greetings,
I went in several times. Once when I brought into the coffee corner a carton of soy milk that I had bought on the assumption that one of the important participants does not drink animal milk from livestock raised in conditions of crowding and exploitation.
The second time I went in was to bring that distinguished rabbi (mentioned above) the receipt for the 'New Otzar HaGeonim on Tractate Bava Batra' that he purchased from me.
I saw you only at the end of the meeting, speaking passionately with one of the organizers on the issue of providence, and in the heat of the conversation you did not notice that I passed by you.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger, librarian of 'Memaheir"n'
Ah, now I remember. Too bad you didn't say anything. It would have been an opportunity to meet non-virtually. Peace be upon you…
And I also forgot: thank you very much for your thoughtfulness regarding the milk. Though, in my sins, I drink neither milk nor coffee (simply because I don't like them). But a good intention the Holy One, blessed be He, counts as a deed, and I too, the least of all, walk in His ways.
By his holy spirit he answered as I wrote here, that this is not an important question.
As for your question, indeed today it also seems strange to me. Although as far as I remember I never really accepted those bizarre apologetic theses. But in the past I did have greater trust in the system. One matures…
With God's help, 6 Kislev 5778
There is more reason to be concerned today than in Talmudic times that the Temple may be rebuilt—after all, hasn't the time come?—and with the flood of information that now inundates the networks, the concern intensifies that the Diaspora will be flooded with contradictory information about the time when the court sanctified the month, not to mention the concern that a rival court will arise claiming 'halakhic autonomy' and sanctify the month on a different day.
Regarding the repetition of the Amidah by the prayer leader—quite apart from the fact that none of the Geonim and Rishonim demanded its abolition, even in Talmudic times no one argued that in an academy of sages, where all are proficient, they are exempt from the repetition. Already in the days of Rabban Gamliel it was clear that there are both silent prayer and communal prayer, and Rabban Gamliel held that communal prayer is primary (and individuals pray so that the prayer leader can arrange his prayer), whereas the sages held that the individuals' prayer is primary and the repetition of the Amidah is meant to fulfill the obligation of one who is not proficient.
For this is the nature of the enactments of the sages: they obligated the collective to take account of concerns that pertain to individuals. Did they not abolish the blowing of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat throughout the world because of the concern that some Jew at the end of the world would go to an expert to learn? Are there not today concerns for people who need a special prayer book (the visually impaired or those who have difficulty reading), who sometimes need the prayer leader to fulfill their obligation? And one who did not concentrate on one of the blessings in the silent Amidah can find in the repetition another opportunity to listen and have proper intention where he missed it in the silent prayer..
In short: one needs strong proofs to argue that the sages did not enact something "with this understanding," and if the early and later authorities did not make such a claim—what can we say after them?
With blessings,
Thank you, our Rabbi Michi, for the fascinating article as always!
As for the matter itself:
I think halakhic Judaism missed the train.
Halakhic Judaism began coping with similar challenges about two hundred years ago. Modernity posed ideas and objections to tradition, and Judaism stood before a very difficult dilemma: should it contain these changes, or excommunicate them? I would not want to be in the shoes of the leaders of that generation, who feared modernity, and rightly so. But the decision they adopted had consequences for generations.
Today, as a result of the direction in which they diverted the train, fear of the 'slippery slope' has been burned into the DNA of halakhic decisors. 'Ad hoc' arguments abound in responsa literature, and avoidance of a 'leniency that the public cannot withstand' has become a tradition.
In our generation, following all the controversy surrounding Reform and secularization, halakhic discourse and ethos have focused on 'preservation' and defense. The capacity for halakhic decision-making has been emasculated, and fear and dread of the surrounding world have implanted in rabbis the sense that their role is 'guarding the flask of pure oil,' in the 'way of old-time Israel,' without any change from the 'path handed down from our fathers and elders, the mighty pillars of the earth, of blessed holy memory.'
My claim is that the problem keeps getting worse because of the path we took at the beginning. What we could once do is very difficult nowadays, and in my estimation will be impossible in the future. Every passing day takes us farther from a solution. I am very pessimistic regarding the possibility of change, but if it is possible, it must be done today.
Because every day that passes in the modern world increases the gap between reality and halakhah, a gap that deepens and reinforces the conservative and rigid halakhic ethos, and reduces the chances of ever reaching a solution.
What does the Rabbi think???
P.S. I saw they spoke here about a certain meeting (where soy milk was served). May I know what this was about (and whether I would be a welcome guest)?
Aharon
Shatz"l, are you sure you are reading what I write? Who spoke about concern that the Temple may be rebuilt?! I spoke about the concern that when the Temple is rebuilt, the problem of uncertainty will arise. As for the absurd communication concerns you raised here, according to that don't trust the information your bank sends you through secure channels. Is it news to you that there are completely safe ways to send information over the network? Do you think the information about sanctifying the month would be sent in an unverified newspaper article? Is it impossible to talk by phone? This apologetics is what I was speaking about in the post. To defend this foolishness one reaches completely delusional territories. It would have been better simply to leave it as an unresolved question.
The same applies to the repetition of the Amidah. When there is a problem, an obligation is imposed even on forums that do not suffer from it. That is the essence of an enactment or decree. But when there is no problem in any forum whatsoever and people continue to act the same way, that is the ossification I am speaking about.
It seems to me that your attempts at explanation constitute the strongest proof of my point.
Aharon, I am actually optimistic. Reality is stronger than all of us. At least part of the religious public may draw the necessary conclusions. I have written more than once in the past about the failures of the response to the Enlightenment and Reform, and its influence until our day. But I am not a determinist, and just as they formulated one position then, today they can formulate another. And even if whoever does so is not counted among the "great men of the generation," he will be the real great one, and there will be those who recognize him.
The meeting was not connected to the site. It was a meeting of members of an institute dealing with answers to the questions of current leavers (intellectual leaving). It is not open to the public.
At a meeting connected to the site or in any other context, you are of course invited and very welcome.
Rabbi Michael, I must present two logical flaws in your dear article:
A. You argue that there were enactments made in Babylon and that the instruction was to cling to them despite the reason having lapsed, solely because they expected the Sanhedrin to be renewed speedily. This is a nice claim, but it is unproven, and upon it you place the full weight of your argument; in my eyes that is a flaw. And from here to the second point:
You present things as though the various enactments and customs draw their principled validity solely from the thought process of those who instituted them, and from the force of reality at the time the custom was instituted.
In my view this is already intellectual dishonesty or lack of familiarity with the sources.
Common statements in the Gemara and among the decisors show that there is also deference to the public practice of a given time, because the spirit of God rests upon the people, and the public in its inwardness sometimes knows better than the sages. Whether these are statements such as: "If they are not prophets, they are sons of prophets," or "Go out and see what the people do," or whether this is in deference to a prevailing custom ("And so they practiced, and it should not be changed")
You see that throughout the generations weight was given to the public's general non-rational choice, in many cases on the assumption that there is a connection between the souls of Israel and the will of God.
If you sever yourself from this assumption, which was prevalent in halakhic ruling, you are in effect severing yourself from part of the tradition that constituted the organism of Torah throughout the generations, so there is no guarantee that you are properly connected to His will and His Torah, and it may be that through your reading you are severing people from the root of their souls.
I cannot manage to imagine a situation in which there is an orderly change in a normal direction.
First, I do not see in the Haredi public any respected rabbi who thinks like you. Take for example Rabbi Asher Weiss's remarks. He addresses the issue of absorption in vessels in light of modern findings, in the article to which the rabbi linked here. And this is his language:
"I see great danger in the attempt to change the halakhah handed down from generation to generation on the basis of scientific research. The foundations of halakhah were established by the sages, the masters of the Mishnah and Talmud; they are the peg and they are the cornerstone, and their words are the foundation of the Oral Torah. The great ones of the generations never tried to examine their words in order to confirm or refute them, but upheld and accepted their words as the words of Moses from the mouth of the Almighty. If we come to examine the words of the sages and the tradition of halakhah on the basis of scientific research, this, heaven forbid, will lead to uprooting halakhah in many areas and demolishing the entire edifice of Torah… In the final analysis, we have nothing but the ancestral custom in our hands, and heaven forbid that we overturn the order of the world and abolish, heaven forbid, whole sections of the Shulchan Arukh. The tradition of halakhah is holy and sanctified; one must not veer from it right or left, and whoever walks by its light alone walks uprightly"…
And in my estimation, Rabbi Weiss is the most modern marker in the Haredi mainstream.
Second, even if an independent rabbi of great stature arises, he will encounter smears, ostracism, humiliation, and the like. That leader will not be able to build around himself a community with a shared character and ethos of 'service of God.' Perhaps he will manage to unite all the disgruntled people
and rebels of various sorts.
What I can perhaps imagine is a community of secular Jews or formerly religious Jews who are not committed to anything, taking up the gauntlet and opening a new page without asking anyone. But it would need a lot of strength and talent to carry out such a move.
In short, I am engaging here in utopian fantasies, but if I summarize, I would be glad to hear how the rabbi imagines such a thing could happen, from a purely sociological standpoint. I cannot think that way.
I see only the opposite process. I see a situation in which people see that halakhah is fossilized, understand that 'there is no one to talk to,' and throw everything away.
P.S. Regarding the meeting, I assume this is about the Yediah Institute(?). I would have loved to be a fly on the wall there…
Aharon
Hello Rabbi,
Seemingly, until the sages of Israel of our generation agree with your outlook, even in principle, it would be a sin to follow it, for we are obligated to follow the court and the sages of our generation.
What the rabbis of the Kav say about issues concerning the whole of Israel that require broad decision is not empty. The people of Israel stand in a relationship of discourse before the word of God, and they understand what its content is. When almost all the sages of Israel hold that the enactment is not nullified because of some hidden reason in it, a reason that is indeed embedded in the very technical inability to change the enactment, we must recognize the value of this intuitive decision. It is an intuitive, volitional decision with the weight of those about whom the Holy One, blessed be He, told us that they lead us in these areas. The rabbi's contempt for the argument, in my humble opinion, stems from a relative strength in System 2 judgment (from the previous post) and a relative weakness in judgment of the System 1 type. I think one should behave with humility toward the great ones of Israel and Torah scholars who 'see' with their spiritual vision the value of preserving the custom, a vision to which the Holy One, blessed be He, gave validity.
And when, with God's help, the rabbi's words arouse ferment against the background of our screaming reality, surely little by little good forces of unity and renewal of rabbinic authority will awaken, authority that will actualize its power with proper force and from proper authority, authority given to it from Heaven according to the hidden posts of the collective of the sages of Israel… and with the hope that this will happen against the background of as little destruction as possible pushing toward that correction.
Thank you for your enlightening and lucid words
I remember that you used to say "two thousand years of Torah" with complete conviction.
By the way, people also used to argue with you about the contribution of the Haredim to the Israeli economy, and you used to insist that they contribute through consumption via VAT and that the fact that they don't work changes nothing. I really remember that as one of the bizarre things.
The fact that a claim is not proven at all is not a logical fallacy. He is dealing here in the halakhic field, and in that field it is customary to entertain conjectures and even rule by them, and one can always raise other possibilities. There is no proven claim, as the well-known Ramban already wrote.
He did not write that the enactments derive their force (what does "truth" even mean here?) from the thought process of those who enacted them. The enactments derive their force from the authority of those who enacted them, but he also wants to overcome that. And if you didn't notice, he did not rule to stop observing the second festival day of the Diaspora; rather, he wants some sort of general agreement about it, and he didn't write here why, but elsewhere he wrote about the power of the public to obligate. By the way, even here, if you were right in the claim, that still would not be a logical fallacy. One should not confuse an error with a logical fallacy.
How exactly is a move capable of updating halakhah without creating anarchy more feasible than establishing a Sanhedrin?
After all, it's not as if there is a point at which you can draw a line and say, 'These are rabbis to whom a significant enough public will listen,' and thus establish a body (post-Tzohar and post-Beit Hillel) that will sit in study halls and update halakhah. That is precisely the path that will lead to anarchy. The only chance this could work is with a coalition of mainstream rabbis (far more than what is happening in Rabbi Rabinovitch's conversion courts, for example), and once that happens – you can already establish a Sanhedrin and that's it.
With God's help, 6 Kislev 5778
To Ramda – greetings,
When the sages said, "Be careful to preserve your ancestral custom in your hands," the situation was clear: all the Jews of the Diaspora knew when Rosh Chodesh fell, and nevertheless the sages feared that "the matter might again become corrupted" – so among all the secure systems, however secure they may be, is there and can there not be a situation in which "the matter again becomes corrupted," when so much disinformation and 'fake news' are driving the world crazy nowadays and 'returning the world to its corruption'?
And the same applies to the enactment of the repetition of the Amidah: as long as there are people in the world who are 'not proficient' for whatever reason, there is room for the enactment, even according to the sages' view that the repetition was instituted only to fulfill the obligation of one who is not proficient. All the more so according to Rabban Gamliel's reasoning that the prayer of the prayer leader is primary (for although one does not rely on it leniently so that a proficient person may rely on the prayer leader, perhaps stringently they did take it into account, and because of this they practiced throughout the world to have both silent prayer and repetition even when everyone is proficient).
Be that as it may, it is an explicit ruling in Maimonides that even when a court finds reason to abolish an enactment that did not spread among the public, one does not abolish more than two enactments in a generation. So what good did the sages accomplish by abolishing their enactment 🙂 – would the abolition of two enactments calm anyone who thinks a 'comprehensive revolution' must be made and that all 613 commandments are a dreadful burden?
Either way, one whose soul is weary of the yoke of Torah and commandments and ancestral heritage will not be satisfied with anything less than "let everything be permitted, let all be released; even the Torah's prohibitions are an unnecessary burden," while one who truly desires to serve God – for him the commandments, enactments, and customs are all threads connecting a person to his Creator.
The central question is: what is a person looking for? One who wants to detach from his Creator—no leniencies or annulment of decrees will help him; whereas one who wants to connect to his Creator finds his place in His Torah, all of whose general rules and particulars bring man to cleave to his Creator.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
I would also comment on your argument against 'hidden reasons.' Rabbinic literature, even if it was written down, was primarily transmitted by oral memorization. This character requires great brevity, and naturally one had to be brief in reasons and explanations; there is a limit to how much could be loaded onto the memorizing tanna. All the more so in matters connected to the secrets of Creation and the Chariot and the like, which were not expounded in public.
I deliberately wrote "truths" because for me the question is not what the source of authority is, but what the truth behind the authority is, and that is what I meant.
An unproven claim is a logical fallacy when it presents an option as a fact
Paragraph 4, line 2:
… even Torah commandments are…
What is "the truth behind authority"? I do not see any sense at all in that combination of words.
It seems to me you still do not understand what a logical fallacy is, and in any case by your method it would be hard to find anything written that is not full of logical fallacies. But really this semantic discussion does not matter very much. You should just know to use words as most of the world uses them.
"According to the hidden posts of the sages of Israel"?? What does that mean? (Is there a closed Facebook group of the sages of Israel?)
Beyond that, I would be glad if you wrote one smart thing those sages of Israel said. I sat through many classes, read many books, and all I found among those sages of Israel was:
either completely banal,
or smart but not original (you will find similar insights in other religions or just among gentiles),
or a promise without substance that there are hidden things we cannot understand.
It should also be noted that the return of authority to the court might entail not only sweeping leniencies, but also the addition of fences and decrees, from which the sages are currently prevented. As Rabbi Kook said, a Sanhedrin that arises might decree against automobiles out of concern that they may cause accidents and the like.
To merchants from abroad who complained about the economic difficulties caused to them by the 'second festival day of the Diaspora,' Rabbi Kook offered a brilliant solution: immigrate to the Land of Israel and be rid altogether of the burden of the 'second festival day' 🙂
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
The rabbi's claim ultimately boils down to an empirical claim. The bottom-line question is whether this will strengthen Judaism or weaken it.
Because insofar as it weakens Judaism, that is a sufficient reason for all the enactments.
To me it is clear that this will weaken Judaism for 2 reasons.
A. Any act of change in religion done for the sake of those weak in religion—for whom this is what tips the scale one way or the other—does not really help. In most cases it is merely an excuse for a choice that would have been made anyway.
B. The actual risk is so clear and tangible that the effect of such a step is not a slippery slope but a cliff fall. Set up one such court of God-fearing people, and the very next day dozens of such courts will arise in all kinds of communities in the Jewish people.
This is exactly, but exactly, the stamp of approval that the Reform movement lacks so badly. There is no doubt that they do not for a moment think their rabbis are inferior to the God-fearing rabbis. And the only argument against them is that even the God-fearing do not change things.
In my humble opinion, the view expressed in the article is fundamentally mistaken, and the article can convince only a reader who read it in an "uncritical" way, or only a reader who did not notice the nuances, or even only a reader who is not enough of a Torah scholar and not sufficiently versed in the relevant sources in depth—and forgive me for the bluntness.
I will also explain why it is completely mistaken:
1) A mistake from the standpoint of logic—the Gemara explicitly forbade a lesser court to annul the words of a court greater than it, even if the reason for the original enactment of the greater court has lapsed. And all the more so, it certainly denied authority to individuals to annul the words of the greater court, even if the reason has lapsed.
The writer assumes that these words of the sages themselves were based on the assumption that this was a short exile. I disagree with this assumption of his as well, but even if we accept it for the sake of discussion, the writer argues that these words of the sages themselves (that one may not annul the words of a greater court even if the reason has lapsed) should be annulled because their reason (that this is a short exile) has lapsed, according to his view! In other words, his conclusion is built on an assumption that can be accepted only if one already accepts his conclusion. In other words, his conclusion does not hold water logically; it is circular reasoning. (If someone does not understand the argument I just wrote, let me know and, without making a vow, I will gladly explain it.)
2) The writer assumes that the reason one court may not annul the words of another court is merely a dry formalistic reason. It is quite possible, and even more plausible, that the reason for the prohibition against annulling the words of the greater court is that the presumption is that even if it seems to the lesser court that the reason has lapsed and there is no reason to continue the enactment, in fact the reason has not lapsed, because perhaps the original court had an additional, deeper reason than the lesser court understands. This is not an apologetic claim. It is a basic conception in Judaism and in halakhic ruling that "a person does not stand on his teacher's opinion" until after 40 years, and that the generations decline. Just as it never occurred to the Gemara that an amora would dispute a tanna, because the presumption is that the tanna understands better, so certainly the sages of our time do not have understanding on the level required to dispute the Gemara or to impose conditions on its words that it never hinted at at all.
3) In general, halakhah has always been built on applying reason only where it does not contradict, even by implication, the opinion of a higher halakhic authority. Perhaps in Western thought in general, and scientific thought in particular, people love to praise reason, but our reason as human beings is very limited. After all, one who sat in the Sanhedrin had to know how to explain intellectually 150 reasons why a creeping thing is pure, and presumably even the greatest of the generation who sat there had to be "convinced" that the creeping thing ought to be pure, but still the Torah tells us that all these reasons were false, since the Torah explicitly testified that a creeping thing is impure! In other words, the test is not what seems reasonable to me or to you (because all of us can fall into logical fallacies and become intellectually convinced of falsehood, even with complete good faith on the part of the speaker and the listener), but what the higher authority said. And the highest authority relevant to the matter said unequivocally that one court has no authority to annul the words of another court, etc., and did not distinguish between a long exile and a short one. So even if to our reason this seems illogical, it is logical; our reason is simply limited. Just as it is indeed logical that a creeping thing is impure even though they persuaded us with 150 reasons that it is pure.
4) As for the argument that this creates contempt for Judaism and halakhah—simply not true. There are hundreds of thousands of Jews who observe even minor commandments as seriously as major ones, even though they continue to observe the second festival day of the Diaspora and the other things mentioned. By contrast, once one begins to treat halakhah as subject to reason rather than the reverse, there is ostensibly the risk that every youth will determine according to his little mind what seems reasonable to him and what not.
And there is much more to answer, but it seems to me this is enough to demonstrate how the article may sound convincing, but is fundamentally mistaken.
The lungs do not mature enough in the eighth month in relation to the development of the body, and without an incubator or early injections to accelerate lung maturation, the baby will die.
That is probably the source of the myth in the Gemara, and the source of the halakhah that for an eight-month baby the mother crouches and nurses him on Shabbat, while the baby himself is muktzeh…
I didn't read everything you wrote, but your argument 2 is clearly ad hoc (deep reasons = invisible goblins)
The truth behind authority = what is the real meaning underlying the authority, what is the motivating force behind it that also creates the reason and substance of the decree or the mode of conduct in the final analysis. Since we are dealing here with thinking people, I allowed myself to be brief, and it did not seem incomprehensible to me.
As for the logical fallacy, indeed it is unimportant semantics, but from the responses I see I am not the only one who thinks there is such a fallacy here
Not when deep reasons are an integral part of the system (one court does not annul the decree of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and number), and when we see that at least part of the mode of operation was to observe first and then try to understand the reason, to the point of "go out and see what the people do"; from where do we know that song is forbidden, and so on and on without end.
Shatz"l, after generations in which they did not abolish even a single enactment, a situation has arisen in which many need to be abolished. And by the way, the first enactment I would abolish is the enactment not to abolish more than two enactments (of course there is no such enactment, and I wrote that for rhetorical flourish).
By the way, I am entirely in favor of adding stringencies. My claim is not a claim for leniency but to aim at the truth, whether leniently or stringently.
It seems to me we have exhausted the matter.
Hello Avi.
There are quite a few logical flaws in what you write, and the first of them is a misunderstanding of the concept of a logical fallacy, as Yishai already explained.
Yishai also answered you regarding the role of reasoning in halakhah. All the qualifications I brought in the article I referred to, which were created by decisors throughout the generations, are based on reasoning less strong than what I brought here. That does not stop anyone from using them.
As for severances from tradition and the root of the soul, I will leave that to the kabbalists.
Sociology is not my field.
I do not know why I am supposed to follow the sages of the generation, especially since I do not know how to define who they are. Today there is no court with authority. True, it is fitting to take such steps with some kind of consensus, but even that is not a wall and there is no clear definition of consensus (since this is mainly a matter of common sense and not a formal halakhic principle). If the consensus is not created, I assume it will be created from below, and all the better. Many will complain about breaches of the fences, and in the end quite a few of them may perhaps thank whoever does it and perhaps even join him.
I know of no intuition regarding the existence of hidden reasons. This is a mechanism raised ad hoc in order to oppose changes. In my eyes it is more a reflex than an intuition.
If the hope you express at the end of your words is realized, that will be my reward. In any case, I certainly am not waiting for the rabbis of the Kav, and their decisions really have no importance in my eyes. So even if a miracle happens and they join such a move, it would be meaningless in my eyes.
You assume some model of Judaism and infer from it harm or benefit. My claim is that what we are preserving does indeed bring great benefit—but not to Judaism. The change is not made in order to bring benefit but in order to behave in the proper way required by halakhah.
And another logical problem in what you write. You say changes are made for the sake of the weak. You overlooked the fact that the existence of many of these "weak" people stems to no small degree from the absence of change itself.
And I am amazed how you did not address the seven clean days. After all, one can write a calculation program for a mobile phone that will calculate days of menstruation and abnormal discharge. Shall we remain forever with the women in the fields?
Eldad, hello.
1. With all due respect, this is children's logic. According to your method, the fact that one cannot change the Talmudic rule follows from that very assumption itself. So you too are begging the question. All the rules brought in my article mentioned in the post, which make it possible to change enactments when their reason has lapsed (and there are hundreds of examples of this), are based on the assumption that one can change or qualify the Talmudic rule that halakhot cannot be changed when necessary. Again, begging the question. And so too the sages who determined that they themselves have authority by virtue of "you shall not turn aside" rely on their own begging of the question. And so on. This is of course nonsense, and I assume what I wrote is enough for you to understand that.
2. You repeat something already discussed in the post. Is that not redundant? Ad hoc refutations that prevent refutation are a known technique. You only need to explain why a later court, smaller than its predecessor, is permitted to abolish Torah laws established by its predecessor. Are there no hidden reasons there?
3. The Torah does not at all say that the reasons are false. It only says that the reasons to deem the creeping thing impure outweigh those that deem it pure. Maharal addressed this in several places. But that is not really important for our matter. You are again reverting to faith in the wisdom of sages as beyond criticism. We disagree about that.
4. Indeed, those who have not yet left continue to observe the second festival day. Others have abandoned that, and others have abandoned everything entirely. But we are left with the flask of pure oil of a minority of innocent conservatives who continue, without any critical attitude, to preserve this anachronistic system in its purity. If you enjoy that—good for you.
What, am I to go like a peddler and enumerate everything?! I said I am bringing only a few examples out of many.
Rabbi Michael, I was very surprised by your response.
Perhaps I did not use ideal semantics for the concept of a logical fallacy, but that does not exempt you from the real question, which is how you use ungrounded assumptions as the basis on which to erect your Torah observance.
Your and Yishai's answer—that in halakhah too one quite often uses ungrounded tools—does not exempt you, because it requires you to recognize that methods different from yours, and just as ungrounded as yours, are also aimed at God's will; yet that does not seem implied by your words.
As for the second part of your words, I am even more surprised. For you bluntly ignored the fact that you are severing yourself from part of the Torah organism. Perhaps you do not want to use the concept of soul, since it is a kabbalistic concept. But you can certainly use concepts such as life, consciousness, and a person's perception of himself as one personality. If you believe that the Master of the universe is the root of life, the root of the subtle structures of our consciousness and experiences, then severing from the path He outlined as we have known it in the people of Israel over the years (and as I showed, you are asking for such a severance) may be a factor severing one from the source of life
Aviaz, I am sorry you were surprised. But what can I do?! I assume you do not think I should say only things that do not surprise you.
I use very well-grounded assumptions (to the extent that one can define grounding for basic assumptions), no less than any other halakhic consideration based on reasoning. I explained this. I have no claim against someone who uses ungrounded tools (what is that?). What I claim is that with those same tools one can also reach different conclusions, and that I certainly support them and think they are correct. I did not claim that conservatives are ungrounded, but that they are not right. I hope and assume you understand the difference between those two.
You declared that I am severing myself from souls and traditions, and I said I have nothing to say about that (by the way, I have no opposition to Kabbalah and kabbalistic concepts. I am simply a staunch supporter of using defined concepts and claims with clear meaning. Which was not the case with what you wrote). Whoever thinks his way is the natural continuation of the tradition, and whoever thinks otherwise is severing from it—good for him. Why am I supposed to address such declarations one way or another? When arguments are raised, then we can talk.
Of course there is no need to enumerate like a peddler, but this example is especially prominent.
"I did not claim that conservatives are ungrounded, but that they are not right." – So I also claim that you are not ungrounded, but simply not right. You too can entertain gut-level conjectures that all rabbinic decrees apply only to people who have eyes in the back of their heads, and still be grounded, because it is a common halakhic tool to entertain gut-level conjectures, and examples are not lacking. You claim that all the sages' decrees are built on the assumption that the exile will be short; in my view that is a light-minded assumption, with great doubt whether it is true regarding some of the decrees, but certainly not all of them.
I did not declare that you are severing yourself from souls and traditions. I pointed to your severance from an entire approach that has accompanied Jewish sources since the sages, and I commented on the possible implications of this severance. To that you did not answer, and that is a real claim—why do you see the halakhic practices as the central line of Torah, but not the approach to those practices, which is often an approach of deference toward earlier generations or toward public conduct, both of which are part of the Torah organism? Who appointed you to make this distinction?
Aviaz,
It is completely legitimate to make that claim against me. You just ought to write what you are claiming, and not write one thing and then explain that you meant something else.
If you think my reasonings are gut-level conjectures (like the reasoning that the sages' decrees apply to people with eyes in the back of their heads), then we have a disagreement about that. Reasonings of the "eyes in the back of the head" sort I too do not accept. In short, after clearing away all the mistakes and inaccuracies, there is no new claim here that was not already answered in the post itself (in fact I do not see any claim here at all). This is the place to part as friends.
The public will vote with its feet on the issue of the seven clean days before it uses the same tool for meat and milk.
It would sadden me if we part here, mainly because you did not answer the question of how you decide what counts as part of the Torah organism and what does not. Why are you so attached to the halakhic practices, yet wave away in the blink of an eye the sages' frequent deference to public conduct, from the assumption that if they are not prophets they are sons of prophets, throughout the generations from the sages until today. What is the difference? Why is this Torah but that is not? I am really asking in order to know your opinion. After all, you are a person with much influence and important ideas
So as not to sadden a Jew, I will clarify. I am not obligated to anyone's feelings, however important he may be, or however many such people there may be. If someone chooses to defer to someone else—so be it. What obligates is the halakhah, that is, what is written in the Torah and interpreted by the authorized institutions (namely, the Sanhedrin or the Talmud). And of course all this is subject to interpretation, and I am obligated by what seems to me reasonable and correct. Prophets and sons of prophets and other such phrases do not say much to me, and I see no reason to be bound by them.
As a side note, I will also say that you of course have not clarified what in your opinion is part of the Torah organism and what is not. In your view, is everything that exists at a given time part of the organism? That is a strange criterion and does not stand the test of historical facts (since what exists has often changed).
Thank you for the serious response.
I certainly respect the position you presented, and I myself was in it for a long period, but I will explain briefly, as much as I can, why in my eyes it is problematic and not in line with the Torah as we know it.
In the Shulchan Arukh, in Maimonides, in the Mishnah, and in the Gemara—a simple reader would not know whether the given halakhah he is reading is de'oraita, derabbanan, or custom, or even just conduct, in about 90% of cases, to the point of extremes where when the Gemara says of something that it is de'oraita, we see in other sources that it is not really de'oraita but merely an asmachta. Moreover, even in the Written Torah there are many things where, although one thing is written, the practical interpretation is its opposite by 180 degrees.
Beyond that, in the Bible and the Talmud there are woven into the text many life instructions and 'principles' according to which the sage/righteous person is supposed to conduct himself.
If the Torah's expectation were that we cling tightly to the halakhic practices, I would expect all this literature to look completely different.
Certainly there is an expectation to distinguish between decrees and modes of conduct and Torah laws, but this comes hand in hand with a call to merge with the 'values' of Torah. When the Torah says "an eye for an eye," it does not mean pluck out eyes—and not only that, it also means "the wicked person should be punished according to his wickedness." When the Gemara says "one does not inquire after a woman's welfare," it does not mean there is some halakhah decided by the Sanhedrin that one may not say the word 'shalom' to a woman, but rather that there is an expectation of tact and delicacy and a certain modesty in relation to women. And so on and on; this is the unifying thread.
Therefore, with all the attraction of the path you propose, I do not think it is in line with Judaism as we know it, neither by way of the tradition and the 'Torah' atmosphere that guided Jewish communities in exile, nor by way of the written sources. Therefore I am compelled to remain in disagreement with you.
In one word—I do see in the expression "If they are not prophets, they are sons of prophets" a binding expression, even if I do not necessarily understand it, just as "Justice, justice shall you pursue" is, in a substantive sense, a binding expression from the plain reading of the Torah, beyond the prohibitions of cheating with weights in commerce and interest to gentiles.
I hope I was clear; I allowed myself to express myself freely
Chaim
The question is not why they thought an eight-month baby dies, but why they thought a seven-month baby is viable
Rabbi, I did not understand what you want and from whom. If there is an enactment you do not like, don't do it. Do you want to persuade others so that you won't be considered "lite religious"? Why do you care what others think? (R. Feynman) From whom do you want to receive a stamp of approval? Do you want to write a halakhah book that seems less anachronistic to you—write it, and whoever accepts it will accept it. Do you want to establish an authoritative body? Establish a body, and if people accept its words, you succeeded. Do you also want enforcement?! I really did not understand
Thank you very much.
1.
Okay. I understand your unwillingness to get into sociology. I only noted that your proposals for change are detached from reality, in my opinion. They connect in my mind to your constant distinction between theoreticians who sit in ivory towers and practical people (Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: had we been in the Sanhedrin, no person would ever have been executed; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: they too would increase bloodshedders in Israel…).
The problem is known, but you did not propose a practical move toward a solution (and in my opinion there is none).
2.
Another point: your optimism reminded me of your controversial proposal in column 83 to abolish the legislative system. In my eyes, the optimism and belief in the public's ability to correct itself in a gradual and controlled way are rather naive.
3.
Third, it seems to me a point was missed here, and nobody commented on it.
Your underlying assumption is that we have come to terms with a situation in which there is no Sanhedrin, and therefore we need to recalculate the route—how to change halakhah in an era in which there is no prospect of a Sanhedrin.
I accept your assumption, but a large part of the people do not. The Haredi public believes that soon the Messiah will come, the Temple will descend from heaven, and reality will change from one end to the other. 'Tishbi will resolve difficulties and problems,' 'and the earth shall be full of knowledge of the Lord.'
The Haredi leaders see no need for a long-term solution to the problem. From their perspective, they only need to 'drag' the wagon until the coming of the Messiah, speedily in our days, and then he will take command and heal all the problems.
From their perspective, their responsibility is to hand over responsibility to the Messiah when Judaism is in the best possible state, namely—with as many Jews as possible observing halakhah. They do not want to take risks with reforms and refreshing halakhah. They will protect the people from secularism by the safe and conservative path, and the Messiah will fix the distortions.
It is a shame there is no explicit treatment of the difference in apocalyptic positions, from which the different approaches are derived.
Aharon
The second way of coping sounds good to me: "pouring different content into a halakhah that has lost its relevance" – if there is a new purpose for the halakhah whose original purpose was different, then that is good and excellent (provided the new purpose is truly concrete, worthy, and strong).
Once the purpose of fingers was to grasp branches – today their purpose is to type texts on a computer, and no one suggests amputating them just because the first purpose is no longer relevant.
Yasher koach for this article and the other articles.
Two remarks:
Another example of the absurdity of the last generations is the size measurements. In this week's Daf Yomi there is a dispute whether an olive-bulk is the size of one and a half ants or ten and a half ants, and the Gemara says there is no dispute but that each one referred to a different kind of ant. According to the measurements common today in halakhah, it would take hundreds (thousands?) of ants to make up an "olive-bulk." Hence all the bizarre spectacles of eating matzah on the Seder night, and so on.
Second remark –
In the past, when the public was more uniform (Haredi or secular), it was hard to make changes because the public followed its leaders, who opposed changes. Thus, for example, the attempt to blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat in Jerusalem failed. Today, when there are many camps, there is a chance that a halakhic ruling will be adopted by part of the public and slowly seep into more conservative publics.
In my opinion, whoever can should publish halakhic rulings in the spirit of your article, and there is a good chance they will be adopted.
Moshe
It seems to me you are somewhat confused (I judge you favorably). The validity of an enactment is due to those who enacted it. If it has a new purpose, that is in effect a new enactment. So if they want to enact and there is someone who can do so, let them enact it. But if this is done to save the original enactment, and usually these are artificial and unconvincing contents, there is no point in it at all.
This is unlike fingers, which are a physiological fact. And if one finds a use for them, excellent.
If you haven't noticed, that is what I am doing here. I am not particularly interested in what people think of me: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A1/
As stated, I do not deal in sociology.
No idea…
"'The prohibition of kitniyot,' which was apparently founded on concern that chametz might be found in the packages of legumes—a concern that no longer exists today,".
I found grains of wheat inside packages of lentils more than once.
I am not confused.
Indeed, the validity of an enactment is due to those who enacted it, but it does not simply lapse on its own, and if it has a sufficiently good reason, even if different from the original reason, there is no reason to abolish it; and conversely, there is also no need to reconvene and re-enact it anew.
(Of course, I am talking about good reasons. Weak reasons are not sufficient grounds, though one can argue about the weakness of certain reasons).
And what about the other examples the rabbi brought? And what about all the bizarre branches of the kitniyot prohibition regarding oil, etc.? And what and what and what..
Crazy
I recommend you file an official complaint with the Adash Li regards company. In addition to the complaint,
I would recommend looking at the post on kitniyot in its original place
(you'll find it with a simple site search) I believe there is discussion there of the startling findings.
Good luck
Excellent. A change must be made in order to save Judaism.
Mario wrote:
I am commenting here because for some reason on my computer it doesn't let me comment directly on the article.
If I understood correctly, there are two basic arguments in favor of the changes the rabbi proposes—
A) desecration of God's name, abandonment of halakhah, etc.
B) distancing from God's will.
The first problem is not a problem. Why should it matter to us if people are mistaken? If there is God and He gave us His Torah, then it is binding whatever is written in it (as long as it makes sense, of course). If people are mistaken, why is that a problem of the Torah? The example of Knesset members on a plane is misleading: the authority of Knesset members comes from people's decision, so obviously the decision can change. Here we have a constitutional system that is (at least perceived as) imposed on everyone, regardless of whether they want it or not, so what a person thinks or feels about it is not so relevant…
Second problem: the will of God as I know it is to observe the Torah, and the Torah (in its practical sense) is the observance of commandments according to halakhah. How can what is in halakhah be against God's will? It is the very category of His will. How does the rabbi know of extra-Torah divine desires? There is here a closed halakhic file called serving God, and that is His will.
My response:
1. The arguments are not separate but combine with each other: since they are not mistaken, there is added weight to the desecration of God's name (beyond the deviation from God's will). That is, not correcting the mistakes creates a double problem: deviation from God's will and desecration of God's name. Sometimes there is room for deviation from God's will if it helps make fences or serves some such benefit. But here there is harm, and therefore there is no room for it.
2. Halakhah too is the result of human thought and decision, which is an interpretation of the Written and Oral Torah. Therefore here too there is room for our interpretation and for changes, exactly as in the laws of the Knesset. Do you really think that every סעיף in the Mishnah Berurah was given to Moses at Sinai?
With God's help, 9 Kislev 5778
To Ramda – greetings,
From Beitzah 4a it emerges that the concern for corruption on account of which the sages of the Land of Israel instructed the Jews of the Diaspora "be careful to preserve your ancestral custom in your hands" was out of concern for a government decree, and Rashi explained that they feared the government would decree that they not engage in Torah and the secret of intercalation would be forgotten (and not as you wrote, that the concern was that sanctification by sighting would be renewed and there would be communication failures with the Diaspora).
Until less than thirty years ago, hundreds of thousands of Jews lived in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for many years behind the 'Iron Curtain,' cut off from all connection to Torah, to the point that even a simple calendar was hard to obtain. We hope those dark days will not return, but our eyes see that even in an age of progress and enlightenment, and in the name of progress and enlightenment, decrees can be made that will bring a significant part of the people of Israel to forget Torah.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Shatz"l,
It is beyond me how this is connected to the discussion here. If there is concern that the secret of intercalation will be forgotten, what good does it do to observe all the festivals for two days, and why specifically in the Diaspora? They should observe Passover all year, because maybe they will think a month is 83 days, or perhaps 207 days, or maybe that Passover falls every five years and not every year.
And what if they forget the laws of meat and milk and mixtures? Perhaps we should forbid eating anything lest they eat something forbidden?
It is hard for me to believe you do not see the levels of absurdity to which this apologetics reaches. Every message of yours only makes the situation even worse.
The sages enacted the second festival day of the Diaspora out of concern for a government decree that would lead to forgetting the calendar, as explained in Beitzah 4 and in Rashi. I only showed that even in our modern period such things have happened. If you wish to rail against the sages, let it be sweet to you, and enjoy it.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
A study was published claiming that "single women are happier than single men. Sixty-one percent of the women testified that they feel good being single and that overall they feel happy, compared to 49 percent of the men."
So if the results of the study are reliable, then ostensibly we have evidence of a psychological change from the time of the sages.
In antiquity they determined that only women will give up almost everything as long as they are not left alone, unlike men, whereas today it seems the situation is reversed.
http://www.kikar.co.il/256798.html
Aharon
Aharon, you remind me of Tosafot proving that there are many stars in the heavens from the verse, "Lift up your eyes to heaven and see…" If we did not know this on our own, such "studies" that are published every other day by various bored people would not change my mind.
Rabbi,
I think the intent of the argument in the second section is different. The question concerns the very assumption that there is a deviation from God's will, because He Himself commanded us to heed the words of the sages. In other words, why think that when a certain detail of the Torah is not fulfilled according to its original intention, this constitutes an injury to God's will, if that same Torah commanded us to do whatever they instruct us?
Indeed, with respect to the sages themselves there is perhaps an argument here, that they should return and issue a ruling that fulfills God's will more precisely. But we, who according to what is said here are stirring the change from below, should not at all be troubled by the deviation from the specific details, since the current situation is itself God's will in accordance with the general command obligating us to heed the words of the sages.
Thank you, Rabbi.
What is interesting in this study is that it too distinguishes between men and women, but in the opposite direction from the sages.
And what troubles me is the fact that in the religious and Haredi public the sages' determination still applies to some extent more than in the secular public. Take for example a 25-year-old woman from Meah Shearim who still has not found a match; she has the status of an 'older girl,' and therefore she is willing to give up many things, so long as she is not left in her loneliness. To some extent, if we sought to release her without a get, there would be more room to assume that 'it is better to dwell as two' applies to her.
This situation is a result of Haredi tradition, which is built in part on the perpetuation of patriarchal structures and chauvinism. The father seeks a match for his daughter and gives her to the groom, who will bring her into his home and take her under his protection. A daughter whom her father cannot manage to sell is a sign that her value is low on the marriage market. How will she continue to pass her days? Who will take her under his protection?
Take perhaps a divorced woman + 2 sons. Who will make Kiddush and Havdalah for her? Who will teach Torah and halakhah in the home? Who will test the boys on Shabbat? Who will go with them to the parent-teacher meeting with the melamed? And who will take them to synagogue on Shabbat?
In other words, we have entered the chicken-and-egg paradox. If we agree that in Haredi society there is still room for the above rule, then halakhah
is the result of a social situation (chauvinism), and the social situation is the result of halakhah.
This is a tangle that exists in other places too. Halakhah sets rules that are based on a social reality, but in practice cause its perpetuation.
So, is it right to qualify and determine that in the Haredi public this rule, or others like it, still apply? Is it right to use halakhic guidelines at a time when we understand that those guidelines are their own cause?
Aharon
Very enlightening. But we should also ask the question the other way around: what are the reasons loneliness is good in the secular public? Is it connected to the fact that a woman remains attractive while single because there is promiscuity, or perhaps because career advancement is much more important to many women than couplehood or family? Then we must ask to what extent in the religious public the situation
is different, and also to what extent it is liable or ought to change, and only after that can one decide to what extent the assumption that it is better to dwell as two is valid.
And even then, of course, there is a difference between older Haredi single women who desperately long to marry, and young women who examine every date with tweezers
That is of course very true. The norms practiced in society are influenced by it and influence it, and they have a tendency to reinforce themselves. In fact, as long as this is the situation in society, then in a discussion regarding a particular woman one must assume there is a presumption of "it is better to dwell as two," for that is the correct assumption, even if we do not like it. On the legal plane the question is not what is desirable but what exists.
But it seems to me that even in Haredi society the situation is far from what it was in the period of the Talmud and the Rishonim. Moreover, if there is a specific woman for whom it is clear that these are not her preferences, one should go by her own situation. General presumptions and majority rules are meant only for a situation in which the reality is unknown.
It has already been explained there by Rashi that the margin of error the sages feared was one day, for the Hebrew month is a 'lunar month' which is sometimes 'deficient' with 29 days and sometimes 'full' with 30 days, and the enactment of the second festival day covers both possibilities.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Ploni,
First, even the criteria by which decisors are supposed to operate are not agreed upon. My claim is first of all in relation to them.
Beyond that, I argue that if they do not act, what will happen in practice—and in my opinion sometimes it is even fitting that it happen that way—is that it will happen from below.
Why do I write that it is fitting? Because the Holy One, blessed be He, says "according to all that they instruct you" not in order to cancel all the other values of Torah. The value of obeying the sages is one value, but beyond it there are other values (such as doing God's will regarding Shabbat, women, forbidden foods, morality, and the like). Sometimes there is a clash, and for some reason you assume that the value of obedience always prevails. I deny that. It seems to me you are entering here into the issue of one who errs in a mitzvah to heed the words of the sages (see Horayot 2).
What is more, there is no obligation at all to obey sages nowadays (when there are no ordained judges and no Great Court). So with respect to the interpretations of the sages of this generation there is not even the value of obedience. What there is toward them is only what I once called here substantive authority (as distinct from formal authority). Substantive authority is not really authority at all, but merely taking an expert into account in order to arrive at the correct result. And here lies the weakness of substantive authority: if I have reached the conclusion that the expert is mistaken, the branch that obligates obedience to him is cut off (unlike formal authority, which does not derive from expertise but from authority, and therefore does not depend on the authorized body being right or wiser than me).
And finally, I do not know who deserves the title decisor of the generation or great one of the generation, such that one can speak about substantive authority regarding him. As for myself, I have little trust in the decisions of those who are called the great ones or decisors of the generation. From which it follows that they have neither formal nor substantive authority.
In the Jerusalem Talmud (Ta'anit 3:1) it is told of Rabbi that he wanted to permit labor in the sabbatical year, but refrained from doing so when he realized that Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair was not pleased with it.
It is not so clear how Rabbi wanted to permit the sabbatical year, for no court may annul the words of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and number, especially regarding the sabbatical year, whose prohibition spread throughout Israel (see Tosafot, Gittin 36b), and it is not plausible that Rabbi regarded his court as greater than the court that decreed regarding shemittah.
Could it be that Rabbi read this article?
It is also told there that they brought before him a man who was suspected regarding the sabbatical year (apparently so that he would punish him or warn him), but Rabbi said to them: what should this poor man do? After all, he does it for his livelihood.
There is an implication that the unusual empathy Rabbi showed toward that man stems from the fact that he violated a prohibition that in Rabbi's opinion ought to have been annulled.
Just one note. There is no reason Rabbi should not have thought that his court was greater than his predecessors. The assumption that the later one is always smaller than his predecessor empties of content the possibility of change by a court greater in wisdom and number, since that would never happen.
This is the flaw in the Raavad's objection to Maimonides in the Laws of Rebels from the matter of adorning the streets of Jerusalem with fruits, for he assumed as self-evident that the later one is smaller than his predecessor.
I now recall that in the responsa Avkat Rokhel, R. Yosef Karo testifies about himself that he and his court are the greatest in the generation and therefore do not need to write from where they judged.
I do not know anything definite, but it seems to me that "the decline of the generations" is too strongly rooted in rabbinic thinking for me to think such an idea plausible. Besides the clear statements said by the sages about the relation between later and earlier authorities, there is the story of Honi the Circle-Maker, who cannot find what to do in the study hall seventy years later than his own time, or the sugya in Bava Batra 121a, where one sees the decline of the generations in practice.
Indeed, regarding Rabbi we find that he was considered greater than Rabbi Yosei, who belonged to the generation before him (Tosafot Shabbat 51a, s.v. אילו), but from here to his considering himself and his court greater than the Sanhedrin in the time of the First Temple seems far-fetched.
If the Beit Yosef meant only his own generation, that is not relevant to our discussion.
With God's help, 12 Kislev 5778
To Yerahmiel – greetings,
But Rabbi himself used humble language regarding Rabbi Yosei: "We poor ones raise difficulties against Rabbi Yosei," and not for nothing did they say at the end of Sotah: "When Rabbi died, humility and fear of sin ceased"..
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
One who excelled in humility after Rabbi was Rav Yosef, who testified of himself: "Do not teach that humility has ceased, for there is me." I once heard that what Rabbi and Rav Yosef (who was a "Sinai") had in common is that the entire Oral Torah, all the mishnayot and baraitot, was spread out and laid before them. One for whom all the expanses of Torah are open becomes humble through that, for he sees that almost all the reasonings that seem like far-reaching innovations have already been said and discussed by the ancients, and who better than he is aware of their incomprehensible greatness.
Yerahmiel, Shatz"l answered well.
As for Avkat Rokhel, I did not bring from it a direct proof. I only wanted to show that sages are prepared to regard themselves as greater than others despite considerations of humility. Therefore there is no reason Rabbi could not have seen himself as a court greater than his predecessors.
As Rabbi Michael said, if the concept of decline of the generations is deeply rooted in the outlook, while at the same time the statement that one court cannot annul, etc., is taken literally, then there is no ability to annul decrees forever and ever until the resurrection of the dead. In other words: from the giving of the Torah it was decreed that anything the Sanhedrin rules could, after a generation or two, no longer ever be annulled.
To me that is very difficult.
Likewise, it is strange how a court is supposed to know whether it is wiser than a previous court that has not existed for years. That is impossible!
One can answer in several ways: wisdom can also be information not known to earlier generations, and one must also remember that we are dealing with rabbinic enactments, where the rule says that in doubt one is lenient, and in practice this means: do not dispute and annul what preceded you until there is a high probability that you have grasped the reason for the enactment they instituted, and additional information or changes in reality have arisen that nullify the reason.
As stated, I do disagree with Rabbi Michael about how easily one can reach the conclusion that we have indeed grasped the reason behind the halakhah, especially and primarily when, unlike earlier generations, we do not give value to accepted public conduct on the assumption that the people of Israel are sons of prophets.
Thank you, Rabbi Michi. If only there were (or will be) more courage in the world to put these things into practice.