From Individuals to a People: On the Meaning of the Passover Offering (Column 209)[1]

With God's help

Over the past two Thursdays, as part of the series on means and ends (lessons 4 and 5), I came to discuss the categorical imperative (see Column 122). In the course of the discussion it became clear to me that it also touches on voting in the upcoming elections, as well as on Passover (more precisely: the Passover offering) that is fast approaching, and in fact even serves as a continuation of the last two columns on Feiglin's identity and nationalism. The hand of such manifest providence does not allow me to refrain from writing a column on the subject.

The Passover offering between an individual offering and a communal offering

We are accustomed to dividing offerings into individual offerings (such as thanksgiving offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings, which are brought by a single person when he wishes or needs to) and communal offerings (which usually also have a fixed time). There are various rules that distinguish an individual offering from a communal one; for example, communal offerings are brought even in a state of ritual impurity (that is, ritual impurity is permitted or suspended for the community) and come from the Temple treasury collection, whereas an individual offering is not brought in impurity and is funded from the money of the owner of the offering.

Set against these two types, the Passover offering stands out as an independent category of offering. It is brought from the funds of the individual owner of the offering (and of those registered for it), and in that respect it resembles an individual offering; but at the same time it is also brought in ritual impurity, like a communal offering. The Passover offering is brought by the entire community, but each individual (or group of registrants) brings his own offering. I will not elaborate on this, because many have already discussed it (see the above-mentioned article of mine, and in more detail, for example, here and here, and in many other places). Here I will only try to explain the essence of the Passover offering through an analysis of its relation to the Second Passover, and then use that to explain the significance of its uniqueness on the axis between individual offerings and communal offerings.

The Second Passover

In Parashat Beha'alotekha there appears a very puzzling passage in which people who missed bringing the Passover demand an opportunity to make it up (Numbers 9:3-13):

And Moses spoke to the children of Israel to keep the Passover. And they kept the Passover in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai; according to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so the children of Israel did.

Now there were men who were unclean because of a human corpse, so that they could not keep the Passover on that day; and they came before Moses and before Aaron on that day. And those men said to him, We are unclean because of a human corpse; why should we be deprived of bringing the offering of the Lord at its appointed time among the children of Israel? And Moses said to them, Stand still, and I will hear what the Lord will command concerning you.

And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If any man of you or of your generations shall be unclean because of a dead body, or on a distant journey, he shall still keep the Passover to the Lord. In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall keep it; they shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter herbs. They shall leave none of it until morning, nor break a bone of it; according to all the statute of the Passover they shall keep it.

But the man who is clean and is not on a journey, and yet refrains from keeping the Passover, that person shall be cut off from his people, because he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin. Moses spoke to the children of Israel to offer the Passover. They offered the Passover in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai; according to all that the Lord had commanded Moses, so the children of Israel did. But there were men who were impure through a human corpse and could not offer the Passover on that day, and they approached Moses and Aaron on that day. Those men said to him: We are impure through a human corpse; why should we be diminished, not bringing the offering of the Lord at its appointed time among the children of Israel? Moses said to them: Stand by, and I will hear what the Lord will command concerning you. The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If any man is impure through a corpse or on a distant journey, among you or in your generations, he shall offer a Passover to the Lord. In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall offer it; they shall eat it with matzot and bitter herbs. They shall not leave any of it until morning, and they shall not break a bone in it; according to the entire law of the Passover they shall offer it. But the man who is pure and not on a journey, and refrains from offering the Passover, that soul shall be cut off from his people, for he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin.

It is unclear what is special specifically about the Passover offering, as opposed to any other commandment, for which we do not find that someone who missed it demands an opportunity to make it up. Moreover, their tone suggests that they are demanding it, even lodging a complaint ("why should we be diminished"), as though it were obvious to them that here there must be some possibility of completion. And indeed, the Holy One blessed be He responds to their request and introduces the law of the Second Passover.

The laws governing the offering of the two Passovers are similar, but there are several differences in the ancillary laws (see Pesachim 95a). In the Second Passover there is no law of prior registration, and it is brought by individuals. This is a natural consequence of its being an individual offering. If the entire community, or most of it, is impure on the first Passover, they bring the Passover as usual and are not deferred to the Second Passover, for ritual impurity is permitted/suspended for the community (see Maimonides, Laws of the Passover Offering 7:1). The Second Passover is brought only when the problem concerns individuals. It is therefore no surprise that the Second Passover is not brought in impurity (see Maimonides, Laws of the Passover Offering 5:15, and Tosafot, s.v. overrides the Sabbath, Yoma 51a)[2].

On the face of it, the conclusion is that despite the unique character of the first Passover, the Second Passover is certainly an individual offering. But if the Second Passover is indeed an individual offering, it is somewhat strange that it serves as a make-up for the first Passover, which in some respects is considered a communal offering. How can an offering of one character serve as a substitute for an offering of a different character? But before answering that, another question arises: is the Second Passover really a make-up for the first? On the face of the biblical passage it clearly is, for it is defined as an obligation applying to one who missed the first Passover. But the Sages did not see this as self-evident, and in fact we shall immediately see that even as a matter of Jewish law that is not how it is ruled.

The relationship between the two Passovers

The Sefer HaChinukh, at the beginning of commandment 57, defines the Second Passover as follows:

That anyone who could not offer the first Passover on the fourteenth of Nisan should observe the second Passover on the fourteenth of Iyar, for example because of impurity or because he was on a distant journey, as it is stated [Numbers 9:11]: In the second month, on the fourteenth day, at twilight, they shall make it. Our Sages, of blessed memory, further taught us [Pesachim 93a] that this applies not only specifically to impurity and distance of the journey alone, but rather anyone who erred, or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, or even acted intentionally and did not offer it on the first, offers it on the second. That anyone who could not observe the first Passover on the fourteenth of Nisan, for example because of impurity or because he was on a distant journey, should observe the Second Passover on the fourteenth of Iyyar, as it is said [Numbers 9:11]: In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall make it. And our Sages of blessed memory further taught us [Pesachim 93a] that not only impurity and distant travel are included; rather, anyone who erred, was prevented, or even deliberately failed to offer the first, offers the second.

The Sefer HaChinukh adds that the Sages expounded the Second Passover as a commandment even for one who did not observe the first deliberately, that is, for anyone who did not offer the first Passover. This is clearly a conception of the second as a make-up for the first. That only sharpens the difficulty we raised above: why is it so obvious that even one who deliberately failed regarding the first Passover must be allowed to make up the matter on the Second Passover? What is special about the Passover offering as compared to all the other commandments?

But despite this, the enumerators of the commandments counted the Second Passover as a commandment in its own right. This is strange, because ostensibly the Second Passover is nothing more than one detail within the laws of Passover: one who did not observe it for a justified reason makes it up on the Second Passover. Maimonides himself senses this difficulty and writes (Positive Commandment 57):

And this commandment is that He commanded us to slaughter the Second Passover for one who was prevented from offering the First Passover, as He, exalted be He, said (Beha'alotekha 9): In the second month, on the fourteenth day, at twilight, they shall make it. Here one who raises difficulties might challenge me and say to me: Why do you count the Second Passover, when this contradicts what you laid down in the seventh principle, when you said that the details of a commandment are not to be counted as a commandment on their own? Let the one who asks this question know that the sages already disagreed about the Second Passover—whether its law is like that of the First Passover, or whether it is a command stated independently—and the halakhah was decided that it is a command stated independently. Therefore it is proper to count it on its own. The 57th commandment is that He commanded us to slaughter the Second Passover for one who was prevented from the First Passover, as He, may He be exalted, said (Beha'alotekha 9): In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall make it. Here an objector may challenge me and say to me: why do you count the Second Passover, when this contradicts what you laid down in the Seventh Principle, when you said that the law of a commandment is not to be counted as an independent commandment? Let the one who raises this difficulty know that the Sages already disagreed about the Second Passover, whether its law is like the law of the First Passover or whether it is an independent command stated in its own right; and the law was decided that it is an independent command stated in its own right. Therefore it is fitting to count it separately.

Maimonides explains that as a matter of Jewish law the Second Passover is not a make-up for the first but an independent commandment, and therefore it is counted separately. This is very surprising, for in the verses themselves it seems clear that the second is a make-up for the first.

The source of this is the passage in Pesachim 93a-b:

The Rabbis taught: One is liable to karet for the first, and liable to karet for the second as well—these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Natan says: One is liable to karet for the first, but exempt for the second. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya says: Even for the first he is not liable to karet unless he did not perform the second. The Sages taught: One is liable to karet for the first, and liable to karet for the second; these are the words of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: One is liable to karet for the first, and exempt for the second. Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya says: One is not even liable to karet for the first unless he did not observe the second.

And they each follow their own reasoning, as it was taught in a baraita: A convert who converted between the two Passovers, and likewise a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, is obligated to observe the second Passover. This is the view of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: Anyone who was subject to the first is subject to the second; anyone who was not subject to the first is not subject to the second. What is the basis of their dispute? Rabbi holds that the second is a festival in its own right. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is compensation for the first, and one who was not obligated in the first cannot make it up through it. And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya holds that the second is an amendment for the first. And all three derived their views from one verse… And they follow their respective reasoning, as it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Passovers, and likewise a minor who came of age between the two Passovers – is obligated to observe the Second Passover; these are the words of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: Whoever was subject to the first is subject to the second; whoever was not subject to the first is not subject to the second. What do they disagree about? Rabbi holds that the second is a festival in its own right. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is a make-up for the first, and it cannot repair the first for one who was not originally subject to it. Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya holds that the second is a remedy for the first. And all three expounded one and the same verse…

Therefore: if he acted intentionally in both this and that, all agree he is liable; if he acted unwittingly in both this and that, all agree he is exempt. If he acted intentionally in the first and unwittingly in the second, according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan he is liable; according to Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya he is exempt. If he acted unwittingly in the first and intentionally in the second, according to Rabbi he is liable; according to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya he is exempt. Therefore: if he deliberately neglected both – everyone agrees he is liable; if he inadvertently neglected both – everyone agrees he is exempt; if he deliberately neglected the first and inadvertently neglected the second – Rabbi and Rabbi Natan hold him liable, while Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya exempts him. If he inadvertently neglected the first and deliberately neglected the second – Rabbi holds him liable, while Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya exempt him.

We will not enter here into all the details of the dispute and its implications, and will focus on the disagreement between Rabbi and Rabbi Natan. They disagree over whether a convert who converted between the two Passovers, or a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, is obligated in the Second Passover. According to Rabbi Natan, they are not obligated in the Second Passover, since they were not obligated in the first Passover, and the Second Passover is merely a make-up for one who was obligated in the first and did not do it. Rabbi, by contrast, holds that even though they were not obligated in the first Passover, they are obligated in the second, because the Second Passover is a commandment in its own right and not a make-up for the first. The law is decided in accordance with Rabbi, even though his position runs counter to what seems to emerge from the verses. We also see here that all agree that even one who deliberately failed to observe the first Passover is obligated in the second, and that seems on its face to contradict what we saw above in the verses.

The positions can be summarized as follows: according to Rabbi Natan (and Rabbi Chanania), one who offered the first Passover is not obligated in the second at all. Only one who did not offer the first becomes obligated. According to Rabbi, everyone is obligated, but one who has already offered the first is exempt from the second. As stated, Rabbi's opinion (which is the one accepted as Jewish law) is, on its face, very difficult in light of the wording of the verses, since they clearly imply that the Second Passover is a solution for one who did not offer the first. It is quite clear that Rabbi read the passage differently. According to his view, the second is not a make-up for the first; rather, one who brought the first is exempt from the second. One may say that not bringing the first is a sign that you are obligated in the second, but not the cause of that obligation.

The meaning of Passover and the Second Passover

In my article I argued that the Passover offering has two dimensions: it is an offering of individuals, and at the same time also a communal offering of the Jewish people as a whole. When there is a minority of impure people, the Passover brought by the majority constitutes the offering of the community, and a completion is required for the individual aspect (for those who are impure), and that is done on the Second Passover. When the majority is impure, everyone offers the Passover at the first opportunity, because ritual impurity is permitted/suspended for the community. In Jewish law there is no possibility of making up the communal aspect of the Passover offering, but there is no need for that either.

I explained there that the reason is that the Exodus from Egypt is the creation of the nation, and the Passover offering is the act that gathers all the individuals together and 'fuses' them into a collective community. On the Second Passover one can complete the obligation to bring an offering, which is an obligation of the individual, but not the creation of the nation. If the nation is created on the first Passover, then by bringing the Second Passover the individual who did not bring the first thereby joins a nation that already exists.

In fact, this is explained in the passage in Yoma 51a, where it says:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: But a tanna taught: Why is the Paschal offering called an individual offering, and why is the Festival offering called a communal offering? If it is because it is brought in a gathering, the Paschal offering too is brought in a gathering! There is the second Paschal offering, which is not brought in a gathering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rava: But the tanna, why does he call the Passover an individual offering, and why does he call the festival offering a communal offering? If it is because it comes in assembly – the Passover too comes in assembly! – There is the Second Passover, which does not come in assembly.

That is, the Passover has a communal character because it comes in assembly (= the entire community together), even though it is of course not an ordinary communal offering (in which one offering is brought for the entire community and it is purchased from the Temple treasury collection), whereas the Second Passover does not come in assembly and therefore is an individual offering. This is also the difference between the first Passover and the second: in the first they create a community, and in the second they join it. Therefore, according to the law, which follows Rabbi, the Second Passover is not really a make-up for the first, but of course one who brought the first is exempt from the second.

Perhaps in this we can also find an explanation for the difficulty with which we opened. In the biblical text it appears that it was obvious to Moses and to the people that there had to be some way of making up the commandment of Passover, and we wondered why Passover is exceptional among all the other commandments, such that if one did not observe them he cannot make them up. The answer is that it was clear to everyone that each individual must have an opportunity to join the community. Therefore the Sages add that even one who deliberately failed to observe the first Passover must have an opportunity to make it up on the Second Passover (it is not reasonable that he remain outside the Jewish people). That is what the Second Passover is for. But for one who participated in the first Passover this is of course no longer relevant.[3] This is how Rabbi reads the passage, and therefore it poses no contradiction to his view that the Second Passover is not a make-up for the first. In the first Passover they create the very community, and the second is intended to enable one who has not yet joined the community (which now already exists) to do so.

The connection to the commandment of circumcision

In my above-mentioned article I discussed the connection to the commandment of circumcision, which is another positive commandment that carries karet (Passover and circumcision are the only two). Circumcision also brings the individual into the Jewish people as a whole. This is of course not a communal commandment, because it parallels the Second Passover. In circumcision, the individual who is born joins an existing community. That is unlike the first circumcision of the Jewish people as a whole in the wilderness, which in this respect parallels the first Passover. And indeed, regarding the Passover offering it is said No uncircumcised person may eat of it. (no uncircumcised person shall eat of it), meaning that circumcision is required as a condition and a preparation for participation in the Passover offering. When the individual is ready to join a community (enters the covenant through circumcision), he can take part in the process of its formation (the Passover offering). It is no wonder that Passover and circumcision are the only two positive commandments whose violation incurs karet. One who violates them is not included in the Jewish people, and is therefore cut off from it.[4]

Between the First Passover and ordinary communal offerings

The conclusion is that the essence of the Passover offering is to fuse the collection of individuals and create from them a community. Therefore this is an offering that all individuals bring, each separately, but when all of them offer together, that occasion is considered the bringing of a communal offering. Those very offerings are what transform the collection of individuals into a community, and therefore at the end of the process there is here a community that has brought an offering. They enter the process as individuals and emerge from it as a community.

In that respect the Passover offering differs from ordinary communal offerings, because in those cases there is already a community and it merely has to bring an offering. Therefore the offering is brought from the Temple treasury collection and only one animal is sacrificed for the entire community. This is a collective act that the entire community performs as one. By contrast, in the Passover offering each individual brings his own offering, and the offering itself is what creates the community.

An illustration: the voting dilemma – "What if everyone does as you do" 1

The difference between the Passover offering and ordinary communal offerings can be illustrated through the discussion we once held regarding the categorical imperative. In Column 122 I pointed to the similarity between the categorical imperative and the prisoner's dilemma in game theory, and I will briefly return here to the core of that argument. For that purpose I will use a timely example: voting in elections.

Reuven comes to the conclusion that his vote has no effect whatsoever on the outcome of the elections[5] and therefore decides not to go vote. In arguments with such people one claim always comes up: "What will happen if everyone does as you do?" There will be anarchy. Reuven of course agrees to that, but in his view what all the others do is their own consideration, and they will make their calculations one way or the other. His personal decision not to vote, which for the purposes of the discussion he will keep secret so that it has no influence on anyone else, will not change anything one way or the other. Whether he decides to vote or not will obviously not change anyone else's decision.

At this point the claim arises that each person has a very small chance, but the overall result of the election is the sum of all our decisions. Therefore it is not true that I have no influence at all. But it is easy to see that this is a mistaken argument. When a person weighs his options, he must compare the two possibilities and their results: if I go vote, the election result will be X. If I do not go, the election result will be that same X. Therefore going to vote is a waste of time. Everything else is lofty talk and slogans. Thus the debate proceeds with no exit (I have been present at quite a few such debates), because all the disputants have a strong intuition that one ought to go vote ("to fulfill our civic duty"), but their explanation does not hold water. Reuven advances a crushing argument and they have no answer, yet they refuse to be convinced because they have the moral intuition just mentioned. It is hard to escape the impression that this is a dialogue of the deaf.

The categorical imperative: "What if everyone does as you do" 2

I explained there that the only way to answer Reuven and try to persuade him to go vote is the categorical imperative. Kant proposed this criterion as a test of whether an act is moral or not. He essentially turns the claim "What if everyone does as you do" from a teleological (consequence-based, purpose-based) claim into a principled one. In the previous section that claim was raised in order to clarify for Reuven the expected consequences of his decision, but as we have seen the consequentialist consideration does not hold water. His decision will have no consequential implications whatsoever. The state of affairs in the world will be exactly the same whether he votes or not. Kant argues that the claim "What if everyone does as you do" is a thought experiment. Imagine, hypothetically, that everyone acts as you do: is the world that would thereby be created good or bad in your eyes? Would you want your decision to become a universal law? If so, that is an indication that this is a good act, and if not, that is an indication that the act is bad. It is important to understand that in this sense no one is claiming to Reuven that his act will actually affect others, or that it will have any consequences at all. On the contrary, the claim is that even in the absence of consequences there is an obligation to go vote, because there is an obligation to behave morally. Morality is not teleological but deontological (this is a morality of intentions, not of results).

I assume there will be people who hear this argument and say that they do not identify with it. Why do something that has no effect on the world? It seems strange to them that the morality of an act should be detached from its results. But for those who have the intuition that there is an obligation to go vote (and in that column we saw additional examples of such decisions), this is the only possible explanation for their intuition. There is no other explanation. This explanation even interprets the claim that arises intuitively in their minds, "What if everyone does as you do," though not in the consequentialist sense. To examine whether the act you are considering is moral, you must carry out a thought experiment about a hypothetical state of affairs: what would happen if everyone acted as you do? That is the measure of the morality of the act, regardless of whether this will actually happen in practice.[6]

And yet, consequentialism

As I explained in Column 122, ironically the categorical imperative requires a person to act without paying attention to the consequences, but it turns out that this behavior is the only one that brings about the practical consequences. In our world, most people do go vote (and even those who do not, the overwhelming majority of them abstain not because they think voting is unimportant and ineffective, but because they have no one to vote for), and therefore in fact in our world people behave in accordance with the categorical imperative, even if the great majority are not aware of it (I already explained that this is the explanation of the widespread intuition that there is a moral duty to vote). Now think about a world in which people do not behave in accordance with the categorical imperative (or do not possess this intuition). In such a world no one goes vote, because each person makes for himself the calculation that his vote has no effect at all. In such a world people would also evade taxes for the exact same reason. This is a world in which intolerable anarchy reigns (practically speaking. I am an anarchist at heart, a reincarnation of Bakunin, but unfortunately that is not practical). In such a world it would be impossible to live.

So by virtue of what do we nevertheless live? By virtue of the categorical imperative. That is, what emerges here, ironically, is that the categorical imperative is what brings us the results. Deontological behavior that ignores considerations of consequence is the only thing that succeeds in bringing about the results (the telos). Each person individually makes the hypothetical calculation of the categorical imperative and decides to vote, though this has no consequence whatsoever for him, and thus we have a functioning society. Each individual can still make the consequentialist calculation and conclude that there is no point in voting or in paying taxes, but society exists because most of us do not do that. Most of us act against our personal consequentialist logic and do something that has no result at all, but that and only that is what succeeds in producing the result.

In Column 122 I explained that this is very similar to what happens in the prisoner's dilemma. There too, the personal calculation that maximizes the result for each of the prisoners leads to decision A, but when the two sides each decide individually (without mutual influence) to do A, their situation will be worse than if both of them each individually decide B. Of course, if one decides B and his fellow decides to betray their agreement or the categorical imperative, the betrayer will profit (the wicked prospers), but the risk is that if both do so, both will be worse off. Mutual trust leads to a better result than considerations of immediate personal gain.

This is a very confusing situation. Ostensibly, according to Kant, the result ("What if everyone does as you do") is only an indication of the morality of the act, but the morality is not determined by those results. Yet in practice morality is the only means that can attain the result, and indeed it does attain it. So conduct in accordance with the categorical imperative can also be interpreted on the consequentialist plane. One must make that calculation in order to achieve the good result; that is, the categorical imperative can in fact also reflect a morality of results.[7] At that point even consequentialists can join Kantian morality.

What we are now saying to Reuven is the following: if you ignore the categorical imperative, then it is probably rational to ignore it (when one subscribes to consequentialist morality), but then it is likely that everyone will make the same calculation and ignore it. Notice, Reuven: it is not because of you; rather, they will make the same calculation that you are making. Each person will act in parallel to you, even if there is no direct influence between you, and then indeed it will be bad for all of us. The only way to reach a good world is by a gentlemen's agreement that everyone will follow, even though from the personal standpoint it is not optimal for them. This is a collective consideration, and it depends on the good faith of all the members of the collective. For each individual, it is still worthwhile to violate it (if all the others are independent of him), but if everyone violates it, the situation will be bad for all.

From individual to collective: another look at altruism

Conduct in accordance with the categorical imperative is always moral conduct. But it can bring results only in a collective all of whose members can rely on the others not to betray the trust.[8] Each person makes his own calculation and does not reveal it to others, but he knows that the same is true of every other individual. They need to act in coordination for the sake of the collective interest, but without any actual coordination between them. There is theoretical coordination, because each person knows that if everyone acts this way, that is the only way to create a better world, but there is no effective coordination here; that is, there is no possibility of sanction, no one knows the decisions of the others, and there is no influence of one upon the other.

What we have here is a consequentialist consideration, but the one who makes it is the collection of all the individuals, each separately but in parallel. The calculation of one person by himself leads to opposite conclusions, and of course also to a very bad result. The deontology of individuals is in fact the teleology of the collective. One can say that such an act, although it is done for the sake of a consequential interest, contains an element of altruism. The agent is the individual, and the one who enjoys the results is the collective as a whole (with the individual inside it). This of course brings us back to Column 120 (where we dealt with the question whether and how altruistic acts can exist), which was the basis for Column 122. I argued there that such acts are in principle possible (I assumed that not every act is done for the sake of an interest). Here I add that even if all of us act only out of interests, such acts are still possible, because sometimes (and perhaps always) they too are interest-driven, except that the interest is that of the collective and of the individual within it, not of the individual as such.

Individual offerings, communal offerings, and Passover

How is this fusing of individuals into one collective created? When a collective already exists, it can make collective decisions; that is, it can demand certain behavior of its members and even impose sanctions on anyone who deviates from the agreement. But how does one create such a collective? Here the loyalty of the individuals is required. If each individual acts out of a decision to be part of the collective, and does not see before his eyes only his own personal consequentialist calculation and interest, then the collective result can come into being, and in fact the collective itself is thereby created.

One can say that an act of the collective as a single organism parallels an ordinary communal offering. Here the entire community acts together and brings one offering on behalf of everyone from the Temple treasury collection. An act of each individual on his own, in a coordinated fashion such that the collective result is produced, parallels the Passover offering. In the Passover offering, each individual brings a separate offering purchased from his own money. The formation of the collective depends on each individual making the personal calculation in a manner parallel to all the others, and together the collective result is created.

From this follows the character of the Passover offering, whose purpose, as we have seen, is to fuse the individuals and create from them a community. This cannot be done in the manner of a communal offering, because a communal offering is brought only after the community already exists. The creation of the community can take place only in a way whereby each individual acts in parallel with his peers on the basis of collective considerations (that is, taking the collective result into account and acting in order to achieve it). This is the meaning of the unique halakhic character of the Passover offering.

From the Passover offering to elections

Although I am somewhat embarrassed by the analogy, it is nonetheless called for. Here elections are conducted voluntarily (there is no obligation to go vote and no sanctions on one who does not vote). Perhaps the reason is that elections are the stage at which the public is created, and therefore there we must act in the mode of the Passover offering, where each individual separately makes his own calculation in a way that keeps the good of the whole before his eyes. Once an agreed-upon government has been chosen, it can impose requirements and punishment, because that is a stage at which the public already exists and acts collectively, like an ordinary communal offering.

Of course, one who thinks there is no one to vote for (a thought that undoubtedly has substance) will fulfill his civic duty by not voting. My remarks here are directed at those who are considering not voting simply because one individual vote has no value and no influence.

By the way, from here one can also find a justification for countries in which voting is compulsory. Ostensibly there is no justification for coercing a person and using force in order to make him perform actions that do not affect his surroundings. That is an intrusion into his private sphere. But in light of what we have seen here, although his decision has no direct effect on the public, the collection of those personal and independent decisions is ultimately the only way to achieve the result. Therefore, even from a liberal perspective, one can see a justification for coercing the duty to vote, for there is harm to others here. Not direct harm, but harm through the integration of the individual into the collective, as we explained here.

The connection to Persico's critique of 'Zehut'

Up to this point we have linked the discussion to Passover and to elections. I will conclude with a remark concerning the contradiction that Persico pointed out in the ideology of the 'Zehut' party between nationalism and freedom, discussed in the previous column. It seems to me that the Passover offering reflects with full force my claim that there may indeed be tension here, but not contradiction. True, each person acts freely, in a libertarian manner, and makes decisions by himself and for his own sake. But that does not necessarily mean that he is egoistic and devoid of social sensitivity. The individual is supposed to do this as part of the public, with the benefit of the public (and himself within it) before his eyes. To achieve this one does not need coercion, and perhaps it cannot even be achieved by coercion (see my above-mentioned lessons on means and ends, especially lessons 4-5).

Therefore I argued that there is no contradiction between independent and autonomous action based on my own considerations and seeing nationhood as part of my identity. Those are themselves my considerations. My identity is personal, and part of it is belonging to the collective. Therefore the capitalist interest for whose sake I act is not only mine, but also that of the collective of which I am a part. This is altruism within a libertarian world, something Persico refused to accept in the discussion following my previous column.

[1] The entire issue is discussed in detail in the article Midah Tovah 5767, Parashat Beha'alotekha. Hereafter: my article.

[2] However, see Maimonides, Laws of Entering the Sanctuary 4:9, where he connects this to the fact that this is an offering with a fixed time, and not to the fact that it is a communal offering (see Yoma 50a). There is a connection between these two characteristics, and in the formulation of the law here (5:15) one can see this explicitly.

[3] In my article I explained why this itself is not called make-up. There I suggested that there are two aspects to the Passover offering (the obligation of the individual and a communal obligation). See also the article Midah Tovah 5767 on Parashat Nitzavim-Vayelekh, where I discussed the relationship between the individual and the community in all communal commandments, and showed that there can be a situation in which the commandment was fulfilled by the community, yet there are still individuals who nullified it (because they did not join the community).

[4] Therefore, in circumcision as well, which ideally must be performed on the eighth day, it can be completed throughout one's lifetime, exactly like the Passover offering, which is completed on the Second Passover.

[5] The vote of a single person has an effect only if the number of votes for the party for which he votes comes out one vote short of an exact whole-number seat quota. On the assumption that the number of votes per seat is over thirty thousand, the chance that this will happen is negligible. And indeed, it has never happened and apparently never will happen (at least not in the next million years). We are prepared to ignore a greater danger to our lives when we go out onto the road.

[6] An interesting question is whether Hillel the Elder, in the saying What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. (What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow), intended the consequentialist meaning (if you do it to him, he will do it to you) or the deontological one (if when he does it to you it appears bad in your eyes, then it is a bad act, and therefore do not do it to him). I will not enter into that here. On this, see briefly in my article on the categorical imperative in Jewish law.

[7] For a similar looping phenomenon, see Column 13, where I dealt with the "samukh" ("it'll work out") approach in sports and more generally. We saw there that coping with the samukh approach can be done on the basis of a non-consequentialist argument, but in the end that is the only path that can bring the results. In my above-mentioned lessons (especially lesson 5) on means and ends, I brought additional examples of similar loops between means and ends.

[8] As noted, a genuine Kantian does not act this way because of the consequentialist consideration. Even if it is clear to him that all the others will not behave like gentlemen, he himself will continue to act that way.