Why We “Killed” Yonatan, or: A Look at “Be Fruitful and Multiply” (Column 420)

Dedicated to my dear son, Yossi—may he live and be well,

with wishes for continued success in his studies. And to Yonatan, of course.

This Shabbat I spoke at the synagogue about the commandment of “be fruitful and multiply” that appears in the parashah. A few interesting points came up, and I’ll share some of them with you here.

The duplication

The command to procreate regarding human beings (as distinct from Gen. 1:22) appears twice. Once in Parashat Bereishit with the creation of the human being (Genesis 1:28):

“And God blessed them; and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.”

And a second time in Parashat Noaḥ, after Noaḥ exits the ark (Genesis 9:1–7):

“And God blessed Noah and his sons, and He said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth and upon every bird of the heavens; upon all that creeps on the ground and upon all the fish of the sea—into your hand are they given. Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you; like the green herb have I given you all things. But flesh with its life—its blood—you shall not eat. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I require the life of man. Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God He made man. And you—be fruitful and multiply, swarm in the earth and multiply in it.”

Here it appears twice.

Rashi on verse 7 addresses this duplication:

“And you, be fruitful and multiply”—According to the plain sense, the first instance is a blessing, and here it is a command. And according to the midrashic reading, it likens one who does not engage in procreation to a shedder of blood.

In my talk at the synagogue I didn’t notice that there is a double occurrence here as well, and I thought he was dealing with the duplication vis-à-vis Parashat Bereishit. But now I understand he is addressing the duplication within this very parashah. This, of course, raises the question why he is not at all bothered by the first occurrence in Parashat Bereishit. We will see this below.

In his first answer he explains, according to the plain meaning, that the first verse is stated as a blessing, and indeed at the beginning of the chapter the phrase appears as God’s blessing. But Siftei Ḥakhamim here explains that this is also the explanation for the first occurrence (in Parashat Bereishit):

“He holds that the verse in Parashat Bereishit (1:28) ‘and He said to them: Be fruitful and multiply’ is an explanation of ‘And God blessed them’; and likewise the verse above (9:1) ‘and He said to them: Be fruitful and multiply’ is an explanation of ‘And God blessed them’. But the commandment of procreation we learn only from here, for there [in 1:28] no blessing is written with it.”

There is difficulty with this explanation, for the phrasing “be fruitful and multiply” is imperative language, not a simple future tense. And if you look at the occurrence in Parashat Bereishit (the first quoted above), you see that the word “God” appears twice there; that is, “be fruitful and multiply” is not the content of the blessing. God blesses them, and afterward commands them to be fruitful and multiply. Thus, at least there it clearly seems to be a command. By contrast, in our verse 1 here there is no such division, and so it is possible to understand it as a blessing, though the imperative language is still strained. In any case, with regard to the first occurrence there is clearly no explanation here; and yet, as noted, it seems that Rashi was not troubled by it at all.

The midrashic explanation

Rashi’s second explanation is in the homiletic vein. It is unclear whether this is because he sees difficulty in the plain-sense explanation (perhaps for the reasons I described above) or he is simply bringing a midrashic option as well. In any case, he relies on the immediate context—namely, the prohibition of murder—and concludes that it apparently comes to teach us that one who does not engage in procreation is akin to one who sheds blood.

On its face this sounds somewhat exaggerated. Important as the commandment to procreate is, it is hard to accept that one who does not engage in it is a murderer. And even if we accept an analogy between failing to bring life into the world and taking life, then even one who stops after having a son and a daughter would, to the same extent, be “shedding blood.” This is a good place to recall the words of my son Yossi, the delight of my soul, who constantly reminds us that we “killed” Yonatan—the child we did not bring into the world after we were blessed with six children. Not for nothing is this column dedicated to him (and to Yonatan).

Perhaps this can be understood in light of the categorical imperative. Even if a given person does not engage in procreation, many others still do. There is thus no real fear that humankind will be extinguished. But according to the categorical imperative (see columns 122, 344, and others), a person should evaluate his actions by the (hypothetical) state that would obtain if everyone acted as he does. If the whole world did not engage in procreation, humankind would be annihilated—a highly problematic state. Keeping that in the background may help explain why one who does not engage in procreation is “as if he sheds blood.”

We can see this in Nazir 23b (right after the sugya of “a transgression for the sake of Heaven”):

“R. Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Korḥa: A person should always precede [others] in a matter of a commandment, for in the merit of one night in which the elder preceded the younger, she merited that her descendants preceded Israel by four generations in royalty.”

Ḥazal greatly praise the actions of Lot’s daughters, who, as we recall, decided to have relations with their father. As the verses imply, their reasoning was based on the assumption (from their perspective) that all humankind had been destroyed and only they and their father remained alive. In such a situation, if they would not have relations with their father, no trace of humankind would remain. That consideration led them to permit to themselves the severe prohibition of incest, despite the fact that there is no halakhic rationale that would justify this (incest is one of the “big three” that are not allowed even for the sake of saving a life). It seems that Ḥazal view this as an example of a “transgression for the sake of Heaven,” i.e., deviating from the law under extreme circumstances that justify it (see more on this here). Incest is not permitted for the sake of saving a life, but it is permitted in a situation of saving the life of all humankind. In other words, fear of the extinction of humankind overrides every prohibition.

From this example we can learn that the extinction of humankind is even graver than bloodshed. Moreover, had they not transgressed incest, the expected extinction would have occurred on its own, not as a result of their action. There too it would have been by omission rather than an action by their own hands, and still that is more severe than bloodshed—to the point that incest was permitted to prevent it. From this we may derive that, at least from the perspective of the categorical imperative, even a private individual who does not engage in procreation is “as if he sheds blood.”

Indeed, Maimonides (Rambam), in Positive Commandment 212, writes about the commandment to procreate:

“The 212th commandment is that He commanded us to be fruitful and multiply and to intend thereby to sustain the species; this is the commandment of procreation. And His saying (Genesis 1): ‘Be fruitful and multiply.’”

We see that each person’s procreation is directed toward sustaining the species—even though if I personally do not fulfill the commandment, the species will not thereby be extinguished. But from the standpoint of the categorical imperative, in deciding whether to permit this to myself, I must examine the state that would obtain were everyone to act as I do. From that vantage point, every individual’s procreation is the sustaining of the species (see, from a slightly different angle, columns 252–254).

In passing I note that I do not know who inserted the scriptural references into the Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, but it is interesting that Rambam’s reference here is specifically to the verse in Parashat Bereishit, contrary to Siftei Ḥakhamim’s explanation that there it is a blessing. In Rambam we see, as I argued, that even there it is a command.[1]

Back to the difficulty

In any case, we are left with a difficulty: why is duplication needed in the command “be fruitful and multiply”? Even if we have an explanation (plain and midrashic) for the duplication in Parashat Noaḥ, the duplication vis-à-vis Parashat Bereishit remains unexplained. In particular, we saw that Rashi apparently was not troubled by this duplication at all; somehow the verse in Parashat Bereishit does not enter the equation.

As we saw, Siftei Ḥakhamim’s suggestion that it is a blessing is problematic. I will now try to suggest a possible solution to this difficulty, prefacing it with a discussion of a puzzling sugya at the end of the chapter Ḥezkat Ha-Batim.

The sugya at the end of Ḥezkat Ha-Batim

At the end of Ḥezkat Ha-Batim (Bava Batra 60b) we find two dicta that, on the face of it, seem similar. The first deals with a proposed decree not to drink wine and not to eat meat following the destruction of the Temple:

“It was taught: R. Yishmael ben Elisha said: From the day the Temple was destroyed, it would be fitting to decree upon ourselves not to eat meat and not to drink wine; but one does not decree a decree upon the public unless most of the public can abide by it.”

It would have been appropriate to decree a prohibition on eating meat and drinking wine in light of the destruction, but they did not, because of the principle that one does not impose a decree on the community unless most can stand by it. There was a concern that even if they would issue the prohibition, the public would not uphold it, and in such a case one does not decree.[2]

The second dictum continues the first and deals with a decree not to procreate (not because of the destruction, but because of the rule of an evil regime that does not allow us to engage in Torah and commandments):

“And from the day that the evil kingdom spread, which issues upon us evil and harsh decrees and nullifies from us Torah and commandments and does not allow us to enter the week of the son [i.e., circumcision], and some say: even to save the son— it would be fitting to decree upon ourselves not to marry a woman and to beget children, and the seed of Abraham our father would be extinguished on its own. Rather, leave Israel be; better that they be unwitting transgressors than intentional.”

This appears very similar. Here, too, they did not decree a prohibition, so that people would not transgress intentionally.

Tosafot, s.v. “din,” there, raise a difficulty:

“‘It would be fitting to decree upon ourselves not to marry women’—It is astonishing, for it is written: ‘Be fruitful and multiply.’”

Tosafot wonders how the Sages could decree a prohibition regarding procreation when there is a positive commandment from the Torah. In Torat Ḥayyim here, a resolution is proposed that the Sages uproot a Torah law by telling people to sit and not act. This is difficult in light of what we saw above. It is implausible that the Sages would uproot a commandment and bring about the destruction of the entire Jewish people—extinguished on its own—because of the rule of an evil regime. This is akin to the annihilation of all humankind, which, as we saw, overrides every prohibition. To uproot the commandment of procreation on the basis of the mechanism of “uprooting a Torah law by inaction,” even if such a mechanism exists, seems disproportionate. Note that here we don’t even need the categorical imperative: this is not the hesitation of a single individual, but a question of whether to impose a general prohibition on procreation. If such a prohibition were imposed, everyone would be obligated to observe it; thus the annihilation of humankind would directly follow from the decree (assuming the public would heed it). When an individual fails to procreate, humankind will not be annihilated; the extinction is only a hypothetical state used to evaluate his private act, as in the categorical imperative. But when a prohibition on procreation is imposed, extinction follows necessarily (assuming compliance).

Not for nothing, Tosafot gives a different answer:

“Perhaps he was speaking about those who already fulfilled procreation; and ‘the seed of Abraham would be extinguished’ [means] that one would beget only a son and a daughter.”

That is, it speaks only of those who already had a son and a daughter and thereby discharged their Torah obligation. What would remain is merely the command of “to settle the world” (la-shevet yatzarah), which is from the Prophets/Writings, and that the Sages could uproot.

The claim is that the aim here is to bring the seed of Abraham to an end. It is unclear whether Tosafot means that they did not truly intend to end the population, only to reduce it—if so, that is not the straightforward reading of the Gemara. Perhaps the assumption is that if procreation is limited to a son and a daughter, the population will, in the end, die out. Demographers indeed say that to keep a population from shrinking, the average number of children per family must be above two (about 2.33, due to child mortality or those who do not bear children). If so, if there are only two children per family, the population shrinks. But for our purposes this is irrelevant, since if childbirth is capped at “a son and a daughter,” many families will have more than two children—because families whose first two children are two boys or two girls (roughly half of two-child couples) will have to continue until they have a son and a daughter. Nadav Shnerb, in his essay in Keren Zavit (Parashat Noaḥ), shows that in such a regime the average number of children would be three, and thus such a policy would maintain the population size and even increase it.

The difficulty in the Gemara

There is a major difficulty in this Gemara, and curiously I have not found anyone who raises it. Regarding the decree about meat and wine, the rule is cited that one does not decree upon the public a decree it cannot abide by; that is, if there is concern that most of the public will violate the decree, it is better not to issue it. Therefore, they did not, in fact, decree. But regarding the second decree—a prohibition on procreation—another principle is cited: “Better that they be unwitting transgressors than intentional.” What does this rule mean? It’s a bit confusing, but it is not hard to see that this is a different principle. The rule “better they be unwitting” usually concerns whether to rebuke someone committing a transgression (see, for example, Rema, OḤ 608:2; 433:5; 339:3). The logic compares two possibilities: if I rebuke him and he does not heed me, he will transgress intentionally; if I do not rebuke him, he will transgress unwittingly—and it is better that he transgress unwittingly than intentionally.[3]

Consider our case. Ḥazal are debating whether to decree a prohibition on procreation or not. If they decree it—the public will not abide by it and will transgress (a rabbinic decree) intentionally. If they do not decree—the public will not transgress at all, but rather fulfill a positive commandment of procreation (since absent a decree, there is no prohibition, and the commandment remains in force). In such a case, there is no dilemma between an unwitting transgression and an intentional one, but between an intentional transgression and the fulfillment of a commandment. Why, then, is the rule “better they be unwitting” relevant here? The Gemara should have brought, here too, the rule that one does not decree upon the public a decree most of them cannot abide by. That is the relevant rule in this case as well. One might claim that the Gemara meant that rule and this is merely a turn of phrase, but that is unlikely, since in the first part of the dictum the correct rule is cited; so why not repeat it in the second part? The shift to another rule calls out for explanation.

We are compelled to understand the Gemara differently: the Gemara assumes that, as a matter of Torah law, there is a prohibition to procreate when an evil regime rules over us and prevents us from keeping mitzvot (akin to years of famine, etc.). The debate was not whether to decree a rabbinic prohibition on procreation, but whether to inform the public that under current conditions there is a Torah prohibition on procreation—in other words, whether to rebuke them for transgressing. In that case, the rule “better they be unwitting than intentional” is indeed relevant, for if we do not inform them, they will still be transgressing—but unwittingly. According to this, the rule about not imposing a decree on the public is not relevant, since this is not about legislating a new rabbinic prohibition, but about whether to inform the public of a Torah prohibition.[4]

Incidentally, the upshot is that the Torah scholars who knew the law truly did not procreate, since they knew that in such circumstances there is a prohibition to do so. Those who had children were only the amei ha-aretz (the common folk) who were not informed of the prohibition and thus transgressed unwittingly. If so, it turns out that today we are all descendants of the amei ha-aretz of that generation. Well then, we do not boast a lofty pedigree. This is the source of the oft-told remark of the previous Admor of Klausenberg, who took as a son-in-law for his daughter a young man from a simple family in Bnei Brak. When asked why he did not insist on the groom’s lineage, he answered that he prefers one who begins the lineage to one who ends it. Ponder that well.

In any event, it is now clear that Tosafot’s difficulty above does not arise at all. We saw that the Sages did not intend to uproot a Torah commandment here; rather, they debated whether to inform the public that there is a Torah prohibition on procreation in such circumstances.

Back to the duplication

We can now perhaps understand the duplication of the command “be fruitful and multiply.” The occurrence in Parashat Bereishit is also a command (so it follows from the imperative phrasing, and so too from Rambam’s formulation in Sefer Ha-Mitzvot). But after that command, the generation of the Flood corrupted its way. Consequently, at the end of Parashat Bereishit, God “regrets” having made the human and seeks to destroy all humankind. In such a state, there is certainly no commandment of procreation, for a child born then would not be expected to keep the commandments (he would not be allowed to). This is precisely like the situation of an evil regime that does not allow us to keep mitzvot. Recall that above we saw that the foundation of the command to procreate is sustaining the species—that is, the collective continuation of humankind (or of Israel). Therefore, one who does not engage in procreation is as if shedding blood, and via the categorical imperative this applies to every individual. But if God desires to destroy humankind, He does not desire the sustaining of the species; it is thus very plausible that in such a situation the commandment to procreate does not apply (all the more so).

If so, although in Parashat Bereishit a command to procreate is given—and not merely a blessing—subsequently a situation arose in which the commandment lapsed and humanity was destroyed. Noaḥ, who survived, brings a sacrifice before God, and now God tells him that he has found favor in His eyes and He once again desires the sustaining of the species. He informs him of this by reinstating the commandment to procreate. Therefore, a further command to Noaḥ is required, beyond the command given to the first human. Even Rambam, who cites as the source the verse from Parashat Bereishit, can still explain the duplication this way: in his view, the second command merely teaches that the original command returns to force and was not annulled permanently. From this it follows that if we now ask for the original scriptural source of the mitzvah, it is the verse in Parashat Bereishit.

This explanation also accords with the midrashic explanation Rashi brings (the second explanation): the midrash teaches that one who does not engage in procreation is as if one who sheds blood, since the aim of procreation is sustaining the species. If so, when there is no interest in sustaining the species, the commandment lapses—and hence the duplication of these commands.

The mirror image of “and live by them”

In Yoma 85 the Talmud discusses the source that danger to life overrides all the commandments of the Torah. The final source is the verse “and live by them,” which Ḥazal interpret: “and not die by them.” The implication is that the commandments obligate us only so long as they do not threaten our lives; where there is danger to life, there is no obligation to observe commandments. Commandments that cost one’s life are not desired. This is the mirror image of what we have seen here: “and live by them” teaches that without life, commandments have no value; and here we have seen that where people do not observe commandments, life has no value. If this occurs due to humankind’s own culpability (as in the generation of the Flood)—God seeks to destroy it; and if it is not due to its culpability (as in the Bava Batra sugya we saw)—then only the commandment of procreation lapses and the people are meant to come to an end on their own. The conclusion is that commandments without life are not commandments, but life without commandments is not life. It seems the hierarchy between life and commandments is not straightforward.

This recalls the tension between two rationales in that same Yoma sugya for permitting Shabbat desecration in a life-threatening situation. On the one hand is Shmuel’s rationale based on the verse “and live by them,” which, as we saw, seems to assume that the commandments are a means to proper life (and thus when they cost life, they lapse). On the other hand is R. Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale based on reason: “Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so that he will observe many Shabbatot,” which seems to assume that life is a means to commandments. Again we see that the hierarchy between life and commandments is not simple. But that will be the subject of the next column.

[1] Nadav Shnerb, in his book Keren Zavit, in his essay on Parashat Noaḥ, cites this Rambam differently. According to the version he brings (I do not know its source), Rambam cites the verse “And you, be fruitful and multiply,” i.e., the verse from Parashat Noaḥ. The Frankel edition reads as cited above; see there in the “Sources and Notes.”

[2] The halakhic authorities wrote that this would indeed have been the proper practice all year, but they did not decree it because the public would not have endured it. In any case, this is a reason to be stringent at least during the Nine Days.

[3] The Rema rules that this principle applies only to rabbinic prohibitions, but that is not the plain sense of the Gemara nor the view of several Rishonim.

[4] It follows that the principle “better they be unwitting” is said even regarding neglect of a positive Torah commandment, and not only about rabbinic prohibitions (see the previous note).

Stated more softly, one might say that in such a state the commandment to procreate lapses, and the Sages then debated whether to legislate a rabbinic prohibition. But that does not fit the Gemara, for even in such a case the rule “better they be unwitting” would not apply.