On Savoraim and Ways – A Look at the Beginning of Tractate Kiddushin (Column 573)

Dedicated to my daughter Rivka, may she live long,

“May your strength be devoted to Torah.”

Many years before I ever heard of academic Talmudic research (which, to this day, doesn’t really speak to me—I’m just a simple yeshiva bochur), I had a research-style insight about the sugya that opens tractate Kiddushin. When I first learned it, I immediately felt it wasn’t part of the Talmud as we know it. Something there struck me as odd and atypical. In time I discovered that the Rishonim already write that this is a Savoraic addition. It is not of the very bone of the original Talmud (which itself is likely the product of ongoing compilation and editing), but was added later. According to that tradition, originally the Talmud began the tractate with “From where [do we know] money?” (bekesef minālan).

So, for example, the Ramban writes on Kiddushin 3a (and so too the Ritva there):

“We have found in the responsa of the Geonim, of blessed memory, that this entire section of the sugya up to here is ‘after the ruling,’ and Mar Rav Huna Gaon of Sura—he taught it, and he is the one who forbade the kenasa [marrying a woman by intercourse alone], and in his days they instituted the ordinance of the moredet [recalcitrant wife], which the Geonim practiced; and nonetheless I toiled above to explain it and to raise difficulties and resolve them, for it is precisely the ‘Gemara of the Rabbanan Savoraei.’”

In the Iggeret of Rav Sherira Gaon it is brought that this is a Savoraic addition (the editor of the Ritva there notes that some of the Savoraim were at times called “Geonim”).

In any case, this concerns the entire first part of the sugya, from the Mishnah until “From where [do we know] money?” on 3a. From the language of the Ramban, the Ritva, and Rav Sherira Gaon, it appears that what led them to this conclusion was not a difficulty in the sugya but a tradition; hence they even know to attribute the sugya to a specific Savoraic sage. Still, some have suggested that the Rishonim were troubled by a duplication in the sugya: on 2a we find one source for acquisition by money (a gezerah shavah “taking–taking” from the field of Ephron), and on 3a the Gemara again asks “From where [do we know] money?” and brings a different source. The tradition that everything up to there is a Savoraic addition, and was not in the original Talmudic text, resolves that difficulty as well.

Rashi on 3a, s.v. “bekesef minālan,” explains the duplication more simply:

“‘From where [do we know] money’—here is the main [discussion]; above (Kiddushin 2) it mentioned it incidentally, to resolve the wording ‘acquisition’ used by the Mishnah.”

Indeed, from a simple reading of the Gemara it emerges that at the beginning of the tractate the aim is not to seek a source for betrothal by money. The discussion there is linguistic, and the Gemara’s purpose is to explain the Mishnah’s phrasing “the woman is acquired” as opposed to “the man betroths” at the beginning of the second chapter. The source for betrothal by money appears within that terminological discussion (the Ritva there already notes that this is a gilui milta, a clarification of meaning). Either way, since the claim that this is a Savoraic addition does not rest on a difficulty in the sugya but on a tradition, there is no reason to assume Rashi rejects it. It is likely a conceded fact.

Yet, as I described above, my feeling that this was a later addition was due to the character and conduct of the discussion—not specifically because of a duplicated point, and regardless of the tradition. When you look at the flow of the sugya as a whole, it looks different—very different from a regular Talmudic sugya. It’s interesting that the Rishonim and commentators do not dwell on this; apparently it didn’t trouble them, or at least it didn’t serve as a reason to assert that it’s an addition (they were apparently not die-hard, trained academics like me). In any event, from the first time I learned the sugya until today I always thought not only that this passage is exceptional, but that it looks unclear and inconsistent—a sort of ungrounded word-play lacking a logical backbone—and therefore I didn’t see much point in engaging with it.

But apparently the Ramban’s words weighed on me, for he wrote at the end of the previous citation that even if this is a Savoraic addition, we must still study and analyze it: “And nonetheless I toiled above to explain it … for it is precisely the ‘Gemara of the Rabbanan Savoraei.’” This week I studied this sugya again with my daughter Rivka, and to my delight several of the difficulties I’d always seen in it clarified for us. We discovered that there is likely underlying logic and method. If I’m right, then the sugya’s progression sheds an interesting light on the development of the Sages’ language out of the language of Scripture, and I’ll try to share that with you. Everything written here emerged from our joint inquiry (so she, too, is to blame for any nonsense you may find here).

With your permission, I must preface that this column is a kind of plain-sense lesson in Gemara. I will try here to interpret the sugya step by step. All the stages in the sugya deal with linguistic clarifications (which is part of what is unusual about it). I think this is an atypical column on an atypical sugya. I must add that I am not versed in academic Talmud, and even less so in matters of language. So there is certainly a chance that errors and flaws have crept into my words, and I would be happy to receive your comments and insights.

The flow of the sugya: the first part

The Mishnah at the beginning of the tractate speaks about the modes of betrothal:

“A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two ways: She is acquired by money, by document, and by intercourse. For money—Beit Shammai say: by a dinar or the value of a dinar; and Beit Hillel say: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar. And she acquires herself by a bill of divorce and by the death of the husband. A yevama is acquired by intercourse and acquires herself by chalitzah and by the death of the yavam.”

For our purposes, what matters is that in the reisha three ways are given by which the woman is “acquired,” i.e., betrothed: money, document, and intercourse. And in the seifa two ways are given by which she “acquires herself”: a bill of divorce and the husband’s death.

The first part of the (Savoraic) sugya, as noted, deals with a linguistic clarification:

“‘The woman is acquired’—what is different here that it teaches ‘the woman is acquired,’ and what is different there that it teaches ‘the man betroths’?”

The Gemara asks why in our Mishnah the language of “acquisition” is used (“the woman is acquired”), while in the Mishnah at the beginning of the second chapter the language of “betrothal” is used (“the man betroths”). It’s important to note that according to my assumption there is no ownership of the husband over the woman, as I elaborated in this article.

And the answer is:

“Because it wanted to teach ‘money.’ And from where [do we know] money? It derives ‘taking–taking’ from the field of Ephron: it is written here, ‘When a man takes a woman’ [Deut. 22:13], and it is written there, ‘I have given the money of the field, take it from me’ [Gen. 23:13]. And ‘taking’ is called ‘acquisition,’ as it is written, ‘the field which Abraham acquired’ [Gen. 23:18], or alternatively, ‘Fields shall be acquired with money’ [Jer. 32:44]. Therefore it teaches: ‘A woman is acquired.’”

There is a complex progression here, but its entire purpose is to explain the Mishnah’s wording—why it used the language of acquisition rather than of betrothal. The Gemara explains that it is written so in order to say that betrothal is performed, among other ways, with money. From this it is also clear that when the Gemara asks “And from where [do we know] money?” it is not seeking a source for the law of betrothal by money, but a source that the correct expression is that a woman is “acquired.” The answer is that in Scripture a woman is “taken” (“When a man takes a woman”), and there is a gezerah shavah (which is essentially a gilui milta, i.e., a lexical clarification of the term “taking,” and therefore may be drawn even from the Prophets) to a field, teaching us that “taking” is an act done with money and is described as “acquisition.” Therefore the Mishnah states “the woman is acquired.”

In passing I’ll note that although the search here is not for a source that betrothal is done by money, in practice such a source seems to appear within the discussion. Therefore the Gemara on 3a still requires explanation (why it seeks another source). But as noted, this is a Savoraic addition, and just as that duplication shouldn’t bother us, so too the apparent contradiction.

After we’ve explained why the language is “acquisition” and not “betrothal,” the Gemara continues to clarify why the second chapter also does not use the language of acquisition:

“Let it teach there, ‘the man acquires’? Initially it teaches Scriptural language, and subsequently it teaches Rabbinic language. And what is Rabbinic language? That he prohibits her to everyone like hekdesh.”

The Gemara explains that in the language of the Torah (Scripture) the way to describe betrothal is as acquisition or taking, but in the language of the Sages we use the term kiddushin (from the root k-d-sh—because it is like consecration by which she becomes prohibited to the world. See also Kiddushin 6a which compares a woman’s betrothal to consecrating a sacrifice). The second Mishnah comes to teach us the Sages’ language: the taking of a woman is not described only as acquisition but also as consecration.

This is the first time this sugya addresses the shift from the language of Scripture to the language of the Sages. Below we will see this recur in the sugya’s second part. The Gemara here didn’t explain why the Sages at all found it necessary to coin an expression different from that of Scripture. Why should there be a distinct “language of the Sages”? Why not use Scriptural language? Apparently the Sages felt that Scriptural language was insufficient, or at least that it was important to emphasize another aspect not represented in Scripture’s language. Therefore they added the term that uses the k-d-sh root. In Rav Gustman’s opening lecture (Kuntresei Shiurim – Kiddushin) he elaborates on the different aspects of betrothal and shows their appearance through varied expressions (kiddushin, erusin, acquisition, and the like). Here I won’t expand on that.

We now return to our Mishnah. Until now the Gemara explained why the Mishnah used the language of “acquisition” and not “betrothal.” Now the Gemara continues to clarify why in our Mishnah the betrothal is framed with focus on the woman (“the woman is acquired”) and not via the man (“the man acquires”):

“Let it teach here, ‘the man acquires’? Because it wished to teach in the seifa ‘and she acquires herself,’ it also taught the reisha with focus on her. And let it teach, ‘the man acquires and transfers’? Since there is the case of the husband’s death—where he is not the one who transfers, but Heaven transfers her—therefore it did not. And alternatively: if it had taught ‘acquires,’ I might have thought even against her will; [therefore] it taught ‘the woman is acquired’—with her consent, yes; without her consent, no.”

According to the second formulation, the Mishnah states “the woman is acquired” and not “the man acquires” because it wished to teach us that a woman is not acquired against her will but only with her consent. Without her assent the betrothal does not take effect. As I explained at length in my article in Akdamot, even after she consents the woman is not acquired to the husband and does not become his property. The expression “is acquired” in the Talmud and halakhah means that this is how the legal state of kiddushin comes into effect. A kinyan-act in halakhah is any act that effects a legal status—not necessarily ownership (ownership is only one example of a legal effect). I showed there that kiddushin is a contract, not an ownership act; yet in halakhah, effecting a contract also requires some concrete act.

The flow of the sugya: opening of the second part

Up to this point we clarified the terms mekadesh versus koneh, and the focus on the woman rather than the man. The first part concluded that the Mishnah chose the wording “the woman is acquired” and not “the man acquires” to teach that a woman is not betrothed against her will; she must consent. Now the Gemara continues with a passage that seemingly begins a different clarification (we’ll soon examine whether it really stands apart), and it too, as noted, is linguistic:

“And why does it teach ‘three’ [shalosh]—let it teach ‘three’ [shlosha]?”

At first glance, behind this question lies the assumption that, in principle, it should have said the masculine form shlosha, not the feminine shalosh. But that is very odd, since “ways” (derakhim) is feminine, not masculine. The (self-evident) answer also shows that this wasn’t the question:

“Because it wished to teach ‘way,’ and ‘way’ is feminine, as it is written: ‘and you shall make known to them the way that they shall go in it’ [Exod. 18:20].”

We see that only here does the Gemara register that the Mishnah’s number modifies “ways.” If so, it’s unclear what the difficulty was to begin with. What exactly did the Gemara take the numeral to be modifying? If not “ways,” then “three” of what?

One could understand that behind the question stands the assumption attributed to Ibn Ezra (perhaps mistakenly): “Anything inanimate—treat it as either masculine or feminine.” That is, when it comes to inanimate objects, the grammatical gender is of no consequence; one may refer to it in either masculine or feminine. Different languages customarily divide even inanimates into masculine and feminine (thus “way” receives feminine grammatical treatment), but it seems these divisions are arbitrary. A “way” doesn’t have reproductive organs or chromosomes to mark it as female rather than male. So what does it mean that “way” is described grammatically as feminine? Apparently assigning gender to inanimates is arbitrary, as Ibn Ezra said. No wonder there are differences across languages. Some inanimates are masculine in one language and feminine in another. Some tolerate both forms. In any case, it may be that the Gemara wonders why the Mishnah attached the feminine form to the word “way,” since a “way” is inanimate and tolerates both options. The answer is: because in the Torah it appears that way.

This is very strange, since the fact that Scripture uses it so itself calls for explanation. Why did Scripture assign femininity to “way”? Beyond that, if that was indeed the Gemara’s line, then in its answer it should have sufficed to state that in the Torah “way” appears as feminine. The opening of the answer, “Because it wished to teach ‘way,’” is unclear. According to our working assumption, the entire discussion from the start proceeds against the backdrop that we are speaking about “ways,” and the only question is why use the feminine for them. If so, citing the verse should have been enough. From the wording of the answer, it follows that initially we did not assume that the numeral modifies “ways.” Only in the answer do we arrive at the conclusion that we wanted to speak about “ways,” and therefore the numeral modifies “ways,” and then indeed it is clear the numeral must be feminine (shalosh), as the verse shows. And again the difficulty recurs: what did the questioner think the Mishnah meant? The Mishnah explicitly says “ways.” The numeral plainly modifies “ways.” For some reason the questioner didn’t read the Mishnah that way—very odd.

The natural solution is that the Gemara is wondering why it says “three ways” by which the woman is acquired, rather than “three manners” or “three things” (as becomes explicit later in the sugya). That is, in the question they knew—or assumed—that “way” is feminine. The question wasn’t merely about the numeral (shalosh or shlosha) but mainly about the very term “way.” The numeral only reflects the term chosen to describe the modes of betrothal (feminine for “ways” versus masculine for “things/manners”). According to this, the question was: why did it use “three ways” and not “three manners” or “three things,” and, consequently, a question arises regarding the numeral (since “ways” is feminine, whereas “things/manners” are masculine).

On this reading the Gemara’s answer is that the Mishnah specifically chose the term “way,” because for some reason that is the right term to describe the modes of betrothal; consequently, the numeral will be feminine (as learned from the verse cited). In other words, the discussion presented in the Gemara as if it revolves around the numeral actually revolves around what is being counted. The gender of the numeral only reflects the Mishnah’s choice to speak of “ways” rather than “things/manners.” We must still examine why “ways” is indeed the right term in the Mishnah’s eyes—and, on the other hand, what’s wrong with it? Why would “things/manners” seem preferable to the Gemara? For some reason the Gemara doesn’t explain this here; we will return to it below.

A linguistic preface/hypothesis

During our study, we considered the following hypothesis. The term “derekh” (way) in Scriptural Hebrew describes a road, path, or route—i.e., some physical object on the ground. In contrast, in our Hebrew, following the language of the Sages (for example, in our Mishnah), the term “derekh” was broadened and is used also to describe a manner or mode of doing something. For example: “By which way do you use this or that object?” or “It’s advisable to approach the problem in such-and-such a way,” and so on. So too in our Mishnah: “In three ways the woman is acquired.” The “ways” here are of course not routes on the ground but distinct manners of effecting betrothal. Precisely as speakers of Hebrew (and as those well acquainted with the language of the Sages), we are very accustomed to this extension; it is well embedded in our language, and hence it is hard for us to notice that there has been a shift in meaning.

When the Gemara asks about the Mishnah’s wording, it wonders whence the usage of the term “way” at all, since in Scripture the term does not appear with that meaning. Hence the Gemara’s question about why the Mishnah uses the terminology of “ways” of betrothal (and consequently a feminine numeral) rather than “manners” of betrothal (which would have taken the masculine numeral). The Gemara is implicitly assuming that the Mishnah should have written: “In three manners the woman is acquired”—and now we can understand why.

We saw that the Gemara answers that the Mishnah had reason to choose specifically the term “way,” even though that is not its Scriptural meaning; but it does not spell out why the Mishnah wanted this. In any case, from here it will also be understood that the numeral should be feminine (as we see in the verse “the way which they shall go in it”). The explanation for why this was the terminology the Mishnah chose will be clarified later in the sugya.

We thus learn that the term “derekh” in the language of the Sages (as in the Mishnah, and down to modern Hebrew) broadened beyond its Scriptural meaning. It expanded from an object/thing to a manner of action or conduct. This is what we find in the Talmud (Avodah Zarah 58b and parallels): “The language of the Torah is its own; the language of the Sages is its own.” Here is another step in which the sugya deals with the shift from the language of the Torah to the language of the Sages, as we also saw in its first part.[1]

And what about the verse “the way which they shall go in it,” cited in our sugya as a source? It’s a verse, and according to our proposal, the term “way” there should carry the meaning of an object, not a manner. But seemingly “the way which they shall go in it” does not describe a physical road but a spiritual “way” (the way they shall go, and the deed they shall perform). If so, this appears to be a manner of walking, not a route. This would contradict our hypothesis about the meaning of “way” in Scripture. But I think that’s not precise: it does refer to a route—albeit a route and walking in the spiritual realm; and still it is “way” in the Scriptural sense, only used metaphorically. The “way” here is a route or object, and therefore it is still not the Sages’ sense of “way” (=manner). It is an extension of “way” in its physical sense (in the material world) to the spiritual world.

Continuing the second part: the contrast

Now the Gemara challenges:

“But then that which is taught: ‘In seven ways we examine a zav,’ let it teach ‘seven [masculine]’? Because it wished to teach ‘way’—and we have found that ‘way’ can be masculine, as it is written: ‘They shall come out against you by one way [masc.], and flee before you by seven ways [masc.]’ [Deut. 28:7].”

Up to here, it was clear to the Gemara that linguistically “way” is feminine (in Scripture and in the Sages’ language). Therefore we explained that the Gemara’s question was not about the numeral but about using the term “ways.” But here we find “way” used in the masculine—both in a verse (regarding ways in war) and in the baraita (regarding the “ways” of examining a zav). The Gemara asks how this squares with what we saw above.

Note that the meaning of “way” in the verse cited here is as we described for the regular Scriptural meaning (way as object). The usage in the baraita is similar to what we saw in the Sages’ language (though one could slightly distinguish): the “ways” of examining the zav are the manners of examination (like the modes of betrothal in our Mishnah). That is, the term’s meaning holds here as well: in Scripture it’s an object; in the Sages it’s a manner. Yet here “way,” in both meanings, receives masculine grammatical treatment, which contradicts what we saw above.

It seems the original problem we dismissed returns here. The term “way” is inanimate and, in essence, has no inherent grammatical gender. Hence there is a question rather than a contradiction. One could accept usage in either masculine or feminine, but it is unclear why the Mishnayot and Scripture employ “way” in both genders, and, more importantly, what criterion determines which gender is used in a given context. Below we will see that the discussion still concerns only the term “way,” not all inanimates.

Indeed, that is what the Gemara now asks:

“If so, the verses contradict one another, and the Mishnayot contradict one another as well?”

The Gemara does not have a principled problem with masculine or with feminine. The problem is an internal inconsistency.

And the Gemara answers:

“The verses do not contradict: here it pertains to the Torah, and the Torah is called in the feminine, as it is written: ‘The Torah of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul’ [Ps. 19:8]—so it wrote it in the feminine. There it pertains to war, and it is the way of a man to wage war, and it is not the way of a woman to wage war—so it wrote it in the masculine.”

“The Mishnayot do not contradict: here it pertains to a woman—so it taught it in the feminine; there it pertains to a man, for it is the way of a man to be examined and not the way of a woman to be examined, for a woman, too, contracts impurity by coercion—so it taught it in the masculine.”

The Gemara says that, in both Scripture and the Sages’ language, the term “way” (even though, as we saw, it is used there with two different meanings—object and manner) can indeed be used in either gender. The choice of gender depends on context: in a feminine context the term “way” itself will take feminine grammatical treatment; in a masculine context, masculine. In our Mishnah it concerns a woman, hence the feminine: “three ways.”

In what sense does our Mishnah concern a woman? After all, the man is the one who betroths the woman. We must remember that our Mishnah indeed states “the woman is acquired,” not “the man acquires,” and above (at the end of the first part of the sugya) this was explained: to teach that a woman is not betrothed against her will. If so, perhaps here lies the connection between the two parts of the sugya: after we understood that the Mishnah’s subject is the woman, and that its aim is to teach that a woman is not betrothed against her will, this can also help us understand why it was important for the Mishnah to use specifically the term “way” (the unresolved question above). It wanted a linguistic means to center the focus on the woman, and the word “way” enables that (because the grammatical gender of this term depends on context). We’ll see this immediately.

Note: Is the discussion about all inanimates?

From what I’ve written thus far, one might have understood that the Gemara’s inquiry concerns all inanimates. The Gemara is trying to understand how grammatical gender is assigned to an inanimate object or concept in general, with “way” merely as an example. On that reading there would be a rule that any inanimate can take either masculine or feminine, and the context decides. But from the continuation of the sugya it is clear this is not so. The discussion here is solely about the usage of the term “way,” not about all inanimates. How do we see this? Because the Gemara now returns to the earlier question that remained open:

“What is the reason it taught ‘three’—because of ‘ways’? Then let it teach ‘things’ and teach ‘three’ [masc.]!”

If the inquiry up to now were about all inanimates, this question wouldn’t arise: what difference is there between “things” and “ways”? Both are inanimate, so both tolerate masculine or feminine, and the context would decide. Even had the Mishnah chosen “things” rather than “ways,” the explanation for using the feminine numeral would have remained. From here we see that our discussion concerns only the usage of the term “way,” not all inanimates. For other inanimates there is a single correct answer; specifically with “way” there are two possibilities determined by context. This leads us straight back to the question of why the Mishnah cared to use specifically the term “way.” If it indeed has a uniqueness (since only it is used in either gender according to context), that can help us understand the Mishnah’s linguistic choice.

In any case, the term “way” is apparently one of the bi-gender terms—i.e., it tolerates masculine or feminine—but the choice is not arbitrary (whereas for other bi-gender terms it may be arbitrary). What determines which is used is the context. Therefore the Mishnah specifically chose this term, because using the feminine with it reflects the message that the woman’s consent is required.

Continuing the sugya: explaining the Mishnah’s linguistic choice

We saw that the Gemara above answered that the feminine choice is because the Mishnah wanted to use the term “way.” Now the Gemara returns and attempts to explain what remained open above: why indeed was it important for the Mishnah to use specifically the term “way,” and not “manner” or something else?

The Gemara answers:

“Because it wished to teach ‘intercourse’ (bi’ah), and intercourse is called ‘way,’ as it is written: ‘the way of a man with a maiden; so is the way of an adulterous woman’ [Prov. 30:19–20].”

The verse cited is from the Writings (Proverbs 30:19) rather than the Torah, and yet it is a verse. In that verse, does the term “way” carry the Sages’ meaning or the Scriptural one? “The way of a man with a maiden” is the manner in which a man relates to a young woman. Seemingly “way” there is not an object but a manner of something, which would fit more with the Sages’ language.

But on second thought, it looks very similar to “the way which they shall go in it.” Above I explained that “way” in that verse does not mean “manner”; it is a metaphor that uses the regular Scriptural meaning—a route in the spiritual realm. The verse in Proverbs likewise uses “way” in a very similar sense: the human route by which a man conducts himself with a maiden.

This seems from the verse itself. But the Gemara understands that “way” in the verse in Proverbs means “intercourse.” That is actually an action (intercourse is a verbal noun), thus not really an object, but also not a “manner” of something. If anything, it aligns more with “things” than with “ways of betrothal” (in the sense of modes of betrothal). Therefore it would have been more appropriate to write “things” rather than “ways”; but since one of the modes of betrothal (one of the “things”) is intercourse, and intercourse is called in Scripture “way,” the Mishnah chose to use here the language of “ways” rather than “things.”

Something quite odd has happened. If “way” means “intercourse,” and the Mishnah wishes to speak about intercourse, it should have used “things” rather than “ways” (for intercourse is a “thing”). But “way” as an object (in the Scriptural sense) is linked to the object/action of intercourse; therefore the Mishnah wants to describe intercourse specifically as a “way” rather than a “thing.” However, this now requires that we shift the meaning of “way,” since now “way” becomes a manner of performing betrothal rather than a “thing.”

Here we have a metamorphosis of the Sages’ language out of Scriptural language: the term “way” moves from the meaning of “route” to the meaning of “mode” of doing something. They chose this term in particular because in Scripture it describes the very act of betrothal (intercourse); but in the process a new meaning was born for “way”: instead of a route—physical or spiritual—it became a description of a mode for doing something (betrothal). One can surmise that with time this broadened and became commonplace in other contexts as well (as we saw above: the way to tackle a problem; it can be done in various ways, etc.).

Of course this metamorphosis has internal logic. A way of doing something is a choice among possibilities, and metaphorically this can be seen as choosing among routes (in the spiritual realm). Thus there is internal logic for using the term “way” with this meaning. The shift from Scriptural language to the Sages’ language is based on a generalization and abstraction of the Scriptural sense of “way” as a route (in the physical world). A manner of doing something is a kind of route—one among several—by which to perform it. The verse in Proverbs, “the way of a man with a maiden,” like “the way which they shall go in it,” are the intermediate steps in this linguistic metamorphosis. It is an expansion of the concept “route” from the physical meaning, through choosing among spiritual routes, to choosing among possibilities in general. Ultimately a different meaning arises in the Sages’ language: the mode of performing something, even where it is not literally a “route,” not even in the spiritual sense. This is the language of the Sages.

In that sense, Scripture itself already contains the beginnings of the development toward the Sages’ language. And perhaps the derivation from “the way of a man with a maiden” is not only to teach that “way” means intercourse, but that here one sees that the term “way” already in Scripture receives a somewhat more abstract, spiritual meaning than a physical route. The term “way” is treading upward on the “road” (mesilah) “that goes up to Bet-El” (Judg. 21:19; see also Gen. 35:1, 3).

Once we’ve reached the point that “way” is a manner of performing betrothal, it means that intercourse is not a freestanding object but a manner of performing something more fundamental: the betrothal itself. This naturally opens the door to other ways of performing it. Perhaps there are more “ways” (manners) to perform betrothal. Indeed, the Mishnah adds money and document. True, they are not included in the Scriptural term “way” (which is only intercourse); but once we arrived at the Sages’ meaning—“way” as “manner”—then money and document also fall very naturally under “way.” Intercourse is but one manner of performing betrothal, and these are two more. Now we no longer have three distinct “things”: money, document, and intercourse. Rather, we have three manners by which to perform one thing (betrothal), i.e., three “ways” of performing it.[2] This also helps the Mishnah convey the message that the woman’s consent is required for betrothal. It does so by choosing the term “way,” whose grammatical gender depends on context; and as we saw, the context in our Mishnah is feminine for that very reason.

This also explains what we saw in the first part of the sugya: that the Sages added the language of kiddushin over the Scriptural language of acquisition. They wanted to tell us that there is a more fundamental concept here, and the different “ways” are only manners of performing it. Therefore it cannot be viewed merely as acquisition (as one might have understood from the Torah’s language). If so, the shift from Scriptural language to the Sages’ language in the first part of the sugya is entirely parallel to the shift we’ve seen here.

This also explains the next step in the sugya. The Gemara raises what seems like an obvious objection:

“This works for intercourse; but money and document—what is there to say? [It is all] because of intercourse.”

We justified the term “way” because we need intercourse. But the Mishnah includes two other “ways”: money and document. So the Gemara asks why the Mishnah adopts language that suits one of the three ways and ignores the other two. Seemingly this is not difficult, for intercourse forces the use of “way,” whereas money and document can be “way” or “thing,” and thus we set the language based on intercourse. That is likely the answer.

But the Gemara apparently does not accept this, for it immediately asks:

“And would it teach two on account of one? Those, too, are in need of intercourse.”

If document and money tolerated both “way” and “thing,” and intercourse compelled specifically “way,” then, as I explained above, there would have been no problem with saying “ways” because of intercourse. From the Gemara’s objection it is clear it understood that document and money compel specifically “thing” rather than “way,” and therefore it was difficult for the Gemara that the one trumps the two.

Ultimately the Gemara answers that both of those, too, ultimately lead to intercourse—the “way of a man with a maiden.” That is, the language of “way” applies to them as well. But now that “way” suits all three modes of betrothal, we may use the Sages’ sense of “way,” and view money, document, and intercourse as ways (=manners) of performing betrothal. Again there is a transition from the Scriptural meaning, which sees these three as “things” (objects or actions) that effect betrothal, to three manners of performing one action (betrothal). The meaning of “way” underwent a transformation: from route (an object/thing) to the manner of doing something.

Continuing the sugya: “way” in the sense of derekh eretz

From here on I will only present the last part of the sugya, even though it heads in a different direction. Further on, the sugya brings an alternative formulation:

“And alternatively: whose opinion is this [Mishnah]? It is Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says, Why did the Torah say, ‘When a man takes a woman’ and not write, ‘When a woman is taken to a man’? Because it is the way of a man to pursue a woman, and it is not the way of a woman to pursue a man. A parable: to a person who lost an object—who goes after whom? The owner of the lost object pursues his lost object.”

Seemingly this provides another resolution to the question of why the Mishnah focuses on the woman rather than the man. But the content of the explanation does not really answer that. From the continuation it seems this is an alternative answer to why the Mishnah uses “ways” rather than “things” (as we saw, that was actually the first question in the sugya, though at first it was couched in terms of the masculine or feminine numeral, and only later surfaced explicitly). The second formulation explains that the language of “way” in the Mishnah is to teach that it is the way of a man to pursue a woman (the “side” that has lost its counterpart).

This is a bit puzzling, for here the focus is specifically on the man’s pursuit, whereas up to now we saw the focus on the woman (in continuity with the end of the sugya’s first part). But here there is an alternative explanation for why it used “ways”—to hint that it is the way of a man to pursue a woman. It’s unclear whether this comes only to teach a fact, or to recommend this as the proper “way” (that it is not appropriate for the woman to pursue the man). Beyond this, there is no hint to this in the Mishnah’s wording. One could equally have learned that it is the way of a woman to pursue a man. If that was the aim, the Mishnah should have spelled it out. Apparently the intent is that the factual “way”—that the man pursues the woman—is also the normative “way.” The man should be the active party; his three ways of acting are: money, document, and intercourse. True, the woman’s consent is required, but that is only a condition for the betrothal to take effect; the act of betrothal is performed by the man.

We should note, however, that the feminine language used by the Mishnah derives from its choice of the term “way.” That is, Rabbi Shimon, too, does not disagree with what we have seen thus far. He can even accept that the Mishnah hints at the need for the woman’s consent by saying “the woman is acquired” rather than “the man betroths,” and that the choice of the feminine numeral serves to teach that very point (since he, too, agrees that the choice between masculine and feminine follows the context).

If so, the second formulation departs from the first only regarding the connection to the end of the sugya’s first part. I explained that in the first formulation this inquiry is seen as a continuation of the first section that aims to emphasize the need for the woman’s consent. The second formulation likely agrees with the need for her consent, but sees this inquiry as something separate, not linked to the first part.

From here on the sugya proceeds in that vein:

“And that which we learned, ‘In seven ways we examine a zav,’ let it teach ‘things’! There [the reason is] that it comes to teach us that excessive eating leads to ziva, and excessive drinking leads to ziva.”

So too with the zav: they used “way” because they wanted to teach derekh eretz (proper conduct). Here, too, it seems the aim is not merely to teach facts (what leads to ziva) but to teach that one ought not adopt ways that lead to ziva. These are practices that are not normatively proper. In a number of places where the expression “the Torah taught derekh eretz” is used, it tolerates both meanings (and in most such cases it seems to mean a fact that has normative import).

Likewise for the etrog:

“And that which we learned, ‘An etrog is like a tree in three ways,’ let it teach ‘things’! Because we need to teach the seifa, ‘and like a vegetable in one way.’ Let the seifa too say ‘thing’! There it comes to teach us that the ways of an etrog are like a vegetable: as a vegetable grows on all waters and its time of tithing is at harvest, so an etrog grows on all waters and its time of tithing is at harvest.”

Here “way” comes to describe a fact, but a norm (a halakhic obligation of tithing) follows from it.

And regarding a koy and a bill of divorce:

“And that which we learned, ‘A koy has ways in which it is like a wild animal, and ways in which it is like domestic livestock, and ways in which it is like both, and ways in which it is like neither,’ let it teach ‘things’! And furthermore, that which we learned, ‘This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce of women and emancipation documents of slaves are equal’—let it teach ‘things’!”

But in conclusion:

“Rather, wherever there is a division [of cases], it teaches ‘ways’; and wherever there is no division, it teaches ‘things.’ And indeed the seifa states: ‘Rabbi Eliezer says: An etrog is like a tree in every respect’—learn from this.”

The term “way” is used only where the intent is to distinguish among cases.[3] Therefore, too, our Mishnah uses “three ways,” for there are three ways by which a woman is acquired, and two ways by which she acquires herself.

Summary

We saw in the sugya three explanations for why the Mishnah uses “ways” rather than “things”: (1) “Way” means intercourse. (2) Using “way” always comes to teach a normative value from facts. (3) Where the text intends to distinguish among categories, it uses “ways.” It seems, however, that conclusion (2) is rejected; and even on its own it seems rather forced.

Note, though, that the latter two explanations do not return to the question of the numeral—i.e., whether “way” is masculine or feminine. It seems all agree with the explanation at the beginning of the sugya’s second part: that the choice of masculine or feminine is set by context; and perhaps also with the development of the Sages’ language out of Scriptural language. This is indeed an unusual focus, seldom found in the Talmud, but it illuminates an interesting facet of linguistic development. The Savoraim here engaged in a kind of philological-developmental inquiry into the term “way,” from Scripture to the Sages, intertwined with examining its grammatical gendering.

[1] In Nedarim 49a we find a comparison between the language of the Torah and the language of ordinary people (the street—not the Mishnah’s language, which is the Sages’ language). The term “way” in ordinary speech is of course drawn from the Sages’ language.

[2] In the past I explained on this basis the apparent contradiction in the Rambam. In his Second Shoresh he writes that a halakhah derived by exegesis is Rabbinic; yet at the beginning of Hilkhot Ishut he writes that of the three ways of betrothal, only two are Biblical—money is Rabbinic. But many have already wondered how, one halakhah later, he writes that one who has intercourse with a betrothed woman is liable to death, without excluding betrothal by money. Seemingly it follows from there that betrothal by money is Biblical. If we look at Positive Commandment 213:

“The 213th commandment is that He commanded us to engage in intercourse for betrothal and to give something into the woman’s hand, or by document, or by intercourse. And this is the commandment of betrothal. And the hint is what is said (Deut. 24): ‘When a man takes a woman and has relations with her’—this indicates that he will acquire by intercourse (Kiddushin 2b). And it says (ibid.) ‘and she departs and becomes [another man’s wife],’ and just as departure is by document, so too the becoming is by document (ibid. 5a). And likewise we learned (ibid. 3b) that she is acquired by money from what is said regarding the Hebrew maidservant (Exod. 21): ‘there is no money’—our Sages said: there is no money for this master, but there is money for another master, namely the father. But betrothal is Biblical, and it is clarified by intercourse, as has been clarified in places in Ketubot (3a), Kiddushin, and Niddah (Mishnah 44b). And the laws of this commandment have been fully clarified in the tractate attached to this, namely tractate Kiddushin. And explicitly they said (Kiddushin 9a): betrothal by intercourse is Biblical. Thus it has been clarified that the commandment of betrothal is Biblical.”

Here it does not state that betrothal by money is Rabbinic, though it hints at it by saying that the betrothal explicated in the Torah is by intercourse. It seems his intent is that even if betrothal by money is learned from exegesis, the exegesis did not innovate a brand-new law but interpreted the concept of “taking” (betrothal) written in the Torah. Therefore, betrothal by money is also Biblical. If so, money, document, and intercourse are three ways (manners) to perform one act: betrothal. That is what I wrote above.

[3] Though not always in the same sense. With the etrog these are ways in which it is similar to, or different from, a tree. With a woman’s betrothal the distinction is between ways she is acquired and ways she acquires herself (two different subjects).