A Reexamination of Paradigms in the Wake of the Simchat Torah Events (Column 602)

With God's help

In the previous column we dealt with solutions to paradoxes. A paradox sets an argument that appears logical against a claim that appears true to us. There I distinguished between two kinds of solutions to paradoxes: 1. finding a flaw in the argument. 2. rejecting the claim. In the second case, the argument is nothing but a proof that the claim is incorrect, and that is precisely why we tend to ignore it and look for solutions by the first route. The surprise-exam paradox is solved by the second route, and in that it teaches us that sometimes we must listen to counterarguments rather than be taken captive by our intuitions. If we take the trouble to listen to arguments, it may become clear to us that we were mistaken in our claims.

The meaning is that if we hold some position, we have a tendency to belittle arguments that attack it. But sometimes it is precisely the arguments that are correct, and they show us that we must throw out our intuitions and our existing paradigms. In the conclusion I wrote that this recommendation has, of course, many current applications, and I intend to touch on several of them in this column. Here I will deal with conclusions from the events of the war 'Swords of Iron,' which is still ongoing. Here too, each of us is called upon to reexamine his paradigms in light of the events and to formulate a new position regarding them. This requires the same intellectual honesty I spoke of, namely a willingness to listen to the facts and to counterarguments and to draw conclusions from them.

The disputes and the unity following the recent events

In the weeks since Simchat Torah, there has been an optimistic feeling regarding the public rupture that accompanied us over the past year. The political and ideological disputes, the various hatreds, and the polarization have supposedly disappeared. There is wonderful unity, and many think the rupture is already behind us. You could hardly be more mistaken. It is indeed encouraging to see that we have not lost the will to live, and that will naturally requires cooperation and temporary disregard for our disagreements, but in my opinion nothing essential has really changed. The first shoots of the arguments that await us the moment the war is over are already appearing, and this is only the squill that heralds the coming of autumn. In my assessment, after the war, when each person and each group among us stands before the shards of its paradigms and faces the results of the war (I have no idea what they will be, but my estimate is that the long-term situation will not change substantially), the disputes will awaken with even greater force and intensity.

When a left-winger or a right-winger understands that his previous paradigms have shattered, he will have to rebuild his camp identity, and then naturally points of dispute will be found that can provide the needed fuel. And if they are not found, we will manufacture them, or we will focus on people rather than ideas. A common enemy always unites the camp in a time of crisis. Already now, in my opinion, the hostages are beginning to become such a point (the demonstrations on their behalf look like a continuation of the Kaplan protests, with only the topic changed). I fear that people will not be willing to draw conclusions and change positions if that means I have to admit that the other side, the rival, was right. That is a recipe for rigidity and for intensifying the dispute.

It seems to me that the proper way to prepare for the next stage is to reexamine our paradigms in light of the events of these weeks and to formulate updated positions about them honestly. Each of us should keep what seems relevant to him and update what does not. Once we have a position, we can look around and see who is with us and who is against us. It is not advisable to preserve the disputes along the existing fault lines, although the human tendency is toward just such inertia (we can see this today, when many people honestly admit to an ideological and paradigmatic break they are undergoing in light of the events, but this does not soften their dispute with their opponents. You will not get from them an admission that the other side, which had always said this, was right). If we begin doing this thinking now, there is perhaps a chance that after the war we will arrive at a somewhat different situation.

The shattering of paradigms

My feeling is that quite a few paradigms were shattered in these events, and each of you has surely read quite a few texts by people writing about this. At first glance, I am under the impression that most of the paradigms that have shattered are connected to conceptions of the side called the 'left' on our political map (note: for the sake of clarity and brevity, the terms 'left' and 'right' will be used here in the imprecise and non-substantive way in which they are commonly used in our political discourse), and indeed most of the confessions come from there. I must say that alongside these confessions I have not heard a straightforward acknowledgment to the ideological rivals who were saying this all along and sometimes were met with dismissal and contempt. Evidently there is a limit to people's honesty, but at least we are on the way. There has also been some breakage on the right, although there I have seen fewer such admissions. This column is meant to make its contribution to this important process.

It seems to me that the best way to deal with this difficult situation is for each person honestly to examine his own paradigms and not those of others (especially his opponents). I therefore wish to enumerate here the points that it seems to me we ought to reconsider in light of the events, both from the left and from the right. In the comments on this column I ask each person to do one of two things: 1. add points I did not think of, or arguments that are not raised here regarding the existing points. 2. describe a paradigm shift of his own, or at least his own hesitation regarding the paradigms he held until the current events. Please do not engage here in criticism of others. I think this is not a bad preparation for the days after the war, when we may perhaps try to rebuild ourselves, find common denominators, and better understand positions that are opposed to our own.

I should note that in the sections I am now listing, I am presenting considerations that everyone ought to take into account. I do not intend to express my own position, although I assume that in certain cases it may be understood from my remarks. I will try to indicate places where I myself have second thoughts about previous positions of my own.

1. Antisemitism and progressivism

Gadi Taub, in his book Mobiles and Immobiles, distinguishes between Israelis who are generally of higher economic and educational status and are mobile in the world. Their connection to the country is not necessary, and therefore it is also weaker. They speak a universal language and culture, they have friends abroad, and they also visit there quite a bit. This is in contrast to the immobiles, who are provincial, connected to the country, and speak a local language and a local culture. The former generally belong to what is called here the 'left,' and the latter to the 'right.'

The mobiles generally think there is no antisemitism in the world (except for justified reasons). Therefore they tend to join criticisms of us from outside and to see them as an expression of our flaws. They speak about war crimes by IDF soldiers, about apartheid in our treatment of Israeli Arabs, and the like. In many cases they are the source of these global criticisms. The mobiles also think that the global left is characterized by concern for the weak and the suffering, by standing with the righteous—in short, by genuine liberalism. Therefore the global left's criticisms of us come from a genuinely liberal place (and not from antisemitism). The fact that our friends in the world generally belong to right-wing parties (Trump, Bolsonaro, Orban, and their friends), whereas left-wing parties are more critical and less sympathetic to us, was for them proof that something is wrong with us (that we are not on the right side of history).

And now, in recent days, one can read remarks by quite a few people from the group of the mobiles who confess to the shattering of their paradigm of mobility. Contrary to what they had thought, the antisemitic events around the world reveal to them that there really is antisemitism—that those among their friends (former friends) who criticize us do not always do so from objective motives. Not only that, but the antisemitism appears in especially blatant and severe form precisely among the strata of their friends (the global mobile left, especially the part called 'progressive'). Their friends are no longer really their friends, the criticisms of us are no longer really objective, and suddenly experiences that we thought had passed from the world begin returning to us (groundless hatred by gentiles, persecution and violence against Jews, unwillingness to recognize our existence and our right to defend ourselves, automatic support for our enemies, the need to conceal Jewish markers, the feeling of fear, and so forth). Quite a few people speak of understanding the situation and the helplessness of our parents in the generations of exile.

Moreover, the anti-Zionist attitudes around the world, which usually aroused their identification, suddenly reveal themselves to them as an expression of antisemitism. The attitude to the State of Israel is related to its being the state of the Jews, and this is not merely criticism of one policy or another government. Therefore the criticisms of the State of Israel and of Zionism lead to an antisemitic attitude toward Jews around the world, with no connection whatsoever to their attitude toward the State of Israel, their citizenship, or their views. All of these are characteristics of the classical antisemitism on which we were raised, and as we learned, attempts to assimilate into general society usually did not really succeed in calming it. One must understand that this is a very deep fracture in the worldview of the mobiles, and I have read several moving texts that express it.

I myself was partly party to all this. It was clear to me that antisemitism certainly exists, and that anti-Zionism is connected to antisemitism (that is, that the world does not judge us in a balanced and reasonable way), but I thought the talk about antisemitism was exaggerated. Not everything is antisemitism, and there are also valid criticisms. I still think so, but the proportion is apparently different from what I had thought. Antisemitism is definitely present, and it is very ugly.

I must say that these confessions arouse great appreciation in me, for there is here a relinquishing of a very basic and essential stance and movement of soul central to the conceptions of the universal liberal left, of the mobiles. At the margins, I nevertheless must note that I missed there an acknowledgment that there was someone here who had been saying this all along, that is, that the immobile 'right' was right.

2. Jewish identity

This is a continuation of the previous point. As part of those same reactions, I also see a return to Jewish identity (a retreat from universalism). This point too is certainly worth further thought. People felt that they were citizens of the world, but that same world is again placing them, just as in the stories, before the Jewish identity from which they tried to flee.

There are quite a few videos of rabbis speaking with soldiers before they go out to battle, praying, reciting Psalms, and conducting religious discourse. This time it seems to be received with greater ease, and perhaps that is part of the same awakening and return from universality to Jewish particularity. I must say that this phenomenon arouses a certain discomfort in me, for several reasons. First, in my view these are not religiously commanded wars, nor are they connected to Judaism or to the enemies of Judaism. This is self-defense against enemies, like any normal people fighting for its life and defending its citizens. It is not conducted in God's name but in the name of the right to live. Beyond that, there are soldiers who are uncomfortable with this, and I think it places them in unpleasant situations. I assume that for most of them it is not pleasant to comment and criticize, to stand against their comrades and against the general spirit, but one must take them into account as well.

Here this is a point for thought from all sides: do we want a Jewish/religious identity or not? But so long as not everyone has decided to come under the wings of the Divine Presence, in my view it is not proper to use the situation that has arisen in order to bring them there against their will. Of course, if there are soldiers who are interested in this, it is very good that they should pray and conduct any ceremony their heart desires, but not in a mandatory framework and not as part of military procedure.

3. The source of Palestinian terror

The accepted conception on the left was that terror is generated mainly against the background of the Palestinians' economic and national distress. The obvious conclusion was that if there were progress in the national conflict and if we alleviated the economic distress, redemption would come to Zion. The siege on Gaza was perceived as the main cause of terror. The data showing that terror does not appear especially among the weaker strata but mainly among the stronger ones (the Hamas leadership is composed for the most part of people with academic education, quite a few doctors and engineers. Incidentally, it seems to me that in the current generation this has diminished) received no attention in public discourse. The written and spoken Hamas/Islamic ideology, which speaks of a religious command to conquer the territory in our hands and of an inability to compromise in any way whatsoever (as a religious command), also received no real attention. There may perhaps be a distinction between the religious elements among the Palestinians and their nationalist elements, but in many cases the difference does not seem significant. As happens in other religions too, something of the religious mentality has undergone secularization and characterizes even the secular groups. It seems to me that among them this happens more than among Jews and Christians.

On this matter too, second thoughts are being heard from the left. Suddenly one hears the voices of experts on Islam and Hamas, and they receive some degree of attention. I must say that I myself used to distinguish between the written ideology of a person or a group and their behavior in practice (see, for example, in column 507), both with regard to judging them in the present and with regard to predictions about their conduct in the future. I still think that this distinction is important and correct, but the recent events are giving me second thoughts, particularly regarding the applicability of this distinction to Hamas, and perhaps to the Palestinians generally as well.

4. The innocent and the uninvolved

The attitude toward Palestinians who are uninvolved also merits reexamination in light of the recent events. For me it was clear that harming the uninvolved is forbidden, unless it is necessary in order to achieve our aims (defending our lives, freeing the hostages, and so on). I still think so. But even so, it is hard to ignore the complicity of Gazan civilians who joyfully joined the pogroms and kidnappings on Simchat Torah and even took a significant part in them. It is very hard to ignore the support of the residents of Gaza, and of most Palestinians generally, for Hamas. One can perhaps speak of the uninvolved, but it is rather difficult to speak of the innocent (incidentally, in the past I was careful to use the expression 'the uninvolved,' because I always thought there were very few innocents in Gaza).

It is very hard to relate to a society entirely built on murder and violence, which educates its children from infancy, in kindergartens and schools and mosques, to terror, to killing Jews, and to antisemitism; which finances terror and supports it in varying degrees; which refuses every reasonable proposal that would improve its life; which wails over its terrible condition, and yet, by means of lies and distortions, directs all its resources and the enormous donations it receives from the world to terror instead of improving the lives of its residents. All this is done without any real damage to the public support enjoyed by Hamas. Perhaps the opposite is true. Such a society is certainly a kind of Amalek (symbolically, not necessarily in a halakhic sense), and the attitude toward it cannot be like the attitude toward an ordinary enemy society in which we distinguish between soldiers and the regime on the one hand and civilians on the other. Therefore, today I am not really retracting my position on this matter, but I certainly better understand those who think differently from me regarding harm to the uninvolved.

5. The morality of war

This section is, of course, connected to the previous one. Not infrequently the question arises of harming innocents (or the uninvolved) in the course of action against terror and against terrorists. This is so, for example, in the question of targeted killings. Here too the division is between right and left (and in this case the dispute really is connected to right and left, as I showed in columns 5 and 151. This is not a spurious correlation). It seems to me that these questions must receive renewed attention, since it turns out that the distinction between the involved and the uninvolved is quite blurred. The recent events also shed new light on questions of proportionality (how many uninvolved people may be harmed in order to harm a terrorist).

These days one hears new tunes from unmistakable people of the left who call to flatten Gaza and kill everyone from infant to suckling. Members of the kibbutzim near Gaza who are identified with the left say this again and again. The question is whether they will remember this after the war, and what their opinion will be when the victims of terror come from other places (as in the West Bank, for example). Talk from the right about "flattening Huwara" or taking a hard line against terror and the society that enables it always received (until a month ago) torrents of condemnation and contempt, and suddenly those very same things are being heard directly from the strongholds of the left. That means someone here needs to rethink things honestly.

6. War policy and aggression

As part of the previous discussions, we must ask ourselves about the policy of opening a war. Usually we recoil very strongly from preventive wars, and we try to contain almost every step by the enemy. Certainly if that step does not directly harm us, and involves only a military buildup and preparations to harm us. We act on the basis of successes and results (whether any of our people were killed and how many), and not on the basis of capabilities and intentions (the accumulation of weapons and forces in preparation for actions against us). The Six-Day War was very exceptional in this respect, although even there it was preceded by prolonged hesitation.

All this requires rethinking. The events of these days teach us that we must not accept the buildup of terror organizations on our border. If they conduct a military exercise or make preparations for an attack, that is grounds to destroy them just like an actual attack. Certainly an attempted attack is grounds for a response just like an attack that succeeded. A missile that is fired and does not hit anyone is not grounds for a real response. But that very same missile, if it had hit and killed one person or several people, would be grounds for war. It seems to me that the recent events have sharpened the perception that they must be attacked without mercy even when they are not hitting us, and even when ostensibly we have quiet. The policy of containment and the desire to obtain quiet are to our detriment. The quiet over there is only for the sake of preparation and buildup (this is well grounded in Muslim doctrine), and there is no reason to wait for them. The initiative should be in our hands, and opening a war in such circumstances is not aggression and is not a war of choice. And that includes necessary harm to the uninvolved. As stated, our morality of war needs to change.

Incidentally, this has implications for the northern front at this very moment. This is an excellent opportunity to apply this policy to Hezbollah. At the moment we have relative quiet (very relative), and we are exercising restraint (relatively). When the army is mobilized in massive numbers and our population has already been evacuated, this is a golden opportunity to deal with them with full force and determination, just as in Gaza. There is no difference between Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of intentions, and there is a great difference in terms of capabilities. The fact that at the moment Hezbollah has no results (Hezbollah has no successes) should not change anything. They are not accumulating power for the sake of accumulating power. It is meant to be used against us, and therefore it will come sooner or later. We will not be able to avoid dealing with this problem forever. Of course, I do not know the facts regarding our ability to manage two such fronts simultaneously, and therefore this is only a principled remark.

One may say that our time horizon needs to expand. It is not necessarily right to pay prices, certainly irreversible ones, for quiet. In the long run this may exact from us very high prices. The policy of 'peace now' and 'quiet now' sometimes has its place, but it can also be destructive. Even the agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which are regarded by most of the public as great successes, are not necessarily such. In non-democratic countries, such agreements are very fragile. As is known, they did not filter down to the broader public, which in both those countries is still very hostile to us. This is an agreement of shared interests with the regimes alone, and in a non-democratic state such an agreement is dangerous. The next ruler can easily violate it (see Morsi). The prices we paid for those peace agreements (especially with Egypt) may cost us dearly in the future. Present quiet is sometimes an illusion.

7. Is there a partner?

The distinction between different Palestinian groups stands at the basis of the left's conception that believes in peace. I should note that Bibi, who is receiving very justified criticism for supporting Hamas for years, did not do so because he thinks they are righteous. From his standpoint they and Fatah are the same garbage, and his whole purpose was to separate them and set them against one another. People on the left can criticize him for supporting Hamas (and again, justifiably), but they do so because in their opinion Fatah are a partner and Hamas are not.

I think this position merits another look, and this time the direction is not unambiguous. On the one hand, it is quite clear that for some time now there has been a significant majority in the Palestinian public that supports Hamas (which is why Abu Mazen does not hold elections), and therefore we have a general problem with the Palestinians and not with a specific party among them. On the other hand, in these weeks we are hearing more and more voices of Israeli Arabs who disavow Hamas's actions and even take part in helping evacuees and victims. The large southern operations center of 'Brothers in Arms,' which takes care of the army and the evacuees, is in Rahat. Among the Bedouin in the south there were some who cooperated with the Simchat Torah attacks, but there were also some who fought them and saved Jews. As is known, some of those murdered were Bedouin. Even the few Israeli Arabs who speak in favor of Hamas (incidentally, sometimes this is a false accusation, part of the general hysteria sweeping over us these days) are exceptions that prove the rule is not there. Part of the reason that Guardian of the Walls-type events did not break out here as in 2021 is the lack of identification with Hamas and its deeds (and of course also the fear that now we would no longer contain such acts). A few days ago I saw a poll speaking of 85% of Israeli Arabs opposing the atrocities committed on Simchat Torah. True, 15% who do not oppose them is a rather troubling figure, but even so it seems to me worth considering this datum when formulating a position regarding the chances of progress with the Palestinians and the way to achieve it.

8. On the right and racism

On the left there is a tendency to connect the right with racism. A discriminatory or different attitude toward Arabs is perceived as improper inequality. I have already written here more than once that none of this has any necessary connection to racism (although it of course also exists), since we are dealing with enemies who seek our lives. The position one forms regarding Arabs in general can also project onto this question. One who reaches the conclusion that after all this is a people of enemies (and not a peace-seeking people with terrorists in its midst), will, I assume, see in a different light those who are unwilling to give them equal treatment. Not everyone who supports the use of force or a harsh attitude toward Arab nationalism is a racist (regardless of the question whether he is right and whether I agree with him).

9. The disengagement

These days one occasionally hears voices that raise second thoughts regarding the disengagement as well. True, they are heard mainly from the right, but the matter is certainly worth reconsidering. Likewise, many people have an automatic reservation about statements that we should now return to Gush Katif. It is argued that the settlers prefer land to people and blood, but the recent events should awaken in all of us a willingness to think about the matter again. It seems that the price was exacted from us not only in land but also in blood. I do not think there is an unambiguous conclusion here, but this whole issue requires renewed thought.

I have written more than once that the disengagement is not a one-time step. When people asked me what my opinion of the disengagement was, I answered that I had no opinion because the question is not well defined. Such an action is not merely a withdrawal from territory; at the same time one must define responses and policy for every event that will occur afterward. If one speaks only about leaving the territory and does not define the policy that is to accompany it, such a question cannot be discussed. It seems to me that everyone understands that if we had adopted a more forceful policy toward Hamas's buildup and the rocket fire, tunnels, and incendiary balloons, we would not have arrived at the recent events. Therefore hanging everything on the disengagement is making life easy for ourselves. Not to mention the dangers to the communities that would have lived inside the Strip and to the soldiers who would have guarded them. There is no doubt that supporters of the disengagement need to think about it again, but its opponents as well cannot derive a simple proof for their position from the recent events.

10. Gilad Shalit and the cash suitcases

Today it is very fashionable to blame Bibi for the Shalit deal, which created a problematic precedent that encourages kidnappings for bargaining purposes. Is it proper to do this when an overwhelming majority of the public supported and applied enormous pressure for such a deal? Suddenly it turns out that everyone was very smart, and only Bibi was foolish. I remember that my wife and I visited the protest tent of the Shalit family near the Prime Minister's residence at the height of those enormous pressures, and we conducted a stormy argument about the justification of such a deal (incidentally, even they did not fully support it. They at least said they expected some kind of pressure measures for Gilad's release, not necessarily an exchange deal). Whoever opposed the deal at that time was presented as a fanatical right-wing extremist who was indifferent to human life. The media and public consensus in favor of the deal was wall to wall, apart from a few right-wingers (mainly rabbis) who were presented as esoteric extremists. Moreover, even I, who opposed the deal then, today fully support an exchange deal (because of the number of captives, the ages, and the likelihood of freeing them by another route). You can see the enormous pressures taking place these very days for the release of the hostages, and especially for a deal. That of course will not prevent criticism of such a deal, if it is made, from those same people themselves.

In my opinion there is no necessary dependence between what happened then and what is happening today. Moreover, even if Gilad were still in captivity, do you really think Hamas would not have had motivation to carry out this mega-attack? Do they not understand that this gives them an enormous card and that they have a better chance of obtaining a deal? And even if they had not taken captives, they would have killed them. The consideration is not simple at all.

The same applies to the suitcases of Qatari cash for Hamas. Now everyone is smart and criticizes Bibi for that decision. In real time, very many people supported this policy in order to preserve quiet in the Strip and not to give them motivation for attacks. Even those on the left who criticized Bibi for this did so mainly in order to show his inconsistency, and not because of genuine opposition to the step itself. After all, someone who opposes the siege on Gaza cannot say that he opposes transferring suitcases of cash.

Be that as it may, all of these are complex and difficult issues, and hindsight is the easiest wisdom. This certainly requires honest and renewed thinking, not the flinging of tendentious slogans nourished by an agenda of being for or against Bibi.

11. Trust in the IDF: "Let the IDF win"

We all grew up with almost complete trust in the army. Although most of us were there and we know how it is run (including the jokes that logic stops at the base gate), somehow the army's standing in Israeli society was not really harmed. People tend to think that if the government did not interfere, the army would solve all the problems. It turns out that this is not necessarily the case. Our army is apparently fairly mediocre, not endowed with truly creative thinking, run in a sloppy manner, and of course also not really interested in winning. Israel's standing policy, whose aim is to gain a bit more quiet in return for reasonable prices, certainly enjoys backing and support in the army. In many cases the army restrains the government and not vice versa.

The events of these days caught the army with its pants down. It is convenient for people on the left to hang everything on the government, but it is quite clear that the main problem was actually in the army. Much has already been written about how we were captive to the illusions of technology, to the desire for quiet, to the 'deterrence' we had achieved against our enemies, to the absence of thought, to reactiveness, to the absence of initiative, and much more. Therefore the attitude toward the army also now requires a strong refresh from the root (down to the question of a professional army, strategic think teams outside the army and the government, and the like).

12. The limits of power and political constraints

The concept of 'the limits of power' has two meanings that are relevant to our matter.

• We do not have infinite power. Far from it. Ministers in the current government sent Biden and the Americans to mind their own business and let us deal with our problems, out of some kind of hubris that we can solve all the problems ourselves if only they do not interfere (an expanded version of "Let the IDF win"). But these days it turns out that our power is not unlimited, and it is contingent on the Americans (and on other countries). This is not only about the political backing that is needed in order for us to continue fighting, but also about the supply of missiles and munitions (Iron Dome batteries, smart bombs and bunker-busters, and more), without which we could not have waged this war, certainly not if it expands to the northern front and to Iran, and so on. Think what will happen if our Iron Dome batteries run out against the hundreds of thousands of Hezbollah missiles (even against Hamas they apparently would have run out at some stage). Our dependence on the Americans and on the world was brought into very sharp relief by the recent events. Precisely because our enemy is a fairly primitive terror organization, not very strong and not very well equipped, and we see that even against it we have no real ability to deal with the problem by our own forces. That ought to give us some humility and somewhat increase the importance of realpolitik considerations. This does not mean that we may not stand our ground or that we must surrender to every dictate, but one must know that if there is a real American dictate (they are unwilling to support us unless we do X), we have no real choice. All the armchair experts need to take this into account, instead of sending Biden off to do his homework.
• Even if we did have infinite power, the ability of power to solve all problems is limited. These events show that power really does not answer everything. Hamas, with its metal stakes, its tunnels, and its balloons, and with drones bought on AliExpress, succeeds time and again in making fools of the mighty, sophisticated, and marvelously equipped IDF, and in making life miserable for the residents of the Gaza border communities and the south generally. Thought and creativity are parameters no less important than power, and of course the constraints within which we use power are also important.

Incidentally, on these points too the dispute is of course waged between right and left. For the right it is obvious that power will answer everything and that we can overcome everything and manage with everything on our own, and the left explains again and again that power only creates problems and does not solve them. The situation is more complex than that. Power is important, and it is certainly important to use it (see the previous sections), but it also has quite a few limitations.

13. Trust in the policy of "right all the way"

This is a continuation of the previous section. Even before the recent events, it was plain to see that a forceful policy does not necessarily bring good results in the fields of security and crime. Ben Gvir and Bibi, who spoke in the name of governance and security, brought us to the depths in these areas, and the recent weeks are only the edge of that process. This must provoke further thought about the limits of power and about effective and efficient policy for dealing with crime and terror. This does not mean that peace processes would do the job better, but bluster and increased force also apparently are not especially effective tools.

I have written more than once that intellect is a more effective tool than the gut and emotion in these matters, and in general. My feeling is that both the right and the left focus too much on emotion. If we did not relate with contempt to our moral feeling but also did not see it as the whole story, and if we overcame the feelings of frustration caused to us by terror and by Palestinian rejectionism and thought more coolly about what to do with them, I think we would be able to reach not insignificant agreement regarding the proper policy.

14. The credit given to public representatives and political compromises

One cannot ignore the identity and abilities of the members of the current government of horrors. Many voters were willing to swallow quite a few frogs just in order to advance a policy of 'right all the way,' governance and security, and also judicial reform. For that purpose they were willing to buy corruption, the appointment of cronies and of unqualified people to central roles, the distribution of portfolios and the opening of ministries with no content whatsoever, the transfer of funds and accommodation of parasitic groups that only drag the economy backward, division, incitement, and the stirring up of strife between groups in the population, government members without backbone and without courage or independent thought, people who do not exercise an ounce of criticism toward the one who leads them even when it runs against the interest of the state and of themselves, and more. In these days, when we have a government of 33 ministers and various deputies that does not function at all (and in so extreme a situation this is all the more conspicuous), while civil society is doing almost all the work, we are eating the rotten fruit of these conceptions of compromise.

Each person now has to ask himself whether it still seems correct to him to pay all these prices and accept these problematic personalities and this problematic conduct simply because this is a necessary evil (so that there will be 'right all the way, all the way'). And this is not only because the policy of right all the way has really not proven itself, but even if it had proven itself—the present days show the heavy prices we pay for it. We have a tendency to belittle the rules of proper administration, and we are accustomed to treating public money and political appointments as tools for preserving power and creating coalitions. As is known, proper administration is something for embittered leftists. I say this about the current government because this is the government presently in office. But the lesson is general and in all directions (it is not as though in the left and center parties everyone is talented and of constructive character, and it is not as though everything there was and is conducted properly). In other words, should we choose a party only because of its platform, or should we also examine its ability and willingness to implement the platform, and no less than that the personalities who serve in it and the propriety of its conduct. We must ask ourselves whether the end sanctifies every means. As stated, this point is directed mainly at right-wing voters, of course, but the principled questions ought to be asked with respect to every party and every voter.

15. The importance of all parts of society

At both political extremes there prevailed a feeling that one could manage even without the other side. Karhi and other ministers sent the leftist pilots to hell (together with Biden). From their point of view, the Golani soldiers could man the air force as well. On the other side too there was hubris, as though everything stood on them. The events of these days make it clear that apparently all sides are needed, certainly when we have no government, but even if we did. One side really cannot manage without the other, not in the economy, not in society, and not in the army. We need arrogant pilots and left-wing startup and high-tech people, as well as religious right-wing infantrymen with fanatical views, and also thinkers and rabbis with right-wing opinions who will warn us against the movie in which many of the people in the mobile bubble are living, as has been revealed these days. But we also need defeatist left-wing thinkers who will teach us the limits of power and draw our attention to the rules of morality and sensitivity that still exist even in conflicts such as this.

At the same time, perhaps we also need the impassioned talks and prayers of rabbis before going out to war (I personally have already had my fill of the flimsy little Torah remarks about the war and its deep Torah meanings), but to the same degree there is also room for those who protest this and are annoyed by it. And in particular, sensitivity is also needed to manage this while paying attention to the fact that the IDF is not God's army and does not fight God's wars. More generally, the attack that occurred on Simchat Torah is not an opportunity to promote redemption, but a security event, and perhaps also a national one, that must be dealt with in order to prevent its recurrence in the future.

There is a delicate fabric here, and therefore, although in not a few units there is a dominance of soldiers from a certain side of the political-religious map, we must not follow the tendency to exploit its sensitivities and extreme situations in order to advance our agenda. A military rabbi is a formal role, and in our army there is no Chief Military Secular Officer (from 'Eretz Nehederet') opposite him. Whether one accepts this or not, it is a sensitive matter that deserves attention.

16. Drafting women for combat roles

There are also completely different questions that require renewed thought. One hears quite a few voices pointing to women fighters and women commanders who acted with great courage and saved lives, both in infantry combat and in tanks. Many say that this war has proved that opposition to drafting women is an anachronism. In my opinion this certainly merits renewed thought, but it is still important to me to say that the conclusion is not unambiguous.

Anyone who thought in an essentialist way that women are inherently incapable of fighting or that they lack courage is really living in a fantasy. That has now been proven, if proof was needed at all. But the question concerns large numbers of women (how many such women there are), different kinds of combat (which tasks are suitable for women), methods of selection, easing in training, resilience under effort in training and in battle (including medical injuries due to exertion), concern over the captivity of women soldiers and what will be done to them there (think: if Gilad Shalit had been a woman soldier, would the attitude to the situation have been similar?), and how decisions should be made when there is a danger of injury or captivity to women soldiers and not to male soldiers, and so on.

All these are points that still require attention, and my feeling is that both sides fail to address them honestly. There is no doubt that the examinations conducted in the army are also slanted by various agendas, that information is hidden from us, and therefore this discussion is being conducted from the gut.

For example, I have heard quite a few remarks about some woman soldier who was kidnapped, to the effect that "she is just a 19-year-old girl who needs to come home," and other remarks that you probably would not hear regarding a male soldier who was captured or kidnapped. One cannot deny that the captivity of a woman soldier differs from that of a male soldier, and that the attitude toward her differs from the attitude toward a male soldier—both our attitude and that of the kidnappers/captors. I will only remind us all that on Simchat Torah the terrorists raped women and not men[1] (I understood that according to the laws of Islam there are three days in war during which one may do whatever one wants, and in particular rape and plunder). Think also about the fact that since the kidnappings on Simchat Torah one repeatedly hears talk about a humanitarian deal in which they will return the women and children to us. Why are women different from men? Are civilian men not a humanitarian issue? My feeling is that in real time, distress causes the slogans to disappear and the real conceptions to surface. Again, I do not say this in order to determine a position, and I also do not think the recent events can determine such a position. My aim is only to raise a point that requires honest and up-to-date thought, and to indicate that it is not necessarily correct to derive proof for the general issue from a few cases and a few aspects.

At the margins of my remarks I will note that if our attitude toward the army changes, then officers from the army will not necessarily receive priority for positions and careers in their civilian lives, and then the problem of inequality regarding women in combat roles will also diminish. Today, part of the motivation for integrating women into all roles is built on the desire to give women an equal basis for advancement in career and in various civilian roles.

A few concluding remarks

As stated, most of these points are directed at voters and people of the left, but there is also quite a lot here for voters and people of the right to think about. Each person needs to formulate his own position and examine whether he ought to change something in his existing paradigms. Events as extreme as what we have undergone over the past year, and especially over the past month, ought to awaken us to honest and courageous thought; otherwise, the moment the war is over we will go back to the same old thing. The current emotional wave of unity (too mawkish for my taste. It is probably a reaction to the polarization of the past year) will not survive over time, and after the war the disputes simmering beneath the surface will come back up with even greater force. The problem is not the existence of disputes, but each person's fanatical adherence to his own position and unwillingness to reconsider it, and no less than that the attitude of those who hold different positions toward one another, which prevents us from reaching decisions that can be agreed upon by all.

And against this background, one more important remark. Formulating a position on these questions is meant not only to reach conclusions but also to understand the position of the other side. Thus, for example, even if I reach the conclusion that Arabs should be treated equally and that they are a partner for peace, I can still understand the one who thinks otherwise (who sees no chance for peace and/or advocates a more forceful use of power toward them). He is not necessarily racist and benighted. By the same token, one who does not believe in power as an ultimate solution to all problems is not necessarily a defeatist leftist, a hedonist, a traitor, or non-Zionist. This remark is very important also with respect to additional points in the public debate (such as the judicial reform in its various components). In most cases there too, the one who thinks differently from me is not necessarily evil. I did not address those aspects here because I wanted to focus only on points connected to the events of 'Swords of Iron.'

It is important to me to qualify this and say that formulating a position should not depend on trust in and appreciation for the other side. I must formulate my position on the basis of arguments, regardless of what my relationship is to the person who raises them. But even so, mutual respect is important in at least two respects: 1. when there is appreciation for those making the arguments, there is more willingness to listen to their arguments against me and to reconsider my positions. 2. when there is appreciation, I do not see the other as stupid or evil, and this helps the conduct of the argument and the reaching of agreed decisions. It prevents the social disintegration we experienced in recent months.

I repeat and remind you of my request regarding the comments on this column. I asked commenters to do one of two things: 1. add points that were not raised here. 2. describe a paradigm shift, or at least your own hesitation, regarding the paradigms you held until these events. Please do not engage here in criticism of others, in patting yourself on the back, or in declarations of how right you always were. Comments that come to promote an existing agenda, or that do not fit this tendency, will be deleted with a heavy hand, contrary to my usual censorship policy on the site.

[1] Someone told me that boys as well, but I do not know. Well, at least for purposes of the discussion, I think that is an argument that gives one pause.