The Nation-State Law: From Holocaust to Rebirth (Column 161)

The well-known announcer is (Yisrael Aharon) Kalatzkin.

Since I was mentioned, I’ll just note that the Muezzin Law was not enacted (and that indeed changes nothing, but it is worth knowing the facts when writing about them).
And perhaps I didn’t read carefully enough, because it really was hard to delve into every word. Or sentence. Or paragraph…
All my strength to you, in eager anticipation and with eyes strained with longing for more esoteric columns,
one of the three

Precise, as usual. I’m left with only one question. If politics is flooded with fools from both sides, whom did you vote for?

You can say many things about Bibi and Bennett, but they are not stupid, and they are rational. If, as you say, there are no consequences, why make an effort? Don’t say it’s in order to get elected, because what centrist voter would move right because of this?

Bennett didn’t make an effort for this. Bibi wants voters from the right.

Seemingly, if you look at Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, it too doesn’t say all that much, except that the High Court poured concrete content into it. Perhaps that is also the direction behind legislating the Nation-State Law.

Clearly this is a struggle over declarations alone (but declarations are important and always will be important to many people, and I don’t think that is going to change).
The truth is that this law had a bit of practical content, but it underwent massive renovation and castration until all that remained was a merely declarative law. In order not to project failure, they kept going with it, although apparently if they had known from the outset what it would become in the end, they would have given it up from the start.

As the fourth reader of the previous 5 “philosophical” columns, I’m still mulling over the formulation of what the rabbi wrote there. I think a tighter formulation of the rabbi’s claims needs to be found. I have to say that despite my great love for thought and for the contents and arguments with which philosophy deals, the very name philosophy still evokes a certain aversion in me (perhaps also because of my mathematical-physical-yeshiva background). That name still conveys a kind of airiness and lack of seriousness (remember what happened in The Hitchhiker’s Guide when they threatened a nationwide philosophers’ strike). “Love of wisdom” conveys a love of engaging in argumentation and disputation for their own sake, characteristic of philosophy professors. Perhaps the rabbi should switch to the term “thought,” plain and simple. Quite similar to the relation between “Jewish philosophy” and “Jewish thought” [Machshevet Yisrael]. (And note that the “Jewish” versus “Israel” also plays a role here. On a somewhat anti-Semitic note, may the rabbi forgive me, it is also the same relation as between the exilic, shtetl, idle Jew and the responsible Israeli (the Kingdom of Israel and not only Judah), the fighter, and the initiator (though also somewhat rough and coarse, it must be noted)). Not for nothing did Rav Kook choose that name for the relevant department at the Hebrew University; it is the most precise. And this is in contrast to the haredi name (and somewhat obsequious one) that his son used for it at Mercaz HaRav: “faith.” Heaven forbid, “thought.” That’s only for the apikorsim from Gush. (Because thought is in the head. They have heart. And it should be noted that in the Bible, it is specifically the heart that thinks.)

And regarding this column, I’ll only note that I do not think the law is completely meaningless. It turns out that today, if they do not legislate that the sun rises every day, the court (afflicted with the disease of “juristocracy” or “legislatocracy”) might in its ruling fail to take that into account if it becomes relevant. Because according to the “Basic Law: Equality of the Stars (the planets),” perhaps we will need to give equal daily exposure time to every star, and for that purpose we will have to ignore reality and act as if it were different, according to the principles of affirmative discrimination. The rabbi will say that in such a case, where common sense has been completely expelled from the courthouse, the law will not help anyway; but still, one day perhaps they will decide to put in a few more judges who still retain a little common sense, and then through this law they will be able to explain to their other witless colleagues simple truths (just as through the Human Dignity and Liberty Law judges today can strike down Knesset laws according to their agenda). One should not overstate the chance that such people will exist in the future; it is still a court, and common sense will still never feel entirely comfortable there. And if the rabbi thinks I’m exaggerating, with my own ears I heard from a lawyer relative that in the Nuremberg trials the judges and lawyers labored greatly to find exactly which (international) law the Nazis had violated by their crimes. What they finally invented was so ridiculous that I did not bother remembering what it was. Apparently plain murder is not enough to put someone on trial. If it is within the framework of the law, then it cannot be judged. Which reminds me of the ridiculous expression “a manifestly illegal order,” as if “immoral” were not enough. In short, the law functions like a mathematical proof for a stubborn logician by taking the conclusion as an axiom. In terms of the definition of proof in mathematical logic, this is a valid proof (with one line). And there are people on whom this will indeed work.

But for that you need the cooperation of the Supreme Court, whereas it’s obvious to everyone that the opposite is what will happen—they will neuter the law.

The level of shrieking from the left is fit for the crematoria of Auschwitz.

It’s a shame that such a sentence was written.
And it ought to be changed.

By the way, I also read the note (note 2) on the website of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and with all due respect the rabbi is completely mistaken. None of the things they noted there is correct, and it stems from a lack of understanding of the concept of the state and suffers from a self-righteousness typical of such people. What they really want is a separation of nation from state. With all due respect to the fact that the rabbi supports separation of religion and state, once someone is also in favor of such a separation, then he has, once again, lost his common sense. Every state must coalesce (or was created around a coalescing) around something shared, and naturally that is a nation (even America, which pretends to be a state of all its citizens, is not really such a thing). I am not going to fight (nor is anyone else) and risk my life for equal rights for Arabs and all the other “nonsense” of the left (its empty Ten Commandments), and no one will do that. With all due respect, however the rabbi may twist it, the relation between nation and state and its land is like the relation between a family and the apartment it lives in. So as long as the rabbi has not come down with “communism” and believes in the concept of private property, including with respect to land, he too will say that whoever is not part of the family is a kind of guest. Even if you do not call the Arabs second-class citizens, the very concept of the state means that it belongs to the nation around which it was created (it is a tool and an empty framework, not an entity or an end. That is another thing characteristic of the left: idolatry of forms and instruments), and whoever does not belong to it is indeed a kind of guest. Heaven forbid they dared put this on paper…… equal rights for minorities are for our sake, not for theirs. All the other claims there are of the same type, and the answer to them is the same. I am astonished at the rabbi for thinking these are serious claims. Is this “good sense and discernment”? Is this “exactly what is bad about this law”? Heaven forbid the Arabs be offended. They might start going wild on us. I think the rabbi needs to do some serious soul-searching. This borders on pandering to the left. In the name of walking the middle line, one need not try to please everyone. Sometimes it is permitted to be on one side of the map when it is right.

Yoni, what exactly is your problem with this sentence?
The left really is shrieking as though this were a law to operate crematoria in Auschwitz, and not as though it were a law devoid of practical content (and in fact also devoid of new declarative content). Just listen to them: fascism, the thirties, like seventy-something years ago, like in Germany, dark times…
That is how the left relates to things, with no proportions at all and with no logic at all.

In most of the last few times, I didn’t vote at all.

Have we reached the Auschwitz-reflex syndrome? Well, they also wanted to legislate that here (that it is forbidden to mention Nazis).

Eilon, I really do not agree. Nothing in this law will change anything at all. Even if different judges are sitting in judgment, they will be able to do everything even without the Nation-State Law.
As for the Nuremberg trials, I also do not agree. You cannot try people without a law by whose authority you are judging them. And certainly you cannot try people for a moral offense. That is a legal misunderstanding. The big question is whether the innovations and pilpulim invented there (along the lines of Dworkin’s principles) do something different, or actually just whitewash the fact that they are being tried without legal grounds. Either way, it was important to anchor in an orderly way humanity’s right to judge criminals against humanity who acted according to the law of their own state. That is what they did there, and in my opinion this is very important and not superfluous.
Regarding a manifestly illegal order, you are entering here into an old argument I had with one of the greatest experts in this field. You assume (like him, and as is commonly accepted in the field) that a manifestly illegal order means “very illegal” or “grave from a moral standpoint.” Therefore you say there is no need for that term, and it would be better to be straightforward and define it as manifestly immoral. But in my opinion that is not the meaning. “Manifestly illegal” means that it is clear to any layman that the order is illegal, even if it has completely minor implications. In such a case the order should not be carried out because it is illegal, and if you did carry it out you have no defense on the ground that you obeyed orders. I should have known that this was illegal. See the discussion here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8/

The more I think about this expression, the more horrified I become.
The shrieks from Auschwitz that cried out to the very heart of heaven, naked they stood in a cold, crowded room,
and the shrieks of the left over the Nation-State Law are connected in one way or another to that!?

A few thoughts:
1. I agree (?) that this is mainly a declarative law that does not innovate much.
2. At the same time, it serves as a counterweight to the Human Dignity and Liberty Law, and makes it possible to defend policy considered, God forbid, Zionist.
3. And perhaps this somewhat answers the question why prefer more talk over action (*4)
because beyond legislation and before enforcement there are two bodies that steer what gets done: the media and the courts.
Not as a complaint. As reality. And the surrogacy law proves it.
And if actions do not have sufficient legal and juridical backing, they will be rejected.
Therefore a formal infrastructure is required, such as the Nation-State Law (one of whose triggers was the Kaadan ruling and the attempt to deal with the legal formalism that claimed it simply had no way to balance the demand for equality with some directive for Jewish communal settlement).
Will it help? Not sure. But at least this way there are arrows in the quiver.
(4. And there are also actions, after all. Ayelet Shaked is considered a prominent example.)

It seems to me that there actually is something new in סעיף 7 [Section 7]. Since the Kaadan case, the court has issued a series of rulings reaffirming the doctrine that the Israel Land Administration cannot discriminate in allocating land, not even indirectly through the Jewish Agency or other cooperative associations. Admissions committees were limited by law to tiny communities (up to 400 families in the Galilee and the Negev) with a clause forbidding discrimination on the basis of nationality. Now, with the new Basic Law, ostensibly there is a legal justification here; on the other hand, there’s no telling what interpretive flip-flop we’ll get from the judges.

Personally, I don’t understand the common complaint about declarativity. All in all, this law is part of the very, very long process of writing Israel’s constitution. A constitution almost always legally entrenches basic principles and ground rules that already exist and about which there is a consensus.

Have a good week.

Daniel, you are mistaken. Section 7 does not permit actions contrary to the Kaadan ruling.
In the original wording it did permit them. In the final wording that was adopted it does not permit them, and thus the section became merely declarative.

Rabbi, is it moral not to vote? What about the categorical imperative?

*Kant’s categorical imperative (the automatic keyboard is wreaking havoc)

My remarks are directed at what the rabbi wrote here, that he does not vote.

Presumably he thinks that in the current situation, if everyone didn’t vote, that would be good.

I did not write that legislation as such has no significance. I wrote that this law has no significance (and I also explained why this is connected neither to the media nor to the court, both of which will continue doing as they see fit even with this law). And even if it has minor significance, that still does not justify apocalyptic terminology.

Roni—just imagine for a moment the reality in Auschwitz, and think whether this comparison is respectful or useful, and in general what you wrote is incorrect because the rabbi compares the left’s shrieks to the shrieks that were heard in the crematoria.
Rabbi—there is no problem with your comparing anything to shrieks in the crematoria of Auschwitz, only before writing it would be proper to think about the reality behind the words, the emotions and sensations that you are trivializing and ridiculing.
That is, from what I understand from what was written, it sounds as if the rabbi did not really think about what he was comparing this to…
To compare something that is not close to the compared reality not only ridicules that reality, but in the present case also amounts to shallow, talkback-style writing, not the result of writing with prior thought.

I would be glad for a response that explains your position on this sentence more fully.

I have no problem with declarations. I have a problem when they come in place of action, especially when they have no practical significance. And what is even more troubling to me is when they are presented as a practical achievement.
And indeed, there is no telling what interpretive flip-flop we will get from the judges. And if they are sympathetic, then even without the law everything would have been fine. And by the way, discrimination in admitting residents to a community will clearly be ruled out even after this law. It has nothing to do with that.

Indeed. And another reason. If I really have no one to vote for, then it is not right to vote. The categorical imperative instructs one to vote if I have a preferred party but I’m not going (out of laziness, or because it won’t matter since I’m only one person). But if in my assessment it has no meaning at all, then even with the categorical imperative there is no reason to go vote. Going and making a random choice is certainly not a moral command.
Beyond that, there is some point in not going to vote and lowering turnout as much as possible. That might perhaps change the situation. Well, I’m beginning to see that there is material here for a post.

I don’t quite understand why caricatures need to be explained. A caricature always ridicules a phenomenon by enlarging it beyond its proper proportion (like caricatures of Ehud Barak’s mole). I don’t think the shrieks here are like those in Auschwitz, but I do think they are far beyond the proportion they deserve. I think we have exhausted this.

Even if you do not prefer the parties of the right-wing bloc, I think you prefer even less (or at least should, given your positions) the parties of the left-wing bloc. Beyond foreign and security policy, there are issues like state intervention in private life (the left is more socialist and inclined toward burdensome regulation), recognition of the existence of collectives (the left mainly recognizes the individual and does not see the collective as something real, and therefore also prefers individual rights over collective rights), Jewish settlement (left-wing governments will make Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria more difficult than right-wing governments), and above all, the left-wing bloc is simply farther from the truth than the right-wing bloc.

Beyond voting on the basis of views and worldviews, there is also importance to voting for a leader who is fit to lead professionally and in terms of integrity. The idea is that one should vote for the party whose members, and especially whose head, you see as the people most fit to fill the executive positions in the government (relative to the alternatives, of course). Personally, I think Bibi is the LeBron James of Israeli politics. He succeeds in representing the country in the world and strengthening ties with countries like Russia and the U.S., he has extensive experience leading large systems, he deeply understands (and correctly, in my opinion) the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (he even wrote a book about it called A Place Among the Nations), he has excellent powers of expression also in English—in short, if I were interviewing candidates for the position of prime minister, he would win hands down. Do you think Lapid/Gabbay are exactly as fit as Bibi to lead the state?

I also forgot to mention the revolution Ayelet Shaked is trying to lead in the judiciary by appointing more right-wing judges and thereby, over time, bringing about judicial decisions that more faithfully represent the public. And in general, I think Ayelet Shaked is doing a very good job (I seem to recall that you too said good things about her). Not voting for parties in the right-wing bloc perpetuates left-wing rule in the judiciary.

As I understand it, the law is very relevant to the practice of discriminatory admissions committees. In Kaadan, it was determined that the Agency’s discrimination in not admitting Arabs to a community was invalid because the lands were public and the state may not discriminate. But now a Basic Law says that the state must act to promote Jewish settlement, so on its face this is relevant.
There is a case here; what the court will do with it only God knows (if one does not believe in free choice).

He thinks one should not reward those who disappoint, and that your argument is precisely what encourages those disappointing people to run again and again and saddle us with them. If we vote only for someone who is actually reasonable (after all, he is willing to compromise and “reasonably good” would suffice, but they are all really awful), they will learn the hard way that they lack legitimacy, and then different people will come.
But instead of sparing him and letting me speak for him in exchange for interesting columns (that is: not current affairs and not a third- and sixth-hand recycling of anti-postmodernism—perhaps, for example, samplings from books 2–3 in the trilogy), he’s going to write a whole boring column about it all by itself…

About the Nation-State Law I won’t argue. Time will tell. In the current generation it is hard for me to see how one can act in practice only with common sense and without formal tools. It seems to be in the DNA of the legal system (in my wording, while the Knesset and government constitute the right side—the gas pedal of the car—and the intuitive side, the courts and the media constitute the left side—the criticism, the brake, which really is on the left of the gas—the formal side (and in itself also the empty side)). If the rabbi longs for the middle line, then the only option is an enlightened king (which is also what the left really wants). Maybe that is what the Messiah will be). In any event, what really determines things is people’s ego (which dictates to them their position on the right or the left), so in that sense indeed nothing will help. But that is an old discussion between us.

As for the Nuremberg trials, in truth the rabbi has fallen into the same conceptual trap as the left itself. What the rabbi calls “a legal misunderstanding” is precisely the problem itself. We do not need “rights” in order to judge criminals. We judge because it is the right thing to do, and if we do not judge there will be chaos in the world—and deliberately I did not say that we judge because it is “our duty.” All this language of “rights” and “duties” is a language of formal falsehood, meant to cover the nakedness of lack of self-confidence in relying on common sense and lack of faith in intuition. One does not do things because of duty. One does things because of their consequences (that is my old argument with the rabbi concerning morality without a punishing God). This is self-righteousness, and therefore one also does not need rights in order to do what is necessary so that things will be good. Criminals are not judged because they violated the law, but in order to prevent future crime (at the very least. There is also the matter of doing justice as such, which is itself a value, and according to my view injury to that value itself also brings divine punishment beyond the realistic consequences of failing to prevent crime).

The whole concept of law and justice (regarding violations of the law) belongs to the area of the optional domain of the moral world (that is, neither prohibitions nor positive commandments, similar to the halakhic optional domain). The judging of one who violates the law and the obligation to keep the law are tied to a kind of agreement that society accepts upon itself and that its members have signed among themselves. Consequently, one who violates the law has done something immoral because he lied to his fellow signatories on the other side of the agreement. Every person who lives in a given society, from the day he attained understanding, accepts upon himself knowingly or unknowingly, from the moment he chose to live or continue living in that society, this agreement. And therefore one who violates the law is judged. All “legal understanding” begins only after this area. And as a conclusion from this, even if a society legislates for itself that murder is permitted, it will still be forbidden and its laws will be the laws of Sodom. And a second conclusion from this is that there is no need for any right or law in order to judge for murder (and one does not need any legal understanding in order to understand this), and one who claims that he merely did what he was told, or that he did not want to violate the law, is similar to someone who claims that he murdered someone because his life was threatened. It is still murder, and perhaps at most there will be more mitigating circumstances in his punishment—and one does not need legalism to know this. This whole discussion is simply an insult to common sense.

It is a bit funny that the rabbi thinks at one and the same time that all this formalism is important (really?! one needs a “right” in order to judge the Nazis? because they obeyed the laws of Sodom of their own state? Then I suggest it is a shame they did not sentence all of Germany to collective death for its crimes against the rest of humanity. Tomorrow I too can murder someone and claim I acted according to the law I legislated for myself in my own state, “Eilon Barel.” The prime minister (Eilon) ordered me (Eilon) to murder. So I suggest we judge only the first one. Ah… there is no agency for transgression. Then let us judge the second. Ah… he merely obeyed the law of his own state. So let us mount the two together like that lame man on the blind man and judge them jointly). In fact, the central role of the court is to clarify the facts—whether the act was indeed committed or not. The moral aspect of the matter (whether it is called a crime or not) belongs to common sense, and in its absence to the society in whose name the court operates (which is essentially the mind of that society), not to jurists. And perhaps also sentencing (the punishment).

Continuation of the previous comment: it is funny that the rabbi thinks at one and the same time that all this formalism is important… and on the other hand laughs (and rightly so) at all these declarative laws, and certainly at all the commotion around them. To me, the Nuremberg story seems far more ridiculous. That lawyer who told me this is about 70 or so, and I laughed right in his face after the whole solemn story he told about the importance of defining the law in that matter, and after a speech similar to the one I gave here, and he sat there embarrassed. I can imagine that this whole system too would be embarrassed with a drop of self-criticism. This fear of arbitrariness caused the world to reach the opposite side, and in fact today juridicization can serve that same arbitrary whim all the more strongly. The courts want to rule? Fine—there are Basic Laws, and now we can strike down any law we don’t like using common sense. Then they will make an override clause. And the court will strike it down, and then they will make an override clause for cancelling the override clause….

So the conclusion is that in any case one cannot do without common sense. Consequently, certainly in cases like Nuremberg there is no need for laws.

(Correction of mistakes from the previous comment: “We do not need ‘rights’ in order to judge criminals ….”
“and one who claims that he merely did what he was told or that he did not want….”)

Here we are already entering into truly practical considerations. I think there is not much difference between the parties on these issues. The left also declares that it will impose less religious coercion and fewer privileges for the haredim, which I entirely support (but of course it won’t happen). Beyond that, there is value in not voting in order to protest and bring about real change. As for Bibi, I strongly doubt that his advantages outweigh his disadvantages. The cemetery is full of irreplaceable people, and at some point someone else will have to come.

I mock declarative laws not because legislation has no significance and is unnecessary, but because these laws change nothing at all. If you think one can judge without rules, you are bringing insane dictatorships down upon us. According to your view, there is no need for laws at all. Every judge will rule according to what seems right to him. Thus, for example, a judge will send you to prison for keeping Shabbat or eating kosher, or for settling in the occupied territories. What’s the problem? After all, there is no need for rules and laws. Whoever does those things is harmful, criminal, and immoral, and therefore should be put in prison.
I am fairly anarchistic in my basic outlook, but old enough to understand that this does not really work.

You surely know that as long as you do not vote, you are giving certain percentages of your vote to the Joint Arab List.
If you think it is just as good as all the other parties, and that there is no such thing as a ‘lesser evil’ but that all the parties are equally bad, that is already something else.
One may also question the assumption that abstaining from voting will bring change. The elected officials never aim themselves at cynics who don’t believe in the importance of voting. There has already been, over the years, a drop of dozens of percentage points in voter turnout, and it is hard to see that this had any effect, and there is no reason to assume it will have any effect in the future. Whoever has no voice also has no power.

I also inserted this interview into the post because it marvelously illustrates those protesting against the law: https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/379026

An amusing interview indeed. But it only represents the herd. By contrast, the spearhead—the people who really are leading the hysterical attack on the Nation-State Law, the people of Haaretz and their ilk—are simply against the existence of a Jewish nation and therefore oppose the law.

Indeed, and when all of us refrain from voting and the Joint Arab List gets a significant portion of the seats, perhaps some sort of change will happen here.

First of all, I am not against laws and rules either (including a legal system with laws), and I wonder how the rabbi could be mistaken about me on such a matter. Just a moment ago I turned a bit in favor of the Nation-State Law. If I were against laws, I should be against every law. In addition, what the rabbi is speaking about (a reality without laws and rules) is the right side of chaos and disorder. I am speaking against the left side of “the whole earth is full of laws”—that is, only laws. After all, I am constantly busy marketing the middle side, which is balance (and as I will explain later, at its perfect level there is indeed no need at all for external rules), and which should be expressed in a small number of laws and rules and the rest (in court, for example) left to an internal sense of justice and proportionality (common sense). But indeed I criticized the rabbi regarding the Nuremberg trials because there this is an extreme example of the husk of the left side. In that specific case they should not have had to give too many explanations and reasons (in fact none at all) as to why this was a sin; they only had to clarify whether the defendants had indeed done what was attributed to them and decide on the appropriate punishment. Any other explanation to the defendants’ lawyers would be like explaining why it is forbidden to murder. There is a level from which onward there is silence. The rabbi fears the husk of the right side (insane dictatorships), but in any case everything depends on ego and human nature, and rules of adjudication will not help with that. If people are evil, a judge will already be able to find a reason within the law for throwing you in prison, even within the existing rules. That is how the Jewish brain will invent gimmicks for imposing its evil arbitrary will.

Laws do not replace education. And once there is education, there is no longer any need for them, because no one will act according to his evil arbitrary will (the judge will have a sense of justice and will not throw you in because he feels like it, because he won’t feel like it; he will decide in an informed manner). The laws exist in the intermediate state in which we are occupied with education and have not yet reached the goal (humanity is not yet educated). They are training wheels on a bicycle, or a walker for an old man, or scaffolding for a building—and once one already knows how to ride or walk, and once the building is complete, there is no more need for them. The Nuremberg story is simply an endpoint of the matter where already in its own time humanity was educated, and with respect to that issue it had to be educated. If humanity did not understand on its own that it is forbidden to murder even if it is the law in your country, there was no point at all in conducting a trial. This is a legal axiom, and it need not (and probably also cannot) be derived from simpler truths (reasons). It is an educational foundation that needs to exist before any educational process of humanity begins. Even a student entering a classroom must have some foundation upon which something can be built. He must not be a wild man. There are things he should understand on his own, and from there one continues. If the judges at Nuremberg did not understand on their own that no rationale was needed for this, then they have a serious problem of insecurity.

In fact, the rabbi is mistaken about me in the same way that youths are mistaken about adults, sometimes identifying mature behavior as childish (compromising and indifferent, as they themselves were in childhood. They see the thoughts of their own hearts; they project, because that is the only interpretation of such behavior that they know). The reality I am speaking of may look like anarchy (childhood) from the outside, but it is something else. It is a powerful intuition capable of sensing what the right act is in every moment (and for a judge, what the correct ruling is for each specific case—“and his delight shall be in the fear of the Lord”), and this is indeed without any formal rules. It is a reality of “supra-order” and not of “disorder” or “anti-order” (or more precisely, the disorder in it is “above order,” unlike anarchy, which is “sub-order”). The rabbi no doubt knows all this, but he does not understand that Nuremberg is the endpoint—the Archimedean point—the kernel of intuition—from which this intuition begins to be built and to grow. Therefore the explanation they found there was so ridiculous. If such basic truths require a rationale, then the convoluted rationale they found surely itself would require a rationale. And thus we solved nothing.

Actually, I seem to remember that you proposed exactly that, and argued that in any case everything depends on the quality of the judges.

Honorable Rabbi, yasher koach, you simply took the words out of my mouth. In addition to Judaism, I feel at home in several other cultures and languages, and therefore I am able to look at a thoroughly local issue from the outside through the prism of another culture. You defined it very nicely and aptly: declarativeness is everything. Beyond the lack of understatement, allow me to add a few more offensive remarks (though I am convinced of the correctness of my diagnosis) about Israeli culture. In Israeli culture there is no irony and no sense of measure and good taste—what in French is called juste à mesure—and it is no accident that security analyses in the media swing between complacency and hysteria. In Israeli culture it also seems that the dimension of true diplomacy is entirely absent: knowing how to remain silent and refrain from saying things even if they are true, but without lying. In the end, Israeli culture was largely created by a Jewish working class in Poland, with all that that implies. Not terrible, but also נישט א גרויסע מציאה.
I always hated Gemara, and it is not surprising to see empty pilpulim in politics, the rampaging of lawyers and MKs afflicted with an incurable legislative mania. But still, specifically regarding the law, I do not agree with you because of the circumstances. Indeed, it does not change much, but this law is a reaction to the ongoing undermining of the legitimacy of the existence of the independent Jewish state. That legitimacy is being attacked from within and from without. It is important to remember one more thing, and I say this as someone who regularly reads foreign newspapers in various languages: there is no such thing as “it is clear to everyone that / everyone knows that.” Until the 1970s the word “Palestinians” was identified only with the Jews, and where is that now? Let it be known that the slogan of the left, “two states for two peoples,” has only a truncated parallel, “two-state solution,” without the ending “for two peoples.”

To me this is a strange claim—
First of all, most of us will continue to vote, because most of us are satisfied to one degree or another with the elected representatives despite our criticism, and most of us also know that they operate in a hostile environment where their ability to change things is limited, and therefore we don’t break the tools. So what good will it do if you and another several dozen percent don’t vote?
Second, if you vote for the party that is less bad in your eyes, that will have an effect on the competing parties—an effect even greater than the effect of not voting—so why refrain from voting and reduce the effectiveness?

As I wrote, I may address the issue of voting in a separate column. I see no point in entering into that question here.

Hello Rabbi, your explanation of the law is very logical, except that there is one claim I read against the law and I would be glad to know how you deal with it, assuming it has not already come up in the previous comments: they claim that the law will allow judges to prefer national considerations over human-rights considerations (for example, the High Court could rule that it is permissible to set up a detention facility for infiltrators despite possible human-rights problems there, if there is a national interest in it). How do you answer this claim?

What is most amazing in the whole issue of the Nation-State Law is that you wrote 3,500 words about it.

By the way, you spend a lot of time dealing with the haredim of the 1980s; they have changed a bit since then.

Practically speaking, the law is indeed completely unnecessary—but perhaps it has political benefit for the right: moderate leftists who bothered to read the text of the law and see the Zionist Union and Lapid opposing the law will feel uncomfortable voting for them (even if the law is unnecessary, the shouting-party line that it is improper for the state to call itself Jewish drives away Zionist voters), and they will behave like Rabbi Michael Abraham in the elections.

And without this law, do you think the High Court could not decide to permit detention facilities? Do you think the High Court judges did not permit them because they could not, or because they did not want to?

Moshe answered nicely. Everything already existed even without the law (from the Declaration of Independence through Israel’s character as Jewish and democratic, etc.).

I didn’t write about the Nation-State Law, but about the attitude toward the Nation-State Law. Note that well.

It seems to me that the law contains two new discriminatory innovations against some of the state’s citizens,
(the Law of Return is not a discriminatory law with respect to someone who is already a citizen of the state; once a person is a citizen, even if he is not Jewish, he has civil rights like a Jew. It is indeed a discriminatory law between Jews and non-Jews who are not citizens of the State of Israel, but not between citizens of the state.)
Innovation A.
Section 1(c): ‘The exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.’
Meaning: for example, Arabs or Druze who are not Jewish do not have a right to national self-determination. After all, they are not Jewish, so they cannot define themselves as part of the Jewish people—so how will they define themselves nationally? The law innovates: they do not have a right to national self-determination.
Wonderful indeed. Is the legislator some kind of great talmid chacham? Aside from strengthening their sense of separateness and their self-definition as a separate nation, this pilpul does nothing.
Innovation B.
7(a) (at issue): ‘The state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.’
The state is supposed to care for proper housing for all its citizens by virtue of their being citizens. This law says that apart from the state’s duty to care for housing for its citizens, there is an additional duty on the state regarding housing, namely housing for Jews. It follows that the state’s duty regarding housing toward the Jewish citizen is double its duty toward the non-Jew; it is obligated to him both by virtue of his being a citizen and by virtue of his being Jewish.
Practical ramification: if there is a limited housing budget, establishing a Jewish community takes precedence, since it contains a double value—housing and Judaization.
Truly to the glory of the State of Israel. In my eyes this is a desecration of God’s name. Even if this is what happens in practice, to declare that this is the preferred policy from the outset is wickedness and stupidity.
It only again strengthens the Arabs’ sense of separateness, and pushes the Druze and the Bedouin toward separateness.
(The issue of establishing separate communities only for Jews or only for non-Jews is not necessarily discrimination.)

Yaakov, that is simply not true.
What do you mean they have no right to self-determination? If they define themselves, will a policeman come? If they decide they are the Arab nation, or the Druze nation, or the Visigothic nation, will they go to prison or be fined? Nonsense. There is not the slightest hint of that in the law. The law allows anyone who wants to define himself however he likes. All that 1(c) establishes is that the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. That is no different from what is written in the Declaration of Independence.
As for 7(a), you are also mistaken. The law does not refer to particulars or individuals at all. It is merely a declarative law declaring what has always existed—the importance of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.
Whether it was wise in the first place to enter a world war over a declarative matter is another question altogether (and in my opinion the answer depends on how they act to extinguish the fires).

They didn’t let her talk too much (though it sounds to me as if that was for her own good). Pretty bad interviewers—confronting interviewees rather than caressing them is good, but there is no need to argue with them; rather, let them answer, especially when the interviewees are providing the goods on their own.
But now there is an even more embarrassing interview with former police commissioner Assaf Hefetz.

Roni
I agree that 1(c) is open to creative interpretation; your interpretation is that ‘it means that the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people.’
Our rabbi should teach us what that means—what is the significance of this sentence.

As for 7(a), you say ‘the law does not refer to particulars or individuals at all.’
Jewish settlement means that Moshe and Chaim and Roni… have priority over Muhammad and Abd and Mustafa……
in the right to build new communities or expand existing ones. What can be done—the Jewish people is made up of individuals.

Yaakov, there is nothing to teach. 1(c) declares that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. It says nothing beyond that declaration. 7(a) also does not say what you attribute to it. The section does not speak about Moshe and Chaim, but declares that the State of Israel sees importance in Jewish settlement (the section does not even allow canceling the Kaadan ruling, contrary to its earlier draft). These are declarations and headlines, nothing more.

Wonderful—so it is all declarations, and declarations devoid of content.
So it worked out excellently for us: we also got to feel that we stuck it to them and showed the Arabs who’s boss,
and the leftists got upset too (for that alone it was worth it),
and most importantly, we are also truly decent and democratic people, since after all there is nothing in this law,
we are perfect, and feel good, and are pleased with ourselves,
how is it that no one sees how perfect and right we are? There is no explanation other than anti-Semitism, since it is well known that Esau hates Jacob……….

Yaakov, if I understand correctly, this is exactly the complaint mentioned in the column above.
(Though for the sake of fairness, it is true to say that this was not the original purpose of the law, which at first was more than declarative; but after its neutering, this is what remained of it. And the reason the leftists get upset is solely their fault, because there is no justification for this anger.)

Hello to the Rabbi

The rabbi wrote above that in the last few times he did not vote in the elections.

A. From a logical standpoint, is it not advisable to vote for the lesser evil, i.e., for the one who advances a particle of my agenda?
That is, true, I’m not getting the whole hand from him, but at least a finger?

B. By not voting, am I not giving power to the side that may be able to cause us much greater harm? (= the Arabs are flocking to the polling stations)

C. Do you not think there is some influence to the elected house in some respect?

Regards.

They already asked me, and I wrote that I am considering devoting a column to this. It is a side issue here. In general, in my opinion there is not much influence, and the policy of the lesser evil is very problematic in certain circumstances (and in my opinion we are in such circumstances). You will get the finger, but you will never get a hand. Whereas if you do not vote, then admittedly in the short term you will not get a finger, but in the future there is a chance you will get a hand.

To Yishai and the rabbi

Indeed. Now that I think about it, and if I’m not mistaken, the rabbi wrote somewhere in Two Carts things similar to these. I would be glad to know whether the rabbi has retracted them.

Eilon, I lost you. What are you looking for in Two Carts, and what did you ask whether I had retracted?

That one should reduce the number of laws, and that judges should judge with the help of a small number of laws, and in cases the laws do not cover, they should judge according to a sense of justice. He mentioned this in the context of the phenomenon that not infrequently rulings that by legal procedure are completely kosher nevertheless leave many with the feeling that they are not just. I don’t remember where in the book. I only just remembered it now.

That I did indeed write, and more than once. But it is not relevant here. For even such a reduction is based on public agreement that this is how we should act. Or in other words, there is a law that one may judge according to natural justice and not according to statute. Without that, it is impossible to judge people; otherwise you immediately arrive at anarchy and coercion, especially in a society that is not uniform in its values.

https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/379381

Rabbi and Gaon Avishai Ivri speaks about the Nation-State Law. His words align with those of our Rabbi, may he live long.

Indeed. Exactly the same thing.

This law is important not because it innovates anything, but because it gives the fact that Israel is our nation-state the status of a Basic Law. These things have significance in constitutional law and therefore also in petitions to the High Court and in its rulings.

It is true that a clearly progressive (and dishonest) judge will find a way to ignore this, but a neutral judge will have difficulty doing so, and a right-wing judge will find here a tool that will allow him to balance rights against those derived from Basic Law: Human Dignity, and perhaps even against those derived from non-positivist methods.

By the way, I understood that you yourself thought so once:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A0%D7%90%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%93-%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%A9%D7%9B%D7%AA-%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93/

I now saw that you already answered this in the comments.
In my opinion, this has the potential for great significance in rulings, but time will tell.

Here, the supposedly declarative Nation-State Law is already bearing positive legal fruit: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5353537,00.html

This seems like real nonsense to me. This duty of the state existed before as well, and it also does not apply to Hamas. This is no explanation for a tort claim against Hamas. I haven’t read the reasoning inside, but Judge Drori is known for harnessing Jewish law quite freely (and tediously) for the sake of his objectives. But one has to read the opinion itself.

Hello Rabbi,
What do you think of the following analysis:
Although neither side in the debate is right regarding the law, the initiators of the law are worse. After all, the reaction of the Arabs and the Druze could have been foreseen in advance. Does it contribute to the state that Arab and Druze citizens should feel unwanted in the state, even if this stems from a mistake?

Not significant in my view. The Arabs won’t be satisfied regardless of what is in the law, and the Druze are just talking nonsense. One cannot take every nonsense-talker into account.