Conditions – Lesson 7
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Pe’ah and stipulating against what is written in the Torah
- Nazir 11a: condition and reservation
- The distinction between condition and reservation in Kovetz Shiurim
- Applications in betrothal, sale of a house, and things that do not admit reservation
- Tosafot in Ketubot 56: double condition and the difficulty of “I never intended it on that basis”
- Rashba, Rabbi Yehuda, and monetary matters
- Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Sabbatical year, overcharging, and stepping outside the mechanism of condition
- The four characteristics of Pe’ah/forgotten sheaves as a case that is not a condition
- Inheritance, Ketubot chapter 8, and further examples that do not look like conditions
- Interpretations of “his condition is void”: Ri versus Ritva and Rabbeinu Tam
- Kiddushin 7: “holiness spread through all of it” as a proposal for understanding reservation in betrothal
- Bava Kamma 14, Sotah, and the distinction between doubt of impurity and doubt of prohibition
- Conclusion and continuation: monetary matters
Summary
General Overview
The text presents Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s approach in Pe’ah, that stipulating against what is written in the Torah is a specific case of if one acted, it is ineffective, and examines how this connects to the topic of condition and reservation in tractate Nazir 11a and to the question of “his condition is void but the act stands.” It sets up a dispute between amoraim over whether “on condition that” in Nazir is a condition or a reservation, and brings the Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot, section 172, which defines the fundamental difference between “except for” as a partial act and “on condition that” as a complete act with some external factor blocking it. It then presents Tosafot in Ketubot 56, which requires us to view cases like “on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights” as a double condition, and sharpens the difficulty: how can there be a condition vis-à-vis the Torah and not vis-à-vis a person who can waive a claim? Throughout, it shows that there are places where the phrase “stipulating against what is written in the Torah” is used even when there is no halakhic structure of condition at all, and it marks the practical difference between whether the rule belongs to the law of conditions or to if one acted, it is ineffective.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Pe’ah and stipulating against what is written in the Torah
Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Pe’ah says that stipulating against what is written in the Torah is a specific case of if one acted, it is ineffective, and therefore doing something against the Torah “cannot work.” The text emphasizes that a condition is one of the things you cannot make against the Torah, and from here comes the principle that when the Torah defines a legal effect, an attempt to limit it against the law runs into a fundamental problem.
Nazir 11a: condition and reservation
The Mishnah in Nazir says, “I am hereby a nazir on condition that I may drink wine and become impure through the dead—he is a nazir and is forbidden in all of them,” and the question is why Rabbi Shimon does not disagree in the opening clause. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that Rabbi Shimon disagrees there too, while Ravina says that in the opening clause Rabbi Shimon does not disagree because this is “stipulating against what is written in the Torah,” and therefore “his condition is void.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi replies to Ravina, “this ‘on condition that’ is like ‘except for,’” meaning that here “on condition that” is interpreted as a reservation, like “except for,” and in the end a baraita is brought—“it was taught in accordance with Ravina”—which explicitly explains that this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah and therefore his condition is void.
The distinction between condition and reservation in Kovetz Shiurim
The Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot, section 172, explains that “except for” creates a partial act that does not permit her to everyone and therefore is not complete severance, whereas “on condition that” is a complete act that takes effect in itself, except that “some other matter is preventing it.” It states that since in a condition the act is complete, waiving the condition helps and removes the obstacle, so the act can take effect in all respects; but in a reservation there is nothing to cancel, because from the outset only a partial act was made. From this the difference is defined between “I am hereby a nazir on condition that I drink wine” as a condition, and “I am hereby a nazir except for wine” as a reservation, and the text presents this as a substantive distinction despite the linguistic similarity.
Applications in betrothal, sale of a house, and things that do not admit reservation
The text applies the distinction to the example, “You are hereby betrothed to me except for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” which is presented as a problem of partial legal effect that has no place, as opposed to “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” which is defined as a condition in which “the condition is void and the act remains valid,” so she is betrothed and he remains obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights. An example is brought of someone who sells a house on condition that if the buyer goes up to the roof, the sale is void; there the condition causes the entire sale to be canceled if the condition is violated. But in a reservation—“he sold him the house except for the roof”—going up to the roof is defined as trespassing, not as canceling the sale. From this the text formulates the idea of “these are matters that do not admit reservation,” in the sense that certain legal effects cannot be created partially, and therefore an attempt to formulate them as a reservation creates a failure of legal effect.
Tosafot in Ketubot 56: double condition and the difficulty of “I never intended it on that basis”
Tosafot in Ketubot, on “on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” states that “necessarily, he made it a double condition,” because otherwise the condition could be voided simply because “a double condition is required,” and there would be no reason to invoke “stipulating against what is written in the Torah.” Tosafot asks: if he did make it a double condition, then he explicitly said that if he remains obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is not betrothed—so how can they say that she is betrothed? Tosafot rejects the answer that the betrothal is “on condition that she waives it for him,” and instead proposes, “rather, her waiver is not a waiver,” and brings proof from Nazir, where “that answer cannot apply there,” to show that the issue is not waiver vis-à-vis another person but a stipulation vis-à-vis the Torah, which is defined as “stipulating against what is written in the Torah.”
Rashba, Rabbi Yehuda, and monetary matters
The text brings Rashba’s comment that conjugal rights “are not monetary,” and therefore the discussion can be focused on food and clothing, although there are opinions that hold that conjugal rights too are treated as monetary because pleasure has monetary value. It suggests that Rabbi Yehuda can be interpreted consistently with his position that a condition in monetary matters is valid, because it is effectively a possible waiver, unlike a prohibition, where there is no waiver. By contrast, according to Rabbi Meir as understood by Tosafot, even in monetary matters one may still say that the waiver is no waiver because the Torah imposes the obligation, and so it remains within the category of “stipulating against what is written in the Torah.”
Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Sabbatical year, overcharging, and stepping outside the mechanism of condition
Rabbi Akiva Eiger suggests that in a loan made “on condition that the Sabbatical year not cancel the debt for me,” the condition creates a track whereby if the borrower causes the debt to be canceled, “then retroactively the money will only have been given as a deposit,” and a deposit is not canceled. He similarly suggests that in a sale made “on condition that you have no claim against me for overcharging,” if the buyer wants the overcharge returned while the sale remains in force, then the stipulation is that the sale should retroactively be canceled. And in the case of one who rescues property from a river, he explains that making a stipulation before a religious court is a declaration that he does not want to rescue it for the reduced wage of an idle laborer but only for full wages. Afterwards Rabbi Akiva Eiger says, “and I am very perplexed,” and argues that these cases are not really “by way of condition” at all, but are an expression of the desire to make the transaction “with this entitlement” and to remove the Torah-law mechanism, so that they should perhaps be viewed as reservation rather than condition.
The four characteristics of Pe’ah/forgotten sheaves as a case that is not a condition
The text lists four characteristics because of which “I reap on condition that the law of forgotten sheaves will not apply” does not belong to the law of conditions: the condition is immediate and not future-oriented; there is no second party facing him; reaping is a physical action and not a “legal act” that can be suspended on a condition; and the stipulation concerns part of the consequences of the legal effect itself, not some side matter like “on condition that you not drink wine.” It concludes that this explains why, in the language of the Bartenura, “stipulating against what is written in the Torah” sometimes serves as a way of saying that one cannot act against the Torah even without a formal halakhic condition, while in cases like betrothal and Nazir one can still discuss whether this really belongs to the law of conditions.
Inheritance, Ketubot chapter 8, and further examples that do not look like conditions
In the Mishnah in Bava Batra 126—“one who says, ‘So-and-so my firstborn son shall not receive a double portion’… has said nothing, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah”—the text emphasizes that there is no conditional act here at all, but rather an inheritance law that takes place on its own, and yet it is still called “stipulating against what is written in the Torah.” The Talmud there raises an initial possibility of linking this to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in Ketubot, and answers, “there she knew and waived it; here he does not waive it,” which presents waiver as part of the explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s view. In the Mishnah in Ketubot chapter 8, regarding “I have no legal claim or dealings in your property,” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says, “if she dies, he inherits her, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void,” and the text presents this as a withdrawal from rights that seems far removed from the structure of a condition.
Interpretations of “his condition is void”: Ri versus Ritva and Rabbeinu Tam
The text presents Ri as understanding the condition as some external “other matter” that seeks to uproot a legal effect that has already taken hold in full, and when the condition is against the Torah and therefore invalid, what remains is the full legal effect. It then brings Ritva and Rabbeinu Tam, who disagree and explain that one who stipulates against the Torah is like someone who says “on condition that you ascend to heaven,” meaning he was mocking her and did not seriously intend it, and from that it follows that the act remains valid. The text notes that this approach is strained, because it suggests that if he had meant it seriously, Tosafot’s difficulty—“I never intended it on that basis”—would arise again.
Kiddushin 7: “holiness spread through all of it” as a proposal for understanding reservation in betrothal
The text brings the discussion in Kiddushin 7: “Be betrothed to me with half of yourself—she is betrothed; half of you is betrothed to me—she is not betrothed,” and the question of why betrothal of half a woman does not spread to the whole woman. The Talmud compares this to consecration—“the leg of this one is a burnt offering, the whole of it becomes a burnt offering”—and explains that in betrothal there is “another will” that blocks this, unlike consecration of an animal. The text raises the possibility of explaining Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s view in betrothal along the lines of expansion of the legal effect, but emphasizes that this would only be a local answer for betrothal and not a general solution for Nazir and the rest of the laws of conditions.
Bava Kamma 14, Sotah, and the distinction between doubt of impurity and doubt of prohibition
The text brings Tosafot in Bava Kamma 14, which asks how the Talmud distinguishes there between an ordinary doubt and a double doubt in the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since in the laws of impurity everything depends on “private domain” and “public domain,” without distinguishing between one doubt and two. It brings the answer that the issue is “to prohibit her to her husband,” meaning as a prohibition and not as impurity, and then cites Avnei Nezer’s question that the source of the laws of doubtful impurity is Sotah, and there too the issue is prohibition to her husband. In the name of the Kuzari, an idea is brought that impurity belongs in a place of holiness, and a sotah is called impurity because she “committed a trespass against her husband,” that is, a blow to betrothal, whereas a woman after childbirth, although she has actual impurity, is prohibited to her husband by a prohibition that is not dependent on damage to betrothal. From here the connection is made as well between betrothal and consecration that appeared in the sugya of “holiness spread through all of it.”
Conclusion and continuation: monetary matters
In conclusion it is said that the discussion so far has completed the topic of “stipulating against what is written in the Torah,” and next time it will move into “monetary matters” in order to reach the sugya of the chapter. Also preserved are side remarks about practical discussion in inheritance, the authority of religious courts, and lifetime wills, within the flow of the explanation of places where “stipulating against what is written in the Torah” appears even without a formal structure of condition.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so yes—Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Pe’ah is basically telling us that stipulating against what is written in the Torah is a specific case of if one acted, it is ineffective. Meaning, when you do things against the Torah, it can’t work. And a condition is another one of those things that you can’t do against the Torah. Now at the end of the last lecture I brought the Mishnah, the Talmudic discussion in tractate Nazir 11a. The Talmud there talks about the relationship between condition and reservation. I’ll just remind you of it briefly. The Talmud there talks about someone who accepts a partial naziriteship, right—only from haircutting or only from impurity or something like that, but without the other elements. And the Talmud says like this—the Mishnah, it starts with the Mishnah: “I am hereby a nazir on condition that I may drink wine and become impure through the dead—he is a nazir and forbidden in all of them.” “I know there is such a thing as naziriteship”—that part doesn’t matter. In the end there’s another dispute there, that Rabbi Shimon forbids. The question is: why doesn’t Rabbi Shimon also disagree at the beginning? So the Talmud says: “And let Rabbi Shimon also disagree in the opening clause?” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Rabbi Shimon indeed disagreed even in the opening clause. Meaning, what he’s really saying is: “he is a nazir and forbidden in all of them”—Rabbi Shimon says no, he is not a nazir. Ravina said: In the opening clause Rabbi Shimon does not disagree. What is the reason? Because this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah, and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah—his condition is void. And therefore if you say, “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine,” the condition is void, you won’t be able to drink wine, and you are a nazir. The act stands and the condition is void, because this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah. So the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Ravina is whether this first case is connected to stipulating against what is written in the Torah. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi—the Talmud says, what does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi answer Ravina? Is this stipulating against what is written in the Torah? So he says: “This ‘on condition that’ is like ‘except for.’” When he says, “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine and become impure through the dead,” the “on condition that” here is like “except for,” meaning: I am a nazir except for drinking wine and impurity through the dead. Okay? That’s what he says. “It was taught in accordance with Ravina: If one said, ‘I am hereby a nazir on condition that I may drink wine and become impure through the dead,’ he is a nazir and forbidden in all of them, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah—his condition is void.” So the conclusion is that it’s a condition, but there’s an amoraic dispute whether it’s a condition or a reservation. What’s the difference between condition and reservation? So there’s a Kovetz Shiurim here on Ketubot—we didn’t see it, so look here—Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot, section 172. He addresses this sugya and says like this: At the beginning of tractate Gittin it is explained that if one says, “You are divorced from me except for so-and-so,” it is not a valid bill of divorce because it is not complete severance. But if he says, “On condition that you do not marry so-and-so,” that is complete severance, because a condition is an external matter. And the explanation of this distinction is that in “except for,” he has done only half an act, because he did not permit her to everyone. He permitted her to part of the world and not to another part, so the act itself is a partial act. But in “on condition that,” the act is complete—meaning that the act, in and of itself, has the power to take effect fully in every respect; it’s just that some other matter is blocking it. And if the condition is removed, there is nothing to block the act from taking effect in every respect. And that is why waiver of the condition is effective. If someone now removes the condition and says, fine, I give up on this condition of “except for so-and-so,” then she would be fully divorced. By contrast, if I say, “You are divorced and permitted to the whole world except for so-and-so,” and now I want to cancel that, there’s no way to cancel it. From the outset I applied the divorce only partially. In a condition, I applied the divorce completely, only there’s something external that can undo it. If you marry so-and-so, that will invalidate the bill of divorce. So if I cancel the condition—say, okay, I give up the condition, we don’t need it now—then she’s divorced, full stop, because I canceled the condition. The legal effect was imposed fully; the divorce is a complete divorce. There was a condition that could qualify it through something external; I canceled the condition. But if the legal effect from the outset is only a partial legal effect, a reserved legal effect, then that’s what I applied—nothing more. So now I can’t cancel the condition; there’s nothing to cancel. All I applied was half a divorce. Okay, that’s basically the difference. “And similarly, if one says ‘except for,’ it does not help later to cancel the reservation so that the act should take effect without reservation, since from the outset he only performed half an act. And this is the reason for the distinction between one who says, ‘on condition that I drink’ and one who says, ‘except for wine.’” Someone who says, “I am hereby a nazir on condition that I drink wine,” versus someone who says, “I am hereby a nazir except for wine.” The first is a condition, the second is a reservation. “Because in ‘except for,’ the acceptance of naziriteship was not complete. But in stipulating ‘on condition that I be permitted wine,’ the acceptance of naziriteship in itself is complete; it is only the condition that would cause him to be permitted wine. And were the condition to be removed, he would not be a nazir at all. Therefore he is a nazir even according to Rabbi Shimon, and the condition is void because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah.” So in short, what he’s saying is that there is a difference between condition and reservation, even though it sounds very similar. Because if I say, “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine,” or “I am a nazir except for drinking wine,” that’s not the same thing. What’s the difference? In light of Ri’s words that we saw in Ketubot—by the way, this Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot is on page 56, where Ri appears—we saw there that Ri explains how a condition really works. I apply the legal effect in any case; the condition is just something external that, if it is not fulfilled, uproots the legal effect. By contrast, reservation is applying only half the legal effect from the outset. Okay, that’s basically the difference between the two things, and that’s also the difference between the two amoraim. From where could there be a stipulation against a Torah-law condition? Against the Torah?
[Speaker D] Stipulating against what is written in the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you do it as a condition, yes. But reservation is not stipulating against what is written in the Torah—it’s simply a reservation. Say, for our purposes, if for example you make a reservation: “You are hereby betrothed to me except for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” then apparently she won’t be betrothed at all. The act does not stand, because there is no such legal effect, right? But if he says, “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” that’s a condition, not a reservation. Here specifically, the act stands and the reservation is canceled—or rather the condition is canceled. She is betrothed to him, and I am also obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights. Why? Because as Ri explained there, I am really applying this completely; I just want the condition to uproot it partially. Precisely because you can’t apply something partially, I want the condition to uproot it. I apply it fully, and the condition will uproot it if it isn’t fulfilled. That’s what I want. But such a condition cannot be made, and therefore the condition is void and the act remains valid, and she is fully betrothed to him. If he had done it as a reservation, then no, because reservation means you made half a betrothal. There is no such thing as half a betrothal. These are matters that do not admit reservation. I brought here an example: if a person sells a house and stipulates that if the buyer goes up to the roof, the sale is void. Apparently that’s really a partial sale—he didn’t give him the right to go up to the roof or use the roof. Okay, he sold him the house except for the roof. But no—if he stipulates on condition that the buyer not go up to the roof, then no, he sold him the whole house, only there is a condition that if he makes use of what is his, then the sale is canceled. By contrast, if this were a reservation, nothing happened to the sale—he’s simply a trespasser. Because he bought only part of the house, not the roof, and if he goes up to the roof anyway then he is trespassing, he’s going onto my part. But if it is a condition, then the moment he goes up to the roof, the whole sale is canceled because he violated the condition. The moment he violated the condition, the whole sale no longer exists. Right, that’s basically the difference between condition and reservation. These are things that do not admit reservation. Now, I remind you that we saw a few times ago that Tosafot in Ketubot brings this sugya from Nazir. Look, I brought the relevant passage here. “She is hereby betrothed”—this is talking about someone who betroths on condition that she has no claim on him for food, clothing, and conjugal rights—
[Speaker E] Yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “On condition that she has no claim on him for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” so Rabbi Meir says: she is betrothed and his condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda says: this is a monetary matter. But for our purposes, what matters is Rabbi Meir. Let’s say this were not a monetary matter. We’re only learning now the law of stipulating against what is written in the Torah. So let’s assume this were not a monetary matter. Then basically Rabbi Yehuda too would agree with Rabbi Meir that what? That the condition is void and the act stands. So Tosafot says: “Necessarily, it is speaking where he made it a double condition, where he said to her: if you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights, then you are betrothed to me, and if not, you are not betrothed. For since later it says that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that his condition is void because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, if he had not made it a double condition, it would follow anyway that according to Rabbi Meir his condition is void because a double condition is required.” Therefore it is clear that he doubled the condition here, right? Because otherwise the discussion is not about stipulating against what is written in the Torah; there isn’t even a valid condition here, because you didn’t formulate it doubly. “And it is difficult,” says Tosafot, “if so, why is she betrothed? He explicitly stipulated that if food, clothing, and conjugal rights will be upon him, then she is not betrothed.” So how can you say that she is betrothed, even though she does have food, clothing, and conjugal rights? Right, we saw this Tosafot. “And one cannot say that this is why she is betrothed—” this is the important line—“one cannot say that she is betrothed because he betroths her on condition that she waive it for him, and she has in fact waived it.” He isn’t betrothing her on condition that the Torah not impose on him the obligation of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, but on condition that she waive it. That’s a different thing. You’re not going against the Torah’s will here. True, I owe you food, clothing, and conjugal rights, but I want you to waive what I owe you. So the betrothal created the obligation. I do owe you food, clothing, and conjugal rights—I didn’t go against the Torah here. And therefore all I want is for you to waive it for me. So basically even according to Rabbi Meir this should have been valid, because this is not at all stipulating against what is written in the Torah. Maybe that itself is Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning. That’s why he says that in a monetary matter his condition stands, because basically it’s a kind of waiver. But Tosafot asks: even according to Rabbi Meir, why does Rabbi Meir connect this to the law of stipulating against what is written in the Torah? He just wants her to waive it for him. What? So Rashba already comments on this. He argues that conjugal rights are not monetary. It’s only food and clothing. They said “food, clothing, and conjugal rights” because those are the three obligations, but the discussion is really only about food and clothing. Not everyone agrees, by the way. There are those who argue that even conjugal rights are monetary, because after all, what—I owe her something, pleasure has monetary value. So I owe her something, and waiver is relevant here, all of that. Meaning, what difference does it make that it’s not cash? If I committed myself to give her a chair, that also has monetary value. So pleasure also has monetary value. But Rashba indeed says no. So that’s what Tosafot says. So apparently, basically, fine—according to Rabbi Yehuda it could be that this itself is what he means, that in a monetary matter the condition stands. Why? Because this isn’t really stipulating against what is written in the Torah at all. You are simply stipulating that she waive it for you. The obligation is created. I’m not arguing with the Torah that I am obligated; I just want her to waive it. If you won’t waive it, then I’m not willing to do this. And that itself is why Rabbi Yehuda says that in monetary matters his condition stands—because it can be waived. In prohibitions there’s nothing to waive. But what about Rabbi Meir? If really all I am stipulating is that you waive it, and not stipulating against the Torah, then what’s the problem? Why does Rabbi Meir say that the condition is void and the act stands? So he says, one cannot say that he is stipulating on waiver and not on the Torah itself.
[Speaker B] And one cannot—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And one cannot say that this is why she is betrothed, because he betroths her on condition that she waive it for him, and she has indeed waived it; rather, her waiver is not a waiver.” Right—so maybe that is the explanation of Rabbi Meir’s view. That basically he betroths her on condition that she waive it for him. Right? And what?
[Speaker D] The waiver—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is ineffective because the Torah obligates him to give it. Why? “For it was taught in chapter 2 of Nazir: ‘I am hereby a nazir on condition that I drink wine and become impure through the dead—he is a nazir and forbidden in all of them, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah.’ And there, that answer cannot apply.” Because there they say this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah, and the condition is void and the act stands. Now, if you explain that here, according to Rabbi Meir, the condition is void and the act stands because the stipulation was about waiver, and therefore the act stands, and waiver cannot be conditioned because the Torah obligates him—if that were the explanation, then why in Nazir too, “on condition that I drink wine,” does the Talmud also say that this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah? What did I stipulate there? Why there too does the act stand and the condition is void? After all, on the possibility that I would still have to refrain from wine, I never intended to become a nazir at all. The same question Tosafot asks here, he asks on the Talmud there in Nazir. And there you can’t answer as we tried to answer here, that I am stipulating with her that she waive it for me—I am not stipulating against the Torah. Who is going to waive wine for me? There is no one opposite me there that I can ask: listen, waive for me the prohibition of drinking wine. Here I am stipulating with the Torah. The one opposite me is the Torah, not another human being. So here this is certainly stipulating against what is written in the Torah. So fine—if you were explaining here, in a monetary matter, why the condition is void and the act stands, because waiver is impossible—yes—but the act stands because I really did mean to effect the act, I just wanted her to waive it, and waiving is impossible because the Torah obligates. If that were the explanation, that explanation cannot work in Nazir. Right? There’s no one there to waive anything; it’s not that kind of condition at all. By the way, in Rabbi Yehuda’s view—all of this is in Rabbi Meir’s view. In Rabbi Yehuda’s view, maybe that itself is the explanation. Rabbi Yehuda claims that I am stipulating against what is written in the Torah, but in a monetary matter the condition stands. Why? Because in a monetary matter I’m not stipulating against the Torah, I’m only asking you to waive it for me. And he simply argues, unlike Rabbi Meir, that waiver works. She deserves it, she deserves it—so what? But she can waive it. Rabbi Meir might say that you can’t waive it, according to the proposal Tosafot rejects—but that was still a proposal. And in Rabbi Yehuda’s view, I stipulate that she waive it, and waiver is possible. Then why in Nazir do they connect this to stipulating against what is written in the Torah? Exactly for this reason. Exactly because in Nazir there is no way to interpret it that way, because that is a prohibition, not money. So there you simply can’t speak about waiver. Therefore in Rabbi Yehuda’s view that really could be the explanation. But in Rabbi Meir’s view there is a problem—why does Rabbi Meir say that the condition is void and the act stands? The act too should be void, because I never intended to do the act on that basis. And in Nazir you can’t answer that it is only about waiver. So how does Tosafot understand the Talmud in Nazir? Tosafot claims that in Nazir this is really a condition; it is not a reservation. If the Talmud in Nazir were talking about reservation, then what does that have to do with us? We are talking about stipulating against what is written in the Torah, and you say: one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah—his condition is void, and therefore the act stands. If this were reservation, there would be no place at all to speak in that language. I applied half a legal effect, not that I did a legal effect and there is a condition to uproot it. I applied half a legal effect. So obviously Tosafot ties this to the actual law of conditions, not to some specific kind of legal effect. To the actual law of conditions. But that really is a question, because Tosafot understands it this way in Nazir too. Fine—even in the case of a woman one still has to discuss it. Even when I say, “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” basically that is a reservation, not a condition. Only if you say that I am stipulating that she waive it for me. But if I am stipulating that the betrothal itself should not obligate me in food, clothing, and conjugal rights, that is not a condition; it is a reservation. And with whom am I stipulating? But in Nazir there is only that interpretation. There is no interpretation that I am stipulating with someone that he waive it for me. Here I am stipulating with the Torah, and I want not to be forbidden wine. In what sense is that a condition? It’s obvious that it’s a reservation. How can you even explain there that we are talking about a condition? A condition with whom? With whom am I stipulating? About what am I stipulating? Okay. So Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself, later there, after the section we saw last time, says this: “And in that case of ‘on condition that the Sabbatical year not cancel the debt for me’”—right, when someone gives a loan to someone else on condition that the Sabbatical year not cancel the debt for him. That comes later in our chapter, by the way. “One can say that the condition is: if you wish to cancel the debt for me, then retroactively the money will only have been given as a deposit.” Why does this belong to the law of conditions? You want the Torah not to enact cancellation of debts in the Sabbatical year. In what sense does that even belong to the law of conditions? So he says: no problem—I lend you the money. Now I say: this giving of the money is a loan only if you do not let the Sabbatical year cancel it for me—not the Sabbatical year itself, but that you not cancel it for me in the Sabbatical year. If you want to cancel it for me in the Sabbatical year, then this money is a deposit. A deposit is not canceled in the Sabbatical year; only a loan is. Okay? So basically he is performing here an act of giving money on condition—therefore it is a condition. Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: there, I understand why this belongs to the law of conditions. Right, there is someone else here; you did something, and you make it conditional on how that other person will react or not react. Right. “And in the case of ‘on condition that you have no claim against me for overcharging’”—that is, a sale on condition that the laws of overcharging do not apply if the price is too high or too low—“that too means that if the buyer wants him to return the overcharge while leaving the sale in force, he stipulated that the sale should not stand retroactively, and the sale should be canceled.” In other words, he makes the sale conditional on your demanding the law of overcharging from me. No problem, because this is a stipulation vis-à-vis another person, that he waive it for me or not waive it. “And regarding one who rescues from the river, where if there is a religious court he stipulates before the court”—that means only a declaration that he does not want to rescue it for the wage of an idle laborer, because he prefers his own work and to earn a lot, and therefore he deserves full wages. Right, someone who goes to rescue lost property from a river basically should receive only the wage of an idle laborer. They don’t really pay him for his full work. Fine? But he says, no—I have work from which I earn a lot of money, and I am not willing to lose that in order to rescue your lost property from the river. So they say: if there is a religious court there, let him stipulate before the court. Let him say: I am rescuing the lost object, provided that you pay me the full amount of my loss. Now with whom is he stipulating there? So he says—there, really he means that he does not want to rescue it. This is not really a condition. Rather, he is saying: I rescue it only if you pay me full price. If not, I am not willing to do this work. So if you require me to do this work, pay me full price. That’s not really a condition.
[Speaker B] Who pays him? The owner of the lost object.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The court is only acting as his representative, because he isn’t here, they don’t know who he is. “And I am very perplexed regarding ‘on condition that you have no claim against me for overcharging,’” says Rabbi Akiva Eiger. “This was never really by way of condition; rather, he simply does not want to sell it except with this entitlement, that there be no overcharging claim against him. And once the buyer accepted it, it is as though the buyer removed himself from the law of return of overcharging. And likewise in the Sabbatical year, he does not want to lend except with this entitlement, that the Sabbatical year not cancel the debt for him. And the borrower accepted this. And nevertheless he cannot remove himself from it against Torah law. And this is like the case in Ketubot at the beginning of chapter ‘HaKotev,’ where he says, ‘I have no legal claims regarding your property,’ which is also like one transferring what is written in the Torah—if the Sages gave their enactments the strength of Torah law. Even though it is not by way of condition, as Tosafot wrote there, since she did not stipulate with him. And here…” So he says: all these things, I would have said—were I not hesitant, says Rabbi Akiva Eiger—all these things are not conditions at all. They are not conditions. This is reservation. It’s reservation. I’m saying: I sell you this object, but without the law of overcharging. A sale contract has lots of laws, lots of clauses. One of them is the law of overcharging. In my contract, that clause isn’t there. A partial contract. Okay? That’s not a condition, that’s a reservation. Fine? Same with the Sabbatical year—the cancellation of a loan in the Sabbatical year—that too is basically part of the loan contract, and I delete that clause. Right. So basically he says: I would really say that all these things are reservation and not condition. Now, I don’t entirely see why that is necessary for him, because he himself in the previous paragraph explained very well why this can definitely be interpreted as a condition. He basically says: I am stipulating with you—not that you waive it for me, not that I am deleting part of the clauses of the contract. And therefore this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah. If you frame it as reservation, then fair enough. But if you said it in the form of “on condition that,” then you are stipulating. Is “on condition that”—does whoever says “on condition that” mean the same as “except for”? That’s the Talmud in Nazir 11. Does whoever says “on condition that” mean “except for,” or does “on condition that” mean an actual condition and not “except for,” while “except for” is reservation? Right? He says: “And opposing me stand the words of Tosafot there on page 56, regarding ‘on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights.’ For they asked: according to Rabbi Meir, we require a double condition. And according to what was said above, this is not by way of condition at all, but rather he is betrothing her with a deficiency in this right, that he should not be obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights. And the fact that Tosafot did not go in this direction requires great analysis.” Exactly what we saw earlier in Tosafot. Tosafot brings that this thing is a condition. Not only that—even in Nazir Tosafot understands it as a condition, which is much more far-reaching. In the case of a woman, really there are a few levels here. If I just make an ordinary contract on condition that you pay me another hundred shekels, there’s no problem at all—that’s a regular condition. Okay? If I do it with a woman, “on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” it already starts becoming more problematic. Why? Because the obligation of food, clothing, and conjugal rights is part of the betrothal contract, and I want that part not to exist. But what? I pull a trick: I phrase it in the language of a condition, not in the language of reservation. But clearly, on the substantive level, this is reservation, not condition. It’s just that the mechanism I chose in order to do it is the mechanism of condition. In Nazir it isn’t even a mechanism there—what you are doing is reservation. There isn’t even a condition there. There’s no one standing opposite you, nothing. So that’s already a third level. Fine? Now Tosafot—he wants to say that even in “you have no claim on me for overcharging,” or “the Sabbatical year shall not cancel my debt,” there too this is really reservation and not condition. That is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s claim. But we said—he himself in the previous passage explained why this can definitely be interpreted as a condition. And then he says, yes, but in “on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” that is really, really not—it’s really reservation. And still we see in Tosafot in Ketubot that he says it’s a condition, not a reservation. What I’m saying now is: even in Nazir, Tosafot in Ketubot says that this is a condition and not a reservation. Why? Because he is basically saying: what you want to do is cancel the Sabbatical-year clause in the loan—that’s what you want to do. So basically you are making a contract without one of the clauses. So that is reservation, not condition. The fact that you formulated it in the shape of a condition—what does that mean? At the end of the day, there’s a loan here in which you have moved aside the law of cancellation of debts. The fact that you did it by means of some trick—so what? You still went against the Torah. So basically what you did here is a reservation. You used a sophisticated mechanism to make a reservation. So he says, okay—but if I used a sophisticated mechanism, that’s the mechanism I used, so it’s a condition and not a reservation. And therefore what Rabbi Akiva Eiger says here does not seem absolutely necessary to me. He himself explained it above in the previous passage. But afterwards, with food, clothing, and conjugal rights, that really is a more problematic level, because there I am not stipulating—I am not—it is part of the betrothal contract. The commitment of betrothal is that I am obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights. And I want that not to happen. And he says there too it’s uncomfortable. He asks, he says: Tosafot sees this as a condition. He says, fine, because it is a condition, no problem. Because basically what I want is to betroth her, only if she does not waive food, clothing, and conjugal rights for me, then basically this can’t work. But if that were the explanation, then in Nazir it could not be a condition, only a reservation. From Nazir we see that Tosafot understands the stipulation not as a stipulation with the woman, but as a stipulation with the Torah. But if it is a stipulation with the Torah, then Rabbi Akiva Eiger is right: if so, it is reservation. It is not a condition. If you are stipulating with the person opposite you, then I do have an escape route. I can say: this is really a stipulation, not a reservation, because I do not want the obligation of food, clothing, and conjugal rights not to exist; rather, I want her not to exercise the claim to which she is entitled. Okay? That’s fine. But Tosafot rejects that. Tosafot says that cannot be the mechanism; proof is that in Nazir we see it also applies. And in Nazir that definitely cannot be the mechanism—there’s no one there to waive it. So Tosafot understands “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights” as, on the one hand, not a stipulation with the woman but with the Torah, and on the other hand Tosafot says this belongs to the law of conditions. It is not reservation. That really is problematic. On this point Rabbi Akiva Eiger is right. I would have said that both in Nazir and in food, clothing, and conjugal rights this is reservation. But Tosafot doesn’t say that. If you say otherwise, the meaning is that you are basically saying this is a condition. Fine. So if this is a condition, okay, maybe it is a condition with the woman: that you should waive it for me. But that can’t be, because then in Nazir it wouldn’t work. It isn’t a stipulation with the woman; it is a stipulation with the Torah. And if it is a stipulation with the Torah, then what are you saying? Basically you are making a reservation. In what sense is this a condition? You are saying to the Torah: if you, Torah, won’t waive for me—won’t waive food, clothing, and conjugal rights for me—then I don’t want to betroth the woman. Is the Torah a party to this contract? What is there to stipulate with the Torah? You want to betroth a woman without food, clothing, and conjugal rights, so basically you are reserving, not stipulating. Fine? That is basically Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question. In the end, a condition against what is written in the Torah—every—
[Speaker D] Every condition against what is written in the Torah is a reservation. If—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —if you are stipulating with the Torah. If you are stipulating with a person so that he will waive it for you, that’s something else. Right. The Torah?
[Speaker D] How could I be stipulating over a Torah matter? Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And not only that, but why is it really that the act stands and the condition is void? After all, if this is a partial measure, then you did only half, so how can it be that now she is betrothed and you’re also obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations? I didn’t want food, clothing, and marital relations; I didn’t apply that at all if this is a partial measure. Therefore Tosafot says: this is a condition, not a partial measure. Fine. So the point, I think, ultimately, the focus of the problem is the Nazirite case. With a woman you could still argue; with a woman you could say that I’m stipulating that she waive it for me. But Tosafot, who ties this to the Nazirite, shows that Tosafot understands that the point is not the waiver. You can stipulate with the Torah and it is still a condition and not a partial measure, which really is a major novelty. But this somehow comes out like this: I want to create a partial measure within the Torah’s laws, but I can’t create a partial measure, because the Torah defined the legal effect this way and not that way. I can’t create a legal effect the Torah didn’t define, so I’m trying to outsmart the Torah. I make a condition with it. With the Torah, not with the woman. I make a condition with the Torah; I say: if You want me to be obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, then I am not betrothing the woman. I betroth her only if You waive that for me. The Torah should waive it. Same with a Nazirite: I accept Naziriteship upon myself only on condition that the Torah waive wine-drinking for me. All right? So I do it as a stipulation. Yes, exactly. So about that… and why does he do that? Because you have to understand why he does it. He does it because of what Ri said in Tosafot, because after all you can’t create a partial legal effect. That’s how he understands it. You can’t create a partial legal effect, so he tries to outsmart things. He doesn’t create a partial legal effect; he creates a full legal effect conditionally. But really his goal is to create a partial legal effect, except that a partial legal effect can’t be made because it isn’t defined, so he gets clever and does it by way of a condition. He wants the Torah to waive part of the legal effect for him. All right? And now the question is: what happens in such a case? So Ri says: the condition is void and the act stands. Because if you went by the mechanism of conditions, then in the mechanism of conditions this is a stipulation against what is written in the Torah. And when someone stipulates against what is written in the Torah, the condition is void and the act stands. If it were a partial measure, then the act itself would not take effect. Okay. So basically there is a stipulation here… really it sharpens the point a lot: when someone stipulates against what is written in the Torah, he is stipulating against the Torah. He is stipulating against the Torah. You can’t stipulate against the Torah, just like “if he did it, it is ineffective” — it won’t work. Since it won’t work, the condition is not created, and since you applied the entire legal effect and only the condition would have uprooted it, and the condition was not created because it goes against the Torah, therefore the act stands and the condition is void.
[Speaker G] And that really is a subtle point, because here we see…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Akiva Eiger wants to argue that sometimes people use the term “stipulates against what is written in the Torah” even though we are not dealing at all with the whole topic of conditions. Not with the topic of conditions; “stipulates against what is written in the Torah” means you can’t do something against the Torah. But in Tosafot you see not that way. In Tosafot you see that it is from the topic of conditions. This is a stipulation; it’s not a partial measure. Even a Nazirite is a stipulation. And therefore the rule of stipulating against what is written in the Torah really is part of the topic of conditions: one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void, and automatically the act stands without qualification. And this is part of the topic of conditions. Okay, that’s basically the point. I brought here four characteristics showing why the case of pe’ah is not a condition at all. Someone who harvests on condition that the law of forgotten produce will not apply. Why is that not a condition at all? The first characteristic is that the condition here is immediate. It’s not “on condition that she not drink wine in a week,” but rather right now, the moment I forgot it, the law of forgotten produce should not apply to it. Okay? So it’s immediate. And therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger understands that this is a partial measure and not a condition. Because what is a condition? A condition is something future that comes back and uproots the legal effect that you applied now. Here there is nothing future; from the outset you do not want the law of forgotten produce to apply. Right now it should not apply. The moment you forgot it, the law of forgotten produce should not apply. Nothing here happens retroactively. It’s not future. It’s not something retroactive. Okay? That’s the first characteristic. The second characteristic: there is no second party here. With whom are you making the condition? I harvest on condition that what? Who is standing opposite you for you to make a condition with? It’s only the Torah — that’s what we said before. But Rabbi Akiva Eiger doesn’t accept that, so he says this is not a condition because there is nobody standing opposite you. So it’s immediate, nobody is standing opposite you. Third thing: with harvesting it’s even worse than Nazirite and betrothal. Why? Because harvesting is not even a halakhic act; it’s a physical act. So what are you stipulating there? That if this didn’t happen, then you didn’t harvest? But you did harvest. For example, even in the Nazirite case, which is the most extreme case we saw earlier, it’s not the same as harvesting. Because with a Nazirite, I vow Naziriteship; that is a halakhic act. I can say that with that understanding I did not vow. You can define that act as an act made conditionally. But with harvesting it’s really strange — what are you stipulating here? That if the law of forgotten produce takes effect, then I’m stipulating with the Torah — okay, too bad if… you can make a condition with the Torah. But what are you stipulating? What, that if the law of forgotten produce takes effect, then you didn’t harvest? But you did harvest — here it is. Therefore in the case of forgotten produce Rabbi Akiva Eiger is certainly right that this is not a condition at all. And the concept of stipulating against what is written in the Torah means: you cannot act against the Torah. I think the point is that in all the other cases, at least according to Tosafot, it is a condition. But true, even though it is a condition, the fact that the condition is void may be not from the topic of conditions but from “if he did it, it is ineffective” — meaning, you cannot act against the Torah, and therefore the condition was not fulfilled, and then the act stands and the condition is void. And one could say that in all… not in harvesting, but in all the other cases, since it is from the topic of conditions, then the rule that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is really one of the laws of conditions. It does not belong to “if he did it, it is ineffective.” Practical difference: does Abaye, who says “if he did it, it is effective,” disagree with the rule that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void? If it comes from the topic of “if he did it, it is ineffective,” then ostensibly Abaye should disagree with it, right? But if I understand that this is from the topic of conditions, then it has nothing to do with Abaye and Rava. The Torah says that if you stipulate against the Torah, the condition doesn’t work. So that is a special novelty within the topic of conditions, and it has nothing to do with Abaye and Rava. Here Abaye would also agree. All right? That would be the implication. The fourth characteristic of harvesting and of… and this is a characteristic of all the cases, is that the stipulation is not about some external matter. When I divorce a woman on condition that she not drink wine, drinking wine is unrelated to the divorce. It does not limit the divorce; it conditions it on something else, on some side matter. Here I want to condition it on the fact that some of the consequences of the very legal effect I am now applying should not take effect. So that, says Rabbi Akiva Eiger, is a partial measure, not a condition. That is the fourth characteristic. Also in the Nazirite case and in betrothal on condition that not… therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger says this is not a condition; it’s a partial measure. Since part of betrothal is becoming obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations. If you want to create betrothal without food, clothing, and marital relations, then you are really limiting the act of betrothal itself. So that is a partial measure, not a condition. So these are four different characteristics of why in harvesting, for example, saying that the law of forgotten produce should not apply has nothing to do with the topic of conditions at all. But notice that in the other cases I brought, not all the characteristics are present. For example, in the Nazirite case, the third characteristic is not present. The third was that there is no act here that can be conditioned. In harvesting, that is not an act you can condition — you harvested. In the Nazirite case, you can condition it. I did not intend to accept Naziriteship upon myself unless such-and-such is fulfilled. That characteristic is not present in the Nazirite case. And not in betrothal either. On condition that… I betrothed; I can say that I did not intend to betroth. The fourth characteristic is present both in betrothal and in the Nazirite case, because what I am stipulating about is part of the content of the legal effect itself. The first characteristic, that this is an immediate condition, also applies there. The second characteristic, that there is no second party here, depends. If I understand that I am stipulating, say in betrothal, then certainly there is a second party. There is a second party here. But according to Tosafot, which says that the stipulation is not with the woman so that she should waive it, but rather a stipulation with the Torah, then in fact there is no second party, so the second characteristic is also present. All right? So you see the hierarchy among these cases: the case of harvesting on condition that there not be forgotten produce, the case of betrothal, and the case of a Nazirite. All right? And of course also “that the Sabbatical year not cancel my debt,” and “that there be no law of overreaching here.” Those too are cases that fit in here, and in each of them some of the four characteristics is missing, but at least in harvesting all four characteristics are present, and therefore there it is clear to me that this does not belong to the concepts of stipulation at all. And nonetheless Bartenura says this is stipulating against what is written in the Torah. So there it is fairly clear that according to him, at least, stipulating against what is written in the Torah means going against the Torah, because there it is not at all the topic of conditions. In all the other cases it already depends on disputes, because some of the characteristics are present and it is still possible to view these things as a stipulation. A stipulation with the Torah, not with the woman, or depending how you understand it. And then at least the possibility opens up of saying that when one stipulates against what is written in the Torah, and his condition is void, that is either because “if he did it, it is ineffective,” even though it is from the topic of conditions, or that it has nothing to do with “if he did it, it is ineffective,” but comes from the topic of conditions. What the Torah innovated when it said that a double condition is required, it also innovated that one may not stipulate against what is written in the Torah. And if you stipulate against what is written in the Torah, then it is not a condition. Okay. There are two more examples here, two examples that also do not look like a stipulation. For example, there is a Talmudic passage in Bava Batra 126: “One who says, ‘This son of mine, the firstborn, shall not take a double portion,’ or ‘This son of mine shall not inherit with his brothers,’ he has said nothing, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah.” That’s the Mishnah. Now if he is making a condition here, what kind of stipulation is there? This is my son; I don’t want him to inherit a double portion. What, if he inherits a double portion then he’s not my son? What is this? Just like with pe’ah, there is nothing here. Here all the characteristics are present. This is not a stipulation at all; there is no stipulation here. But already the Mishnah says that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah — that’s not Bartenura, that’s already the Mishnah. What? No, he said, he said: he shall not take a double portion. You don’t want to, and I don’t want it to be forbidden for me to eat pork; I want to eat pork. So what do you want? What are you stipulating about? If you do an act and suspend it on something and say that if that something is not fulfilled, the act will be void, I understand. But what act did you do here? Inheritance is something that happens on its own. You don’t do it, the inheritance. Inheritance is the Torah’s law: the moment someone dies, his property passes to his heirs. So what are you stipulating about here? And this is called stipulating against what is written in the Torah — he said nothing, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah. So here it’s not Bartenura anymore; here it’s already the Mishnah. And the Mishnah says that stipulating against what is written in the Torah means you can’t do something against the Torah, not specifically the topic of conditions. And the same in the Gemara — more than that, the Gemara itself continues there and links it to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. “Shall we say our Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda? For Rabbi Yehuda said: in monetary matters, his condition stands.” So now this is already an actual discussion in the topic of conditions. But we already said: this is not a stipulation at all; what does it have to do with it? He said, no, but in monetary matters his condition stands. As it was taught: “One who says to a woman, ‘You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim upon me for food, clothing, and marital relations,’ she is betrothed and his condition is void” — these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: in monetary matters, his condition stands. So the Gemara explicitly links this to the topic of conditions, and it has nothing to do with a condition. “You can even say Rabbi Yehuda,” says the Gemara. “There, she knew and waived it; here he does not waive it.” What does that mean? Who says he can? And here? What, the firstborn can’t waive it? Why not? What is the problem with waiving it? He can waive it, but this is not a condition. What does it mean, “waive it”? What am I conditioning on his waiving it? I didn’t do anything. Inheritance is something the Torah does, not me. All right? In the case of “on condition that you have no claim upon me for food, clothing, and marital relations,” I can condition it on the woman waiving it. Fine? The Torah waives it, the woman waives it — I don’t know exactly what. But I condition what? I condition the act of betrothal. But in inheritance there is no act that I can condition. So why is that relevant? True, the firstborn can waive it for me, so what if he can waive it? He doesn’t want to waive it. What does that have to do with anything? If he doesn’t waive it for me, then what gets voided? What? I didn’t condition anything. The very first condition is missing — that there has to be some kind of act. It’s like harvesting; it’s like the Mishnah in Pe’ah regarding someone who harvests. One who harvests on condition that the law of forgotten produce not apply. So what? And if the law of forgotten produce does apply, then you didn’t harvest? What does that have to do with anything? Therefore here… and now even more than that, not only does the Mishnah call this stipulating against what is written in the Torah, the Gemara links it to Rabbi Yehuda. Ostensibly there for sure the approach is that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, when it says that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void — or Rabbi Meir; Rabbi Yehuda says that is only in non-monetary matters, but Rabbi Yehuda also agrees that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void — that means not specifically in the laws of conditions, but a general rule. Because otherwise what is the connection between that and what is written in the Mishnah? This is already Gemara. True, in the final conclusion it is only the Gemara’s initial assumption. Because in the conclusion it may be that that itself is what is written there. Why are you linking it to that law? In the Mishnah here, what is written is “he stipulated against what is written in the Torah,” meaning he simply wants the Torah to waive it for him. What does he want? Rabbi Yehuda, in the case of the woman — “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim upon me for food, clothing, and marital relations” — there she can waive it. Therefore in monetary
[Speaker D] matters his condition stands. More than that, there too you are betrothing, so it is clear that it belongs to the topic of conditions. So it could be that in the Gemara’s answer they back away from that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Otherwise there is an explicit Gemara supporting this approach, saying that it is not from the topic of conditions at all. But we saw that there are medieval authorities who say that stipulating against what is written in the Torah is from the topic of conditions, one of the laws of conditions. How does that fit with the Gemara here? If it is one of the laws of conditions, then what does it have to do with this case, which is not a condition at all? It could be that this is the Gemara’s initial assumption, that it is not related to the topic of conditions, but that the very conclusion is that it is. More than that, here in the Gemara it also says that what Rabbi Yehuda says — that in monetary matters, one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition stands — is because she waives it. Right, that’s what it says. And therefore Rabbi Yehuda says that in the case of the woman the condition stands because she waives it. Which means that the Gemara is basically saying that the stipulation is with the woman, not with the Torah. From here there is a difficulty against Tosafot. Because Tosafot says that in “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim upon me for food, clothing, and marital relations,” this is a stipulation with the Torah, not with the woman, and it brings proof from the Nazirite case. Here with inheritance, is this really a stipulation with the Torah? No — he is not stipulating anything; it is not a condition at all. What is written here, that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, means he went against the Torah; you cannot go against the Torah. This does not belong to the topic of conditions; the term “stipulated” is just borrowed language. Right, and he didn’t do anything. But that is only a condition, and only in the context of an acquisition act, no? Right, obviously. And if you make a legal effect conditional, you can say: if such-and-such happens, I did not apply it. You cannot say, “I didn’t harvest if such-and-such happens”; you harvested — that is the fact. Or inheritance happened; it’s not I who bequeath — the Torah bequeaths. If it is money then maybe he is asking for waiver? Asking what? And therefore if he doesn’t waive, then what will happen? If he doesn’t waive, then he won’t condition it on that. That I know; I know that too. The question is what you want. The firstborn son knows that if he can waive, he can waive, and if not, not — no problem, it’s his decision. Or he can give a gift to the other children, or not give a gift to the other children. But what are you making conditional on that? A condition always means: I am doing this act on condition that you waive. And if you don’t waive, then what I am doing will be void. But I am not doing anything. The fact that the firstborn son can waive or not waive is obvious; anyone can give gifts. But what are you conditioning? What are you conditioning? Yes, he isn’t doing anything except dying, exactly. And does it exist today
[Speaker D] in the Rabbi’s religious court today in Israel — does this issue of the Mishnah exist today,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with the firstborn receiving equally with the other sons? In memory of Israel, in Jewish law it exists. Yes, I know, but in practice today. What do you mean? The law doesn’t — the law does not determine inheritance law according to the Torah. No, for that reason, the law doesn’t determine that. If you write that you want inheritance law according to the Torah, then the law will recognize that, because you’re allowed to if you do it during your lifetime at least. If he goes according to the rabbinical court, goes to a religious court? Right, right. There are judges who try, they try to get people to waive it. Yes, they say: I’m giving you a gift. No — if you make a gift during your lifetime, that’s fine, but that’s not the religious court. In the religious court you arrive only after the person has died. And now there is an appeal by the brothers regarding the division of the property. There the religious court has nothing it can do. All it can do is ask the firstborn to compromise. But if the person goes in advance and writes a will during his lifetime, by which he bequeaths during his lifetime equally to all his children or something like that, that’s fine, no problem. Many do this, by the way, including many Haredim. No, many do it, even though the Chazon Ish says it is not proper to do so. And do the judges accept that? What? Do the judges in effect cancel that? Many Haredim make a lifetime will in order to give equal inheritance to all the children. And have you ever heard that the judges get around it and ask for, or make the fulfillment of the will conditional on, the firstborn waiving it? That I don’t know. I know they try to get people to compromise, but I don’t know whether they condition the implementation of the will on that. I don’t know; I’m not familiar with the issue. In any case, I think the religious court has no standing in the execution of a will, in my opinion; only the civil court does from the standpoint of the law. Maybe from the standpoint of the people, if religious people go to a religious court, then the religious court simply says so and they’ll enforce it. They’re ruling here between law and religion, you understand? No, but that isn’t in inheritance. What? In matters of personal status, in divorce and betrothal, that’s something else. But inheritance — here we become Danny and Moti. We’re only saying. In inheritance the rabbinical court has no authority. What? The rabbinical court has no authority in inheritance. He turns to the rabbinical court and it can obligate you too. But I have to agree; it’s a compromise. Again, in divorces and betrothals the rabbinical court has authority by power of the state; it has legal authority. So there if the woman went there and I don’t want to, it won’t help me. Because if I go to civil court, that’s something else. But regarding inheritance, the law does not grant them authority. If both sides agree, then of course you can go there and sign that we agree. Well, I don’t know, it needs checking, I… but that’s what I know. The law says — there is an explicit situation where if I go to civil court, she can go to rabbinical court. And the reverse for any matter, if he went first. Well, that sounds strange to me, but I’ll try to check it again. What? The same as with divorces and betrothals — why not? He claims that in inheritance too it’s like that. In inheritance? First come, first served, and in the other matters too. Well, I don’t know. Check quickly, quickly. Yes. Okay. In the Mishnah in Ketubot chapter 8 there is also a similar case: “He wrote to her, ‘I have no legal claim in your property, nor in its produce, nor in the produce of its produce, during your lifetime and after your death’; he does not eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she dies, he does not inherit her.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: “If she dies, he does inherit her, because he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void.” Now, what did he stipulate here? He simply withdraws from… he relinquishes his rights to her property. What? No, he did not die; it’s not talking about death. No, this is husband and wife. So he says he withdraws from the rights in her property, nichsei melog — no, no, I don’t want it. The produce belongs to me according to the law; I don’t want it, I withdraw from it. Okay, so what happens when she dies? When she dies, in principle he is supposed to inherit her, but if he gave up the property, then it is no longer the couple’s property, the produce is not his, so in principle he should not inherit. It says yes, but the Torah’s law is that you inherit her, so this withdrawal is stipulating against what is written in the Torah, and therefore you will inherit her in any case — that is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says. Now what does stipulating against what is written in the Torah mean? What did I stipulate? I simply withdrew. I did not perform some act conditioned on my not having the produce; I simply did not want the produce. This is not a stipulation. Again, we see that the expression “stipulating against what is written in the Torah” sometimes appears not in the topic of conditions at all, even when we are not dealing with the topic of conditions at all. So let’s sum up for a moment where we stand. We have, essentially, a stipulation, say, in the case of the woman: one who betroths a woman on condition that she has no claim upon him for food, clothing, and marital relations. One could understand it as a partial measure, as Rabbi Akiva Eiger understood. One could understand it as a condition, as Tosafot understands. If it is a partial measure, there is no betrothal. But the Gemara says there is betrothal: the condition is void and the act stands. Right? But that is Rabbi Meir who says the condition is void and the act stands. But if it is a partial measure, how did Rabbi Akiva Eiger explain that? A penalty. No, what do you mean a penalty? This is a Torah-level law. So there are two possibilities here. One possibility — we saw that the Ritva and Rabbenu Tam, who disagree with Ri in Ketubot 56, claim that when one stipulates against what is written in the Torah, the condition is void and the act stands because he was just joking with her. He didn’t really mean it seriously. What? Joking with her. He didn’t really mean it seriously, like “on condition that you ascend to heaven.” He just didn’t really mean to make that condition. And from this I inferred that apparently according to them, if he had meant it seriously, then yes, it would have worked. What do you mean it would have worked? As a condition. Not that she would be betrothed without food, clothing, and marital relations. “The condition would have worked” means she would not be betrothed at all, as in Tosafot’s question. What did Tosafot ask? Tosafot asked: after all, in the possibility that he became obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, he did not
[Speaker D] intend to betroth her at all, so how can you say to him: she is betrothed to you and you are also obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In that possibility he did not intend to betroth her. So Ri gives his answer, that this is from now on retroactively and all the… yes, this is retroactive voiding or a complete application, and if the condition is not fulfilled then I want to void it. The moment the condition didn’t work, the legal effect remained, and there is nothing to void it. That is Ri. But Rabbenu Tam
[Speaker D] and the Ritva do not say that. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because apparently they understand that a condition does not operate from now on retroactively,
[Speaker D] but rather it is clarified retroactively. And if it is clarified retroactively, then what happens?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I applied it, when I said betrothal on condition that you have no claim for food, clothing, and marital relations, that is basically exactly Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Basically I made a partial measure. Right? I said: this is betrothal without food, clothing, and marital relations. It is clarified retroactively; here it is even retroactively — it is simultaneous. No, it’s not something future. Right now I do not want there to be food, clothing, and marital relations. So here it really is a partial measure, it is
[Speaker D] really Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s approach. And they themselves ask Tosafot’s question. So if that is the case, why does the act stand? After all,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the possibility that there is food, clothing, and marital relations, he did not want to betroth her at all. So they say no,
[Speaker D] he wanted to betroth her only without food, clothing, and marital relations; that’s a partial measure, not a condition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you cannot apply a partial measure, because betrothal includes food, clothing, and marital relations. You want to create a different legal effect of betrothal, one the Torah did not define — there is no such legal effect. Exactly. So there is no choice; after all it says the condition is void and the act stands. How can that be understood? He didn’t mean it seriously. For all the difficulty, and we already saw that this is difficult, and “condition against what is written in the Torah” and “a matter not in his control” — in the Gemara itself you see that these are two different things. In the Gemara in Gittin, the Kovetz Shiurim asked this question against them there. But never mind; that is what they say, and apparently that is also what Rabbi Akiva Eiger would have to say. Because otherwise how will he explain it? He thinks that “You are hereby betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim upon me for food, clothing, and marital relations” — Rabbi Akiva Eiger says this is a partial measure. And about that Rabbi Meir says: the condition is void and the act stands. How does the act stand if it is
[Speaker F] a partial measure? So one would have to say that according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, he intended
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to leave something out, but really he didn’t intend to leave something out; he’s joking with her. I don’t know, a bit strange.
[Speaker F] There’s another possibility I thought of. There is a Gemara in Kiddushin 7. Rava said: “Become betrothed to half of me” — she is betrothed. “Half of you is betrothed to me” — she is not betrothed. Yes, half of me will be your husband — become betrothed to half of me, then she is betrothed. “Half of you is betrothed to me” — I betroth half of you — she is not betrothed. No, no, no — what does “half of you” mean? Half of me will be your husband; you are marrying half of me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Half — I don’t know — the other half will marry another woman. That’s what the Gemara says. These are examples.
[Speaker F] Okay. I’m supposed to have a debate today with Yaron Yadan. Who? Yaron Yadan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some former kollel head who was in Kfar Chasidim and left, I don’t know, and since then has been working against Jewish law and Torah and against religious people. Yes, something like that, just on a somewhat higher level.
[Speaker F] So one of the questions he wants
[Speaker D] to discuss is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] all sorts of strange discussions in the Gemara — what is the law regarding oneself, someone who has relations with himself. What are you discussing? Here, another example now: “Become betrothed to half of me.” Why do you agree to speak with him? Because his arguments are arguments that many people think are good, and you need to give answers. I think they take them very seriously.
[Speaker D] Very many people treat this with great seriousness. His pamphlets were a hit — they used to be, he doesn’t publish them now, but they were — it was called True Knowledge.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh yes, many people — it caused many casualties, no doubt. So I was just reminded now because this is one of the strange discussions: “Become betrothed to half of me” or “Half of you is betrothed to me.” Abaye said to Rava: “What is different about
[Speaker D] ‘Half of you is betrothed to me,’ that she is not betrothed? The Merciful One said ‘a woman,’ and not half a woman.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too, the Merciful One said ‘a man,’ and not half a man!” If you make that derivation here, make the same derivation there. He said to him: “How can you compare? There, a woman is not fit for two men, but is a man not fit for two women?” A woman cannot be married to two husbands, so clearly you cannot betroth half a woman, with the other half to be betrothed to someone else, because then that woman would be the wife of two husbands, and that cannot be. But one husband with two women can happen. So if I say “half of me is betrothed to you,” and the other half of me will be betrothed to someone else — therefore with the husband it is possible to betroth half, but with the woman it is not. “And this is what he is saying to her: if I want to marry another woman, I will marry one.” In essence, what did he say to her? I want to marry another woman; that is what “become betrothed to half of me” means. Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari said to Ravina: “Then let the betrothal spread to all of her.” Why doesn’t the betrothal spread to her whole being?
[Speaker F] He betrothed half of her. That means you can’t betroth half
[Speaker D] of her, fine — so let him betroth half and let it spread through all of her, and then all of her will be betrothed to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. So like this — she will be half my wife and it will spread through all of her. Was it not taught: “One who says, ‘The leg of this animal shall be a burnt offering,’ it is all a burnt offering”?
[Speaker D] And even according to the one who says it is not all a burnt offering, that is only where he consecrated something on which life does not depend. But if he consecrated something on which life depends, it all becomes a burnt offering. What does that mean? If someone says, “The leg of this animal is sacred with the sanctity of a burnt offering,” yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then the whole thing is a burnt offering. Fine? And there is someone who says no, nothing is consecrated. But even the one who disagrees and says that nothing is consecrated says that only because I consecrated a leg. But if I had consecrated the heart, or something on which life depends, then indeed the whole thing would be consecrated. Fine? So if so, the same should be true with a woman: if I consecrate half a woman, betroth half a woman, then it should spread to the whole woman, and now the whole woman should be betrothed to me just like the burnt offering. They say: is that comparable? There with an animal, here there is another mind involved. With an animal, if half of it is consecrated, there is nothing in the other half to stop the spread; it all spreads to the rest of the animal, there is nothing to stop it.
[Speaker D] If half an animal becomes consecrated, it spreads through the whole thing. With a woman, when I betroth half the woman, the other half
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the woman is not an animal; it is a woman, it is
[Speaker D] a person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if the person does not want the betrothal to extend further onto the other half, then she will stop it, so it will not spread. There is another mind here that stops the spread.
[Speaker D] Therefore there it doesn’t work. So the later authorities and the medieval authorities bring from here an example that betrothal resembles consecration; that’s why it is called kiddushin. It is similar to consecration. Just as holiness spreads through the whole animal, so too the betrothal should really have spread through the whole woman; it is only because there is another mind preventing it that this does not happen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now if that is so, maybe what Rabbi Akiva Eiger says is this:
[Speaker D] one who betroths a woman on condition
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that she has no claim upon him, Rabbi Akiva Eiger
[Speaker D] says this is leaving something out, not a condition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean?
[Speaker D] I am making half a betrothal. Aside from the obligation of food, clothing, and marital relations, I am making half a betrothal. Exactly, and that is like betrothing half a woman, only here
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there is no other mind preventing it, because this is not half of the woman; it is
[Speaker D] half of the concept of betrothal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here, on the contrary, the Torah itself wants it to spread to everything, because the Torah wants betrothal to be full betrothal. So it may be that what Rabbi Akiva Eiger is really trying to claim is not that he didn’t mean it seriously, as the Ritva and Rabbenu Tam say, and therefore she is betrothed and he is obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, but rather that the half-betrothal takes effect and then spreads to the whole. And then the claim is that really the condition is void and the act stands even though this is leaving something out and not a condition. But if that were really so, then that is true only with betrothal. Maybe in Naziriteship you could say that it too is a legal effect, a kind of holiness, maybe it too can spread — I don’t know.
[Speaker D] But with ordinary conditions you can’t say such a thing, and then it turns out
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to be specifically about betrothal, not a general statement. Therefore the simple straightforward explanation is that this goes like the Ritva and Rabbenu Tam.
[Speaker D] The Ritva and Rabbenu Tam say that he doesn’t mean it seriously, and therefore he intended to betroth her without qualification. And therefore the condition is void and the act stands. And all this is very forced. It seems that the straightforward explanation is really Ri, and therefore also Tosafot, and not Rabbi Akiva Eiger: this is not leaving something out, it is a condition. And the whole reason the condition is void and the act stands is because of
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the mechanism Ri described — from now on retroactively. I have very little time; I can’t
[Speaker D] start the next section now, so I’ll just tell you one more thing
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so as not to leave the page blank, as they say.
[Speaker D] There is a Gemara in Bava Kamma 14. The Gemara says — okay, we’ve finished with that for now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A Gemara in Bava Kamma 14 says — it brings
[Speaker D] several statements of Rabbi Elazar. And
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: “If a placenta partially emerged on the first day and partially emerged on the second day, we count for her from the first.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is about the impurity of a woman who gives birth. Let’s say a woman who gives birth must be impure for two weeks, so when the placenta partially emerged on the first day and the second part of the placenta emerged on the second day, we count for her from the first. We assume that the birth already took place on the first day. Even though we don’t know. The placenta came out, but I don’t know what is inside the placenta; the fetus has to come out for this to count as a birth. The placenta came out — I don’t know what is inside that placenta. Is the fetus still inside in the part that remains inside? Is the fetus outside? So it says: we count for her from the first. Fine? Rava said to him: what are you thinking — stringency? This stringency leads to leniency, because you are purifying her from the first. If she starts being strict on herself and counting impurity already from the first day, she’ll finish it on the Sabbath two weeks later, so that is also a leniency. If you want to be stringent, you have to say: start on the first day but finish on the second day. Fine? Because of the doubt, since you don’t know whether there is a fetus inside or not.
[Speaker D] Rather, said Rava: she must be concerned,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It only counts from the second day. Right, so it goes stringently in both directions. She begins on Sunday and finishes on Monday two weeks later. What is this teaching us? Fine, what’s the novelty? Okay, a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently—we know that too. So what’s the novelty? That there is no partial placenta without a fetus. What does that mean? You might have thought this was a double doubt. Why? Because part of a placenta emerged, but maybe there is no fetus in the placenta at all—only the placenta came out and not the fetus. And even if a fetus did come out, maybe only part of it came out. So this is a double doubt. She needs most of the fetus to have emerged in order for the impurity of a woman who gave birth to apply. And it teaches us: no, this is not a double doubt, it is one doubt. Why? Because there is no partial placenta without a fetus. If part of a placenta came out, then clearly there is a fetus there. The only doubt is whether it was most of the fetus or part of the fetus. And therefore we are concerned in both directions, and there is a doubt here. So the novelty is that this is not a double doubt but a single doubt. Meaning, if it were a double doubt, then we would be lenient in both directions. Right? Because then she would begin on Monday and finish on Sunday. Okay? Tosafot asks: “And there is no partial placenta without a fetus.” And if you say that according to Rabbi Elazar, who says we are concerned because there is no partial placenta without a fetus—but if there could be a partial placenta without a fetus, then we would not be concerned. Right? If there could be a partial placenta without a fetus, then it would be a double doubt, and there would be no need to be concerned. But what are we talking about here? If it is in the public domain, then even in a single doubt we declare it pure. And if it is in the private domain, then even a double doubt is impure as well. As we learned in Taharot, with regard to any doubt of impurity, you can multiply uncertainties in the private domain—even a double doubt is impure. The law of doubt in impurity is different from the law of doubt in prohibition. In prohibition, a doubt is treated stringently, and a double doubt leniently. In impurity, the framework is different. If it is in the public domain, then it is always pure. One doubt, two doubts, three doubts—it doesn’t matter how many, everything is pure. If it is in the private domain, everything is impure; it doesn’t matter whether it is one doubt or two doubts, everything is impure. There is no difference between a doubt and a double doubt; the only question is where it happened. Did it happen in the private domain or in the public domain? Tosafot says: what kind of case is this? After all, here this is a doubt regarding impurity—the impurity of a woman who gives birth. What was the case? If it happened in the public domain, then even with a single doubt it should be pure. If it happened in the private domain, then even a double doubt is impure. So how can the Talmudic text here say that it comes to teach us that this is only one doubt and not a double doubt—because with a double doubt we would be lenient, and with one doubt we are stringent? In the laws of impurity there is no such thing as being stringent with one doubt and lenient with a double doubt. If it is in the public domain, in both cases we are lenient; if it is in the private domain, in both cases we are stringent. So how can there be a case in the laws of impurity where with one doubt we are stringent and with a double doubt lenient? So the Avnei Nezer says—there is a pilpulim book by Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz on the Torah, and in the portion of… what? Sorry. It can be said that our passage is dealing with forbidding her to her husband. The discussion here is not about impurity, it is about prohibition. The question is whether she is forbidden to have relations with her husband or not, but this is not a law of impurity, it is a law of prohibition. Tosafot asks—the Avnei Nezer asks: where do we learn the law of doubtful impurity in the public domain or the private domain from? From a sotah. From a sotah? Yes. A sotah who was secluded—that is in the private domain, and therefore because of doubt we render her impure. But if she was not secluded, if this is in the public domain, then no matter how many doubts there are—sorry—even one doubt and she is pure. That is the source; the Talmudic text says that is the source. We learn it from a sotah. Now what is the discussion with a sotah? Is it a discussion about impurity? Did the sotah become impure? No—she became forbidden to her husband. The discussion there is about prohibition to her husband. So then how can you tell me: no, here the discussion is about forbidding her to her husband, and therefore with one doubt we are stringent and with a double doubt lenient? The source for there being no difference between a doubt and a double doubt is sotah, and there the discussion is about prohibition to her husband. So he brings—the publisher of that book is the grandson of the brother of the Sochatchover, the Avnei Nezer. He brings this in the name of his great-uncle, and he says: and in the portion of Chukat. So he cites the Kuzari, who says that impurity applies only where there is holiness, and vice versa. If there is no holiness and no impurity, then it is prohibition. It is forbidden and permitted; it is not holy and impure. Okay? So he says as follows: why is the sotah forbidden to her husband? Because she has betrayed her husband. She committed a betrayal within the betrothal bond; she did something that damages the bond of kiddushin. Why is a woman who gave birth forbidden to her husband? She is not forbidden specifically to her husband; she is forbidden to any person. True, the one who would have relations with her would be her husband, because anyone else is forbidden anyway. But the prohibition is not a prohibition to her husband; it is a prohibition to the world at large. So he says like this: in a place where the prohibition is because of damage to the kiddushin bond, that is impurity. Why? Because it is the absence of holiness. When there is an absence of holiness, the law is a law of impurity. And because of that impurity, the husband is forbidden to have relations with her, but fundamentally it is a law of impurity. Because the concept of kiddushin has been damaged. When holiness is damaged, impurity is created. In the impurity of a woman who gives birth, even though there really is actual impurity there—yes, she imparts impurity to pure items that she touches—the prohibition to her husband specifically is not connected to impurity. Even though there is actual impurity there, and in the case of sotah she is not really impure—if she touches something she does not impart impurity to it—but the prohibition there is called impurity because it is damage to holiness. In the case of a woman who gives birth there is real impurity: when she touches things she imparts impurity to them. But the prohibition of a woman who gives birth to her husband is specifically a prohibition; it is not impurity. Because the prohibition is not due to damage to the bond of kiddushin between them—that is unrelated. It is a physiological state. Okay? Therefore this is not in the category of doubtful impurity, but of doubtful prohibition. In the case of sotah, the categories are those of doubtful impurity. In essence, what this says is that the concept of kiddushin belongs to this world of consecration, of holiness. Therefore damage to the concept of kiddushin creates impurity and not prohibition. And that is what we saw in the Talmudic text earlier, that holiness spreads through the whole thing, and the Talmudic text says the same would apply to a woman—that in kiddushin it spreads through all of her. Because kiddushin and consecration are the same thing. Kiddushin is a kind of holiness. The bond between a husband and a woman basically belongs to the worlds of holiness, to the conceptual worlds of holiness and impurity. And that is why the Talmudic text says that holiness should spread through all of her in a woman, just as we see in an animal that is consecrated. Fine, okay. What? Right, and therefore there it really is doubtful impurity; it is not doubtful prohibition. That is why the laws of doubtful impurity are learned from there, because in essence the prohibition of a sotah to her husband is impurity; it is not prohibition. Good. Okay, next time we’ll get into… until now we finished the Mishnah, what is written in the Torah, and next time I’ll move on to a monetary matter, and then we’ll reach the topic in our chapter. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace. There is… what? All the topics—Torah, faith / belief, Jewish law. It’s a kind of podcast, he uploads the recording so there will be a recording. What? He had been a head of a kollel, that’s at least what I understood, pretty Hasidic, and at some point he took his wife and children and they fled in the middle of the night.