Q&A: Authority in Jewish Law, Rabbi Feivelson
Authority in Jewish Law, Rabbi Feivelson
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I heard a lecture a few days ago by Rabbi Feivelson in which he spoke about the authority of the great sages of Israel.
He cites the Talmud in Horayot and talks about the authority of the Sanhedrin. Then he explains, based on Maimonides and other commentators, that in fact the authority of the Sanhedrin has ended, and he brings from Maimonides that what still remains as binding law is this: if all the Jewish people, or virtually all of them, accepted something upon themselves, then it is binding. He emphasizes that if there is a minority opinion, it is not nullified unless there is an actual overwhelming majority of virtually all of the people.
He gave as examples electricity on the Sabbath or the second day of a Jewish holiday, which are laws that almost all the Jewish people accepted upon themselves, and therefore even an individual who thinks otherwise is obligated, just as with the Sanhedrin, unless he succeeds in creating a discussion in which there will be a minority opinion opposing it.
He added another case in his understanding of Maimonides:
that even a community or a particular place that accepted a certain practice upon itself, this binds the members of that community.
Afterward he added the point that in his view nowadays the Ashkenazi public and the Sephardi public are binding communities, since generally people belong to certain communities and certain synagogues, and likewise to certain institutions (mainly in Haredi society) and certain circles of friends, and this really has the meaning of a community. Therefore he argues that a person who wants, in halakhic terms, to act against his community—for example, an Ashkenazi who wants to act like a Sephardi—can do so, but he would have to move to a different community, because this community binds him even when he has learned and understands differently, since it is like the authority of the Sanhedrin, which is binding.
Rabbi Feivelson also wanted to propose an additional novelty: that the Haredi public has an identity and a stance, and therefore it is a kind of particular community (for example, he argued that a component of Haredi identity is a strategy of separation in order to preserve yourself, and for other reasons).
And someone who belongs to that community, meaning:
he prays in their synagogues, these are his friends, his children are in their institutions, so he belongs to that community,
and if, say, the majority of the Haredi public made a decision on a certain issue, that would bind him because that community made a decision, since that community has rabbis of high stature whom the public follows.
Based on this he wanted to say that if there are certain issues on which all the rabbis made a decision, and generally the entire Haredi public follows them, and there are rabbis whom the public follows,
then that binds anyone who identifies with and belongs to the Haredi public even if he understands the Jewish law differently!
And anyone who does not belong to the community is not bound by it.
What do you say about that?
Answer
There are a lot of things here, and it’s impossible to address all of them here. I’ll just say that custom is binding only where, in your own view, it does not involve a prohibition. Therefore the various Haredi customs need to be examined: if this is something improper or forbidden, then it certainly is not binding. Beyond that, I do not agree that a community custom binds me in my home. The rabbi and the community determine what happens in the synagogue, not in my house. It is true that regarding an ethnic custom, the idea has taken root that it binds even at home, but that only means that this is not really a community but something else. And in any case, if I am Ashkenazi and hold like the Shulchan Arukh, then an ethnic custom has no force whatsoever. Custom does not override Jewish law.
Discussion on Answer
His intention is to speak about a custom concerning a mode of halakhic ruling, where the practice was accepted to rule like one side in a dispute. Like electricity on the Sabbath.
Once the understanding is that the decision of the place is binding in halakhic terms,
let’s say a place where the practice is to rule that electricity is forbidden on the Sabbath.
That is, it was accepted to rule like a certain opinion, and that binds all the people of that place.
And if an ethnic group or community is like the custom of a place, then it would be binding.
No?
In the previous comment I wasn’t clear,
I meant that this was Rabbi Feivelson’s intention, etc.
This is a continuation of the question to Rabbi Michael.
If he smells something, let him recite “Who creates various kinds of spices.”
I explained everything.
Even if it’s herbs?
Does the opinion of the majority of sages bind everyone? For example, regarding electricity on the Sabbath—a cellphone, for example—it would seem that this is a matter of rabbinic law, but do you accept that a rabbi who rules that it is permitted on the Sabbath is, in terms of a rebellious elder, ruling differently from what all the sages rule,
and that it is forbidden to act in accordance with his words?
Or do you say that the agreement of the majority of sages is binding only in the public sphere?
Today there is no authority that is binding on everyone. True, the agreement of all the sages or of all Israel has binding weight, but that can be relevant to a law they newly establish. On the interpretive level, one should follow the truth.
Electricity on the Sabbath is not a newly established law according to any halakhic decisor.
It is an interpretation of an existing rabbinic or Torah-level law. Therefore a determination by the sages of our time or by sages of previous generations has no special standing if reason leads to the conclusion that they are mistaken.
But that is only if you are competent to rule and interpret. Just an ordinary person who thinks differently without a halakhic basis—that is meaningless.
In short, if you use electricity on the Sabbath, you will not be prosecuted for violating “do not deviate,” but you will be prosecuted for desecrating the Sabbath (assuming you are mistaken and it is indeed forbidden).
From the end of the Rabbi’s words it sounds like specifically if he holds like the author of the Shulchan Arukh, meaning that he has a reasoned view.
If so, what about a person who just likes the idea / feels inclined to follow Maimonides and the like?