Q&A: Private Marriages
Private Marriages
Question
Rabbi Abraham, hello,
As you know (perhaps), I officiate wedding ceremonies according to Jewish law outside the Chief Rabbinate, and I would like to consult with you.
A couple who married in a private ceremony and chose a friend or relative to conduct the ceremony— in my humble opinion, if they separate, they do not need to arrange a bill of divorce as a matter of law. Because it is evident to us that they did not intend to marry according to Jewish law. I would say this even if the groom said, “Behold, you are consecrated to me,” because when something is evident to us, unexpressed intent does count. But at the very least, if the groom deviated from the standard formula in what he said to the bride, then no bill of divorce is required as a matter of law.
And all this is regardless of the status of the witnesses.
Only if they chose a rabbi to conduct the kiddushin, or chose a religious friend to conduct the kiddushin specifically because he is religious, then perhaps there is a need to arrange a bill of divorce as a matter of law.
And even without documentation, if the couple did not register as married, “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits,” and their word about the details of the ceremony may be accepted.
Do you agree with me?
Best regards,
Answer
Hello,
I am not entirely sure. I have encountered cases in which the friend conducting the kiddushin and the couple came to consult about how to do it properly according to Jewish law. For example, if the parents want it done according to Jewish law, and sometimes they themselves want that as well.
And if the claim is based on their being secular, that is also true when a couple turns to a rabbi to conduct the ceremony. After all, in substance they do not really care that it be done according to Jewish law, apart from the ceremony and the social norms. And if in that case we are concerned, then there is reason to be concerned here as well. The point is that kiddushin according to Jewish law are a kind of contract defined by Jewish law, and therefore even someone who is not bound by Jewish law—if he signed this contract, he is bound by it. This does not necessarily depend on fear of Heaven or on a desire to do things properly according to the law. I once discussed this when I was asked, regarding my approach (in an article I wrote), that there is no commandment-act at all for a person who does not believe—so how can his kiddushin nonetheless be valid? I answered that it is because he signed a contract with these terms. That binds him even if he has no interest at all in fulfilling a commandment and is incapable of fulfilling a commandment.
Alternatively, I have heard that there are also religious couples who turn to a friend to do this. So that does not necessarily indicate that they do not want it according to Jewish law. If the ceremony was conducted in accordance with Jewish law and the words were said as they are normally said, there is reason for concern that they did intend it according to Jewish law, since unexpressed intent does not count, and we follow what they said and did (and, as noted, this is not necessarily a case of what is in his heart and in everyone’s heart).
If it becomes clear that the ceremony itself was not conducted according to Jewish law, then of course we do not require a bill of divorce. At first I understood that this was not what you meant. But at the end of your remarks you speak about clarifying the details of the ceremony (and discuss it from the perspective of “the mouth that forbade”), meaning that I understand there is a possibility that there were problems with the ceremony itself. On that I will say a few things.
In clarifying how the ceremony was conducted, the question arises whether they are believed by virtue of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits.” But even regarding credibility on that basis, there is room for discussion, for at least two reasons: 1. When they want to void the kiddushin without a bill of divorce, they are interested parties (they have a personal stake in testifying that the ceremony was not conducted properly). 2. There are other witnesses who were present, and perhaps some of them were valid witnesses as well (especially since regarding visual testimony about the kiddushin—not testimony required to establish the matter—according to many halakhic decisors, even Sabbath desecrators are believed if they are not suspected of lying). If so, they are not “the mouth that forbade,” and therefore they are also not believed to permit.
Bottom line, in my opinion, if you can locate witnesses who were there at the ceremony and who can testify that something improper was done there, that will solve the problem. Otherwise it is difficult to be lenient here. I think the best thing is to look for the kiddushin witnesses themselves, because then either way: if they themselves were not valid witnesses (I mean that they were not valid at the time, of course), then that settles it. And if they were valid, then they can testify about what they saw there.