Q&A: The Science of Freedom
The Science of Freedom
Question
Hello Rabbi, I’m reading your book The Science of Freedom (wonderful), and I wanted to ask a question.
The Rabbi explained the problem of weakness of will, in one of its formulations, as follows: given two conflicting possibilities (for the reasons brought there), (a) if I know which of the two is better, I want it; (b) if I want something and I am able to do it, I will do it; (c) there are times when we feel that we were able to do what we wanted, and nevertheless we did the other thing. (Correct me if I’m mistaken.)
From this a question came to me that isn’t directly related—
It sounds from this mechanism (which seems fairly logical to me) that every action is the product of one of two things: (a) knowledge that generates desire. Such an action can be (but need not be) a free action. (b) an action not in accordance with our desire. And such an action is certainly not free.
But seemingly, the desire to learn and the other things that build up the level of our knowledge also have to be built on prior items of knowledge, so that in the end it seems that we have some initial outlook that constructs all our free choices, but it itself is given. In other words, it turns out that a person is coerced either by his initial outlook or by the second type of action. I’d be glad to understand where the mistake is. Thank you very much.
Answer
In columns 172–173 I discussed the problem of weakness of will at length (in the book I only hinted at it). My claim is that sin stems from a decision not to choose (but rather to let nature—both the external and internal nature within me—drag me along). Therefore, all the knowledge in the world does not determine what I will do.
Beyond that, the desire to learn is not knowledge but an inclination. One can choose whether to go along with it or not.