Q&A: What Is the Difference Between a Rabbinic Decree and a Rabbinic Prohibition
What Is the Difference Between a Rabbinic Decree and a Rabbinic Prohibition
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In Maimonides, Laws of Leavened Food and Matzah, chapter 1, it says:
9. The Sages prohibited eating leavened food from the beginning of the sixth hour, so that one not come into contact with a Torah prohibition. From the beginning of the sixth hour, leavened food is forbidden for eating and for benefit. The sixth hour is by rabbinic law; the rest of the day, from the seventh hour onward, is by Torah law.
10. During the fifth hour one may not eat leavened food—a decree because of a cloudy day, lest one confuse the fifth and sixth hours. However, it is not forbidden for benefit during the fifth hour. Therefore, with regard to terumah, thanksgiving bread, and the like—leavened items that are sacred—one leaves them pending: they are neither eaten nor burned, until the sixth hour arrives, at which point everything is burned.
11. [10] From this you learn that it is permitted to eat leavened food on the fourteenth day until the end of the fourth hour; one may not eat during the fifth hour, but one may derive benefit from it; and one who eats during the sixth hour is given lashes for rebellion. But one who eats from the beginning of the seventh hour receives lashes.
A few questions about this:
- Is the decree regarding the fifth hour considered a decree upon a decree?
- Why is there no lashes for rebellion in the fifth hour as there is in the sixth hour?
- Why during the fifth hour are the items left pending, and then in the sixth hour they are burned, if both are rabbinic and the prohibition against burning is Torah-level?
- Nowadays, when there is no concern that one will confuse the fifth and sixth hours, is it permitted to eat leavened food during the fifth hour?
Answer
1. Simply speaking, yes. But we do find decrees upon decrees more than once. Usually the answer given is: “it is one decree,” meaning either chronologically—that it was enacted together (that is, from the outset they set the fence this way, from the fifth hour onward)—or essentially, meaning that the decree is one in nature.
2. Good question. I don’t know. Perhaps this is just conventional wording, and in truth one would also receive lashes for rebellion for the fifth hour. Especially if it is all one decree, then what he writes about leavened food in the sixth hour would refer to this entire decree, including the part that applies in the fifth hour. It would be worth checking the Frankel reference volume on this halakhah.
3. You still cannot burn it if there is no prohibition on it. True, there is a rabbinic prohibition, and perhaps Maimonides holds that this is only a recommendation and not really a full rabbinic prohibition. If that is correct, then the previous difficulty is also resolved, of course. Or perhaps, in his view, a decree upon a decree is a lighter rabbinic prohibition, for which there are no lashes for rebellion and which is not considered a prohibition regarding terumah.
4. When the reason lapses, the decree does not lapse unless it is repealed by formal vote. Especially since nowadays the clock is moved the night before, so there is room to get confused about the hours.
Discussion on Answer
3. This is not a case of setting aside a commandment because of a prohibition. Rather, there is permission to burn terumah only when some prohibition applies to it and it cannot be used. A rabbinic prohibition also puts it into that status, since in the end it is unusable.
4. Indeed, some have written that when the reason is stated, there is no need for a formal vote, but that is not agreed upon. Beyond that, it is possible that only the requirement that the repealing court be greater in wisdom and number does not apply, but repeal by formal vote is still required. But perhaps nowadays it really would be possible to repeal this decree.
3. I thought to explain that the difference is in the prohibition of deriving benefit, which applies only in the sixth hour. But still, the prohibition of benefit is rabbinic, while the prohibition against burning is Torah-level. How can one move into a Torah prohibition because of a rabbinic prohibition?
4. Why is a formal vote needed to repeal a decree in a case where the reason is spelled out explicitly in the decree?