Q&A: Divine Intervention by Means of Prior Preparation
Divine Intervention by Means of Prior Preparation
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Regarding the Rabbi's view that God does not intervene in creation because nature is deterministic:
Why can't we say that God arranges events in advance so that a certain event will occur?
Even if we accept that God created only the world in its state at the first moment, and every later state is a necessary result of the previous one, it is still possible that when God created the initial state He acted on the basis of His knowledge of what would happen in the future.
Similar to this is Esther's becoming queen, which falls under "He prepared the remedy before the blow." It could be that God knew the Jewish people would fast and wear sackcloth, and therefore in advance made sure Esther would become queen.
Answer
1. You can say that about deterministic events, but not about events involving free choice. There it is not known in advance what will be chosen.
2. Still, regarding that, one can say that He embedded options into creation: if A is chosen then X will happen, and if B is chosen then Y will happen (for example, a sick person who prays will recover, and a sick person who does not pray will not recover), and from that point on everything happens deterministically. This is Maimonides' approach regarding miracles (and its source is a midrash of the Sages).
3. But my claim is not that He cannot intervene; rather, as a matter of fact, we do not see involvement with our senses, and there is no reason to assume it. So if the prior preparation you are suggesting is the laws of nature familiar to us, then you are just restating my point. And if it is something else, I do not see any indication of it.
By the way, see Maimonides in Root 1, where he raises an objection to Baal Halakhot Gedolot, who counted Hanukkah and Purim in his enumeration: how could the Torah have commanded Hanukkah and Purim before they happened? On the face of it, this proves my point. But at first glance this seems like a strange question, since it is possible that the Torah would command that if trouble occurs and we are saved, then we must do such-and-such (for example, establish a Jewish holiday whose character depends on the salvation and is entrusted to the sages). But this is difficult in the view of Baal Halakhot Gedolot, because according to that, Hanukkah and Purim should not have been two commandments but one. In any case, apparently conclusions can be drawn from this for our issue as well. And of course the proof can be rejected.
Discussion on Answer
1. Indeed, correct. I discussed this at length in several places (see, for example, the series of columns on knowledge and free choice).
2. That is what I meant when I said that the proof from there can be rejected.
To complete the picture (on the face of it, this is not significant for any of the arguments), intervention in advance within the laws of nature does not have to be only by setting the laws of nature themselves; it could also be by setting the initial conditions (such as where every particle/wave stood after the Big Bang).
1. I am suggesting that the prior preparation is the laws of nature, but that they are influenced retroactively by free choice. For example, the flood that caused the Deluge was naturally prepared in advance because God knew that the generation of the Flood would in the future choose evil. In a universe in which the generation of the Flood would have chosen good, the flood would not have been created in advance.
I understand between the lines that according to the Rabbi this is impossible, because God does not know in advance what will be chosen. Did I understand correctly?
2. Regarding the proof from Maimonides, it seems to me that Maimonides means that the Torah was given in a way that would be understandable to the people of the generation that received it. It is not reasonable that God would give specific instructions about a Greek conquest not because it is philosophically impossible, but because it would be terribly strange.