Q&A: Disputes over the Plain Meaning and Midrashic Interpretation in the Torah
Disputes over the Plain Meaning and Midrashic Interpretation in the Torah
Question
I came up with a way to describe the history of the combative dispute over the plain meaning and midrashic interpretation in the Torah, and I do not know whether it is all obvious from the outset and what novelty it is teaching, or only obvious in retrospect, or lame in some respect, etc. Perhaps you can tell me what you think?
In the dispute over the plain meaning and midrashic interpretation in the Torah there are two wings: one wing against the Sages, and one wing against Torah from Sinai. In the wing against the Sages, the claim is that the Sages, through their extensive interpretations, falsified the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He, the giver of the Torah, whose intention plainly appears to us to be such-and-such, not as the Sages said; this is the claim of the Karaites. And to this the Sages answer that they possess traditions, and that the thoughts of the Holy One, blessed be He, were deep, arranging in His book two powers: plain meaning and midrashic interpretation. In the wing against Torah from Sinai, the claim is that the phenomenon of having two levels, plain meaning (simple) and midrashic interpretation (more complex), is natural in the case of a human Torah. In a human work, the writers in their own time did not pretend to be overly clever, nor were they capable of being clever in that way; only after the Torah spread and was accepted did beliefs begin to swirl around it and people began attributing much greater complexity to it. That is, in a human work that was accepted, it seems completely to be expected that two layers would develop, plain meaning and midrashic interpretation; whereas in a divine work, the Holy One, blessed be He, could just as well have maintained a single layer, unifying everything important in a more open way, since He did not come to mislead us. And to this, adherents of the Jewish religion answer: not at all; there is a Creator, and there is Torah, and there is Sinai, and it is in our hands to this day, and the Holy One, blessed be He, indeed could have decided anything, but in the end He decided to maintain in His book two powers, plain meaning and midrashic interpretation; certainly He had His reason, and perhaps that reason is even known to us. [And the secular claim is that if one hypothesis predicts A, and a second hypothesis predicts A or B (especially if B is preferable), and A occurred, that confirms the first hypothesis; that is, a statistical entailment.]
And in this dispute there stands the question whether the method of plain meaning is a method that stands consistently and fully on its own—that is, whether in principle it is possible to interpret the entire Torah, in every place, place by place (each place separately would be interpreted well, though contradictions might perhaps remain unresolved), without resorting to the interpretations of the Sages (even if perhaps other necessary traditions would still be needed). If the method of plain meaning is self-sustaining and does not need to feed at others' tables, then immediately the two wings above open up: the wing of those who claim that the Sages are false, and the wing of those who claim that the Torah is false.
In the past, the dispute was in the first wing, and that dispute with the Karaites was not so difficult. The disagreement itself was smaller, because they agreed on most things—namely, Creator and Torah and Sinai and the Jewish people and perhaps also necessary traditions—and only denied part of it. And the danger that others would be led astray was also not so great, because the overall Karaite position did not have a broad variety of strong arguments, nor did it possess strong means of influence. But later, the focus of the dispute shifted toward the second wing, and this dispute with the secular is indeed difficult. The disagreement itself is great, because the secular deny everything: Creator-Providence and Torah and Sinai and the Sages. And the danger that others will be led astray has grown, because the secular position in general against the Torah has several other not insignificant arguments as well, for example from biblical criticism, etc., and it also possesses strong means of influence.
If the dispute has shifted from one wing to another, then the precedent set by the great Jewish scholars, the commentators of plain meaning, who dealt with it extensively and publicized it and put it on its feet so that it appeared to be an independent and sufficient method, is no longer relevant, because today we stand in a different dispute in which the expected risk is far greater.
What do you think of this description? Is it reasonable, and is it trite? [In particular regarding the link that the existence of two layers—plain meaning and midrashic interpretation, simple and evident versus complex and hidden—puts a sword in the hand of those who argue for a human work to which complexities were attached only later; and regarding the link that despite accepted precedents from great Jewish scholars to engage in plain meaning systematically, there are strong groups within Judaism that recoil from presenting plain meaning as something present and as an independent and sufficient method, because the dispute has changed and the expected damage has changed.]
Answer
As for the Sages' answer to the Karaites, there is another option: this is not what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended, but He gave us permission to expand the Torah by means of midrashic methods. Quite apart from the question of what He intended originally (and perhaps He did not intend anything at all, and left it to us according to the circumstances).
The plain meaning does not stand on its own in the sense that there are scriptural decrees that have no explanation on the plain level. Even so, the very reading of the verse according to its plain meaning is apparently possible. And in places where the midrash or Jewish law follows or uproots the biblical text, there we have uprooted the plain meaning and not left it as an alternative alongside the midrashic interpretation.
I also do not understand why the claim that the complexities were created later is preferable. That depends only on whether you believe in the revelation at Mount Sinai, at which the Oral Torah was given, or not.
But I am not sure I understood your main argument. You are claiming that when the dispute was with the Karaites (the Sages are false), it was a relatively easy dispute. Today the dispute is with the secular (the Torah is false. But that is independent of the Sages, who are also false in their view), and it is harder because biblical commentators are of no use here. They are useful for reconciling the Sages, but they are not useful for showing that the Torah is true.
In my opinion, the commentators generally do not engage in reconciling the Sages but in reconciling the biblical text, and therefore, if anything, they are fighting (with limited success) against the secular and not against the Karaites. The war against the Karaites belongs to the commentators on the Sages. Moreover, in my opinion the renewed engagement with plain meaning in our generations is דווקא because of secular criticism, except that the tools are not those of the biblical commentators but new tools that take the new (secular) criticism into account. The problem, in my opinion, is not the expected damage, but that this interpretation simply usually does not answer the difficulties.
You certainly know my view about biblical interpretation and engaging in it, certainly classical interpretation (but also contemporary interpretation). In my view it is rather lacking in value in itself, and even in the apologetic sense I doubt its value.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, the dispute with the secular is harder, and that is obvious. The claim that the midrashic interpretation was added later depends on faith, as I wrote. Clearly, if I had no prior assumptions at all, I would not produce midrashic interpretations but would focus on the plain meaning.
No worries—the commentators do not really succeed in presenting a smooth plain meaning. But it is true that the smoother it is, the more the resort to midrashic interpretation requires grounding. See the previous section.
The distance from the secular is of course greater, and that too is obvious as an egg.
You wrote that God gave the Sages permission to interpret. But in the Torah it only says that if I have a doubt they will clarify it; it does not say that they should take the initiative. That too is an expansive, midrashic interpretation—a pair of tongs made by a pair of tongs.
This has already been discussed here several times. There is a tradition that transmitted to us the methods of midrashic interpretation, and they were apparently given so that we would use them. When there is a doubt about how to use them, there is the Great Court, as with any other doubt. Its decision is binding by the force of “do not deviate.” And if the Great Court is in doubt whether to forbid something or not, that is no different from any other doubt that you or I might have, and they are supposed to decide that too.
The dispute with the secular is harder for two reasons. First, technically, because in general the dispute with them is harder and there are many burning fronts, and secularism also has strong means of influence. Second, essentially, because their claim here is stronger. And their claim is that if there is an open plain meaning, easily understood and continuous, and alongside it there is a hidden, complex, and ramified midrashic interpretation, that fits like a glove with a process of a human Torah to which crowns are attached at a later stage. Whereas in the process of a divine Torah, first, it is not necessary at all that there be two layers, plain meaning and midrashic interpretation; there could have been one layer containing a unified presentation of the insights (and this is confirmation, in the sense of statistical entailment, of the general secular claim that the Torah is human), and second, it is burdensome that there is a hidden and complicated layer liable to lead to mistakes—so why would the Holy One, blessed be He, do that?
Commentators who engage in reconciling the biblical text—and not in the sense of turning midrash into plain meaning (such as Malbim), but in the sense of reconciling the plain meaning on its own (such as Rashbam, and Ibn Ezra as well, except that he minimized interpretations that went against Jewish law)—on the contrary, they play into the opponent's hands. For if the plain meaning is smoothly resolved everywhere and readily acceptable as it stands, that is exactly what we would expect from a human Torah that never imagined and never thought about midrashic interpretation and ideas like applying one matter to another context. [And this is really also the claim of the Karaites: since the plain meaning is complete and fitting, their approach—that only the conclusions of the plain meaning exist in the world—fits very well, because that is what it predicts the Torah should look like. Whereas according to the rabbinic approach, in which the conclusions of midrashic interpretation also emerge from the Torah, we must say that the Holy One, blessed be He, specifically decided and undertook to create a complex and hidden system and did not put everything out clearly on the table, and if so something slightly surprising happened. But in their day people were not troubled by the folly of the Karaites.]
The secular argument is stronger than that of the Karaites. Because from the Karaite view to the rabbinic view one does not make such a large leap, but only adds an appendix to tradition, and therefore the weight of a proof in accordance with them and not with the Sages is lower. By contrast, from the secular view to the rabbinic view one makes a large leap: to add the Creator, morality, Sinai, Torah, and midrashic interpretation. It seems to me that the greater the distance between the predictions of the two hypotheses (the distance between the prediction of the Karaite hypothesis—namely, Creator and Sinai and Torah—and the prediction of the rabbinic hypothesis—namely, Creator and Sinai and Torah and midrashic interpretation—is smaller than the distance between the prediction of the secular hypothesis—namely, none of the above—and the prediction of the Jewish hypothesis—namely, Creator and Sinai and Torah and midrashic interpretation), the stronger the statistical entailment. And that is apart from the technical point that secularism is more threatening than Karaism.