Good evening, Rabbi,
I first want to thank you for the response, the care, the great investment, and the fact that this is so far from self-evident. Many thanks!

I’m reconstructing the line of thought the Rabbi laid out in the meeting and trying to process it and get to its depth.

First, though, I’ll preface with something else:
There are two possibilities regarding the existence of truth in the world—that there is truth, or that there is no particular truth. The thought that there is no truth is uncomfortable for a person and makes life essentially harder, because there is no reason for life and no answer to the most basic question—“why.”
Therefore, in our inquiry we may be biased and prejudiced in favor of the conclusion that there is God and truth.

I’ll move to the Rabbi’s line of argument, and I’d be glad to clarify its starting point:

The Rabbi relies on the fact that everything that was created has a cause that preceded it, and in this way proves that someone also created the world. And that is God.
Of course, the obvious question is: and who created God? Here a failure is created, because an infinite regress is created.
In order to escape the dead end, the Rabbi assumed that He did not need to be created, but rather is the first cause that created the chain of all the other causes.
And here I’d like to linger on a point we also discussed on Thursday—it doesn’t seem very rational to assume assumptions using a certain rule, and the moment it doesn’t work out, to decide that it is “canceled” and no longer relevant from this point on. If there is a flaw in it, then from the outset we shouldn’t assume it, but should look for another way.
From here, two possibilities are before us:
1. To understand that this is beyond our ability. There—you see, reason proves to us that we have no way to understand and reach what created (or did not create) the world.
2. To try to propose another explanation, even if it is less logical, in order to arrive at some intellectual conclusion.
If we choose 2, that would not be faithful to truth, but an attempt to fit truth to what is comfortable for us—we have difficulty dealing with the fact that there is no way to reach a clear solution with our reason. If we admit that, we’ll be in trouble (because then we have no way of reaching anything in reality), so we force upon truth the desire to reach an intellectual answer and change things for its sake.
It seems that from the outset we wanted to receive a certain answer, to the point that we gave up consistent rational thinking for it.

The whole line of argument is built on logical suppositions. Isn’t it more logical to arrive at the understanding that rational inquiry clearly leads to the conclusion that it cannot help us with the big question, than to zigzag between modes of thinking and choose each time the one that suits us and will ultimately lead us to the specific theory we wanted?

Thank you very much, Rabbi, I appreciate it very much. Good evening!

Regarding your preface: the very claim that we are biased says that there is truth. If there is no truth, there is no bias, because bias is a deviation from truth. Therefore the statement that I am biased in favor of the claim that there is truth is an oxymoron.
Incidentally, I’m also not sure that all human beings are biased toward the position that there is truth. I know many who are biased in the opposite direction (it is very convenient that there is no truth and you can do whatever you want). Therefore the discussion of biases will not help us here. What we need is to try to formulate a position as honestly as we can. Constant suspicions that perhaps we are biased will not get us anywhere, not here and not anywhere else. Constructive verification that we are not biased is a positive and desirable thing. But rejecting conclusions by merely raising the concern that perhaps we are biased—that is just baseless skepticism. Incidentally, even in this itself (that we are always biased) we can be biased. In fact, not only can we be—we must be. If we are always biased, then the conclusion is that we are biased even in this very claim (why should it be exceptional?!).

You describe the exclusion of God from the assumption that everything must have a cause as an escape from a dead end. That is a description with a problematic connotation. But in fact this is what is called in logic a “proof by negation” or reductio. In mathematics, philosophy, and every other context, we use proofs by negation. A proof by negation is built on the fact that I assume a thesis X, show that it leads me to a contradiction, and conclude that apparently X is not correct.
And in our case, my claim is that an infinite regress is a flaw, and therefore necessarily the regress is finite. What this means is that at the beginning of the finite chain there is an entity that does not require a cause. This is a simple and logical proof, not an “escape” from anything. Of course, you can say that every proof by negation is an escape from contradiction or a dead end. That’s how that logic is built. But what’s wrong with it? Is it preferable or more logical to remain in contradiction? Are theorems in mathematics or science that are proven by negation not valid in your eyes?
Let me formulate it differently: your description as though this is an “escape from a dead end” smells like you are claiming that there is an act here driven by interest. But as I explained, this is a pure logical move and has nothing to do with interests. My “interest” here is not to be in contradiction. That ought to be the “interest” of every reasonable person.

As for the second part of your remarks:
1. If I have a simple way out, why assume that this is something beyond my ability? According to that, every refutation of a scientific theory should not lead me to new conclusions but to the claim that this is something beyond my ability. You are right that when I am in a dead end with absolutely no way out, then I will conclude that apparently there is something here beyond my ability. But when there is a logical way out (or a logical conclusion), then rejecting it by claiming that this is something beyond my ability is absurd. On the contrary, I showed you through a logical argument that it is within my ability. I reached a conclusion in this issue through my own ability.
2. I don’t know what a “less logical explanation” means, in your words. If it is a contradictory explanation, it is not an explanation. If it is an explanation less good than mine—then why adopt it? Forgive me, but I’ll allow myself to say that this seems a bit as if you are insisting on looking for problems where the conclusion is simple and called for. I see no problem in my conclusion. It is remarkably logical, its opposite leads to contradiction, and there is not even a shred of refutation against it. Truly perfect. So why raise against it merely skeptical doubts with no basis? After all, any claim by anyone in any field can be rejected by a skeptical argument that maybe it’s not true and maybe it’s beyond reason and maybe and maybe many other things. I don’t see what the difference is between my conclusion here and any other conclusion I reach in any other field.

You are welcome to continue writing or to meet if you find a need for it. Don’t hesitate.

Goodbye,

Hello Rabbi!
Thank you very much for the response, and forgive me for not replying. The truth is I simply didn’t understand the answer. If the principle of causality does not always hold (because in relation to God it does not hold), perhaps it also does not hold for the world itself?
If we assumed assumption x (everything has a cause) and discovered there is a flaw in it, it seems more logical to understand that it is problematic and reject the whole assumption—not to take part of it and when it doesn’t work out determine that from a certain point onward it is no longer valid.

I assume I’m repeating what I said; I simply didn’t understand the answer. In any case, I’ve started reading the Rabbi’s first book.

Many thanks!!

There is a legal principle called lex specialis (= preference for the specific). Explanation: when there are two conflicting principles, we always prefer the more narrowly defined one. For example, when there is one principle that it is forbidden to murder and a second principle that one who desecrates the Sabbath is liable to death, the second principle, which is more specific, overrides the first, and therefore Sabbath desecrators are put to death. The logic is very clear: if the broader principle (the prohibition of murder) were to prevail, then the second principle (the obligation to execute Sabbath desecrators) would be completely emptied of content. By contrast, if we prefer the specific one, then both principles remain intact, and the broader one is slightly narrowed.
The same applies in a contradiction between two philosophical principles that both seem logical to us. On the one hand there is the principle of causality, which is a simple intuition accepted by everyone. On the other hand there is infinite regress, which says that it cannot be that everything has a cause, because then we are caught in an infinite regress. That is, there is a general principle saying that everything has a cause, and a specific principle saying that necessarily there are things without a cause. The logical solution is to qualify the principle of causality and exclude from it entities that are not accessible to our experience, and regarding which it is therefore unclear that the principle of causality applies. (Incidentally, the less we exclude, the more logical it is. But that’s not important to the logic of my explanation.) This explanation preserves all our intuitions in the optimal way. The two other alternatives are far less plausible: giving up the principle of causality means giving up all of science, and that is unreasonable. Accepting infinite regress is a logical contradiction or a logical vacuum (as we discussed). Therefore this is the required, logical, and most reasonable solution.
Goodbye, and regards to your parents,

Hello Rabbi, thank you very much for the answer!
The Rabbi explained that when we are dealing with entities we have no experience of, and therefore it is unclear whether the principle of causality applies to them, we can exclude them from the principle. It’s understood that we have no experience with God, and therefore according to this we can exclude Him. But we can go one step back—what about the world? It too is an entity we have no experience of, and we do not know whether the principle of causality applies to it.
I assume my statement sounds ridiculous—what do you mean, we have no experience with the world, after all what does science do?! But all the experience we have with the world is within the world, what happens inside it; but with the world itself we have no experience. We may identify a certain regularity that operates within things that exist in the world, such as the principle of causality, but that does not necessarily indicate those same principles regarding the world itself (what is outside the world, of which the world is a part, and not what is part of the world and within it).

Likewise regarding giving up the principle of causality—this is not giving up all of science, if one starts from the assumption that the principle operates within the world as we identify it, but not necessarily outside us and with respect to the world itself.

Thank you very much!

Hello.
The world is nothing but the collection of particulars included in it. The world is you and me and the elephant Yankel and this particular tree and Dolly the sheep and this particular stone, etc. etc. There is nothing in “the world” beyond the particulars that compose it. Therefore, when you deal with the question of who created the world, that is only shorthand for the question of who created Dolly and me and you and the stone. Now think: what is the meaning of the statement that the world does not need a cause for its existence? What is “the world” here?
But even beyond that. The other side of the same coin: even if we assume that “the world” (whatever that may be) does not need a cause for its existence, there still remains the question of who created me and you and Yankel. Did the “world” create us? If this world is something in addition to all of us, then that is God whose existence we have proven (what do I care if you call it “world”?). And if it is not something in addition to the particulars, then we are back to the question of who created us, the particulars within it, and the claim that the world does not need a cause for its existence does not answer that.

Let us look from another angle. When people speak about the world as the totality of particulars (what is called pantheism), this is empty talk. It says nothing, for the reasons I described earlier (is the “world” another thing, or is there nothing beyond the particulars? And if it is another thing, then it is God and not the world). The only meaning such talk can have is that God is something, something spiritual, embedded in the world, like the soul of the world (the Talmud in Berakhot 5a compares the relation between God and the world to the relation of the soul to the body). To understand what this means, think about a soul in our body. The body is ostensibly nothing but the collection of particles that make it up. There is nothing in it beyond that collection. So what turns each of us into one unified total entity? What defines it as an organism, as distinct from a collection of particles (which also exist in a dead body)? The soul. But here the claim is that the soul is something in addition to the particles that make up the body. It is implanted in the body in such a way that now the combination “soul + all the particles of the body” creates an organism that is a unified total entity. Only this way can one understand the concept of organism. One can also conceive God this way (in relation to the world as soul in relation to body), but then my whole argument still stands. Because in the end, God is something in addition to the world, even if His connection with the world is what is called “the world” (just as “the human being” is the combination of soul and body).

Hello,

What is the problem with the claim that the world does not need a cause for its existence? Why is it more problematic than the claim that God does not need a cause for His existence?
So how were I and Yankel created? I’m no expert in the field, but science increasingly explains this—the Big Bang, evolution.
I didn’t understand the second paragraph. If one defines the world as the sum of its parts—what is the problem?

Many thanks, Rabbi, for the patience and the reply. Good night!

Hello.

I explained. The world is the collection of particulars that compose it. There is nothing else in it. So what does it mean that it does not need a cause for its existence? If every particular within it does need a cause, then what exactly is it that does not need a cause?

The argument from evolution is dealt with at length in my book (and even more extensively in my book God Plays Dice). I show there that this is not an alternative to God. If you want a shorter version, see the article here: https://mikyab.net/%d7%9b%d7%aa%d7%91%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%91%d7%98-%d7%a9%d7%99%d7%98%d7%aa%d7%99-%d7%a2%d7%9c-%d7%99%d7%97%d7%a1%d7%99-%d7%90%d7%91%d7%95%d7%9c%d7%95%d7%a6%d7%99%d7%94-%d7%95%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%94.

Thank you very much, Rabbi, for the attention, responsiveness, and patience.
1. Regarding the cosmological proof, I’d like to question its most initial assertion: how do we know that everything (that we have experience of) has a cause?
True, I know that objects being pulled downward has a cause, that the existence of a clock has a cause—but how do we know that the universe has a cause? And if we see the universe as the sum of its parts: how do we know that all the parts in it require a cause? What is the cause of the fly’s existence? (If the Rabbi answers biologically how the fly came into being, the question will then come: what was the cause of the first fly? Of the first animals? Who says they had a cause?) What is the cause of the appendix? One can say that we do not know the cause of everything, but because there are things that do have a cause, we infer that the first things also have a cause and we simply don’t know it. But one can also say that not everything has a cause, because there are things whose cause we do not know how to explain. And perhaps the universe too (or some of the parts of the universe, though let’s say the universe is the sum of all its parts) is without cause.

2. I’d like to focus more on the matter of Mount Sinai, because it seems to me the most significant, since to a large extent the whole argument rests on it.
I didn’t find much treatment in the book of the possibility that the Mount Sinai event was invented, the way we think about all other religions.
A. Granted, in our case there is a significant mass element—but why is it impossible to plant such an invented event some time after it supposedly happened? It’s possible that so-and-so many years after the supposed Mount Sinai event, one or two people invented Judaism, convinced some other people that this is what happened, and those passed the tradition on until it reached us. One can argue that they would investigate this deeply and not accept such information without basis, but we know that people very often do this when it comes to religion (according to Judaism, all other religions lack a logical basis, and still billions believe in them, when each religion began with a certain group that accepted it without basis). This is all the more true when we’re not talking about our knowledge-saturated, educated, critical era, but about the ancient world, where education did not cultivate critical thinking.
A father wouldn’t lie to his son? Then how did all religions come into being?
One can also make up the story in a more gradual way, as traditions tend to develop and change over generations: for example, there was a temple at Sinai; there were rumors of revelations to people at the temple, as in religions generally; over time one of the recipients of the revelation came to be seen by a certain population as the religious leader of its ancestors; after generations, members of that population could believe that their ancestors were present near the mountain during the revelation; after a few more generations, someone could tell them that their ancestors also received the revelation and heard God speaking, and this would sound reasonable and natural and there would be no reason to doubt it. Even in the Hebrew Bible, commandments like Passover and Sukkot were renewed over the generations.
B. Another thing: it is not necessarily true to say that the whole people accepted the Sinai tradition. If there were those who did not accept the event and testified that they neither saw nor heard such a thing, they simply assimilated and their descendants did not remain Jewish. That sounds logical. So the ones who passed on the tradition were those who believed in it, but it is certainly possible that not everyone accepted it.

3. On that same topic, I’d be glad to address in more detail other mass revelations, because they seriously undermine the occurrence of the Mount Sinai event, which we claim is credible mainly because of its mass nature.
For example, the revelation of Constantine and his army—here we have a revelation before a crowd, where the whole army also supposedly testified that it witnessed it (because of its not rising up against the rumor, just as is claimed regarding Mount Sinai that if it had been invented, the listeners would have said they weren’t there or hadn’t received such a tradition). I assume the Rabbi will answer that this does not meet all the criteria, since no binding commandments were received there—but I do not understand why that is a criterion. It is understood that a system of many commandments would be accepted less easily, but still, even if the revelation does not obligate anything—why would an entire army lie without anyone standing up and saying that none of this ever happened? It doesn’t make sense. (In addition, it is clear that the cross is a symbol connected to religion, and the conclusion should be faith in Jesus.) I’m making here, of course, the very arguments made about Mount Sinai—so what is the difference?
If we’re speaking about Christianity, Jesus performed many miracles before large crowds. The miracle of the loaves and fishes that occurred before thousands—according to the principle of mass revelation, we should also accept that as true. Jesus walking on water, the wedding at Cana where he turned water into wine at a wedding with many participants, Jesus’ resurrection, and many others. Beyond Christianity—the miracle of Muhammad splitting the moon before many. The Sioux testify that Buffalo turned into a goddess before an entire tribe, taught it religious ceremonies, and they carried them out (so here too we have a mass revelation that also obligated a certain system of laws). She also gave them a sacred pipe that they preserve to this day and pass down from generation to generation. Sounds stronger than our testimony, doesn’t it? In addition, their god “Wakan Tanka” also revealed himself to them and gave them commands. The Pomo tribe also claims a revelation before a people, with the impressive wonder of a mountain shaking and bursting into flame and a river of fire. The apparition of Our Lady of Fatima before 70,000 people—even more convincing than Mount Sinai, since there are many testimonies to the apparition of Our Lady of Fatima (and not just the single testimony of the Torah itself, when there is no external source at all testifying to the event), and this is also very close to us historically and the witnesses lived until not so long ago. All these miracles, like the Mount Sinai event, occurred before many, were passed down from generation to generation, we do not know of testimony undermining them, and some of them have advantages such as many firsthand testimonies or a preserved object.
What is the difference?
In the book I did not find a detailed discussion of this matter, beyond the generalization that they are local and were held before a small audience (which is not necessarily true, as in the examples brought), or that they do not meet criteria that I do not understand why they are necessary (other than that they happened at Mount Sinai, so of course it is convenient to define them as required criteria), even though there are revelations that also satisfy the parameters. (Of course, a revelation that also includes binding, detailed, irrational commandments unrelated to the reality in which they were given is less easy to transmit, but that does not teach that a revelation without those is not also binding to accept as true, since it was argued that one cannot refute a revelation given before a great nation because if something like that were invented, those who were not there or did not receive such a tradition from their ancestors would rise against it. In addition, the boldness to make promises that are empirically falsifiable does not seem to me to indicate truth as the Rabbi argued, especially when they are not fulfilled…)
If at least one of these stories is not true, then we have here a way to invent a mass revelation, and from that it follows that perhaps the Mount Sinai event too was invented.
If the Rabbi argues regarding some of the stories that they were some kind of illusion before the large crowd, sorcery, or hallucination—it seems one can easily say the same about Mount Sinai. It is possible that the impressive spectacle and the speaking voice were in fact effects or sorcery produced by human beings.

4. Regarding the interruption in transmission of the tradition, it seems this is the Rabbi’s very specific interpretation. Things are described pretty simply in Scripture. Anything can be interpreted and in the end taken to places that suit us. The break in Judges really does look like forgetting, according to the plain sense of the verses, and indeed it’s not fair that God is angry at them for that, but in many cases ignorance of the law does not exempt from punishment and that is not unreasonable.
Likewise regarding the finding of the book in the days of Isaiah. And the interpretation of “they did not know about the book at all” as the words “they had not heard the words of the book” is very convenient but completely changes the meaning. If we give verses interpretations far from their plain meaning, we can distort the whole Hebrew Bible.
But I will say that the description of the House of God in the preceding verses does lend support to the Rabbi’s claim.
The Torah reading in the days of Ezra—why is it unlikely that laws and traditions were forgotten? On the contrary, that seems very plausible when we look at religions and traditions, and the support from Passover as described in the book of Kings does not strengthen the point but adds to the fact that things are indeed forgotten and changed—unless we distort the plain meaning of the text, which solves every problem as I said.

5. I’ll add one small side question:
Suppose we accept the occurrence of the Mount Sinai event. The only record of it is in the Torah, and it is described there that what was received was the Ten Commandments. It is also obvious that the entire Torah could not have been given there, since it describes events that took place after the Mount Sinai event. If so, why is the binding force of the entire Torah—or what we accept—based only on accepting the occurrence of the Mount Sinai event?

Again, thank you very much, Rabbi!

These are difficult and lengthy questions that I have written about quite a bit, and it is very hard to do them justice here. So forgive me if I respond relatively briefly and refer you onward where possible. In general, I’ll repeat what I told you in our meeting. If one wants to find speculative excuses, one can explain away anything. The question is whether what the tradition says is the speculative excuse, or whether what its critics say is the speculative excuse. Therefore these specific discussions are not very fruitful. The overall picture is stronger than any one of its details, over which one can argue forever. Where there is an overall and unified picture, and there is a major argument over each of its details, the burden of proof is on the challenger. That is how it is in all fields of science (when there is a theory that explains everything in a coherent and unified way, whoever raises the possibility that maybe it is not correct in this or that detail bears the burden of proof). Take for example the critiques based on the performance of sorcery in a materialistic world (without God), which you mentioned here—that sounds to me like unserious fabrication. Especially when this is raised in order to reject the possibility of miracles or revelation. So instead there is sorcery, and that is more reasonable? Or the claim against the principle of causality. In every other field of life and science it is accepted as obvious. When there is some anomaly in it (in quantum theory), the greatest minds sit and try to explain it and clarify why there is no anomaly here after all. And the critiques here casually wave the claim that maybe things have no causes. That is not serious. If in order to be an atheist one must give up all the foundations of rational thought, such as accepting the existence of sorcery, assuming the existence of multiple strange worlds that nobody has observed, giving up the principle of causality, raising speculative possibilities about historical testimonies and interpretations of Scripture, and so on and so on, then it seems to me that faith has already won the argument. It is hard to deal with critiques that undermine rational thinking, because rationality is also the tool with which to conduct this discussion. As far as I am concerned, if rational thinking leads to faith, and opposition to it forces the opponent to give up rationality, then that is the end of the discussion.
One more general referral. There is a website called “Knowing Faith” (I was one of its initiators and was involved in it at the beginning, but later we parted ways). There are some pretty good articles there on many of the topics you raise. Some are less good and some are better, but there is a great deal of important and relevant material there. There is also an option there to ask questions and get answers. In what follows I’ll refer you there as well. Of course you are welcome to continue turning to me. This referral is for your benefit, not in order to stop your inquiries to me, of course.
Now I will respond (briefly) according to the sections in your remarks.

1. The rational assumption in every field of our lives is that everything has a cause. If you were to say about something that it happened without a cause, they would hospitalize you. When a commission of inquiry investigates what happened to some airplane that crashed, and they find nothing—what will they say? That there was a cause but they didn’t find it. This is an assumption of reason, and if it always works and is assumed in every context, there is no reason not to assume it in our case as well. David Hume already pointed out that causality is not a product of observation but an a priori assumption of reason, and as such there is no reason not to apply it here too.
As for the question of what the fly’s cause is—you answered it yourself. You yourself said it has a cause, but then you retreat again to the causes that preceded it and ask about them. But that is exactly the cosmological argument: go down the chain until you reach the first fly. The cosmological claim is that one must posit God, otherwise there is a fly without a cause (this is of course just a parable, because there is evolution).

2. I explained that it is hard to discuss the Mount Sinai event as with any historical event from ancient times. You can examine different testimonies about it, texts or traditions, or findings. About any ancient historical claim one can ask maybe it was invented. Therefore I wrote there that this fits into the philosophical framework that there is a God and that it is plausible that He would reveal Himself and tell us what He wants from us, together with the tradition that came down to us and said that this indeed happened. If everything fits together well, there is no reason to say that all this is an invention. After all, it is both a priori plausible that this would happen, and a tradition reaches us saying that it did happen. So why assume that it is an invention? All the claims you raised fit into that framework. If I were in a balanced position with respect to this question and came to it “clean,” maybe I would say the two options are equal (invention or not). But there are good arguments in favor of the matter, and therefore although theoretically it is possible that everything was invented, I have no reason to assume that. We spoke about the fact that I am looking for plausibility, not certainty. I am not saying that all the details of the event are precise, but that in principle there was an event of encounter with the Holy One, blessed be He—that sounds entirely plausible to me. I explained in the book the witness argument and the various refutations of it, and it is worth seeing there.

3. Regarding other revelations, there is a discussion about this on my site (search “other revelations”), and also see this article:
https://www.knowingfaith.co.il/%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A8-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%9B%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%A2-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99
I have a friend who examined the other stories in depth, and if this troubles you, you can speak with him. Ask, and I’ll give you his email.
Briefly I’ll say that none of the reported revelations resembles the Mount Sinai event; sometimes these are outright falsehoods (some of them deliberate, on atheist websites), and sometimes slight distortions or incorrect comparisons. But even if those revelations are fabricated, one should not necessarily infer from that regarding the Mount Sinai event, because the tradition transmitting it is far more reliable than the nonexistent “traditions” about those revelations. Of course, theoretically one can claim anything, even about the Mount Sinai event—see my remarks in section 2. Science-fiction speculations (or sorcery) can explain anything, including the force of gravity.

4. What I had to explain about interruptions in the tradition, I explained there, and in my opinion it is entirely plausible. I assume there are more articles on the “Knowing Faith” website I referred you to above. I’ll only say that this is really not some specific interpretation of mine, but the completely plain sense of the matter. One sees from the verses that there was an ancient Torah, especially when Scripture itself gives away its own “fabrications” in a straightforward description that refers to interruptions in the tradition. Someone who wants to invent does not do that.

5. I think that in our first conversation I emphasized that the Mount Sinai event is the encounter itself with the Holy One, blessed be He. Not necessarily all the details were there. But that encounter began the process of Torah and its interpretation, and if the Holy One, blessed be He, gave us a Torah that is open to interpretation, then I have no problem with people doing that. There is no doubt that a significant part of Jewish law is a later creation. So what? The basis was given in that encounter, and from that point onward this is a human creation. That claim has implications, because if it is a human creation then you and I can also participate and disagree and criticize. I fully accept that (see the third book of the trilogy). But all this is done within the framework of the giving of the Torah at Sinai and its transmission onward.