Question

Sorry that this appears in two parts 
 
Regarding Rabbi Uziel’s responsum, at the end he writes 
 
“And all this applies to testimony in monetary matters, but with witnesses for betrothal and divorce, and likewise in matters of sexual status, it is forbidden to enact such an ordinance, and even if they enacted it, their enactment is void. Since in this testimony there are many distinctions in the law, doubts, and grounds for leniency, a woman is suspected of being lenient in them, and this is exactly similar to what the Rema wrote: ‘But in a case of doubt, perhaps there is no prohibition here, etc., or where there is a prohibition that has grounds for leniency, a woman is not believed, because a woman is light-minded toward leniency’ (Yoreh De'ah 127:3). And wherever there is suspicion, an ordinance is of no use, because this would be nothing but a stumbling block and lawlessness.”
 
Is Rabbi Uziel’s reasoning at this point reasonable? Until now he crossed the threshold by relying on the claim of precision and that one can depend on women in various matters. Why, then, specifically in the laws of divorce and betrothal? After all, we do not expect men to have broad expertise in divorce and betrothal in order to serve as witnesses!
 
If so, why should we care whether women today, who are capable of being careful and precise, testify in these matters as well? Is Rabbi Uziel concerned about a slippery slope, or is this some special Torah-level issue? That does not seem plausible, because he permitted testimony about murder and other monetary matters (through the consent of the community).
 
So it is interesting why he stopped at this point.
 
What do you think?