Q&A: Firstborn of a Doubtful Priest and the Territory of Commandments
Firstborn of a Doubtful Priest and the Territory of Commandments
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I seem to remember from the third book (I don’t have the book with me right now, so I can’t verify it) that commandments have a kind of territory, such that sometimes they do not override other things even though they are a more important value. (I’m probably not phrasing this precisely, sorry.)
The Mishnah in Yevamot (99b, 100a) says that a doubtful priest is not required to sell his firstborn animal to another priest; rather, it grazes until it develops a blemish. That is understandable because the burden of proof rests on the claimant, but the Arukh LaNer asks: it comes out that he is causing consecrated offerings to be lost from the outset. He could transfer it to another after that one offers it, but instead he lets it remain until it gets a blemish. Here too, should we say simply that the scope of the commandment of the firstborn does not include financial loss? (The Arukh LaNer himself explained the Mishnah in a less straightforward way.)
Thank you very much.
Answer
That may indeed be another way to formulate it. But I think here there is no need for that. This is not a case of one person’s right against another person’s right. The simpler formulation is that the priest is not obligated to sell, and the result happens on its own, so at most this is indirect causation.
Discussion on Answer
I would not be punished if I did not save my friend who is in danger. And were it not for the verse “do not stand idly by your neighbor's blood,” there would not even be a prohibition here. And this is not a question of territory.
I assume the continuation of the sentence is: despite the fact that there is the commandment “you shall greatly guard your lives.” I don’t think this is similar, because there, as stated, it can be a personal command addressed to every individual, just as I do not need to make sure that all my neighbors eat matzah. What is different here is that in the definition of the commandment, a person brings the firstborn to the priest, so the owner is also part of the commandment.
But it’s good that you mentioned “do not stand idly by your neighbor's blood,” because that is the original question I wanted to ask. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 73a) requires the verse “do not stand idly by your neighbor's blood” in addition to the law of returning his body, in order to obligate him to hire workers. Why is the obligation of “you shall surely return” and “you may not ignore it” not enough to obligate a person to spend money on him? Is this also an example of the same principle?
Thank you very much.
Absolutely.
Glad to hear it. I have to add many thanks for your columns and for the third book, which really developed my thinking. And also for your responsiveness to everyone who asks; it is truly holy work, magnifying Torah in Israel. You provide clear answers for which it is hard to find good parallels. Thank you very much.
My pleasure.
I didn’t understand. That is exactly the question—why is he allowed to let the consequence of the exemption happen, rather than acting to fulfill the commandment? Do you mean that the obligation to offer a firstborn is not on the owner, but only on the priest to whom it is brought, and therefore he is not obligated to make sure that the sacrifice reaches him? In my humble opinion that seems less likely, because models like that exist for commandments that any person can fulfill, and so if my friend desecrates the Sabbath, I am not obligated to prevent it. But in a commandment that depends on me, where he cannot fulfill it unless I bring it to him, it does not sound reasonable that the obligation is only on him and I can ignore it.