Q&A: Definitions of Concepts in Learning
Definitions of Concepts in Learning
Question
I am studying Jewish law for rabbinic ordination (specifically right now the laws of forbidden and permitted foods), and a lot of the time I run into situations where concepts are not clearly defined.
Usually these are concepts for which there are several Talmudic passages, and the medieval authorities try to reconcile them and distinguish between cases in a very technical way, but without clearly defining the concept in a way that fits all the cases.
The current example I ran into is the topic of a “complete creature,” where it seems that Rashi and the Ran mix together the concept of a complete creature with its practical implications regarding the eating of forbidden food (so they write that a prohibition that did not come into being at the time the creeping creature / animal was created does not have the status of a complete creature).
That was a pretty long introduction, but my question is more general and conceptual:
1. Are there books for studying Jewish law that care about trying to understand the principles and not just what each authority says? (Because learning this way feels a lot like memorizing exercises for a test instead of learning the formulas.)
2. If I find a connecting principle and define the concept, does that have any significance, or did the medieval authorities (and the Amoraim themselves, etc.) not really work in a logical way and not define concepts, but rather make more technical distinctions (I’m generalizing, of course)?
3. If the answer to question 2 is that there is not necessarily a clear principle, then does my learning still have significance when in practice I have no real way to derive very much from it in practical questions (because I probably won’t be eating a live kosher bird anytime soon)?
Sorry for the length.
Thank you very much.
Answer
I think every distinction should be examined through a formulated definition. Even if the commentators do not do this, you should do it. There are sometimes distinctions that are not based on the definition of the concept. Sometimes even something that is defined as a complete creature will not be nullified not because it is not a complete creature, but because of some side reason. So note that not every distinction stems from the definition of the concept.
The point about a complete creature probably comes from the fact that the term is rooted in “to create,” and so they connect it to creation. By the way, this appears elsewhere in the Talmud as well, for example regarding the redemption of second tithe in tractate Eruvin 28b: “fruit from fruit, and produce of the ground, and offspring and offspring of the earth’s offspring.” They distinguish there between what is produced directly from the ground in creation and what merely feeds from the ground, and so on. It seems that for the Sages this was a meaningful criterion in defining different kinds of entities.
I am not familiar with Jewish law books that do this systematically.
Obviously, if you define it, that is not necessarily what was in the mind of Maimonides or Rav Ashi, but it is your conceptualization of what was going on in their work. See here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91-%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA
In general, learning is not judged by its possible applications. Learning has intrinsic value and not only instrumental value (as a means to something else). Therefore there is no difference between studying practical laws and studying theory. True, in all learning and in every field one should strive for a decision and a conclusion.