Q&A: Trust in the Sages
Trust in the Sages
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I have a question that has been bothering me for some time while learning the Talmud.
I’ll try to give an example so you can understand my difficulty.
In Nedarim 32a it says that from the verse, "And He took him outside," they derive that Abraham said to God that he had seen in the stars that he would have only one son, and God said to him: "Go out from your astrology; there is no mazal for Israel."
Now let’s imagine theoretically that we have proof that there is no mazal for anyone, not even for gentiles; that is how Maimonides understood it, for example. (That also seems right to me, that there is no such thing.)
So in that case the Talmud has derived something incorrect.
So apparently the Talmud did not receive this from Sinai, and it also doesn’t seem that there is some special mode of derivation here from the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded, but just the plain reasoning of the tanna or amora.
So my question is not דווקא in this case, but in all places where reasoning is involved, and all the more so in places that are only reasoning:
How can I rely on them that they interpreted and understood God’s word correctly?
After all, this little insight, for example, is not really even hinted at in the verse, and even if here it is only an asmachta, in other places this kind of thing appears a lot, including in halakhic rulings. (I don’t have an example right now.)
So how much can we really assess that they understood the Torah correctly, if sometimes their logic seems strange and seems like mere reasoning?
Thank you very much.
Answer
You’re pushing against an open door. First, in areas that are not Jewish law, the Sages have no authority whatsoever. If it seems otherwise to you, then disagree with them. And even in Jewish law, their authority does not mean they are necessarily right, but that they are the ones with authority. I have often defined formal authority as opposed to substantive authority. Formal authority is like that of the Knesset. One must obey not because they are always right, but because they are the authorized body. By contrast, there is no obligation to obey a doctor, but it makes sense to obey because he understands it better than I do.
Even about things that are at the core of our tradition, like providence and divine involvement in the world, I have written more than once that in my opinion the Sages were mistaken about this. Needless to mention scientific matters. Their lines of reasoning were the reasoning of people like me and you. They can err like me and you.
Discussion on Answer
I know, I know. I read these things eagerly in the books and on the site. And in my humble opinion, I think this way. I’ve been convinced.
But if so, then the question is, on the personal level, how much are we supposed to feel that we are doing what God wrote and intended in the Torah???
How much did they misunderstand the Torah???
After all, sometimes there are these strange interpretations based on reasoning that I wouldn’t pay any attention to at all if they were said by someone in our own time.
And if possible, a reference to your article on the subject of our obligation to their authority, and acceptance of the Talmud—that we do not disagree with the Talmud because that is what we accepted as a public. (So what?)
And if there isn’t one, perhaps I could ask whether you might write one.
I’ve tried several times to correspond about this and I haven’t gotten a clear understanding.
Thanks for everything.
I think part of the problem is our lack of familiarity and skill with the methods of interpretation. Another part of the oddities is the result of traditions that did not reach us. In any case, there is no need to panic. The validity of halakhot does not depend on their authenticity (that is, that this is what was transmitted at Sinai). Of course, if you have some clear information regarding God’s will, you can use it. Usually that is not the case, and then the assumption is that this is the best we have.
As for public acceptance, this is discussed at length in Beit Yishai – Derashot, sec. 15; take it from there. In general, every authority of a normative system (like a legal system, or the rules of a guild) stems from the fact that the public accepted it upon itself. Therefore I don’t think there is much more to elaborate on here. We also accepted the laws of the Torah upon ourselves.
It seems there is an error slipping from the mouth of the ruler: "Every authority of a normative system, etc., stems from the fact that the public accepted it upon itself… we also accepted the laws of the Torah upon ourselves." Presumably the Rabbi means the Sages’ interpretation of Torah law?
Not that we all stood there at Mount Sinai, together with all the souls of Israel, etc. etc., and by our own good personal will decided, "let’s go with this."
I am not a ruler (unless you accepted me upon yourself), but neither do I see any error here. In the accepted view (although in the past I once expressed doubt about this here), acceptance of the Torah is the basis of our obligation toward it. The fact that we did not stand there changes nothing. The public accepted it upon itself, and now everyone who belongs to that public is bound by it. Just as if the Knesset enacts a law, it binds the public even two hundred years later (unless they changed it), even though we were not the ones who voted for the Knesset that enacted it.
If today we decide to change the commandments of the Torah, will they change?
Where did the Rabbi express doubt about the accepted view, and what does the Rabbi argue?
Ze’ev, I did not understand your question. What does it mean to change? Are the commandments in our hands?
I don’t remember a source at the moment. I expressed doubt about whether this really is a contract that we could also have refused to accept. On the simple reading, "the mountain over them like a barrel" means that it was forced upon us, and that is also the straightforward meaning—that the Holy One, blessed be He, compels this upon us. The idea of a major legal protest is aggadah.
Ah. I understood from the context and from the comparison to Knesset laws that one could also change the acceptance today, because the obligation to observe comes from acceptance and not from the force of the divine command. At the moment I understand that this is not your view and that you did not mean that. Rather, there was a condition for the command taking effect: that they would want to accept the Torah.
the command
Regarding the question of mazal, I think the intent is whether a person can control his own fate, or whether he is only influenced by the various circumstances of his life. The Sages probably thought that Israel are in a higher state of awareness, such that they can be in the category of a choosing person who controls his fate, even if his nature and environment direct him away from the goal he aspires to. But gentiles, in their view, at least in the time of the Sages, had not reached the level of a choosing person.
Beyond that, even if you found a questionable interpretation in the realm of aggadah, it is not certain that one can infer from that to the correctness of interpretation in the realm of Jewish law. Usually the Sages’ mode of learning in the field of Jewish law is much more systematic and orderly when it comes to practical law.