Question

Dear Rabbi Michi, greetings.
 
Following your column on the relationship between Jewish law and morality, and then the column responding to Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu’s remarks about those killed in the disaster in Turkey,
 
an example came to mind of an issue in which there seems to be a gap between Jewish law and morality, and it seems that perhaps the halakhic decisors themselves may relate to the issue that way.
 
It is well known that, in the laws of the Noahides, the rule is that in principle Noahides are executed for a one-time violation of any of the commandments. If a Noahide steals, he is liable to death; if he kills, he is liable to death; if he has relations with one of the forbidden sexual partners prohibited to him, he is liable to death; and likewise if he worships idols, he is liable to death. And yet those same halakhic decisors themselves, who decree death upon every Noahide for even a one-time minor offense, call for practical conduct to be different, and not only because of peaceful relations. I’ll give a few examples that occurred to me:
 
A. Maimonides is very strict regarding the laws of the Noahides, and rules that for any of the transgressions committed intentionally he is liable. And it makes no difference whether he knew the prohibition involved in the offense or not, but only whether he intended to commit that specific act or not. For example, if he had relations with another man’s wife but thought she was his own wife, or if he killed a person accidentally. But if he did not know the prohibition, he is still executed.
A.B. On the other hand, Maimonides rules in the Laws of Kings and Wars that one does not wage war against any person in the world, or against any city, until first calling for peace. And if the residents of the kingdom or city make peace with the rule of Israel, they are accepted as proper Noahides.
Seemingly there is a contradiction here. After all, according to the first clause, a Noahide is executed even for less than the value of a perutah, and a city or kingdom that is not made up of resident aliens or pious among the nations of the world, but mostly of idolaters—and in which it is known that each person has violated at least one of the seven Noahide commandments at least once in his life—if so, why are they not killed?
Is this a classic case of a compromise between theoretical Jewish law, which expresses the fundamental legal principle, and practical Jewish law, which expresses what should be done in order to achieve, for example, the repair of the world? (True, both of these are in principle mostly theoretical laws, but it seems that one of them expresses the written theoretical ideal, while the second expresses the theoretical ideal according to which one should actually act.) And so too regarding the rule that one neither raises them out nor lowers them in. Maimonides rules that it is forbidden to heal an idolatrous gentile or save him from death, but on the other hand it is forbidden to kill him. This despite the fact that it is known he violates the seven Noahide commandments. (Of course, again, both of these laws are theoretical, since today even idolaters would be saved from death; but I mean the distinction I already asked about in the previous clause.)
2. Likewise, in the Sefer HaChinukh I remembered and found an amazing gap. On the one hand, he too is very strict regarding the laws of the Noahides. As I understand it, “Noahide” is a term for a person who lives with or near the people of Israel and violates the seven commandments. The Sefer HaChinukh says that in principle, aside from a woman, any Noahide or any Jew is permitted to judge a Noahide to death, and that in principle they are liable to death for any of these offenses.
But in his commentary on the commandment of loving the convert, he writes that even though in practical Jewish law it applies only to righteous converts, it is fitting to extend that trait to any person living beside us who has nowhere else to go. And here too there is a contradiction between the halakhic ideal, which would apparently obligate such a person to death (for in the period of the Sefer HaChinukh, presumably any such foreigner would also generally be pictured as an idolater who violates one of the seven commandments), and the moral ideal, which says that in practice one should treat him with compassion. And although this is not an explicit contradiction (because it could be that this is a principled trait practiced so long as we see that he is not actually violating the seven Noahide commandments), I certainly find a principled contradiction here.
C. And likewise regarding Amalek and the law of accepting converts. There is a dispute whether it is permitted to accept an Amalekite convert as a resident alien or a righteous convert, such that his death liability would thereby lapse. And I ask: why is it not obvious that one should not accept him, on the grounds that a Noahide is executed for less than the value of a perutah? And if we are dealing with an Amalekite, all the more so. Yet on the other hand, according to most halakhic decisors, there is reconciliation with Amalek if he accepts upon himself the status of resident alien or righteous convert, and he is not then killed. (And if this is so with Amalek, then certainly with the case of an Ammonite or Egyptian convert there is a gap between these two directives.)
I am not entering here into the question of the Jewish people’s attitude toward other nations. I am only asking whether this is something that can be brought as an example of what you presented as the gap between Jewish law (the theoretical, religious, written law) and morality (not behaving that way in practice for reasons such as improving a person through accepting the commandments, or sanctifying God’s name, or preventing increased hostility between Israel and the nations).
 
Thank you