You write the opposite here
https://www.dropbox.com/s/w8hk4lqumzdp9ae/%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%94%20%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%94%201.pdf.png?dl=0

Tosafot on Ketubot doesn’t ask that. He raises a difficulty on the Talmud just as I described here. See the above-mentioned column.

Okay, I’ll take a look.

In the article “Good Measure” on Exodus, you point to two different conceptions of a common denominator:
is the derivation from the two source cases together, or from one of them while the second merely removes the refutation?

Which side do you lean toward? (I lean toward the first.)
Does the model you developed in the first book of Talmudic Logic fit both approaches?

That’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (the Rosh and the authorities on Bava Kamma 6a). But it seems to me that in some places it works this way, and in others that way.

A. You explain that the refutation of “a more stringent aspect” comes up when the aspects are halakhic properties and not factual properties (= microscopic parameters).
But in Sotah 29b they raise the refutation of “a more stringent aspect” by saying that a person who immersed that day can belong to a category whose kind includes a primary source of impurity, and an earthenware vessel can impart impurity through its airspace — and therefore you can’t derive from them that a second-degree impurity imparts impurity to terumah.

Now, “its kind includes a primary source of impurity” is a factual property, and nevertheless they raise the refutation of “a more stringent aspect”?

B. In Ketubot 32a they try to derive from one who injures his fellow that just as he is liable both for monetary payment and lashes, and nevertheless when monetary liability applies he pays and is not lashed, so too in any case where he is liable for both money and lashes, the rule is that he pays and is not lashed.
Is the property “being liable for monetary payment and lashes” a factual property or a halakhic one? Is that a microscopic parameter or just another column in the inference table?

A. What?? “Its kind includes a primary source of impurity” is a halakhic property, not a factual one.
B. Halakhic, obviously. I don’t understand the question. We’re talking about laws that apply to it. Factual properties are properties that come from sensory observation.

The fact that a person is a primary source of primary impurity is a halakhic law??? It seems to me that it’s a fact. A fact that the Torah taught us. “You can’t see it, but he is a primary source of primary impurity.”
A halakhic law is a norm. But being a primary source of impurity is not a norm but a fact, from which norms follow (for example, a priest may not touch him, etc.).

B. In the inference there, what we infer is that if he is liable for monetary payment and lashes, then only payment is imposed on him. In other words, one entails the other, the way a factual property entails a halakhic property…

That’s not like in Kiddushin, where from the fact that money effects betrothal but not marriage, we argue from that halakhic rule that there is some fact behind it because of which canopy would effect betrothal.

In Ketubot, the property “liable for monetary payment and lashes” entails “only payment is imposed on him,” whereas in Kiddushin the property “effects betrothal but not marriage” is not what itself entails the rule that canopy effects betrothal.

So I see a difference between “liable for monetary payment and lashes” and “effects betrothal but not marriage.” The second is indeed a halakhic property, but the first apparently isn’t.

A person being a primary source of primary impurity is a halakhic determination, not a fact. Some speculate that underlying it is a factual claim (impurity as a metaphysical reality), but the argument is not built on that. And even if there is such a fact there, it is an ethical fact (see Column 456 and elsewhere), regarding which there is no naturalistic fallacy. That is, de facto it is a norm, not a fact.
B. Every inference from a halakhic property is like that. This is clearly a norm, not a fact. “He receives lashes and pays” is a halakhic instruction, not a property of an act or object. I really don’t understand this discussion. It’s completely straightforward.

I don’t know if you remember, but is the answer you gave in Good Measure, Part 1, p. 182, to the question “How can it be that one refutes by means of a more stringent aspect?” identical to the answer that appears in Column 346?
As I understood it, it isn’t identical, so did you change your mind about this? Or did I not understand the answer in the book there?

The halakhic decisors rule in Makkot 4b in accordance with the Rabbis, that one is not lashed for a prohibition that involves no action.
If so, it seems that this refutation (the refutation of “a more stringent aspect”) is accepted.

But in Column 346 (note 6) you write that as a matter of Jewish law we follow Rabbi Yehuda, that one does not refute with “a more stringent aspect,” and the explanation behind this is that if the halakhic properties are different, then the burden of proof that both share a common factual property falls on the one making the refutation.

Isn’t there a contradiction here?

Above you wrote: “B. Every inference from a halakhic property is like that. This is clearly a norm, not a fact. ‘He receives lashes and pays’ is a halakhic instruction, not a property of an act or object. I really don’t understand this discussion. It’s completely straightforward.”

Let me phrase this more clearly and then you’ll understand my question and request:
I wasn’t talking about “he receives lashes and pays,” as you wrote, but about “liable for monetary payment and lashes.” What do I mean?
After all, you already wrote elsewhere that underlying a halakhic norm there is a microscopic parameter, which is what causes the halakhic norm. For example, there is something about money that causes it to effect betrothal.
So when there is an inference, we construct a table with actions and results, and the results come from the actions because of the microscopic parameter involved. The parameter does not appear in the table! It underlies the table, because it is what causes the action to bring about the result.
If so, in the case of Ketubot 32a there is some problem. After all, what causes the person to “receive lashes and pay” is the fact that he is “liable for monetary payment and lashes.” In other words, in the table should we write as a result the fact that conspiring witnesses are “liable for monetary payment and lashes,” and then add another column that says “he receives lashes and pays”? Apparently that is difficult, because the very fact that he is liable for monetary payment and lashes is itself the reason that he receives lashes and pays.

Likewise in Makkot 4b, being “a prohibition that involves no action” causes the rule that “one is not lashed for it,” so is that a halakhic property or a factual one? Should one write in another column “a prohibition that involves no action”?

Whereas in Kiddushin 5a, the fact that intercourse effects marriage is not itself what causes it to effect betrothal. Therefore one can build a table with two columns (betrothal and marriage), and then infer: “From the fact that intercourse effects both marriage and betrothal, and canopy also effects marriage, presumably it should also effect betrothal.”

As we discussed, the halakhic decisors were not careful to maintain consistency on the level of the form of exposition. Maimonides rules in some passages like Rabbi Akiva and in others like Rabbi Ishmael with respect to the form of exposition (amplification and limitation, or general and particular). It may be that the same is true here as well. I explained in the past that perhaps this is the result of later approaches that mixed together the earlier approaches.

“Liable for monetary payment and lashes” is the context under discussion. The discussion is about what the law is when there is both monetary liability and liability to lashes. So this is not a property, neither factual nor halakhic (even though the determination itself is of course halakhic). The question is: when there is double liability, which of them do we implement? Exactly like in the primary categories of damages, the fact that the pit caused damage is not a feature in the logical analysis but the framework of the discussion. The discussion deals with damage caused by a pit.
“A prohibition that involves no action” is the framework of the law and not a property (but here the determination is factual. The fact that it involves no action is a fact, not a determination of Jewish law. Jewish law tells you whether one is lashed for such an offense or not).