Torah Study, Lesson 2

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This has nothing at all to do with our three blessings. On the Torah-level, what’s required is to offer some kind of praise for the giving of the Torah. The Sages instituted the wording of the three blessings we know today. But none of the three can be defined as the Torah-level commandment itself. The Torah-level commandment is to say some sort of praise, and then the Sages came and said: say it this way, in these three blessings. It’s somewhat like the commandment of prayer, where according to Maimonides, on the Torah-level the commandment of prayer is just to pray sometime, something, once a day, and then the Sages came and established three prayers a day with set times, with wording, with exactly what is said. So that same structure, according to the Sefer HaChinukh, exists here too. It’s just that the Sages fixed the wording of the blessing and instituted two or three blessings, depending on the opinion, as brought in the Shulchan Arukh, section 47, and in the Beit Yosef, in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). As for Maimonides’ view, that it is only rabbinic, see the later authorities (Acharonim) who discuss this at length. I’m not sure, by the way, that he’s right about Maimonides’ view, but that’s what he claims. And this commandment is not obligatory; rather, only if one wants to study is there a positive commandment upon him to bless, as a conditional commandment. If you want to study, then you have to bless, but if you’re not studying, then you don’t have to bless. And see in the Shulchan Arukh: one who merely thinks the words does not need to bless, but one who writes does need to bless; see there in the later authorities. And it is explained there in the Shulchan Arukh that women are obligated to bless. That’s what I mentioned earlier. If so, the same law would apply to slaves. Slaves and women are compared. But in any case this matter requires analysis, since they are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, so why are they obligated? Okay?

Now this is a little strange, because he himself explains above that on the Torah-level one has to give some kind of praise to the Holy One, blessed be He, for the Torah, and he himself says this is not a blessing over a commandment, it’s praise. So what’s the question as to why women are obligated? He somehow takes it for granted that this is a blessing over commandments, as most of the later authorities assume. As for the medieval authorities, I’m less sure. If you read their language carefully, there are quite a few of them that I don’t think it’s correct to classify as blessing-over-commandment. In any case, that’s the question he asks: how can this be? Even though they need to study the laws, see there, still they are not obligated under the commandment of Torah study, only so that they know their laws. You see? That sentence is exactly what I said earlier, right? They don’t need to study Torah; they need to study in order to know what to observe. That is not the commandment of Torah study; it’s only to know what to do. So that’s why he says he basically doesn’t accept what the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah say—before the Mishnah Berurah, but he was after the Magen Avraham, so he already knew this answer of the later authorities—and he’s not willing to accept it. Because he says: that’s not Torah study.

After all, whichever way you look at it, your difficulty was based on the idea that the Torah blessing is a blessing over commandments, and that’s why you ask why women bless, since they aren’t obligated in Torah study. Fine, but if this is a blessing over commandments, then what’s the answer? If it were a blessing of praise, no problem. Then you say women also offer praise for the Torah, even though they aren’t obligated in fulfilling the commandment. But if you remain with the notion that this is a blessing over commandments, then what’s the answer? The answer is that they need to study their laws—but studying their laws is not the commandment of Torah study. So what exactly did you answer?

So he says: it can be like Grace after Meals, where there is no commandment to eat, but the Torah commanded that if one eats, one should bless, and that is a positive commandment. So too, the Torah wrote that one who studies, even though he is not obligated, has a positive commandment to bless. What’s written here? One could have said that this is a blessing over commandments for a non-obligatory positive commandment. Because in blessing over commandments we say, “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to engage in something” or “to do such-and-such.” But a non-obligatory commandment—He didn’t exactly command us. If you want, do it; if you don’t want, don’t do it; you’re not obligated. So apparently there’s a novelty here in the Sefer HaChinukh, that even over a non-obligatory commandment one blesses. I don’t think that’s his intention. Because he doesn’t want to claim that the commandment of Torah study is a non-obligatory commandment. He wants to say that the Torah blessing is a non-obligatory commandment. He says: just as eating is a commandment… no… if you eat, you have to say Grace after Meals. The same thing here: Torah study, for women, is not a commandment—it isn’t a commandment—but if you study, you have to bless. But not “and commanded us.” What? But not “and commanded us.” Right.

Again, the question is what here is Torah-level and what is rabbinic, and that needs discussion. It may be that the whole “and commanded us” is entirely rabbinic, and it refers to the commandment of Torah study, and maybe according to his view it really would not apply to women. But the Torah-level obligation—which is to give some kind of praise to the Holy One, blessed be He, as he defined above—what’s the problem with that? They tell you that if you study, then you need to give some kind of praise and thanks to the Holy One, blessed be He, just as if you eat, you have to give praise and thanks to the Holy One, blessed be He, in Grace after Meals. And then it’s also clear why this appears within the framework of the commandment of Grace after Meals in the Sefer HaChinukh, because it’s the same thing: here you thank Him for food, there you thank Him for Torah.

By the way, in the Talmud in Berakhot, which is the source for this whole discussion, the Gemara there tries to derive the blessing before Torah study from Grace after Meals after eating, and the blessing after Torah study from the blessing before meals. That is, it makes a kal va-chomer argument: just as Grace after Meals, which has no blessing before it, has one after it—on the Torah level, as the Gemara says—then if Grace after Meals requires no Torah-level blessing before but does require one after, Torah blessing, which does require one before on the Torah level, then certainly should require one after! Now if Grace after Meals and Torah blessing were two completely different things, why make a kal va-chomer between them? In the Gemara itself you see that the same underlying idea is at work. And that’s why I say that these later authorities who define this as a blessing over commandments—in my view that is really not the straightforward meaning of the Gemara, nor of a large portion of the medieval authorities. Rather, it’s some sort of praise to the Holy One, blessed be He: here praise for the food, or thanks for the food; and here praise or thanks for the Torah. That’s all. Otherwise it’s the same thing. So that’s why it can appear as a subsection, as the Sefer HaChinukh presents it, under this commandment of Grace after Meals; and that also makes it clear why this is not an additional commandment, but rather a detail within the commandment of Grace after Meals.

In any event, the wording “Who sanctified us… to engage in words of Torah”—that’s difficult, of course. The wording “and commanded us to engage in words of Torah” requires analysis. Again, he doesn’t want to make this distinction between the rabbinic and the Torah-level. He doesn’t want to see the rabbinic layer as a change of direction, as though the rabbis added a dimension of blessing-over-commandment that is not Torah-level, and maybe women really wouldn’t be obligated in that. However, from the Shulchan Arukh it sounds like they are. The Shulchan Arukh doesn’t distinguish; it says women are obligated in the Torah blessing. It doesn’t say in which of the Torah blessings; it sounds like in all of them. But one could say that “Who chose us” is praise, and there they are obligated, like Grace after Meals; but “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us” they do not bless. It’s possible, though the Shulchan Arukh did not distinguish.

Okay. In any case, for our purposes, his position seems to me in the end to be that this is not a blessing over commandments. Even though at first that’s what he assumed—that it is a blessing over commandments—in the end he seems to reach the conclusion that it is not a blessing over commandments, because otherwise you can’t understand why women need to bless. And again I return to what I said earlier: even though they need to study the laws that pertain to them, studying the laws that pertain to them is not the commandment of Torah study. Yet according to those who hold that they are permitted to bless over all commandments even though they are not obligated in them—here he suddenly goes back again to some kind of blessing-over-commandment conception. He hangs it on the dispute among the medieval authorities as to whether women may bless when they perform commandments in which they are not obligated—time-bound positive commandments. Right? What does that have to do with anything? If here this is not a blessing over commandments, then what difference does it make whether they are obligated or not obligated? They are giving praise like everyone else; they are giving praise for the Torah. So once again there seems to be in him some conception of blessing over commandments. Right? Fine, it’s not completely clear where his words are leading.

In any case: blessing of praise, and positive commandment—look: blessing over commandments, blessing of praise—every line here he changes direction. Even though they are not obligated in Torah study, like Grace after Meals, and according to this women and slaves can discharge men’s obligation, because they are obligated on the Torah level. Indeed, there was already discussion of whether they discharge others—what is this? I’m missing something here, I don’t remember. In any case, those are roughly the points. It’s not entirely clear to me whether in the end he is talking about blessing over commandments, because he seems to be talking about praise, and yet he makes it depend on the dispute whether women bless over commandments that do not apply to them. Maybe he thinks that when women bless over commandments that do not apply to them, the blessing they recite is a blessing of praise, not a blessing over the commandment. Because regarding the commandment they are not obligated, but praise for the fact that the Jewish people received this commandment can still be given. That may be a possible explanation of his wording; I don’t know. There’s something very ambiguous here.

In any case, that was just the seam. Now I want to move to the definition of what I mentioned earlier: the commandment of Torah study, and Torah study in general. I’ll return at the end to women again. Because for me women are not a bad indicator for trying to understand what Torah study is, what the commandment of Torah study is, and so on.

“And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav”—I’m reading from the Talmud in Nedarim 8a—“From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it says: ‘I have sworn, and I will uphold it, to keep Your righteous ordinances.’” Right? So one swears to fulfill a commandment. Usually an oath concerning a commandment does not take effect, because an oath cannot take effect on top of an oath. We are already standing under oath from Sinai to fulfill the commandments. So if I swear to put on tefillin tomorrow morning, that has no meaning at all; I am already under oath, and an oath does not take effect on top of an oath. Fine? But if I swear to fulfill a commandment—if I swear that tomorrow morning I will put on tefillin—then yes, it does take effect. Why? Because it says, “I have sworn, and I will uphold it, to keep Your righteous ordinances.” This is what is called, by the way, in the language of the Gemara, vows of encouragement. There it’s called vows even though it’s really an oath, but they call it vows of encouragement. Why? Because a person is spurring himself on.

The Gemara asks: but he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai! So how can the oath take effect? Rather, this teaches us that it is permitted for a person to spur himself on. A person may swear in order to motivate himself further to fulfill that commandment. You may ask: what kind of motivation is that? There is already a commandment to do it even without swearing, so now because he swore there’s another commandment to do it. Fine. Why that is more motivating, I don’t know, but human psychology is that if people swear, they feel more obligated than when it’s merely in the Torah. Why would you need to swear to fulfill the Torah if it already contains so many commandments that the Holy One, blessed be He, has commanded us? If we’re not obligated in commandments, then what would swearing help—this oath too we won’t keep. If we’re not obligated in commandments, you could ask that question even about the Sinai oath in general. But in any case, there is some human psychology that if I swear, it spurs me on, so it is permitted to do so, and that is learned from a verse.

And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav, another statement from that same fellow: one who says, “I will arise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate,” has vowed a great vow to the God of Israel. Again, he is really swearing; this is an oath, yes, not a vow. A vow is on objects; an oath is on a person’s actions. An oath is on the person. So if someone says, “I will arise early and study this chapter”—tomorrow morning I’ll study the chapter, say, “How do we recite blessings,” in tractate Berakhot—then it says, “He has vowed a great vow to the God of Israel,” though in fact this is an oath. At least most of the medieval authorities think this is an oath, not a vow. So the oath takes effect. And again, of course, the same question: where are we? Is he not already sworn and standing? An oath cannot take effect on top of an oath. Again, he is already sworn and standing from Sinai, so why does this oath take effect? I am already under oath regarding the commandment of Torah study; in any event I already have to study. So why does this oath take effect?

So the Gemara says: what is this teaching us? That it is merely encouragement? Do you want to say this comes to teach us about vows of encouragement? The Gemara says: that is the earlier statement of Rav Giddel. We already learned that from the previous statement of Rav Giddel. Why do we need another statement here to teach the same thing? The Gemara answers: this is what it teaches us. Since if he wanted, he could exempt himself with the recitation of Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him. What’s written here? Since if he wanted, he could exempt himself with Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him. He fulfills his obligation with Shema alone. Right? There is no commandment to study any particular chapter. Shema morning and evening fulfills one’s obligation of Torah study. Therefore, if tomorrow you want to study the chapter “How do we recite blessings” and you swear that you’ll do it, you are not swearing about something that is already a commandment; you are not already sworn and standing from Sinai. You are sworn and standing from Sinai for Shema morning and evening, or if you like, one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening—not necessarily even Shema, according to most views, but Shema is actually, as we’ll soon see, the Gemara that is the source for this says that even Shema—which you are saying anyway as part of Shema—even that is enough to fulfill the commandment of Torah study. So since that is so, when you swear to study an additional chapter, you are not swearing about something you are already sworn to, and therefore the oath takes effect.

All right, let’s continue. So what does this Gemara mean? The Rosh there writes quite simply—the Rosh writes there straightforwardly—that in fact we are not obligated to study Torah beyond Shema morning and evening. That is what is written in the Gemara. There is no commandment of Torah study beyond Shema morning and evening. There is room now to discuss: maybe this is a non-obligatory commandment, such that if you studied, you fulfilled a commandment; you just aren’t obligated. There are commandments that have some minimal threshold, like charity. There is a minimal threshold—“one should not give less than a third of a shekel a year,” says Maimonides—and that is the minimum threshold. Beyond that, if you give charity, that is also a commandment, but you are not obligated; it is what is called a non-obligatory commandment. So here too, maybe one could say that this is the minimum threshold. But then the question is: if I swear to fulfill a non-obligatory commandment, does that count as an effective oath? In such a case, do we not say that an oath cannot take effect on top of an oath? That depends on different views; not important right now. The plain wording of the Rosh seems somehow to indicate that there is no obligation. I would even say maybe no non-obligatory commandment either, I don’t know; it’s not completely clear. But obligation, certainly not. Shema morning and evening is perfectly sufficient.

By contrast, the Ran—look at the next source—the Ran says this: “This is what it teaches us: since if he wanted, he could exempt himself…” It seems to me that this is not exact, that he really exempts himself with this. It cannot be that he exempts himself with Shema morning and evening from the commandment of Torah study. Why? Because every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability. And we say in the first chapter of Kiddushin: “Our Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall repeat them’—the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if a person asks you something, you should not stammer and say…” And Shema morning and evening is not enough for that. If you have to master Torah to the point that when someone asks you, you can answer immediately—by reciting Shema every morning and every evening with devotion, you won’t get very far. You won’t know anything of Torah. You may fulfill the commandment of Torah study, but you won’t actually know anything; and there is a commandment to know it well enough that if someone asks you, you can answer immediately.

So the Ran says it cannot be that just Shema morning and evening exhausts the obligation of Torah study, that one can exempt himself with the commandment by Shema morning and evening and not need to study more than that. Rather, from here I see proof for what I wrote in the chapter “Two Oaths” later, there in tractate Shevuot: that anything derived by exposition, even though it is from the Torah, since it is not explicitly stated in the verse, an oath does take effect on it. And here this is what we mean: since if he wanted, he could exempt himself from what is explicitly written in the verse—namely, “when you lie down and when you rise,” with Shema morning and evening—therefore the oath takes effect fully upon him, even for bringing an offering. And that is why it says “a great vow,” meaning for all its legal implications like a voluntary matter, and I have already written this there with conclusive proofs.

The Ran has a major novelty here. He wants to claim that there is a difference between commandments written in the Torah and commandments derived by exposition, even though those too are from the Torah. Maimonides, in the second root, says that commandments derived by exposition have the status of rabbinic matters, not Torah-level. There are debates about the interpretation of Maimonides; I think he means it literally, but never mind, he calls it “the words of the Sages.” The Ran here explicitly says not so. He says: even something that comes from exposition, although it is Torah-level—he does not think like Maimonides that it is not Torah-level—even though it is Torah-level, still there is a difference: an oath takes effect on it. An oath does not take effect on something explicitly written in the Torah, because I am already sworn and standing from Sinai. But an oath does take effect on something derived by exposition, even though it too is Torah-level. Why is that? This Ran really raises a very interesting question.

The simple understanding in the Gemara—which almost none of the medieval authorities understand this way, but still the simple understanding in the Gemara is this: why can’t one swear concerning a commandment? Because he is already sworn and standing from Sinai. And that is really a subsection of the law that an oath cannot take effect on top of an oath. In fact, one can’t swear only on an oath; on commandments one can swear. Except that I am simply already sworn to fulfill all the commandments, so when I swear to fulfill a commandment, that is really an oath trying to take effect on another oath, and that’s the problem. The problem is not an oath taking effect on a commandment, but an oath taking effect on another oath. It’s just that I am sworn concerning all the commandments, so any oath about a commandment is automatically an oath on top of an oath. That’s what we saw in the Gemara itself; it says so. “And an oath cannot take effect on top of an oath”—that is what the Gemara asks above. That is the plain sense of the Gemara.

Now most of the medieval authorities understand differently: “an oath does not take effect on an oath” is just a phrase. “You are already sworn and standing from Sinai” means that you cannot swear to fulfill a commandment or not to fulfill a commandment. You are already sworn concerning it. In other words, the problem is an oath about a commandment, not an oath about an oath. Because the Holy One, blessed be He, already obligated you. You can’t swear either not to obligate yourself or, of course, not to do it—both directions—because you are already obligated. So basically the fundamental principle is that an oath cannot take effect on a commandment, not that an oath cannot take effect on an oath. Fine?

And the Ran wants to distinguish between commandments written in the Torah and commandments derived by exposition. What is the difference between them? I think the plain meaning is simply that commandments written in the Torah are those concerning which we were sworn at Sinai, and therefore an oath cannot take effect on them, and an oath cannot take effect on another oath. Commandments that come out of exposition obligate us on the Torah level, but they are not included in the Sinai oath. The Sinai oath speaks about the Torah that we received from the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai. What is the Torah we received from the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai? What is written in the Torah and its straightforward explanation, like what is written in the Torah and its interpretation. Exposition is not interpretation; exposition is expansion. And expositions are things that are renewed over the generations. Therefore, we were not sworn at Sinai on that. According to the Ran, that does not prevent it from being Torah-level. Maimonides takes this one step further, and therefore it really is “the words of the Sages” and not Torah-level. But the Ran explicitly says it is Torah-level, and still an oath takes effect on it. Why? Because in his view, the fundamental problem with an oath on a commandment is really the problem of an oath on another oath, not an oath on a commandment; and the Sinai oath was not on things learned from expositions.

According to the other medieval authorities, where the problem is simply swearing about something I am commanded in, I am commanded also in things derived by exposition. So what difference does it make? An oath should not take effect there either. The Ran wants to claim that an oath cannot take effect on an oath—that’s the point—and the fact that an oath does not take effect on a commandment is simply because we are sworn concerning it, that’s all. But that is a subsection of the issue that an oath cannot take effect on another oath. So if now I am dealing with something concerning which I am not sworn—even though it is Torah law and I am obligated in it—but I did not swear concerning it at Sinai, then it does not have the category of an oath, and therefore if I swear concerning it there is no problem that the oath should take effect, because it is not an oath taking effect on another oath. That is the Ran’s novelty.

But for our purposes, that is just a parenthetical remark, because for our purposes the Ran basically joins, in a certain sense, the Rosh. He does not say as radically as the Rosh that Shema morning and evening is the commandment of Torah study, period, and beyond that one is not obligated. He claims that whatever one is obligated in beyond that comes only by exposition. The commandment of Torah study that is written in the Torah—“and you shall meditate on it day and night”—is Shema morning and evening, period. That’s it. The study beyond that—what goes beyond that—is the exposition of “and you shall repeat them,” that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so the Sages expound that you need to master Torah, and therefore you need to study Torah. But all of that is exposition. The commandment of Torah study itself is Shema morning and evening. Is the rest not Torah-level? The rest is Torah-level according to the Ran; according to Maimonides, if he emphasizes that it is exposition, then not. But the Ran says that even though it is Torah-level, the oath takes effect on it because it comes from exposition. So that means that when the verse says what the commandment is—what commandment are we counting? The commandment is “and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Fine? And “and you shall meditate on it day and night” means Shema morning and evening, and with that he exempts himself from this commandment. That is the commandment of Torah study. There is another law, to know Torah—that is not the commandment of Torah study. “And you shall repeat them, that they should be sharp in your mouth”—that is a law from exposition. And one can swear concerning that law because it is not explicitly written in the Torah—or it is Torah-level, but not written in the Torah; it comes from exposition. Fine?

So basically the conception still is: even though he says there is a Torah-level obligation to study the entire Torah, not just Shema morning and evening, still the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening. That’s all. And then the question is: really? Is “and you shall meditate on it day and night” the commandment of Torah study, meaning Shema morning and evening? Maybe it’s not a commandment to read in Torah but to be engaged in Torah study, to occupy oneself with it. Okay, and therefore? And therefore it’s not… there’s no blessing, no hint that this is… well, it adds to the difficulty. Yes, right, it’s very strange. What does the concept of neglect of Torah mean? What is neglect of Torah? There is no neglect of Torah. Neglect of Torah assumes that I really need to be engaged in Torah all the time, and if I am not engaged in Torah without justification—it doesn’t matter, there are many views as to when that is—but when I’m not, then neglect of Torah, when it’s unjustified, is the sin of neglect of Torah. It stands at the head of them all; for that a person is judged first and foremost in the heavenly court—on neglect of Torah. But according to these conceptions there is no neglect of Torah, no such thing. There is no obligation at all to study Torah; there is only Shema morning and evening. Someone who didn’t recite Shema in the morning—that is neglect of Torah. Someone who didn’t recite Shema in the morning didn’t fulfill the commandment of Shema. So what do all these concepts of neglect of Torah mean? You can say that neglect of Torah is perhaps what the Ran writes—that it comes from expository teachings: that the words of Torah should be sharp. And then according to the Rosh, what is the definition? According to the Rosh, after all, everything beyond Shema morning and evening is a non-obligatory commandment. So if it’s a non-obligatory commandment, then if you didn’t do it, nothing happened. That’s the definition of a non-obligatory commandment: if you did it, there’s a commandment; if you didn’t do it, okay, so you didn’t do it. But neglect of Torah means that if you didn’t do it, that’s a problem. So how does that fit with what the Rosh says?

So let’s try to see this from the Gemara, which is really the source of some of these discussions. This is a Gemara in Menachot. And the Gemara says as follows. Look how beautifully this sugya revolves around this point, even though if you read it in the usual way you won’t think it’s dealing with this. But in my opinion, the whole thing is dealing with exactly the point I’m talking about now.

Rav Ami said: from the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment, “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” This is basically the source of what we saw. Fine? That Shema morning and evening exempts him. Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—we’ve heard this many times, I don’t know why; Rabbi Yohanan, an Amora, says a statement in the name of the Tanna Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, but he wasn’t his student. From where do we learn that “it shall not depart” is a commandment at all? It’s from Joshua? Yes, that will appear later in the Gemara; the Gemara says there that it is just a blessing, not even a commandment. That’s in a moment.

So Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: even if a person recited only Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart.” What does he add to the previous statement? Shema? That’s one difference maybe—I hadn’t even noticed that difference. But there’s another, much more striking difference. The first statement of Rav Ami says: one chapter. Not specifically Shema, any chapter. Right? No, not only that—it’s the reverse. Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: forget it, you don’t even need one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening. The Shema that you are reciting anyway in prayer—you recite Shema, there is a commandment of Shema—that itself is Torah study. In short, he empties the commandment of Torah study of all content. There is no commandment at all, basically—no meaning at all. In other words, there is a move here that tries to empty the commandment of Torah study entirely of content. One tells me: “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth day and night”—what would you think? Like people say in our yeshivot: you have to study all the time and not stop, and neglect of Torah, and all those things. Then Rav Ami comes and says: nonsense—one chapter in the morning, one chapter in the evening, play basketball the rest of the time. From where in the Torah do we know the yeshiva high school model? Right? That’s enough, no need for more. Then Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: forget it. What is in between? You understand that there’s a move here that can’t be read indifferently. It is clear that there is some move here intended to empty the commandment of Torah study of content. There is no commandment of Torah study. It’s something theoretical.

Why did Rav Ami need to add a chapter at all? Maybe the one chapter is also within… maybe. I don’t know. But what does Rabbi Yohanan come to add? That is what he comes to add. Maybe he doesn’t disagree; maybe he just comes to sharpen the previous statement: the previous one says “a chapter,” but know that it doesn’t even have to be a new chapter, just Shema. I’m not saying there is necessarily a dispute here, but there is a progression in the sugya. The sugya is systematically emptying the commandment of Torah study of content. And that is very significant. As an obligation, yes. But as Torah study it is a commandment. We’ll see in a moment. I think that is exactly the point of the sugya; we’ll soon see. But for now, that is what is written here. And that is the basis of what we also saw in the Gemara in Nedarim.

Now immediately afterward the Gemara already understands that there is something here that requires a meta-level response—what do we do with such problematic statements? So the Gemara says: and it is forbidden to say this in the presence of the ignorant masses. And Rava said: it is a commandment to say it in the presence of the ignorant masses. So what’s the dispute? Why is it forbidden to say it in the presence of the ignorant masses? Why does the other say it is a commandment? What’s the argument? So, what do you say? That they won’t understand? Lest they think there really is no such commandment. What do you mean they won’t understand? They will understand; it’s not that they won’t understand. If I tell them there is no commandment, they understand there is no commandment. It will lower their motivation. Yes, they won’t study, right. But what’s the problem if they don’t study? It’s actually true, after all. There is no commandment of Torah study except Shema in the morning and evening. So whichever way you look at it, if you’re afraid to say it before the ignorant masses because, God forbid, then they won’t study—but after all that is what you are saying, that really they don’t need to. If you study, excellent, good for you. But if you don’t study, fine, nothing happened. Even preparation for the commandment will suffer—they won’t know how to fulfill things. Maybe, although here I don’t think so, because that’s obvious, so explain to them that in order to fulfill things, of course one has to know—that everyone also understands. But the commandment of Torah study, leave it—you don’t need it.

So indeed the second says: it is a commandment to say it before the ignorant masses. That’s Rava. Rava said it is a commandment to say it before the ignorant masses. Why? To comfort them, so they won’t think they’re sinners, so they’ll understand that what they are doing is also okay. Maybe not the summit of the mountain, but it’s also okay. But what does the first one say? Why is it forbidden to say it before the ignorant masses? Clearly, the first one—who is the first one? Rabbi Yohanan. Why does Rabbi Yohanan say that this thing is forbidden to be said before the ignorant masses? Because it is obvious to him that one needs to study. Otherwise, what is the problem if the ignoramus draws the conclusion and doesn’t study? Because obviously one has to study. So if it is obvious that one has to study, then why is this statement true at all? Forget whether to say it to the ignoramus or not. Why is it true in the first place? Forget the ignoramus—to Torah scholars too, why is it true? You say it’s not true, because you yourself say one does need to study. If the ignoramus won’t study, that’s a problem. But a minute ago you told me no, that’s not a problem. Shema morning and evening—and you emptied the commandment of Torah study entirely of content. And you made a systematic move of emptying it. This wasn’t accidental; it’s not like you got caught with your pants down. There is a whole move here emphasizing that there is no content to the commandment of Torah study. So now all of a sudden you stop: wait, wait, wait—but it is forbidden to say this before the ignorant masses. But this is the truth! The answer is that the commandment of Torah study is indeed empty of content. But Torah study, or the obligation of Torah study, is something else entirely. Obligation—certainly you have to study Torah. The commandment of Torah study? Shema morning and evening; one chapter in the morning, one chapter in the evening; do what you want. The move of emptying the commandment of Torah study of content is meant to glorify Torah study, not diminish it. It comes to say that Torah study is not one of the 613 commandments. People think there is a commandment of Torah study: I study Torah because I want to engage in the commandment of Torah study. That’s nonsense. I study Torah because Torah is the most basic thing there is; it’s not a commandment. If it were just one of the 613 commandments, then being one of the 613 commandments would diminish the matter.

Therefore the move of the Gemara here is to cheapen the commandment of Torah study, not Torah study itself. It comes to say that there are things that are not included in the count of commandments because they are not important enough—going beyond the letter of the law, pious conduct—that’s not basic. Meaning, it’s not an obligation every person must meet. But there are things that are not included in the count of commandments because they are so basic that they do not want to include them in the count of commandments—because that would diminish them. There are things such that if I include them as a commandment, I lose their meaning. It will become just one of the 613 commandments. But I want to preserve the idea that there is something so fundamental here that it should not be considered just another of the 613 commandments—that Torah study outweighs them all. So I tell you: know that Torah study is not a commandment. The commandment of Torah study—if you want to fulfill your obligation, recite Shema morning and evening, and you are totally covered. No problem. As far as the commandment of Torah study goes, you’re covered. I asked then: so what is neglect of Torah? Why are you afraid to say it before an ignoramus? Maybe he won’t study—but no problem, he doesn’t have to. Of course he has to! But he has to not because of the commandment of Torah study; he has to because he has to study Torah. Why? Everything we talked about in the previous class: because Torah study is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, or whatever else it may be. But that is not the commandment of Torah study; that is Torah study. Fine?

And therefore, the Gemara at first completely empties the commandment of Torah study of content, but it does so not in order that we should not study—therefore it is forbidden to say it before the ignoramus. Rather, it does so in order that we understand how important studying is: that it is not the commandment of Torah study, one among the 613 commandments, but an obligation so fundamental that the Torah does not even want to command it—so basic is it. It is a bit similar to what Rabbi Kook writes about character refinement, that Rabbi Hayyim Vital asks—we’ve discussed this in previous years—why doesn’t the Torah command the refinement of character? And then he answers that the Torah speaks to human beings. If someone is not a human being, there is nothing to talk to him about. In other words, if you don’t understand that you need to refine your character, then what is the point of commanding you anything at all? You are not even a subject of command. And Rabbi Kook takes this one step further. Rabbi Kook says that the Torah did not command character refinement because if it had commanded it, that would have cheapened the matter. It would have become a commandment to be humble. This is the story I always tell together with that Rabbi Kook, about that yeshiva joke, right? Someone reached the matchmaking stage—the chapter “A man betroths,” fine? He started going out with girls, and he rejected them all. Okay? The spiritual supervisor came to him and said: listen, my dear fellow, what, not one of them suits you? Are you such a towering sage? Sit and work on your character for a year, and then come back to matchmaking. Fine. He sat, learned ethics with fervor, secluded himself, I don’t know, cried out to the Holy One, blessed be He, worked on his character. After a year he started dating again and again rejected all of them. So the supervisor says to him: tell me, where were you this past year? Where are you? You worked on your character? So he tells him: a year ago, when I was arrogant, no one was suitable for me. Now that I am even humble, all the more so no one is suitable for me. In other words, that’s what someone looks like who “works on character,” because there is section 117 in the Shulchan Arukh saying one has to work on character. He fulfilled the obligation of character work; he checked the box. That’s the commandment of character refinement. That’s what it would look like if it were a commandment. And Rabbi Kook basically says that the moment you command something, in a certain sense you are lowering it.

Yes. That fits somewhat with the famous statement that one who is commanded and does is greater than one who is not commanded and does. I’ll get to that. Right. Except that my interpretation is a certain Leibowitzian one: that if you are not commanded, then this is not service of God but serving yourself. In other words, you are satisfying a self-generated desire; it’s my own drive. There are Tosafot HaRosh and Ritva who say this. They basically say that every commandment has two aspects. There is the aspect of the repair or improvement for which the commandment was intended. It comes to achieve some purpose—I don’t know exactly what—but the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it because He wants us… it will benefit the world, or us, in some way. And besides that, there is obedience to the Holy One, blessed be He. A commandment has two benefits. Now, one who is commanded and does has both benefits. He also answers a command, he is obligated, he obeys the voice of the Holy One, blessed be He, and of course he also did the commandment and produced the repair. But one who is not commanded and does produced the repair, but does not have the dimension of obedience. Therefore, one who is commanded and does is greater than one who is not commanded and does. Fine? One could even radicalize and say: if there is no crowning of the King and no acceptance of sovereignty here, then the source of the command is yourself. Right, that’s what you said before—that’s the Leibowitz line. That takes it one step further, because then what he wants—Leibowitz basically argued that there is no first side, only the second. There is no repair, only obedience to the Holy One, blessed be He. And the whole meaning of the act derives from the fact that you do it because… right, “walk humbly with your God,” “love your fellow as yourself, I am the Lord.” Leibowitz loved those endings. Everyone, you know, the Reali school, “walk humbly,” it’s on the cap of… once there were caps, today probably not. I grew up in Haifa, so I remember them walking around with caps saying “walk humbly,” or “love your fellow as yourself.” They forget the “I am the Lord” at the end, or “walk humbly with the Lord your God.” It’s not mere morality; there is something here that is part of the service of God, and that is very true, by the way. His extremism is not true, but there is a true point here.

In any case, that is the conception. But the conception of Tosafot HaRosh and Ritva is slightly different. It’s in that direction, but different. There are two dimensions, and one who is commanded and does is greater because he has both dimensions, while one who is not commanded has only one. But Rabbi Kook says there are things where the Torah understood that this line of reasoning—the reasoning says that one who is not commanded and does is greater—that reasoning remains true. In those matters, the Torah is careful not to command them, so as not to lower them, so as not to ruin them. Because if it had commanded them, it would in effect have turned us into people acting from command, but in these matters the one who does it not from command is greater, and therefore they took care to leave it outside the realm of command. That’s what he writes. And therefore, for example, character refinement: if you do it, as I said before, because of the command, then no problem—you are serving God in the best possible way—but humble, you are not. Fine? And if you want the person really to be humble, not just a servant of God, there are things that have value in themselves, not only because they are obedience to the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. And sometimes the opposite: sometimes the command ruins it. Sometimes the fact that you do it because you are obligated ruins the value in the thing, as I showed before with that matchmaking joke. Sometimes doing it out of commitment to a formal commandment empties or cripples the true value in the matter. In things of that kind, the Torah is careful not to command, in order to leave all of us as people who fulfill without being commanded, because one who is not commanded is greater—as part of this, in a certain sense.

Where does it come from, then? We know it from various other places. That’s a very interesting question; maybe one day we’ll talk about it. How do you know things if the Torah doesn’t command them? There are several proofs that the Torah has desires that are not commands. And the question is: if there is no command, then how do you know it is the Torah’s will? The Torah has various ways of expressing desires. It can express them in a form that is not command language. “And you shall meditate on it day and night,” for example. After all, it is obvious that the content of that is day and night, not merely morning and evening Shema. But the Sages understand that the commanding dimension in it is Shema morning and evening. Yet it doesn’t say morning and evening; it says day and night. So you understand that the Torah’s will is that you study day and night, but the command is Shema morning and evening. The same with terumah—never mind now—the measure of one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, or one-sixtieth, which is commonly taken as rabbinic; there are several proofs that it is Torah-level. In Maimonides it is fairly clear that it is Torah-level; there is a Gemara in Hullin that raises such a possibility. And I think it is quite clear that the intention is that this is the Torah’s will on the Torah level, even though the exact measure was determined by the Sages. But already the Torah’s will was that one give more than a single grain of wheat, which technically exempts the whole heap. Yet what formally obligates is one grain of wheat. Formally, on the Torah level, one grain of wheat exempts the whole heap for terumah. There are various desires of the Torah that it expresses in ways that are not commands. So I know that the Torah wants it, but it does not command it. It does not want me to do it from command. Sometimes I am supposed to understand it from reason. Regarding character refinement, one can say: listen, a person ought to understand that a proper person is someone whose traits are refined. You’re supposed to understand that yourself even if the Torah says nothing, even not in command form. Fine? You can argue with that, but that is the claim. It is basically the Euthyphro dilemma, right—the question whether things are moral because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them, or He commanded them because they are moral. And if He commanded them because they are moral, then clearly I should be able to understand that even without His command, and one can understand it even without His command, right?

In any event, returning to the Gemara: the Gemara here, it seems to me, is basically trying to say that the commandment of Torah study indeed—its whole point is to empty it of content, to reduce it as much as possible. Forget it—Shema morning and evening is fine. But not in order to belittle Torah study; on the contrary, to glorify Torah study. It is to say that the commandment of Torah study is only a tiny sliver of the obligation of Torah study. The obligation of Torah study means you have to study because you have to understand what study is. So you study. If it were just another commandment, you’d do it like that fellow who “refined his character” because there was a section telling him to. So they do not command it because it is so great. Therefore he says—Rava says—it is a commandment to say this before the ignoramus. Why? Not in order to calm them down, “don’t worry, you too are okay, you say Shema morning and evening.” In my opinion, it’s because of this: one must explain to the ignoramus—know this: you think that the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening because you heard that one fulfills one’s obligation that way. That is your ignorance. The ignoramus doesn’t understand that there are things we must do even though they go beyond the formal threshold of obligation. The formal obligation is Shema morning and evening. So the ignoramus could think, fine, then nothing more is needed. Therefore Rava says it is a commandment to say this before the ignoramus, because why? You don’t tell him merely that Shema morning and evening exempts him—that he knows anyway; ignoramuses know very well what suits them—but explain to him that this is only part of the picture. That is what is required formally, halakhically—that is the commandment of Torah study. But Torah study is something much more fundamental and broad. Explain that to him, and then maybe he won’t remain an ignoramus.

Let’s read the continuation of the Gemara. You’ll see that the whole Gemara revolves around this issue. See: Ben Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Ishmael, asked Rabbi Ishmael—once I said this in synagogue at a late-night session—Ben Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Ishmael, asked Rabbi Ishmael: “Someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah, what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom?” About this, once when I went to teach in Yeroḥam, on Shavuot night, a student asked me this with a smart-aleck tone. He asked: tell me—if he knew the whole Torah, then how does he not know the answer to this question? “Someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah, what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom?” So you don’t know the whole Torah—here’s one question you don’t know. So what are you telling me stories for? Learn more. Ah, so that’s the problem. So: what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom? So you need to go back and study; you don’t know. There’s a question whether the commandment is to study or to know; there’s a Birkat Shmuel in Kiddushin, section 30, that expands on this. In any case, I think I told him the following answer, and I think it’s correct because it also fits very well into the Gemara, even though it sounds a bit pilpulistic.

He learned the whole Torah. Someone who learns the whole Torah knows that Shema morning and evening is enough to fulfill the obligation. That’s what is written in Torah law—in halakhah, right? In formal law, that’s it. He knows all the formal obligations that are imposed on him, so he knows that if he recites Shema morning and evening—no problem—he fulfills the commandment of Torah study. He knows it all. Now what—can one study Greek wisdom the rest of the time? Meaning, not engage in Torah after he already knows everything? Once he knows everything, not much time is left. What? A lot of time was freed up. Exactly. Those very ignoramuses I was talking about before—the ignoramuses who know exactly what is required and what is not. Exactly. The question of free time. So it’s not part of Torah because the Torah he knows, and in Torah—the law, yes, the formalistic Torah—the law is Shema morning and evening. He is right; that’s enough. So what is he asking? He is asking whether there is something beyond Torah. I’ve learned the Torah; the question is whether beyond halakhah—he says beyond Torah—but is there something beyond formal obligations? That’s what his uncle answers him.

He cited this verse to him: “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Fine? He brings the verse “it shall not depart” and “you shall meditate on it day and night,” and then he says: “Go and find an hour that is neither day nor night, and in it study Greek wisdom.” Fine? What is he really saying to him? He says: look, you’re right, the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening, but it says day and night. “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth day and night,” and obviously the plain meaning is that the Torah expects us to study as much as we can, not just Shema morning and evening. That is not the commandment of Torah study; that is an expectation. I don’t know—an expression of will, an expression of direction. It’s not a commandment, but it’s not a commandment not because you’re not obligated; it’s not a commandment because they don’t want us to do it as commanded people, as those standing under command. That is what Rabbi Ishmael answered him. So Rabbi Ishmael answered him: you’re right, you learned all the Torah; now let me teach you what is beyond Torah, what is beyond formal obligations, which is sometimes more important than what is in the formal obligations—that one must study all day, as much as one can. Again, I’ll comment on that in a moment.

Now see how this continues. You see? So this too revolves around the same point. Understand now the connection of the Ben Dama passage to what we saw before. What we saw before is exactly this point: that the commandment of Torah study is empty of content; Shema morning and evening fulfills the obligation; everything is fine. Then we saw, “This thing—it is a commandment to say it before the ignoramus,” and “it is forbidden to say it before the ignoramus.” I said that was a tactical distinction, but both understand the same thing. Both the one who says it is a commandment to say it before the ignoramus and the one who says it is forbidden—both agree, yes, but there is an obligation to study, not because of the commandment of Torah study, but because this is Torah study. And then appears the story of Ben Dama, which revolves exactly around this issue. He comes to clarify: wait, tell me, is there something more besides Shema morning and evening? To that Rabbi Ishmael says: certainly there is—“and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Does Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai disagree with that? It seems that all the later commentators who did not understand it this way really get stuck here in a contradiction between sugyot. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai also agrees with this. There is no dispute here at all. Therefore Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. He agrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. He only completes the picture. He only comes to say what one should tell the ignoramus: don’t stop at “Shema morning and evening is enough”; continue and explain to him, “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Beyond the commandment of Torah study there is the obligation of Torah study.

And now see how beautiful this is. “And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.” If I asked you: with whom does Rabbi Ishmael disagree? What would you tell me? Obviously one would link the end back to the start of the sugya, right? At the beginning you start out by telling me that Shema morning and evening is enough, or one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, right? Then Rabbi Ishmael comes and says: what are you talking about—“and you shall meditate on it day and night”; go find a time that is neither day nor night. You have to study all the time. So he disagrees—what’s the problem? He disagrees with the one who said one line earlier that Shema morning and evening is enough, right? So he disagrees with him. No, not at all. It appears peacefully. Ben Dama asks Rabbi Ishmael, and Rabbi Ishmael answers him, without any connection at all to what came before. It is not against what was written before. And then when they look for whom Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with, they don’t mention Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—that Shema morning and evening is enough—but rather Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. Why not Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai? Because he really does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. He does not disagree. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says what the halakhic definition is: Shema morning and evening is what you need to do. Rabbi Ishmael agrees with that, and Ben Dama agrees with that too. What the nephew asks him is whether that’s all—whether there isn’t anything more. To that Rabbi Ishmael says of course there is something more. But does Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai disagree with that? No.

I said, apparently all the later commentators who didn’t understand it this way really get stuck here in a contradiction between sugyot. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai agrees too; there is no dispute at all. That is why Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. He only completes the picture. He only comes to say what you should tell the ignoramus: don’t stop at “Shema morning and evening is enough”; continue and explain to him “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth”—that beyond the commandment of Torah study there is the obligation of Torah study. And now see how beautiful this is: “And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.” There’s no issue here that one is a Tanna and the other an Amora? What? Rabbi Ishmael is a Tanna. Yes, this does happen in several places. “And you shall live by them,” for example—if I had been there I would have interpreted better than all of them, says Shmuel. Shmuel himself, incidentally, says in two or three places the same thing: if I had been there I would have interpreted it better than all of them, and in the end everyone rules like him.

“And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw Joshua, that the words of Torah were especially beloved to him, as it is said, ‘And his servant Joshua son of Nun, a youth, would not depart from the tent.’ The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are the words of Torah so beloved to you? ‘This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth.’” Stop for a moment. So that is what Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says, fine? And he is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael. Why? Because Rabbi Ishmael said that this is an obligation, and Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says it is neither a commandment nor an obligation but a blessing.

Now notice: Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani does not say “it is not a commandment but a blessing.” He says, “it is neither a commandment nor an obligation but a blessing.” There are three categories, not two. What is the difference between the first two categories, commandment and obligation? Is one a non-obligatory commandment and the other… a commandment where you have an option not to do it? No—that’s how some explain. Last waters—commandment or obligation? Yes, but that’s not actively getting up and doing it. A non-obligatory commandment is… well, non-obligatory. If you did it, you did it. That’s usually how they explain it. Here it’s something else. Because the continuation of the whole sugya is one continuation, all the same thing. “Neither commandment nor obligation but a blessing.” They want to say: there is a commandment, which is the formal halakhah. I don’t care whether you call that commandment or obligation, call it what you want, but one of them is the commandment that is the formal halakhah. Besides that there are obligations not connected to formal halakhah, like Torah study beyond Shema morning and evening. What we’ve seen up until Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani is that Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says what the definition of the commandment is—Shema morning and evening. Then Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with him; he adds what the definition of the obligation is. The obligation is all day, beyond the commandment. Concerning whom does Rabbi Ishmael disagree, says the Gemara? Not with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, because they agree. He states the commandment, and Rabbi Ishmael states the obligation. With whom does he disagree? Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. Because Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says: it’s not a commandment and not an obligation, only a blessing. So he really disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael. You see? The whole Gemara reads along the same axis. It is simply step by step. Once you see it through these lenses, it’s wonderful. Everything is really stitched together, one thing to the next.

And that surely is forbidden to say before the ignoramus… Yes, exactly. That, apparently, one really must not say before the ignoramus—or maybe, you know what? Maybe this, if it is not even an obligation, perhaps one should say before the ignoramus, because in fact there’s no problem if he doesn’t study. Maybe Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani’s conception is really that… you know, fine… And what does “blessing” mean? Why a blessing? They blessed Joshua. The Gemara explains what was said to Joshua. Yes, the Gemara explains: the Holy One, blessed be He, saw that the words were beloved to Joshua, so He blessed him that they should not depart from his mouth. It’s a good wish. But there is here neither obligation in the halakhic sense nor a halakhic commandment. So when I want to find whom Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with, he does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, because Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai only defines the commandment. Rabbi Ishmael expands and explains what one must do beyond the commandment. That is not a dispute; it is only completing the picture. If you want to know whom he disagrees with, I’ll tell you: Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. Because Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says: it is neither a commandment nor an obligation. He disagrees. That’s right, it’s a third thing. Therefore that wording is unusual. What is the difference between obligation and commandment? Where else have we found this? There are obligatory wars and commandment wars, and there too I think people get a bit confused. But these are unusual terms. And the very fact that this appears here only strengthens the point: you see, this entire sugya has to be read this way. This whole sugya deals with the tension in the commandment of Torah study between the commandment—which it completely empties of content: Shema morning and evening, no problem—and the obligation to study Torah, which is day and night. Except for a time that is neither day nor night, all the time one should study. There is a very strong tension here that contrasts the commandment with the obligation. And then Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani comes and says: forget it, it is neither commandment nor obligation; you’re wrong, both sides are wrong, it’s just a blessing. And on this he disagrees: a third opinion already—well, a second opinion, sorry.

If the source for the obligation or the commandment, according to the views that say there is an obligation or commandment, is this verse, then there is a problem with what you said earlier about preparation for commandment, because the verse isn’t just “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” but “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth… so that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it, for then you shall make your way prosperous.” That is the verse. Yes, but I’m not sure the intention is so that you should fulfill the commandments. That is already a certain interpretation. You study Torah in order to be a servant of God, not in order to know what to do. If you are connected to Torah, of course you will also fulfill. What? “For then you shall make your way prosperous.” Yes, certainly. “You shall make your way prosperous” is not at all tied to fulfillment. That’s the plain meaning. You shall make your way prosperous, however much prosperity means. You’ll live well, you’ll succeed in being successful—not in order that you fulfill the commandments. You will succeed because “this book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” therefore “you shall make your way prosperous.” Right. But that means that by virtue of Torah your ways will prosper. That has nothing to do with fulfillment—where? Fulfilling commandments is here… How does that verse go? “This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night, so that you may observe to do…” Ah, “so that you may observe to do”! Now if that’s what you’re asking about—that it seems to refer to fulfilling commandments—and I’m saying that maybe there too I could push that away. “You shall make your way prosperous” is something else. Fine. But that reminds me of something else too; I’ll note that in a second.

See how the Gemara ends—this is the nicest part here. “A teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael”—the same Rabbi Ishmael we already met above, yes? “The words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, and yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” What is this? So it’s not an obligation? It’s not an obligation. You are not here… “obligation” means formal halakhic obligation. Not a formal halakhic obligation, but “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” Usually when people read Rabbi Ishmael here—if they don’t read the Gemara along the axis I’ve suggested—they understand it to mean that it shouldn’t feel like a burden, right? That you shouldn’t think of it as a burden; on the contrary, you should rejoice in it, enjoy it, not think… No. I’m saying this continues the same axis of the sugya. It should not be upon you as an obligation because it really is not an obligation. But don’t think that because it’s not an obligation, you may exempt yourself from it. You may not. Because it is a meta-halakhic obligation, not a halakhic obligation. And that is how the sugya concludes. If every section in the sugya deals with this… then reading it this way is a beautiful explanation of the sugya.

But Rabbi Ishmael said it’s not a commandment but an obligation. Yes. Not that it’s not an obligation. No. He says: “They should not be upon you as an obligation, and yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” He uses the term obligation, according to the explanation I’m suggesting, to mean halakhic obligation. Or commandment. Yes, yes. I said above that in the words of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Nahmani—I’m not sure which is which, obligation and commandment. The meta-halakhic or the halakhic? Because in the Gemara usually “obligation” means halakhic obligation, and “commandment” means something nice, like in the street, right? “I did a mitzvah today,” meaning I did something good. That’s an observation from someone a bit academic.

Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai lived in a generation of persecution. Both are after the period of persecution. Rabbi Yehoshua bar Nahmani comes from a Judaism that sat for generations, many generations, in tranquility in Babylonia. Very true. That’s the context. In any event, I’ll just say this briefly because I do want to finish this today. In the Gemara in Berakhot, many later authorities ask—and there are whole elaborate discussions about this—it does a full 180-degree switch between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. The Gemara here—I won’t read all of it now, but look. Right—“and you shall gather your grain.” “Our Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—since it says, ‘This book of Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ could one think these words are to be taken literally? That one must study all the time? Therefore Scripture says, ‘And you shall gather your grain’—conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world. These are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.” You don’t need to study all the time. You can work a bit too, engage in worldly life. No need to be hysterical about Torah study. And who responds to him? Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: can a man plow in plowing season, sow in sowing season… what will become of Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others, and so on. In short, that’s the imperialist conception. So that’s a full 180-degree switch. In the Gemara in Menachot, Rabbi Ishmael says: “Go and find an hour that is neither day nor night.” And Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: forget it, Shema morning and evening is good enough. And here in the Gemara it is exactly the opposite. Rabbi Ishmael says: no problem, you can do other things too, study a bit, work a bit, everything is fine. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: forget it, one may not even work; one has to study all the time. The most extreme approach possible—the Gemara later says many tried it and did not succeed. A direct contradiction.

According to what I am saying, this is neither a contradiction nor direct, and there is no need for some big elaborate construction to resolve it. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Ishmael do not disagree at all. There is no disagreement between them, neither in the Gemara in Menachot nor in the Gemara in Berakhot. In Menachot, Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai only sets the definition of the commandment: Shema morning and evening. Then Rabbi Ishmael completes the picture—Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai agrees there too—and says: true, but there is a general obligation not by virtue of commandment. So Rabbi Ishmael says: look, there is a general obligation, fine, but one also has to earn a living. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says—they disagree there on the practical question of how one ought to conduct oneself, not on the definitions of Torah study. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says no, what are you talking about? One has to study all the time in fulfillment of this meta-halakhic obligation. That doesn’t contradict what he said there. Even at the expense of work. And the Holy One, blessed be He, will help; “strangers will stand and pasture your flocks.” Fine? It’s a dispute about practical conduct, not at all about the definitions of the commandment of Torah study. And there is no contradiction between the sugyot if you read them this way. It’s simple. You can erase all the elaborate systems written about it. It’s just, in my opinion, a misunderstanding of the sugya in Menachot.

Now one last thing, which I no longer really have time to get into: Rashi at the beginning of parashat Bechukotai—someone reminded me of it outside. Allow me one more minute. Rashi at the start of parashat Bechukotai: “that you should toil in Torah,” famous Rashi. “If you walk in My statutes.” Right? “If you walk in My statutes, and keep My commandments, and do them.” The plain meaning of the verse—“If you walk in My statutes, and keep My commandments, and do them”—what happened here? It repeats itself three times. “If you walk in My statutes,” “and keep My commandments,” “and do them.” It’s all the same thing. If you keep commandments, why say it three times? So Rashi says—well, he brings from the Sages—“If you walk in My statutes”—could this mean fulfillment of the commandments? When it says “and keep My commandments,” fulfillment of commandments is already stated. So what is “if you walk in My statutes”? How then do I fulfill “if you walk in My statutes”? That you should toil in Torah. What does that mean? How do you understand it? No, I’m returning now to “if you walk in My statutes” meaning “that you should toil in Torah.” It means: study Torah for the sake of Torah itself, right? “And keep My commandments” means to study in order to know what to do. “If you walk in My statutes” means to study for the sake of toiling in Torah—for the sake of Torah toil, not in order to know what to do. “And do them” means the actual performance. There is study, there is study in order to do, and there is the actual doing. Three things. Fine?

Look at Rashi; also Rashi later on “and keep My commandments”—“be toiling in Torah in order to observe and fulfill, as it is said, ‘and you shall learn them and keep to do them.’” Even “My commandments,” meaning “if you walk in My statutes,” is toiling in Torah. “And keep My commandments” is: be toiling in Torah in order to observe and fulfill—which is the learning of women. Fine? And “and do them” is the actual performance. That is exactly these three things.

I’ll just finish with this—I remembered because I mentioned women. When we say that women are exempt from Torah study, it creates a meaningless atmosphere. Shema morning and evening—what, they don’t fulfill the commandment of Torah study? But what difference does it make? We too are exempt, in practice, from the commandment of Torah study, because Shema morning and evening fulfills the obligation in any case. Women are not exempt from the obligation of Torah study, because that has nothing to do with the commandment at all. Anyone who understands what Torah is needs to study Torah and engage in it as much as he can. It doesn’t matter whether he is commanded or not commanded; all these stories are completely irrelevant. They concern the commandment of Torah study. And I think that is why women recite the Torah blessing. The blessing is over that part of Torah, not over Shema morning and evening. One does not recite the Torah blessing over that. The Torah blessing is praise for the meaning of what Torah is. And anyone who understands what Torah is recites the Torah blessing; it is praise for the fact that we received it. And that is the meaning of the Torah blessing—it is a blessing of praise. Fine? It’s not about Shema. What do you mean? In the name of Rabbi Lichtenstein, yes. Okay.

Are women obligated in Shema or not? In Shema as a formal obligatory commandment. But as the obligation of Torah study? No. As the obligation of Torah study, they are exempt, because that is the commandment of Torah study. Shema is not itself the obligation of Torah study; you can fulfill Torah study by reciting Shema, but women are exempt—they are exempt from that dimension. Yes, but that has nothing to do with Torah study, and everything we do in Torah study is not really the commandment of Torah study at all, and from that women are not exempt. They are obligated exactly like we are.