Q&A: On Text and Contextualism — The Death of the Reader
On Text and Contextualism — The Death of the Reader
Question
To Rabbi Michi, greetings and blessings,
I would like to consult with you about an issue that is troubling me at the moment. I am about to begin writing my thesis in political thought, a thesis that will deal with the development of the movement called “conservatism” and the sub-movement called “new conservatism.” Now, from a methodological standpoint, it is very commonly assumed that ideas are not detached from the historical soil on which they grew. Therefore, so the claim goes, one cannot understand a thinker’s philosophy at all without investigating and tracing what happened to him, understanding his period and the rest of the historical baggage. Yet it seems that this is not philosophical work. It is historical work whose assumptions are explicitly relativistic, holding that philosophy does not stand on its own but is always conditioned by time and place. Some would call this “the sociology of knowledge.”
What is your opinion of this position? Can one justify a method that holds that understanding the text is accessible to us even without descending into the historical details? Can one say that there are eternal philosophical questions with which human beings have occupied themselves throughout the generations, so that Aristotle really did disagree with Mill, and Plato with Tocqueville? Or is that a clear anachronism?
From here, of course, we come to ask whether there should be any connection between the position we hold in academia and the position we adopt when approaching sacred study. Ostensibly, the traditional talmudic scholar is occupied with the substance of Jewish laws and their ramifications, and does not engage in historical research for the sake of halakhic give-and-take. Layered Talmud study—even if it may broaden the mind and excite the academic soul—has not found a place among classic yeshiva learners. How do you see this?
Thank you, and Sabbath peace,
Answer
Hello A.,
Your question touches on the purpose of study. If the purpose is to understand what the author intended, then it makes sense to make use of context. But if your aim is to clarify the issue in itself (what the correct position is, and what the arguments are for and against each position), then context can provide illumination and ideas, but it is not essential. In my article on hermeneutics I dealt with this point, and argued that this is why yeshiva study does not require context, and from its perspective Rabbi Akiva Eger disagrees with Rabbi Akiva (and perhaps also with Vashti and Ahasuerus, according to the pilpulists):
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8-%D7%9C%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%99%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%98%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A7/
Though today I’m not really there anymore (that is, I no longer hold the position I presented there).
I do not think there can be a difference between a position you hold in academia and a position you hold outside it. If it is your position, then it is your position. Except that in academia you are not supposed to have a position. You are supposed to survey the various positions and sides. Positions exist only outside academia (or at least that is how it should be). I wrote about this in the controversy in Makor Rishon surrounding Avinoam Rosenak and his opponents at the Hebrew University (the philological-historical approach). You should read it:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%95%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%A2/
All this is connected to postmodernism, which sees every position as an expression of the influences and tendencies around it, and from this it follows that no one really disagrees with anyone else (because if the other person were in his situation, he would think the same way). This is a strange inversion of a relativist approach that turns out to be very objectivist דווקא, because in every situation there is only one possible position.
There is much more to elaborate on here, but this is not the place.
Discussion on Answer
I answered all of that. I don’t understand what wasn’t clear. An academic is supposed to analyze the views of different thinkers. That can be done from their content, and it can be done using context. Clearly, systematic, comprehensive, large-scale research will require both of those aspects. But none of this has anything to do with adopting a position. An academic is not supposed to have a position (in his academic capacity). And that is exactly the content of my article about Rosenak. Or else I really am not understanding your point.
By the way, that column does not take on those departments, but rather Rosenak’s approach and that of his colleagues. The column supports the objective approach (philological-historical), and that is what I wrote to you here.
Thank you for your quick reply.
I remembered your article the moment I clicked “Send,” and indeed I rushed to read it. The article answers the question of the characteristics of yeshiva study and the way it resembles and differs from historical research.
Still, I am asking first about the academic-methodological mode in itself—after all, this is not philosophical work! When the Rabbi approaches the writings of Kant, does he first study Königsberg and its landscapes? Surely reason is universal, and things should be understood as they are. Is there room for concern that one cannot understand the thinker without conducting historical-philological research into his use of words and the nature of the transformations of his ideas through the generations?
I of course remember the Rosenak column as well, but I think that issue is only close to our topic and does not touch the core of the matter itself. The Rosenak issue is useful for taking on the sociology and gender-studies departments, insofar as they do not analyze and classify, edit and organize, but are engaged in producing ideological pamphlets per se (at least according to the accepted stereotype…). But if we still believe in the possibility of philosophy, as the presentation of arguments that carry logic and the pitting of them against one another, comparing systems of thought and raising points of similarity and difference, then that is certainly a legitimate task for the philosopher in academia. And so the question emerges again: is there room only for the historical method, or also for substantive study that discusses positions on their own merits? And assuming there is room for such analysis, what are the basic assumptions on which it stands? How can one ground a position that sees the philosopher as a person whose ideas managed to rise above his time and place and touch eternity?
What do you think about that?