There are two aspects: the aspect of causality (the cosmological argument) and the aspect of complexity (the physico-theological argument).
I was talking about the aspect of complexity: just as regarding the world one should ask who designed it, since it is complex, so too regarding God one should ask who designed Him, since He is complex. And instead of stopping after God (with His existence) and saying God does not need a designer (so as not to arrive at regress), let us stop before God (without Him) and say that the world does not need a designer.
What does God add to the equation that actually solves anything for me?

But even from the standpoint of causality one could say that there is a first "something" before the Big Bang, which is first in the chain at whose end the world was created.
And here too there is no reason to prefer God as giving a reason for why there is a primordial "something," because God Himself also needs a cause, and it is preferable to stop before God (without Him) and begin only with a first non-intelligent being.

Thank you very much.

By the way, I knew this was a question that keeps coming up, but I think the way the question is formulated now, and what it means, is different.

It has exactly the same meaning, and this very formulation came up here yesterday or the day before (the difference between existence and complexity). The complexity in the world, in our experience, requires an assembler, whereas God, who is not within our experience, does not.
The first entity that starts the chain is God Himself. I said nothing about it beyond that. So proposing that this is some other entity is roughly like saying that the one who wrote Macbeth was not Shakespeare but his cousin, who was also called Shakespeare.
The question whether He is an intelligent being or not is a different question, and that too has been asked here many times. I answered that a non-intelligent being (a machine) itself requires a creator/assembler, and therefore it is more reasonable that we are speaking of an intelligent being. All the more so since revelation and the moral argument convey to us the information that He is indeed intelligent.

Regarding complexity: presumably things not within our experience are also like the things within our experience, and there is no reason to assume they are not like that.
In addition, why is it that when something is not within our experience, we no longer need an assembler for it? After all, the reason we want every complex thing to have an assembler is that it makes sense that a complex thing would have an assembler. So what difference does it make whether it is within our experience or not?

And regarding causality: the first being I meant is a kind of primeval matter from which everything began (without God). It is better to say that it is the first cause rather than God, and it answers the question of first cause no less than God does. Not as an assembler, but as a cause—God does not solve more than the primeval being does.

My question is still bothering me. Forgive me. I would be glad if someone, and especially the Rabbi, could answer.

For some reason, I missed this. Sorry.

If you assume that every complex thing needs an assembler, you arrive at an infinite regress. The most reasonable way out is to assume that there is something (probably not of the type found in our experience) that does not need an assembler.

As for causality, I explained that the two proofs join together. From the standpoint of the cosmological proof, there may perhaps be room to speak of a mechanical creator, although even there that is less likely, because such a creature is probably not self-caused.

Regarding complexity, the Rabbi basically answered that apparently the complex thing that does not need an assembler is not within our experience.
And it is preferable to add an entity that is not within our experience, and it is the first complex thing with no assembler, rather than prefer not to add an entity and say that the universe itself is the complex thing that has no assembler, just because it is within our experience and we know that usually things within our experience have an assembler.
That makes sense.
But the Rabbi did not answer "why," because presumably things not within our experience are also like things within our experience, and there is no reason to assume otherwise.
Also, the reasoning that a complex thing requires an assembler is logical reasoning that does not depend on experience, so it does not matter whether the complex thing is within our experience or not—in any case it would require an assembler!

The same thing regarding causality: the Rabbi basically answered that apparently the first cause is not a mechanical creature, because it is less likely that such a creature would be self-caused.

The Rabbi is basically saying that it is preferable to add an intelligent entity (which is a drawback according to Ockham’s razor, since it adds intelligence to it) because it is simpler for an intelligent being to be self-caused than to add a non-intelligent entity that is not likely to be self-caused. Makes sense.
But the Rabbi did not explain "why" it is less likely for a non-intelligent being to be self-caused than for an intelligent being to be self-caused.

The first was explained. The second seems self-evident to me, but in any case I explained that it fits together with the tradition from Sinai.

Forgive me, Rabbi, I did not understand. In my opinion the Rabbi did not answer the question.
*Why* is it likely that what does not need an assembler is not of the type found in our experience, if there is no reason to assume it is different from the type found in our experience?
Why assume that the type not within our experience is different from the type within our experience, and on that basis conclude that there is another entity that assembled everything and does not need an assembler, instead of saying that the world itself does not need an assembler?
And besides, what difference does it make whether it is within our experience or not? The fact that something complex needs an assembler follows from logic, not from experience.

In addition, I did not understand *why* an intelligent being is more plausible, and self-evidently so, as being self-caused than a non-intelligent being. Surely the Rabbi does not mean that God created Himself, and if not, what does that have to do with His intelligence?

I’m sorry. Everything was explained. There is no point repeating it again and again.

The Rabbi answered regarding complexity that the assembler of the complex thing is apparently not of the type found in our experience,
and did not explain why; and similarly regarding causality, the Rabbi answered that a mechanical being is apparently not self-caused, and did not explain why.

No, that is not what I answered. My claim is that that which is not within our experience is not necessarily complex. And even if it is, it does not need an assembler. Because if it does, we are driven into an infinite regress. And if something has to be made an exception to the rule that a complex thing needs an assembler, it is preferable to make the exception for what is not within our experience.
A machine is not its own cause. I do not see what I need to add here.